=Carbonated Drinks: A report on the supply
by manufacturers of carbonated drinks in the United Kingdom
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Summary
On 25 April 1990 we were asked to investigate the supply of carbonated
drinks by manufacturers of such drinks (see Appendices 1.1 and 1.2). We
use the term carbonated drinks as including syrups supplied for making
up such drinks but excluding mineral water, alcoholic drinks and low-alcohol
and non-alcoholic beer.
Demand for carbonated drinks has been rising. In 1989 about 4,000 million
ready-to-drink litres (RTDL) of carbonated drinks, worth over £1,300
million at manufacturers' prices, were sold in the United Kingdom. The
largest supplier is Coca-Cola & Schweppes Beverages Ltd (CCSB), a
joint venture formed in 1987 by Cadbury Schweppes plc (Cadbury Schweppes)
and The Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola) to bottle and sell their respective
brands. CCSB supplies about 43 per cent by value (36 per cent by volume)
of the market. Of these sales over three-quarters were sales of brands
owned by Coca-Cola. Colas are the most important flavour of carbonated
drink and the Coca-Cola brand itself accounts for over a quarter of total
sales by value of carbonated drinks. We found that CCSB, having more than
25 per cent of the market, met the statutory criterion for being a scale
monopolist.
The second largest supplier, roughly half the size in terms of carbonated
drinks sales, is Britvic Soft Drinks Ltd (Britvic). It supplies about
22 per cent by value (20 per cent by volume) of the market. Britvic is
a joint venture between three national brewers, Bass PLC (Bass), Allied-Lyons
plc (Allied-Lyons) and Whitbread PLC (Whitbread) together with PepsiCo
Inc (Pepsi). The largest supplier in Northern Ireland, which has franchise
arrangements with Coca-Cola, is Coca-Cola Bottlers (Ulster) Ltd (CCBU).
We found that a statutory complex monopoly situation existed because CCSB,
Britvic and CCBU had entered into exclusive arrangements in the leisure
trade and CCSB and Britvic placed restrictions on the brands that could
be sold through their can-vending machines.
There are almost 100 other manufacturers of carbonated drinks, of which
12 have market shares in value terms of between 1 and 6 per cent. The
rest mostly manufacture for local markets and account for about 4 per
cent of the market in value terms between them.
`Take-home' outlets (such as grocers, off-licences and confectioners,
tobacconists and newsagents (CTNs)) account for a large proportion-some
80 per cent by volume-of sales of carbonated drinks. Generally we found
that a wide range of products was available in the take-home trade. Colas
and lemonade are the most popular flavours but there are numerous others.
There is also a wide choice of both brands and own-label products and
a range of package types. We found that competition was generally effective.
Leisure trade outlets include pubs, fast-food restaurants, clubs and
leisure centres. We found that the number of suppliers was much more limited,
with CCSB and Britvic accounting for a high proportion-possibly 90 per
cent or more-of sales. Most of the complaints we received about competition
related to the leisure trade. We have identified a number of facts which
operate against the public interest in the way manufacturers deal with
their customers in the leisure trade. Some of these are confined to CCSB.
Others relate to CCSB, Britvic and CCBU and arise from the complex monopoly
situation as well as, in the case of CCSB, the scale monopoly.
The scale monopoly
We found that CCSB had placed a number of restrictions on certain of
its distributors to the licensed part of the leisure trade (including
pubs) as a condition for their receiving special terms. We found these
restrictions (which related to the persons to whom distributors could
sell, the range to be carried, and the sale of competing products) to
be anti-competitive in effect and likely to lead to higher prices and,
in some cases, reduced choice. CCSB told us that it had recently decided
to terminate certain of its arrangements with its distributors, and it
has already changed some of them. We recommended that CCSB should not
include such restrictive provisions in any of its agreements with distributors.
We also found that CCSB had been acquiring dispense operations, in some
cases eliminating the distributors' own-label products. We concluded that
such acquisitions were likely to reduce competition and we recommended
that in future CCSB should only make such acquisitions if the Office of
Fair Trading (OFT) has received prior notification and has indicated that
it envisages no objections on competition grounds.
The complex monopoly situation
Sales under exclusive agreements account for about 30 per cent by volume
of CCSB's sales to the leisure trade, almost 15 per cent of Britvic's-including
6.5 per cent under an agreement with Allied Breweries Ltd (Allied)-and
2.5 per cent of CCBU's. CCSB probably supplies over half the total sales
by value to the leisure trade. Britvic and CCBU between them account for
most of the remainder of sales. We were concerned that exclusive agreements
restricted access to the outlets involved by competing manufacturers.
