NV Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia and enterprises belonging
to Milupa AG: A report on the merger situation
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Summary
On 28 March 1996 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry required
us (see Appendix 1.1) to investigate and report on the question whether
the acquisition by NV Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia (NV Nutricia) of the
assets of Milupa AG's German business, and Milupa AG's subsidiary companies
elsewhere including Milupa Ltd (Milupa), is a merger situation qualifying
for investigation and if so whether that situation may be expected to
operate against the public interest. We have concluded that the acquisition
has created a merger situation qualifying for investigation.
NV Nutricia is the parent company of Nutricia Holdings Ltd (Nutricia),
the UK holding company of Cow & Gate Nutricia Ltd (CGN) and SHS Holdings
Ltd (SHS). The activities of CGN and SHS (through its operating company
SHS International Ltd) include the supply of enteral clinical nutrition
(ECN) products. CGN also supplies baby drinks, baby meals and baby milk
products. Milupa's activities in the UK overlap with Nutricia's in the
supply of all these products.
ECN products
The overlap of ECN products which both CGN/SHS and Milupa supply is
very limited. The MMC in their recent report on the Nutricia/Valio merger
found that the market was com-petitive even after the merger between NV
Nutricia and Milupa AG. The Group of members responsible for this present
inquiry reviewed that finding and agreed that the market is com-petitive.
We do not consider that the merger may be expected to have effects adverse
to the public interest in the market for ECN products.
Baby drinks
Nor do we consider that the merger may be expected to have effects adverse
to the public interest in the market for baby drinks, given the competition
faced by CGN/Milupa from other large manufacturers and strong own-label
suppliers, the ready availability of substi-tutes for baby drinks and
the ease of entry for existing soft drink manufacturers.
Baby meals
We have treated manufactured baby meals, which may be wet or dry, as
one market worth £84 million at trade level. CGN (15 per cent) and
Milupa (13 per cent) together supplied about 28 per cent of baby meals
in the UK in 1995. Heinz/Farley was the market leader with some 53 per
cent. The own-label sector, led by Boots The Chemists Ltd (Boots), had
a 13 per cent share.
There have been changes in the structure of the market in recent years.
In 1994 H J Heinz Company Limited (Heinz) acquired Farley Health Products
Limited (Farley) and CGN acquired Robinsons. In addition several new branded
and own-label suppliers have entered, indicating that this growing market
is attractive to new-comers. The technology and equipment for wet and
dry meals are different, but in both cases they are similar to those used
to produce other food products, suggesting that for some food manufac-turers
entry costs would be relatively low.
We take the view that there are virtually no constraints on entry to
the market for baby meals by established food manufacturers. There is
a strong own-label sector led by Boots, and some branded entry, albeit
in niche sectors. The principal retailers of baby meals, ie Boots and
the major supermarkets, are powerful purchasers. Parents can switch to
home-prepared meals if manufactured products become unduly expensive.
We do not consider that the merger may be expected to have effects adverse
to the public interest in the market for baby meals.
Baby milks
Baby milks are manufactured alternatives to breast-milk, and are used
to supplement or replace breast-feeding for babies up to about two years
old. There are two main types of baby milk: infant milk formula (IMF)
and follow-on milk (FoM). Most manufacturers also supply baby soya milk.
IMF products account for 82 per cent of trade sales and FoM for 12 per
cent.
The composition, labelling, promotion and advertising of IMF and the
com-position and labelling of FoM are regulated. There is no advertising
of IMF direct to the consumer. Promotion of IMF to the general public
through special displays or free or reduced price samples is prohibited.
Parents' decisions about which brand to use tend to be based on percep-tions
about product quality rather than price, and they are usually advised
not to switch brands unless there is a feeding problem, reinforcing strong
brand loyalty. Thus there is limited price sensitivity at consumer level.
The market for baby milks, with trade sales of £131 million in
1995, has two sectors-the supply to retailers amounting to two-thirds
of total supply, and the supply to the Welfare Food Scheme (WFS) and the
National Health Service (NHS) taking the remaining one-third of total
supply.
Baby milks are sold through a wide range of retail outlets, including
large super-market chains and other grocers, chemist chains and independent
chemists. CGN's five largest retail customers, Boots, Tesco PLC (Tesco),
J Sainsbury plc (Sainsbury), ASDA Stores Ltd (ASDA) and Safeway Stores
plc (Safeway) accounted for half its sales to the retail sector in 1995.
The National Health Service Supplies Agency (NHSSA) negotiates with
each supplier a contract price for supplies to the WFS/NHS, making it
by far the largest purchaser of baby milks. Most of these supplies are
distributed through the WFS, the great majority in exchange for tokens
which are supplied free of charge to families on Income Support. There
are also some sales, commonly at half the normal retail price, to families
receiving Family Credit (less than 6 per cent of WFS supplies in England).
In addition there are some retail sales (with a modest mark-up) through
NHS clinics and other welfare food distribution centres (WFDCs) estimated
at up to £11 million in 1995.
The NHSSA has over the last three years refused price increases by suppliers
of baby milks in the absence of a full cost breakdown for IMF. Thus the
price discount for the WFS/NHS compared with prices paid by wholesalers
and retailers has been increasing.
The market for baby milks was already highly concentrated before the
merger with the two market leaders, SMA Nutrition (SMA) with 44.4 per
cent and CGN with 37.5 per cent, holding a com-bined share of 81.9 per
cent. Other suppliers are Heinz/Farley (8.9 per cent), Milupa (7.6 per
cent) and Boots and Sainsbury's with own-label products (1.7 per cent).
