Celcon/MBM Merger Inquiry: issues statement
Product market definition
1. Taking account of the differences between them in terms of cost and
price, properties, function, size, ease of handling, etc, is it reasonable
to view the main kinds of products for walling materials as separate
markets that is, respectively, timber and steel frame and other
prefabricated products; aggregate concrete blocks (aggregate blocks);
and aerated concrete blocks (aircrete)?
2. Even acknowledging that there are degrees of potential or actual substitutability
between the kinds of products listed in 1 above, would it nevertheless
be reasonable to assume that their applications are sufficiently distinct
as to warrant each being treated as a separate market?
3. Alternatively, would factors such as the overlaps between these products
and the degree of substitutability between them indicate that there
is one market for all walling materials; or at least for aggregate blocks
and aircrete?
4. Do the uses to which bricks are put affect the outcome of consideration
of the arguments relevant to 1 to 3 above?
5. Looking at these products, from the supply side perspective, should
it be taken that their technical and process characteristics mean that
manufacturers could not switch between them straightforwardly in the
short term?
6. Allowing for the differences between these products in manufacture,
in technical characteristics and in application, could it be said that
the differences between timber and steel frame and other prefabricated
systems on the one hand and either aggregate blocks or aircrete on the
other are greater than the differences between aggregate blocks and
aircrete?
7. Would it be right to summarise the chief differences between aircrete
and aggregate blocks are as follows: aircrete has a higher unit price
but is typically much lighter, involves greater ease of laying and cutting
and has better thermal insulation properties; while aggregate blocks
have higher strength and provide better sound insulation?
8. As with consideration of walling materials above, is it reasonable
to consider the main products for the construction of foundations and
floors, for each of which aircrete can also be used, as separate markets?
9. Are there any reasons to believe that current aircrete prices are
significantly above the competitive level so that there is more substitutability
between aircrete and alternative materials than would be the case at
competitive levels?
Geographical market definition
10. Is the geographical extent of the markets for aircrete and aggregate
blocks the whole of the UK; or do the following considerations suggest
that they might be in different geographical markets:
11. Or are there sufficiently strong chains of substitution linking each
local market for the market in aggregate blocks also to be considered
to be national?
12. Are there any reasons to believe that there are distinct characteristics
in Scotland, as far as concerns aircrete, such that it might be considered
to be a separate market?
Substitutability
13. One approach to substitutability is to ask how far in practice
can aggregate blocks be considered to be substitutable for aircrete?
14. The Commission will want to consider 13 above in the light of the
evidence including the following considerations which have been put
to it by other parties:
15. Assuming that the installed costs of alternative solutions were taken
to be broadly similar, what are the circumstances, if any, in which
aircrete and aggregate blocks are not substitutable?
16. Given that the significant use of timber frame construction in Scotland
(over 40%) has not been mirrored in England (c.5%) or Wales (c.11%),
will timber frame or other prefabricated construction techniques continue
to be regarded in the latter countries as less than fully substitutable
for traditional masonry construction at least for the foreseeable future?
17. In considering questions of substitutability, to what extent are house
buyers and other end-users views important in assessing
substitutability as between masonry and timber frame or other prefabricated
construction techniques?
Impact of regulatory changes
18. There are questions whether the balance of impending or proposed regulatory
changes is likely to benefit aircrete or aggregate blocks, for example:
19. How are these changes likely to affect the use of other walling systems?
20. Do the forthcoming and proposed regulatory changes suggest that there
are implications for market definition?
21. What will be the impact of these changes on the scope for and extent
of substitutability between aircrete and aggregate blocks?
Barriers to entry and expansion
22. It has been said that the capital costs of entry into the aircrete
market are very great by comparison with entry into the aggregate block
market (up to 25m has been mentioned as opposed to 5m or less). Is
this barrier significant enough to prevent straightforward entry?
23. Would entry on a small scale result in a significant cost disadvantage?
And would entry on a larger scale be unduly risky by virtue of the need
to obtain a sizeable market share?
24. Is the availability of pulverised fuel ash (pfa) of the appropriate
quality and from convenient locations (in transport costs terms) a factor,
or will it be, in discouraging new suppliers of aircrete from entering
the market?
25. If considerable know-how is a prerequisite for the successful production
of aircrete, as has been said, would this also be a factor inhibiting
entry into the aircrete market?
