

Sent: 31 January 2006 00:31  
To: IT Strategy Project Team  
Subject: Transformational Government

Identity cards

What the Government needs to be able to do is identify \*citizens\* and, where a person is able to create a "biometric" card ... another person is almost certainly able to create a \*fraudulent\* one.

What the Government needs to do is to create a database and be extremely careful about the data entry methods and proofs of identity provided before a person is given the "markers" in the database (levels of citizenship? Such already exist ...) that allow access to the various services that will be managed by reference to the data in the database.

The moment an identity card society is created there arise requirements for persons to carry that card at all times, to provide that card to "authority" at any time demanded ...

to be at risk of deprivation of liberty for failure to carry that card, to be at risk of deprivation of service through the failure to carry that card ... to be at risk of crime (theft of the card) that will carry huge personal problems far outside the scope of the crime itself both in time and in personal difficulties.

People may \*die\* because some service is refused due to lack of the card

At present, service providers use discretion ... once a card is in place, refusals will take place due to the lack of the card

A comparison with healthcare in the United States may be beneficial reading ...

As an individual, at present, I choose how I shall access services; there are often many different ways

through personal visit

through an adviser / agent / other 3rd party

through various media (post / internet / telephony)

Some service providers require various "proofs" before service is actually given ... and I can choose to provide those proofs or find an alternative provider whose methods are more to my liking.

I may choose to access a service provider's service in another way because I find it more to my liking, easier \*for me\* ...

If a card identity is imposed, I suspect that flexibility will be lost; gradually for some services ... instantly for others.

An identity \*card's\* data identifies \*the card\* ... since it will be possible for determined organisations to create fakes the \*card\* cannot be said to identify the individual.

The card's \*data\* may be fraudulent and comparison with a central database may show that the card is a fake ... but that doesn't prove the person is a fake, the person may not know the card is fake ... it is quite possible that, to disrupt a person's life, a malefactor might substitute a fake card amongst that person's possessions ...

What is needed is a way to rapidly, by biometrics, identify \*persons\* on the street, 24 hours per day. To be able to determine, within minutes at most, that they are who they claim to be. A card \*cannot\* do this for the reasons I have already outlined.

Further, if citizens are identified by biometrics, then non-citizens can be identified, too. If biometric data are stored abroad and made available then foreigners can be identified absolutely, too.

However, the integrity of the database is paramount ... both the physical and electronic security of the installation and the integrity of the information within in.

Currently, with many persons in the DfWP and other departments suffering "identity fraud" ... it suggests that the current Government data management policies are woefully insufficient to embark on a project of this complexity and size.

I suggest, respectfully, that until the Government can be \*sure\* it has data integrity and that it's staff have the integrity to be trusted with the monitoring / adding / amending / deleting of the data in the databases ... this project should be shelved.

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