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2.1 The Prime Minister should be consulted in good time about the appointment or re-appointment of:
a. the Chair and other Members of Royal Commissions;
b. the Chair of and, as required, the Members of
i. Public Corporations;
ii. the most important Non-Departmental Public Bodies (both executive and advisory) and Executive Agencies;
iii. the more important Departmental committees, including those at 8.14(b);
c. Heads of Non-Ministerial Departments;
d. cases where the appointment is likely to have political significance. Ministers should take a wide view of what constitutes political significance. Even local or regional appointments may from time to time excite an unusual amount of public interest because of the circumstances surrounding the appointment or the background of the candidate. In all cases involving political considerations submissions to the Prime Minister by an appointing Minister should be copied to the Chief Whip. The Chief Whip should invariably be consulted before a Member of the House of Commons is approached about appointment to an office which would result in the vacation of a Parliamentary seat.
2.2 In all such cases, the Prime Minister will need to be informed about the particular requirements of the post, the attributes essential for a candidate and the extent to which candidates meet such requirements. In addition, the Prime Minister should be informed of other factors bearing upon the appointment of particular candidates (e.g. conflicts of interest) and all other relevant information.
2.3 A current list of individual public appointments on which the Prime Minister would expect to be consulted is held by the Public Appointments Unit in the Cabinet Office. This list has been agreed between Departments and No 10. Departments may also choose to consult the Prime Minister in other cases, depending on circumstances and bearing in mind sub-paragraph d. above. In all cases, the submission should make clear why the Prime Minister is being consulted.
2.4 In all cases falling within paragraphs 2.1 and 8.14-15 the submission which is to be put to the Prime Minister should be cleared with the Head of the Home Civil Service in advance and should indicate that any remuneration proposals have been agreed with the Treasury if necessary. No commitment should be made to any individual before the Prime Minister has been consulted. In the case of Royal Commissions, the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister as well as the Lord Chancellor (see paragraph 8.14-15) should be consulted before any informal soundings are undertaken. In other cases, any informal soundings should be made in such a way as to preserve freedom of action and avoid any appearance of commitment.
2.5 Where there is doubt about the need for consultation with the Prime Minister, the Public Appointments Unit should be consulted.
2.6 Subject to the above paragraphs and to the constitution of the body to which the appointment is made, public (non-Civil Service) appointments are the responsibility of the Minister concerned, who should appoint the person(s) he or she considers to be best qualified for the position. In doing so, the Minister should have regard to public accountability, the requirements of the law and to The Commissioner for Public Appointments' Code of Practice for Ministerial Appointments to Public Bodies . The process by which such appointments are made should conform to the principles in the Code - Ministerial responsibility, merit, independent scrutiny, equal opportunities, probity, openness and transparency, and proportionality - and to the procedures set out in detail in the Code.
2.7 Parliamentary Private Secretaries are not members of the Government, and should be careful to avoid being spoken of as such. They are Private Members, and should therefore be afforded as great a liberty of action as possible; but their close and confidential association with Ministers imposes certain obligations on them. Official information given to them should generally be limited to what is necessary for the discharge of their Parliamentary and political duties. This need not preclude them from being brought into Departmental discussions or conferences where appropriate, but they should not have access to secret establishments, or information graded secret or above, except on the personal authority of the Prime Minister. While, as Private Members, they need not adhere to the rules on private interests which apply to Ministers, they should, as a general rule, seek to avoid a real or perceived conflict of interest between their role as a Parliamentary Private Secretary and their private interests.
2.8 Ministers choose and appoint their own Parliamentary Private Secretaries with the written approval of the Prime Minister. The Chief Whip should, however, be consulted about the choice of a Parliamentary Private Secretary; and in view of the special position which Parliamentary Private Secretaries occupy in relation to the Government, the Prime Minister's approval must also be sought before any such appointment is offered and announced.
2.9 Ministers should ensure that their Parliamentary Private Secretaries are aware of certain principles which should govern the behaviour of Parliamentary Private Secretaries in the House of Commons. Like other Private Members, Parliamentary Private Secretaries are expected to support the Government in all important divisions. However, their special position in relation to the Government imposes an additional obligation which means that no Parliamentary Private Secretary who votes against the Government may retain his or her position. Parliamentary Private Secretaries should not make statements in the House or put Questions on matters affecting the Department with which they are connected. Parliamentary Private Secretaries are not precluded from serving on Select Committees but they should not do so in the case of inquiries into their own Minister's Departments and they should avoid associating themselves with recommendations critical of or embarrassing to the Government. They should also exercise discretion in any speeches or broadcasts which they may make outside the House, taking care not to make statements which appear to be made in an official or semi-official capacity, and bearing in mind at the same time that, however careful they may be to make it clear that they are speaking only as Private Members, they are nevertheless liable to be regarded as speaking with some of the authority which is attached to a member of the Government. Generally they must act with a sense of responsibility and with discretion; and they must not associate themselves with particular groups advocating special policies.
