

ANNEX A

LOCAL AUTHORITY COMMAND AND CONTROL

General

1. Although the local authority will be represented at the multi agency strategic level at the Police Main Base Station, it will also need to be prepared to activate its own command and control arrangements according to its generic major incident procedures.

Local Authority Strategic Level

2. The primary functions of the local authority strategic team will be to:
 - (1) liaise closely with the multi-agency strategic (Gold) team,
 - (2) align its own media policy with the overall strategy set by central government and the Police Incident Commander,
 - (3) keep elected members and other local political or community figures informed of progress and future actions,
 - (4) consider the establishment of a Remediation/Recovery team,
 - (5) deal with appeal funds,
 - (6) determine the local authority's priorities for managing the incident response whilst as far as possible continuing to provide normal services.

Local Authority Tactical Level

3. The primary functions of the local authority strategic team will be to:
 - (1) liaise closely for guidance with its own strategic team
 - (2) liaise closely with the police at their tactical (Silver) control centre and with their own and other operational staff in the field
 - (3) consider the need for diversion routes (highways with police),
 - (4) arrange transport for people and equipment,
 - (5) identify temporary mortuaries (the numbers involved are likely to exceed those used in planning assumptions for other events),
 - (6) identify buildings for use as rest centres and survivor reception centres, ensuring they can be properly staffed and resourced,

- (7) consider with the police the identification of buildings for use as friends and relatives reception centres,
- (8) consider setting up help lines and drop-in centres.

Local Authority Operational Level

4. The local authority staff making up the operational team will be located near the scene of the incident and at other related venues. Their primary functions will be to:
 - (1) liaise closely for guidance with the local authority tactical level,
 - (2) arrange road closures,
 - (3) set up diversions,
 - (4) manage traffic control systems,
 - (5) remove debris and other blockages,
 - (6) close or set up car parks and assembly points,
 - (7) set up and manage rest centres (including catering and possible overnight accommodation),
 - (8) assist relatives of victims,
 - (9) check that vulnerable people in the area are cared for and reassured as far as possible.

ANNEX B

ADDITIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

DEALING WITH FATALITIES

HM Coroner¹⁹

1. The coroner has to determine who died and how, when and where the death occurred in relation to those bodies lying within his/her district who have met a violent or unnatural death or a sudden death of unknown cause. The powers and duties of coroners do not vary with the number of people killed or the circumstances in which the deaths occur.
2. The role of the coroner is defined by statute. Designated local authorities have responsibility for providing financial support to coroners under sections 24(2) and 27(3) of the Coroners Act 1988.

Temporary Mortuaries

3. Temporary mortuaries facilitate those procedures that assist and support the coroner's enquiry. Local authorities will be familiar with the need to have arrangements to augment the normal mortuary facilities.
4. If casualties are significant local authorities should already have plans for extending the provision of temporary mortuaries. These may have to take into account that bodies or body parts will be infected or contaminated and the capacity and suitability of the plans should be reviewed.

Body Holding Areas

5. Bodies will usually be taken by the emergency services to a nearby body holding area(s) identified by the police, unless there is a functioning designated temporary mortuary located close to the incident. Such facilities should only be regarded as a 'staging post', prior to the subsequent transfer of bodies to the mortuary for identification, post mortem, viewing by relatives etc.
6. At the scene of an incident, police recovery teams – in protective clothing if necessary – will place bodies into suitable body bags and fix identically numbered labels to both the bag and location from which it was removed.

¹⁹ See also Section 5.3.7 of the *Strategic National Guidance on the Decontamination of People Exposed to CBRN Substances or Material* (Home Office, February 2003).

7. Local authorities will already be aware of sensitivities involved in selecting buildings for this purpose and subsequently returning them to their original use. A number of commercial organisations and many ambulance services can provide inflatable rapid response units and shelters which are suitable as body holding areas although these may be inadequate given the potential scale of need.

