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Strategy Survival Guide

Prime Minister's Strategy Unit

Version 2.1

Strategy SkillsBuilding an Evidence Base

Looking forward - Counterfactual analysis

Counterfactual analysis has theee broad aims:

  • To establish evidence of a causal relationship between a new policy, or change in policy, and outcomes the policy seeks to influence
  • To account for confounding factors, additional to the influence of policy, that might lead to measured change in outcomes
  • To provide estimates of the impact of policy
What is it?

The counterfactual is an estimate of the circumstances that would have prevailed had a new policy or policy change not been introduced. By comparing counterfactual outcomes (often referred to as either control or comparison group outcomes) with outcomes measured for those units subject to the new policy or policy change, causality or attribution can be established.

A counterfactual analysis tool used by government to identify causality or attribution is the use of pilots. These enable the government to test new policies, or changes in existing policy, in a limited number of geographical areas prior to introducing them more widely. The objective is to determine whether the new policy gives rise to changes in the outcomes that policy seeks to alter. For example, counterfactual analysis might answer the question - is there a direct relationship between a new initiative to cut car crime and subsequent change in the number of reported car thefts, independent of other factor influencing car theft? Counterfactual analysis explicitly acknowledges the fact that the outcomes government attempts to influence are subject to a range of factors beyond the immediate scope of the policy being studied. For example, it can't necessarily be assumed that measures to cut worklessness are entirely responsible for an observed fall in aggregate unemployment.

Units exposed to the new policy or policy change are alternatively referred to as the programme, treatment or action group. In theory, causality can be attributed to the new policy because there are no systematic differences between the programme group and a 'true' counterfactual group, except for the fact that the programme group has been exposed to the new policy. Differences in average outcomes between the programme group and the 'true' counterfactual group therefore represents an unbiased measure of the programme's impact.

In reality, measuring the counterfactual is a difficult task. Evaluators use a variety of methods, depending on circumstances and opportunities open to them, to estimate the 'true' counterfactual. The following approaches can be used:

  • Single group pre and post-test designs
  • Two group pre and post-test designs
  • Model-based econometric methods (simple regression adjustment, instrumental variables (IV), the Heckman selection estimator)
  • Statistical matching designs (e.g., propensity score or cell matching)
  • Interrupted time series analysis
  • Regression discontinuity designs
  • Randomised control trial (RCT) designs (alternatively referred to as random assignment, random allocation, experimental or randomised field trial designs).

It is the latter of these that is considered to be the most powerful method of establishing a net effect over and above the counterfactual. This is because programme evaluators explicitly construct control and programme groups at random. In other words, the two groups are statistically equivalent, the only systematic difference between them being that the programme group has been exposed to the policy being investigated. Evaluators can randomly assign individuals, or other units such as institutions (for example hospitals or schools), or geographical areas (for example Wards, or Local Authority Districts).

At present, this approach, while commonplace in clinical trials, is less often used to evaluate social programmes in the UK, although there are examples. It is, however, widely used in North America to investigate the impact of various interventions from changes in taxation, welfare reform programmes, initiatives in education and criminal rehabilitation.

Strengths of random assignment
  • If implemented correctly, it guarantees that the experimental and control groups will be identical. Thus it eliminates the influence of extraneous factors by ensuring that the only differences between the two groups arise by chance.
  • Easy to interpret.
Weaknesses of random assignment
  • Two groups are unlikely to be identical apart from some policy intervention .
  • Only provides a measure of average impact.
  • Can be complicated to implement correctly- two administrative systems are required.
  • Can create political problems by denying services to controls.
  • Risk of contamination if those in the control group are not prevented from participating in the pilot programme.

Many of these practical problems can be avoided if whole areas are divided into intervention and control groups, but for practical reasons this is usually difficult to do.

References

Cost Benefit Analysis, Boardman, Greenberg, Vining and Weimer (2001)

Research Methods for Policy Evaluation, Department for Work and Pensions, Research Working paper No 2. (Chapter 4 gives an excellent description of counterfactual analysis and the different methods available.)

Counterfactual analysis

In Practice 1: SU Waste Project

In choosing between options the impact of a "do nothing" option (i.e. what happens if current policies continue, or the counterfactual) must be considered. The waste team undertook such a counter factual analysis as part of their work.

To do this assumptions were made about future waste growth and waste composition (provided by a waste analysis expert working with the SU team). The team considered current waste funding and looked at the rate of progress over the last 5 years in recycling and incineration based on this funding. This showed that the recycling rate had been increasing at 1% per year and only one new incinerator had been built in the last 7 years. At this rate of progress, and without kerbside recycling or more bring sites, recycling was likely to remain below 25% of the waste stream even by 2015, notwithstanding the fact that this target was originally set for 2005. It was assumed that current levels of opposition to incinerators would continue and only those currently approved would get built.

This analysis established the amount of waste that would end up in landfill sites on unchanged policies and could be compared with EU Landfill Directive targets to which the UK was bound. It showed that, on unchanged policies, many more landfill sites would be needed, resulting in the UK falling further and further from meeting the Landfill Directive.

The chart below shows the results of the counter factual analysis, and the increasing gap between the Landfill Directive targets and the volume of municipal waste likely to be sent to landfill sites in England in future.

Estimated biodegradable waste for landfill in England versus the EU Landfill Directive targets (million tonnes)

Estimated biodegradable waste for landfill in England versus the EU Landfill Directive targets


Counterfactual analysis

In Practice 2: Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) interview

Random assignment was used to evaluate the introduction of a Restart interview for Jobseekers in 1989/90. Those claiming benefit for six months were invited to an interview to encourage return to work. 8,000 people were randomly assigned to receive an interview (intervention group), while 500 people were randomly assigned to the control group that was not interviewed. The trial measured the average time it took both groups to get a job. Those receiving a Restart interview spent 5% less time claiming benefit.

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