A report on the
proposed joint venture: Allied-Lyons PLC and Carlsberg A/S
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Summary
Merger
Allied-Lyons PLC (Allied), a national brewer with a tied estate (some
4,400 pubs after November 1992), and Carlsberg A/S (Carlsberg), a brewer
without a tied estate, have agreed to merge their brewing and wholesaling
activities into a joint venture through a new company, Carlsberg-Tetley
Brewing Ltd (CTL), in which each will have a 50 per cent interest. Allied
will continue to own its pub estate, but has entered into a seven-year
supply agreement to buy all of its beer requirements from CTL, up to 15
per cent of which may be third-party brands stocked by CTL.
We have been asked to investigate the merger and report on whether it
may be expected to operate against the public interest (see Appendix 1.1).
Market
The beer market has been changing and in significant respects has become
more competitive since the introduction of the Beer Orders in 1989. By
November 1992 the national brewers will have sold or leased free from
tie some 12,000 pubs, over one-third of the pubs previously in their tied
estates, and the free on-trade (ie not tied) should then account for around
49 per cent of beer consumption compared with 37 per cent in 1989. Large
independent pub chains have entered the market and several companies,
including one national brewer, have given up brewing to concentrate on
retailing. These chains have significant buying power. The wholesale price
of beer to the free on-trade has fallen in real terms over recent years.
On the other hand, at the brewing and wholesaling level, the market
has become more concentrated, with the five national brewers accounting
in 1991 for 78 per cent of overall production (compared with 77 per cent
held by six companies in 1989) and 80 per cent of lager production. With
Carlsberg, the five national brewers account for 88 per cent of lager
production. While the wholesale price of beer to the free on-trade, net
of discounts, has fallen in real terms, its retail price in the on-trade,
free and tied, has continued to rise strongly in real terms. Although
the national brewers have released from tie some 12,000 pubs, they continue
to have substantial purchases tied to them through loan ties (which are
increasing) and the development of long-term supply agreements with pub
chains. Licensing restrictions continue to be a bar to new pub entry.
Public interest
The merger will have both positive and detrimental effects on competition.
On the positive side, CTL will be a more effective brewer, with a better
balanced portfolio of brands than Allied and Carlsberg separately, and
able to compete more vigorously with the two biggest brewers, Bass PLC
(Bass) and Courage Ltd (Courage). As Carlsberg does not have a tied estate,
the merger will not increase the number of tied pubs.
Against this, Carlsberg is one of only two big brewers without a tied
estate. Its main brand is within the three top-selling lager brands and
it accounts for 8 per cent of lager production (although over half its
sales go to national brewers-Courage and Scottish & Newcastle plc
(S&N)). The merger will bring it together with Allied which has 13
per cent of lager production and 12 per cent of overall beer production.
Following the merger CTL will account for 21 per cent of lager production
and 16 per cent of overall beer production, and the three largest national
brewers will provide some 67 per cent of lager production and 59 per cent
of overall beer production. In a market that is still dominated by the
national brewers, the removal of Carlsberg as an independent supplier
would be detrimental to competition and adversely affect regional and
local brewers and independent wholesalers, especially in respect of lager
supply to the free on-trade.
We consider that the merger would operate against the public interest,
unless it were to be modified to remedy the adverse effects we have found.
Recommendations
We accordingly recommend that the merger should not proceed unless the
following is done:
(a) CTL undertakes not to worsen the terms of supply to Carlsberg's
existing customers who are regional and local brewers or independent wholesalers;
(b) the term of the supply agreement between CTL and Allied is
reduced from seven to five years; and
(c) Allied amends its tenancy or lease agreements so that its
tied tenants/lessees will be free after two years to purchase half their
annual lager requirements from suppliers of their own choice.
Dissent
One member dissented; in his opinion the merger would, on balance, operate
in favour of the public interest, and so the question of remedies did
not arise.
Full text
Contents
|
| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
The merger situation |
| Chapter
3 |
The United Kingdom beer market |
| Chapter
4 |
Allied-Lyons PLC |
| Chapter
5 |
Carlsberg A/S |
| Chapter
6 |
Views of the main parties |
| Chapter
7 |
Views of third parties |
| Chapter
8 |
Conclusions |
| |
List of signatories |
| Note of
dissent |
|
Appendices
|
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference and conduct of the inquiry |
| 3.1 |
The MMC's Beer report and the Beer Orders |
| 3.2 |
The profile of ale and lager drinkers, 1990 |
| 3.3 |
The 1990/91 mergers involving Elders and Grand Met |
| 3.4 |
Allied's secondary distribution depots |
| 3.5 |
PSDs in which more than 20 per cent of full on-licenses
will be tied to Allied post-November 1992 |
| 4.1 |
Outline of the management structure of the Allied group |
| 5.1 |
The structure of the Carlsberg group |
| 5.2 |
Carlsberg Brewery: group profit and loss account, 1986/87
to 1990/9 |
| 5.3 |
Carlsberg Brewery: group balance sheets, 1986/87 to 1990/91 |
| 5.4 |
Carlsberg Brewery: trading results and forecast, three
years 1989/90 to 1991/92 |
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