Although such agreements may be initiated by the leisure outlet, as the
carbonated drinks companies argued, their effect is anti-competitive and
we found that they were likely to make choice more restricted and, over
time, result in prices higher than would otherwise be the case. We recommended
that no provision of exclusivity should be included in agreements for
supply of carbonated drinks so that smaller and new suppliers would be
better able to compete on their merits for access to outlets and so that
there would be greater responsiveness to consumer choice.
Both CCSB and some smaller manufacturers complained to us that the managed
houses and restaurants of Britvic's shareholders were foreclosed to CCSB
and other competitors, and CCSB said that it was hard to get access to
the tenanted estates of Britvic's brewer shareholders. We considered that
the shareholding relationships of Bass, Allied-Lyons, Whitbread and Pepsi
with Britvic did indeed make it very difficult for other carbonated drinks
manufacturers to supply the outlets owned by these companies. We found
it hard to see an effective means of encouraging greater competition for
supply to these managed outlets while the shareholding connections remain,
but our recommendation would mean that the exclusivity in the agreement
between Allied and Britvic would have to be ended. It would, in our view,
be disproportionate to consider divestment of the carbonated drinks interests
of the brewers concerned. We expected, however, that the Order made by
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, following the MMC's report
on The Supply of Beer, preventing the tenants of pubs owned by brewers
being required to buy soft drinks from a particular source, together with
the general changes currently occurring in the pub trade (partly as a
result of the Orders made following the MMC's report), would in time lead
to greater access for different carbonated drinks suppliers.
Increasingly, sales of carbonated drinks in the leisure trade, particularly
on licensed premises, have been from dispense machines (where the product
is diluted and carbonated at the time of sale). Sales of canned carbonated
drinks from vending machines have also grown rapidly as the number of
machines has expanded. We investigated the tying of drinks sold through
dispense or vending machines by the carbonated drinks manufacturer which
supplied the equipment. On balance we concluded in each case that the
practice was not against the public interest. In both cases, however,
the effect of our recommendation on exclusive agreements would be that
carbonated drinks manufacturers could not prevent outlets from having
further dispense equipment or can-vending machines if they chose to do
so.
Full text
Contents
|
Chapters
|
|
| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
The major companies in the industry |
| Chapter
3 |
The market for carbonated drinks |
| Chapter
4 |
Financial performance of the carbonated drinks industry |
| Chapter
5 |
The views of brand owners |
| Chapter
6 |
The views of CCSB |
| Chapter
7 |
The views of Britvic |
| Chapter
8 |
The views of other bottlers |
| Chapter
9 |
The views of other interested parties |
| Chapter
10 |
Conclusions |
| |
List of signatories |
| Glossary |
|
Appendices
|
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
Background information |
| 1.2 |
The MMC's provisional conclusions scale and complex monopoly
situations |
| 3.1 |
The surveys |
| 3.2 |
Questionnaire to retailers |
| 3.3 |
Exclusive supply arrangements |
| 4.1 |
Year-end dates of companies responding to financial questionnaires |
| 4.2 |
CCSB: balance sheet analysis, 1989 |
| 4.3 |
CCSB: carbonated drinks cost profiles, 1987 to 1989 |
| 4.4 |
Carbonated drinks: information on marketing and related
costs of franchisors and franchisees |
| 4.5 |
CCSB: payments to franchisors for concentrates, 1987
to 1989 |
| 4.6 |
CCSB: results for 1989 as reported by CCSB and as adjusted
by separating vending, dispense and assets under construction
from the results of manufacturing and distribution |
| 4.7 |
Britvic: balance sheet analysis, 1989 |
| 4.8 |
Britvic: carbonated drinks cost profiles, 1987 to 1989 |
| 4.9 |
Britvic: payments to franchisors for concentrates, 1987
to 1989 |
| 4.10 |
Britvic: results for 1989 as reported by Britvic and
as adjusted by separating vending, dispense and assets
under construction from the results of manufacturing and
distribution |
| 4.11 |
Carbonated drinks: summary of results of selected major
bottlers,1985 to 1989 |
| 4.12 |
Major bottlers of carbonated drinks: overall financial
results |
| 4.13 |
The principal franchisors: income, costs and profiles
from carbonated drinks, 1987 to 1989 |
| 4.14 |
Coca-Cola: returns on capital employed in operations
in the EC |
| 4.15 |
Cadbury Schweppes: returns on capital employed in carbonated
drinks operations in the United Kingdom |
| 5.1 |
The approach to the European Commission: reactions of
Cadbury Schweppes, Coca-Cola, CCSB and Pepsi |
| 5.2 |
The Coca-Cola Export Corporation undertaking |
| 10.1 |
EC Regulation 1984/83 |
| Index |
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