2.10 Parliamentary Private Secretaries making official visits in the United Kingdom may receive the normal Civil Service travelling and subsistence allowances in respect of absences on official (or Departmental) business, as would other MPs undertaking work for Government Departments. It is for the Minister concerned to decide whether or not the Parliamentary Private Secretary, when accompanying the Minister, is engaged on Departmental business. It may occasionally be useful for a Parliamentary Private Secretary to accompany the Minister on an official visit abroad but no such arrangements should be made without the prior written approval of the Prime Minister. Where a Minister has to pull out of an event ( United Kingdom or overseas) at the last minute and no other Minister is available to represent the Government, a Parliamentary Private Secretary may stand in for the Minister. However, such attendance should be exceptional and very much a last resort. It is for the Minister in charge of the relevant Department to justify the use of a Parliamentary Private Secretary in individual cases. The Prime Minister's approval will be required where this involves attendance at an overseas event.
2.11 The employment of Special Advisers on the one hand adds a political dimension to the advice available to Ministers, and on the other provides Ministers with the direct advice of distinguished 'experts' in their professional field, while reinforcing the political impartiality of the permanent Civil Service by distinguishing the source of political advice and support. With the exception of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers may each appoint up to two Special Advisers. The Prime Minister may also authorise the appointment of one or two Special Advisers by Ministers who regularly attend Cabinet. The Government expects the appointment of experts normally to be made to permanent or temporary Civil Service posts in accordance with the rules of the Civil Service Commissioners. Where, however, an individual has outstanding skills or experience of a non-political kind which a Minister wishes to have available while in a particular post, the Prime Minister may exceptionally permit their appointment as an expert adviser within the usual limit of two advisers per Cabinet Minister. All appointments require the prior written approval of the Prime Minister, and no commitments to make such appointments should be entered into in the absence of such approval. Any departures from the rule of two Special Advisers per Cabinet Minister will need to be explained publicly. All such appointments should be made, and all Special Advisers should operate, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Model Contract for Special Advisers and the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers. The Model Contract and Code of Conduct for Special Advisers will also apply to expert advisers except for those aspects which relate to political commitment.
2.12 The responsibility for the management and conduct of Special Advisers, including discipline, rests with the Minister who made the appointment. Individual Ministers will be accountable to the Prime Minister, Parliament and the public for their actions and decisions in respect of their Special Advisers. It is, of course, also open to the Prime Minister to terminate employment by withdrawing his consent to an individual appointment.
2.13 The Government is committed to making an annual statement to Parliament setting out the numbers, names and paybands of Special Advisers, the appointing Minister and the overall salary cost. This statement will also include similar details in respect of expert and Unpaid Advisers. Where an adviser has a particular expertise or works mainly in a particular area of the department's work, this will also be indicated.
2.14 The appointment of an Unpaid Adviser is to provide advice to a Minister in their ministerial capacity. Such appointments are exceptional, and the prior written approval of the Prime Minister should be sought for any such appointment before a commitment is entered into. These appointments carry no remuneration or reimbursement from public funds. The appointment of an Unpaid Adviser is a personal appointment by the Minister concerned and there is no contractual relationship between such an adviser and the Department. In making an appointment Ministers must ensure that there is no conflict of interest between the matters on which the Unpaid Adviser will be advising and their private concerns. A letter of appointment must be issued by the employing Minister making this clear. Where an adviser is acting on similar terms to a Special Adviser but on an unpaid basis then they should conduct themselves as if they were a Special Adviser. As with Special Advisers, Unpaid Advisers are required to uphold the political impartiality of the Civil Service. The letter should indicate the subjects with which an Unpaid Adviser may (or may not) deal and their access to papers. The normal rules of confidentiality also apply. Unpaid Advisers are subject to the Official Secrets Act and Business Appointment Rules. Aside from the provision of a furnished office, use of a telephone, and access to typing facilities, a personal computer and internal departmental messenger system, an Unpaid Adviser should constitute no cost to the public purse. Ministers are responsible for the management and conduct of Unpaid Advisers.