The proposed merger
General
26. The principal issue for the inquiry is whether the merger would significantly
reduce competition and, if so, whether there would be adverse effects
on the public interest as a result. Adverse effects might take the form
of:
- higher prices;
- lower quality of service to customers;
- restricting the supply of aircrete, including its delivery, to particular
customers;
- reduced choice of products and providers;
- a reduced rate of innovation
compared with the situation which could be expected in
the absence of a merger.
Reduction in the number of aircrete suppliers
27. If the merger goes ahead, the number of existing firms supplying
aircrete in significant volumes in the UK will decline from three, currently
producing roughly equal shares of aircrete, to two - with the merged entity
responsible for over 65% of the product. Does this mean that the current
situation may become unbalanced leading to a significant reduction in
choice and the creation of either a market leader or a firm with market
power?
28. Would such a situation, in addition, increase or weaken the relative
negotiating and purchasing power of the other significant remaining aircrete
producer (Tarmac)?
Prices
29. The Commission will want to establish whether or not the current
level of concentration in the aircrete market indicates scope to raise
prices above competitive levels; and, if so, whether this indicates that
a further degree of concentration might result in further increases in
prices.
30. Would the merger, under which two firms would be providing a very
large percentage of the supply of aircrete, result in competition on price
becoming seriously weakened?
31. Would the merger make it more feasible for aircrete manufacturers
to maintain price differentials between their product and aggregate blocks,
for example in response to any price increase in aggregates as a result
of the forthcoming Aggregates Levy?
32. Following the merger and there remaining just two significant suppliers
of aircrete, would these two firms have scope and ability to discriminate
in price and/or delivery between customers, for example through the use
of rebates and discounts; in particular between customers who could readily
switch away from aircrete and those who could not?
33. Is it reasonable to expect growth in direct contracting between aircrete
suppliers and builders? And, if so, could this lead to a situation in
which, following the merger, it would be more practicable than otherwise
to discriminate between customers?
34. How will buyer power be affected by the merger? Could the merger
limit the extent of buyers current ability to obtain competitive
prices for aircrete purchases?
Switching suppliers
35. Are limits of capacity in aircrete production such that the scope
for switching into aircrete on a large scale is limited, or is this not
the case, and how would this situation be affected by the merger?
36. Given that the merged entity would control such a large proportion
of total aircrete production capacity, would it reduce the ability of
certain of the larger building firm and builders merchant customers
of the present two firms to source their requirements from elsewhere,
if they became dissatisfied with Celcon/MBMs terms and conditions?
37. Given the minimal contribution of aircrete imports to the aircrete
market in the UK in the last decade or more, whether due to costs of transport
or other factors, can it be taken that the product is effectively not
tradeable internationally; is there any realistic prospect of current
trading conditions changing; and would the merger be likely to provide
additional encouragement to any increase in supply from abroad; and, if
so, how?
38. Were, for example, the merger to lead to increased prices for aircrete
in this country, would it be reasonable to expect a surge in imports;
and to what extent could such imports act as a constraint on aircrete
prices?
Innovation
39. Until recently, had there been a history of product innovation in
the aircrete market and is it the case that aircrete has been a relatively
undifferentiated product? Would the merger be likely to promote further
innovation, or would any reduced level of competition resulting from it
imply less innovative activity for the future?
40. Alternatively, would the merged group be in a better position to
control the market for innovative aircrete products, such as prefabricated
masonry systems?
Barriers to entry
41. Would the merger make entry more difficult?
Benefits of the merger
42. Benefits of the merger have been stated to be:
Are these the expected benefits and are there any others?
In addition, how significant are the expected benefits; how certain
are they to materialise; and how quickly will they emerge?
Remedies
43. The Commission emphasizes that it is at an early stage of its investigation
into this proposed merger and has reached no conclusions on any aspect
of the issues outlined above. On the strictly hypothetical basis, however,
that the Commission were eventually to find that the merger could be expected
to operate against the public interest, with some or all of the possible
adverse effects listed in paragraph 21 above, the Commission would welcome
views on the practicability and effectiveness of the following possible
measures in remedying or preventing those effects:
- prohibition of the merger;
- divestment of one (or more) aircrete plant(s) to competing construction
materials producer(s);
- undertakings relating to the terms under which products of the enlarged
group are offered for sale for a period of time after the merger,
for example on prices, on transparency of prices and/or on most
favoured customer contract clauses or deals.
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