Bond Helicopters Ltd and British International Helicopters
Ltd: A report on the merger situation
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Summary
On 9 June 1992 we were asked (see Appendix 1.1) to investigate the proposed
acquisition by Bond Helicopters Ltd (Bond) of the North Sea helicopter
business of British International Helicopters Ltd (BIH). BIH was placed
in administration on 12 December 1991 following the death of Mr Robert
Maxwell whose private interests had acquired the company in 1986. The
Administrators are trying to sell the company's businesses as going concerns
and Bond's bid for the North Sea helicopter business and some other minor
interests was one of a number received. A bid by Bristow Helicopters Ltd
(Bristow), also referred to this Commission, was abandoned during our
inquiry and the reference laid aside. Two other bids remain under consideration.
Helicopters are used in the North Sea primarily for the transport of
personnel to and from the oil and gas fields. In 1991 the turnover of
United Kingdom sector helicopter services was £168 million. These
services were provided by three companies: Bristow, with 51 per cent of
the market, Bond, with 29 per cent and BIH, with 20 per cent. Over recent
years BIH's share of the market has declined, mainly in favour of Bond.
The proposed merger would thus result in a market supplied by only two
companies, each with about half the market.
Demand for helicopter services is expected to remain stable or to decline
over the next few years. Business is mainly acquired through contracts
but there is a small amount of `ad hoc' business. The customers, the oil
and gas companies, conduct their own appraisals of the helicopter operators
and are well informed about prices, costs and the availability of helicopters.
Safety, maintenance and operating standards are laid down by the Civil
Aviation Authority (CAA) and some companies have their own additional
requirements. We were told that competition is mainly on price.
Bond argued that the merger would have no adverse effects on competition
and that, by creating two firms of more equal size, it would intensify
competition; BIH had not for some time been a competitive force; the oil
and gas companies had the bargaining power to ensure that prices were
kept under control after the proposed acquisition and were able, if dissatisfied,
to operate their own services or to encourage new entry to the market.
We noted, however, that most oil and gas companies attached importance
to BIH's presence in the market and, while few were concerned that standards
of safety or service would fall, almost all were concerned about the effect
of the proposed acquisition on prices.
We consider that in this mature and transparent market, if only two
operators are left, with roughly equal market shares, neither Bond nor
Bristow will compete strongly to detach market share from the other and
that prices will drift upwards to levels higher than would otherwise obtain,
unless constrained by customer buying power or the prospect of new entry.
A new entrant needs finance, a proven safety record and aircraft and
staff that meet stringent safety requirements. He is likely to face difficulty
in finding suitable bases since, after the acquisition, existing facilities
at the bases currently favoured by oil and gas companies would be occupied
by Bond and Bristow. We concluded that, without promise of firm contracts
from customers, successful entry on a scale likely to provide effective
competition was unlikely within a reasonable period.
We accept that the oil and gas companies have some bargaining power.
However, there is no practical alternative to the use of helicopters and,
except at times when there is spare capacity, this bargaining power will
be offset by their need to secure an essential service. If customers are
dissatisfied with the extent of competition, we do not think that oil
and gas companies are likely to operate their own helicopter services
except as a last resort. They are more likely to encourage a new entrant
but this may involve costs and an element of risk and we do not think
that they would act until prices had risen, perhaps substantially.
We therefore conclude that if the acquisition takes place competition
will be reduced and prices may be expected to rise. The proposed merger
may therefore be expected to operate against the public interest. We were
unable to identify any measures which would remedy this effect. We therefore
recommend that the acquisition by Bond of BIH's North Sea helicopter operations
should not be allowed to proceed.
Full text
Contents
|
| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
Background to the merger and the main parties |
| Chapter
3 |
Helicopter support services to the United Kingdom sector
of the North Sea |
| Chapter
4 |
Views of the main parties |
| Chapter
5 |
Views of third parties |
| Chapter
6 |
Conclusions |
| |
List of signatories |
Appendices
|
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
Reference and background |
| 2.1 |
Summary of BIH business an assets offered for sale by
the Administrators |
| 2.2 |
Summary of the bid made by Bond |
| 2.3 |
BIH: financial results |
| 2.4 |
Bond: financial results |
| 3.1 |
Aberdeen Airport |
| 5.1 |
Extract from CAA decisions air transport license applications
5/92 |
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