Robert Wiseman Dairies Plc and Scottish Pride Holdings
Plc: A report on the proposed merger
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Summary
This inquiry concerns the poss-ible acquisition of Scottish Pride Holdings
plc (Scottish Pride) by Robert Wiseman Dairies plc (Wiseman). Our terms
of reference, dated 30 August 1996, are set out in Appendix 1.1.
Scottish Pride was formed in 1994 to take over the milk processing activities
of the former Scottish Milk Mar-keting Board (SMMB) as part of the dereg-ulation
of the raw milk industry. It pro-duces fresh processed milk and cream
(most of its output of which comes from a single large dairy at Govan
in Glasgow), ultra-heat treated (UHT) milk and cream, and cheese. The
company made a pre-tax loss of £4 million in 1995/96 on turnover
of £138 million. Its sales have been falling and its financial position
is weak.
Wiseman, originally a small family business, has expanded rapidly both
by acquisition and organic growth and was floated on the Stock Exchange
in 1994. Its principal activity is the supply of fresh processed milk
and cream from dairies at Bellshill (near Glasgow), Aberdeen and Manchester
and a smaller, more specialized plant at East Kilbride.
Wiseman has not made a bid for Scottish Pride but told us that it wanted
to acquire the business as a going concern if cleared to do so. On 11
November 1996 Scottish Pride announced that it was at an advanced stage
of negotiations for the sale of its UHT and cheese businesses to Scottish
Milk Limited (Scottish Milk), the farmers' co-operative which is the successor
to SMMB's raw milk supply operations. Wiseman remains interested in acquiring
Scottish Pride's fresh milk processing business and indeed at the time
we reported it was still possible that it might be able to acquire the
whole company.
Wiseman and Scottish Pride together account for about 5 per cent of
all raw milk bought by processors, and for 10 per cent of wholesale sales
of fresh processed milk, in the UK. However, in Scotland they account
for nearly half of raw milk purchases by processors and nearly 80 per
cent of wholesale sales of fresh processed milk. It was therefore crucial
for our analysis of the merger's effects on competition to assess whether
the markets for raw milk and fresh processed milk in Scotland are separate
from those in the rest of the UK.
As regards raw milk, the evidence indicated that the market was markedly
less regional than in 1992 (the date of the MMC's last inquiry into this
industry). Prices throughout Great Britain are generally set by reference
to the prices of Milk Marque Limited (Milk Marque), the successor to the
raw milk supply operations of the England and Wales MMB. There is also
sufficient scope for raw milk to be traded between southern Scotland and
northern England to ensure that the market in Scotland is part of a continuous
chain of substitution linking it with the market in England.
As regards fresh processed milk, the market in Scotland has become less
distinct from that in England and Wales, most markedly in the supermarket
sector where the price differen-tial which existed in 1992 has now disappeared.
There is still relatively little trade between Scotland and the rest of
Great Britain, however, and there is some evidence to indicate that higher
wholesale prices can be charged to customers other than supermarkets in
Scotland because transport costs restrict the sourcing of supplies from
English-based dairies. The market therefore still has some regional characteristics.
Our assessment of the merger's effects on the public interest led us
to the view that it was unlikely that Wiseman would be able to exercise
monopsony power in the raw milk market. We also considered that, in the
market for fresh processed milk, the UK-based national super-market groups
would prevent an enlarged Wiseman from exerting any dominance in that
sector of the market. The merger would, however, harm competition in the
supply to other customers in Scotland and could be expected to lead to
higher wholesale prices-and, in many instances, higher retail prices-than
otherwise. We judged that the merger's effects on efficiency and employment
did not offset this detriment to competition and therefore concluded that
the merger was against the public interest.
The best solution to this competition problem would be to maintain two
substantial fresh milk processors in Scotland, and we therefore considered
whether to recommend that the merger should be prohibited. We do not believe
Scottish Pride can continue as an independent company, however, and after
examining the position in some detail we were forced to conclude that
the prospects of Scottish Pride finding an alter-native buyer for its
fresh processed milk business were remote. This in part reflects the fact
that no other buyer could, like Wiseman, close the Govan plant and transfer
production to other existing plants: another buyer would have to spend
further substantial sums, either on Govan or on building a new plant.
Prohibition of the merger would therefore be likely to cause disruption
in the supply of a perishable product sold on a daily basis, and most
of Scottish Pride's customers would probably switch in any event to Wiseman.
We also rejected the idea that Wiseman might divest one or more plants
as practicable remedies. This is principally because Wiseman's rationale
for the merger is to transfer all production from Govan to its plants
at Bellshill, Aberdeen and Manchester.
To impose fair and effective price controls on Wiseman would be difficult
and would tend to rigidify the current price structure. This could well
prevent natural market development and cannot in our view be justified.
Instead we recommend that Wiseman should submit regular audited reports
to the Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT) on its prices to the various
cate-gories of customer in Scotland. In the light of the evidence presented
to us, we regard this as practical and involving limited administration,
but it would give the DGFT early warning of any attempt by Wiseman to
abuse its market position in relation to customers other than national
supermarket groups. We believe that the possibility of a monopoly reference,
with the attendant risks of divestment of one or more of Wiseman's Scottish
plants, would make this reporting regime an effective deterrent against
Wiseman attempting to force up prices. We also recommend that Wiseman
should undertake not to acquire any other supplier of fresh processed
milk in Scotland without the DGFT's prior consent.
Full text
Contents
|
Part I
|
Summary and Conclusions
|
| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
Conclusions |
Part II
|
Background and evidence
|
| Chapter
3 |
The companies concerned and the acquisition |
| Chapter
4 |
The supply of milk |
| Chapter
5 |
Views of third parties |
| Chapter
6 |
Views of the main parties |
| |
List of signatories |
Appendices
|
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference and background |
| 3.1 |
Wiseman: profit and loss accounts |
| 3.2 |
Wiseman: balance sheets |
| 3.3 |
Wiseman: calculation of net operating assets |
| 3.4 |
Scottish Pride: profit and loss accounts |
| 3.5 |
Scottish Pride: balance sheets |
| 3.6 |
Scottish Pride: calculation of net operating assets |
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