The merger will have the effect of increasing the combined market share
of SMA and CGN/Milupa to 89.5 per cent. While there has been market entry
by Heinz, Boots and Sainsbury in the past four years, we consider that
further significant entry into the market for baby milks is unlikely over
the next few years, but that entry conditions have not been changed very
much by the merger.
In our view, the possible effects of the merger in the market for baby
milks are likely to fall under three categories:
(a) the continuation of the Milupa brand in the UK thereby preserving
parents' choice;
(b) a reduction in the diversity of research, resulting in less innovation;
and
(c) an increase in prices of Milupa and/or CGN baby milks at a faster
rate than would be expected without the merger.
As to (a) above, without the merger the continuation of the Milupa brand
in the UK would have been in doubt over the longer term because of Milupa's
continuing losses despite a subsidy from its parent company. The vulnerability
of the brand in the UK derived from two principal sources: Milupa AG's
excessive manufacturing costs in Germany (made worse by unfavourable exchange
rates), and relatively high marketing and sales costs associated with
its UK baby milk and baby meal operations. Nutricia plans to deal with
both problems, the first by transferring the manufacture of Milupa's baby
milks to an enhanced manufacturing facility in Ireland, and the second
by integrating CGN's and Milupa's marketing and sales operations in the
UK. Given the synergies, the merger appears to provide a way of overcoming
Milupa's cost disadvantages and thus reducing the vulnerability of the
brand.
Nutricia's expressed intentions are to support the Milupa brand and
we believe there are strong commercial arguments for Nutricia doing so.
We therefore expect the merger to provide a benefit to the public interest
by helping to secure the viability of the Milupa brand of baby milks in
the UK, a brand valued by parents.
Regarding (b) above, the risk of a reduction in the diversity of research,
leading to less innovation, is balanced by the likelihood of more effective
research. We do not expect effects adverse to the public interest in this
area.
As regards (c) above, we consider that in the retail sector the underlying
weakness of Milupa prior to the merger because of its excessive cost structure
was likely, without the merger, to require price increases if viability
and continuity of the brand were to be ensured. The merger, which overcomes
the excessive cost problems, reduces these pressures for price increases.
Nutricia will be attempting to build Milupa's reputation as a premium
brand, and increases in Milupa prices at a rate faster than appears justifiable
to the trade (which consists primarily of large, powerful purchasers)
risks being counter-productive. Nutricia's ability to extract price increases
for the CGN products is unlikely to be enhanced by the merger, with SMA
continuing as market leader and Heinz (number 3 in the market) apparently
adopting an aggressive marketing stance. Boots' and Sainsbury's own-label
products will continue to put competitive price and shelf-space pressures
on Nutricia's products in their stores. Compara-tively low prices in WFS/NHS
clinics, particularly for Milupa's premium brand, will also exert some
downward pressure on retail prices.
Turning to the WFS/NHS sector, we note that the NHSSA is the largest
and most powerful purchaser of baby milks. While the Department of Health
(DoH) has expressed concern at Milupa falling under the control of Nutricia,
we do not feel that the merger is likely to lead to faster increases in
prices. Nutricia is unlikely to risk lasting damage to either the CGN
or the Milupa brand by withdrawing from the WFS/NHS sector. The substantial
bargaining power of the NHSSA in its relations with the baby milk suppliers
has been demonstrated by its holding baby milk prices constant over the
last three years. This bargaining power is not reduced by the merger.
Although it may be reluctant to weaken its policy of providing choice
to welfare customers, the NHSSA has the sanction of dropping any particular
supplier whose price demands seem unreasonable. Anticipated problems of
supplies of a particular brand could be offset by building up temporary
stocks from other suppliers, admittedly at some cost. The NHSSA also has
the ultimate sanction of purchasing its own generic supplies from international
suppliers on tender. This position is not changed by the merger. As in
the retail sector, Milupa's under-lying weakness prior to the merger because
of its excessive cost structure was likely, without the merger, to require
price increases in the WFS/NHS sector if viability and continuity of the
brand were to be ensured. The merger should not lead to any more rapid
increase in Milupa prices to the NHSSA than under an alternative scenario.
We take the view that in both the retail and WFS/NHS sectors of the
market for baby milks the merger will be unlikely to have adverse effects
on prices.
We conclude that the merger may be expected not to operate against the
public interest. One member of the Group, Professor Sam Eilon, disagrees;
his views are set out in a note of dissent following Chapter 2.
This report concerns the effects of the merger between NV Nutricia and
Milupa AG. The UK market for baby milks was already highly concentrated
before the merger and had attracted the attention of the Director General
of Fair Trading (DGFT). He decided in 1995 not to make a monopoly reference
to the MMC at that time, but informed the principal companies that he
would be keeping the matter under review. It is therefore likely that
any action by the market leaders (SMA and Nutricia) to raise prices unjustifiably
will quickly be brought to his attention.
Full text
Contents
|
Part I
|
Summary and Conclusions
|
| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
Conclusions |
| |
Note of dissent |
Part II
|
Background and evidence
|
| Chapter
3 |
The companies involved in the acquisition |
| Chapter
4 |
The relevant markets |
| Chapter
5 |
Views of Nutricia |
| Chapter
6 |
Views of third parties |
| |
List of signatories |
Appendices
|
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
Terms of reference and conduct of the inquiry |
| 1.2 |
Extract from the MMC's Nutricia/Valio merger report |
| 3.1 |
NV Nutricia: summarized group profit and loss information,
1991 to 1995 |
| 3.2 |
Milupa AG: summarized group profit and loss information,
1990 to 1994 |
| 4.1 |
Overlap in the ECN market between Milupa and Nutricia |
| 4.2 |
The Infant Formula and Follow-on Formula Regulations
1995 |
| 4.3 |
European market sizes and shares of the two largest suppliers,
1994 |
| Glossary |
|
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