Burial, cremation and memorial services²⁰

8. A high number of fatalities or body parts would place a tremendous strain on existing public and private sector facilities and severely test their ability to cope adequately with burial and cremation services within acceptable time scales.
9. Local authorities should ensure a co-ordinated response to the demand for these services by developing a comprehensive database of service providers within their own area of operations; this should be supplemented by links and easy access to information about facilities in neighbouring authority areas.
10. There are safety issues around the decontamination of bodies and an assessment about the most suitable arrangements needs to be made if decontamination cannot take place. Cremation is inappropriate if there is internal contamination.
11. Consideration may also need to be given to local contingency arrangements through public and/or private partnerships which allow the rapid recruitment and deployment of extra staff, permit extended opening hours and enable the delivery of additional supplies of equipment and materials to providers within this service sector.
12. The organisation and staging of memorial services for victims will also be a major task involving local authorities and other agencies in the weeks and months following the incident. These services will need to acknowledge and reflect the requirements of different religions and be fully representative of the various ethnic groups involved. Consultation with religious leaders of many faiths, families and friends of the victims, and members of the communities directly affected will be an important feature during this recovery phase.
13. Some of the major issues will include making detailed arrangements for the conduct of services, agreeing on venues and invitations, and evaluating the offers made for lasting memorials, deciding what to accept and how best to establish and maintain these for the future.
14. Extensive public consultation and an awareness of and empathy with family and community needs will be of paramount importance during this time, which could extend over many weeks, given the potentially high number of fatalities resulting from the incident.

²⁰ See also Sections 4.28 – 4.49 of *Dealing with Disaster* which give guidance on handling of fatalities.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Debriefing

15. Local authorities should ensure that the process of debriefing is incorporated into their response plans and carried out for all staff in an appropriate, sympathetic, sensitive and constructive way.

Record keeping

16. The importance of maintaining clear, concise and accurate records cannot be underestimated. This process should form part of the discipline and culture adopted by individuals to ensure an effective audit trail for actions and decisions, thereby enhancing the corporate response to all major emergencies.

Investigation and the gathering of evidence

17. Every major incident is the subject of investigation, either by regulatory bodies or for the purposes of HM Coroner, a public inquiry, civil or criminal court proceedings. Such hearings will always require evidence of the highest possible quality.
18. Given the circumstances surrounding any release of CBRN material, until it has been determined otherwise, the police will treat the site as a crime scene and will secure the immediate area. Steps will be taken to ensure that anything which can be reasonably anticipated to be required as evidence is preserved and not damaged, moved or disposed of without reference to the Police Senior Investigating Officer (SIO).
19. It is possible that several different agencies will carry out their own independent investigations and will want to attend the scene(s) with video/photographic teams and technical experts. Each agency may have different criteria as to what is admissible evidence but the police will need to obtain that of the highest standard for court and will require all evidence to be left in place unless a threat to life prevents this from happening. Safety will always remain the highest priority when considering evidence gathering and/or site access.

DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC

Warnings

20. The need to warn the public of a threatened or actual release of CBRN materials is of paramount importance.
21. It is possible that some advance warning of the location and type of release may be given during which time various agencies will be attempting to prevent or minimise the risk of a release occurring. However if this is unsuccessful or there is no warning at all, plans must be capable

of swift and effective implementation.

22. Generally the police are involved in warning the public of present or anticipated danger, usually by one or more of the following methods:
- ◆ a Public Address (PA) system
 - ◆ door to door visits
 - ◆ the media - by television and radio broadcasts
23. Depending on the type and severity of the incident, guidance will vary but typically will include advice to "take shelter, close doors, windows and stay in" or "be prepared to evacuate" as and when requested by the police or other agencies.
24. If there is a known biological release, the need for health advice may be less urgent but more complex than for other hazards. Responsibility for considering the implications of such a communications strategy would first fall to the Joint Health Advisory Cell. Messages would be disseminated through the media (particularly local radio), telephone help lines and NHS Direct²¹.

Shelter or evacuation

25. In the event of any incident involving the release or threatened release of CBRN material, decisions will have to be made on how best to prevent exposure.
26. The police will decide whether or not the civilian population should be evacuated and in reaching this decision they will receive advice from the Joint Health Advisory Cell. In the immediate phase, they will take advice from the Fire and Ambulance Services and through these agencies, amongst other routes, to specialist medical and scientific advice. The advice will need to take population density and location into account, details of which should be available to the local or regional authorities.
27. In most cases following an airborne CBRN release, the best advice is to shelter indoors, with the doors and windows closed, until notified that the threat has passed or it becomes more dangerous to remain in buildings.²²
28. Any decision to evacuate should only be taken if there is time to achieve this before any hazard arrives and if the likely harm from exposure outweighs the hazards of evacuating large numbers of people. It is recognised that large-scale evacuation could be extremely difficult and time consuming. Some members of the public may not heed official advice

²¹ See also Appendix G of the *Strategic National Guidance on the Decontamination of People Exposed to CBRN Substances or Material* (Home Office, February 2003).

²² Further advice on shelter is given in the Department of Health publication *Deliberate Release Guidance: Public Health Response*.

and may themselves decide to evacuate. Such actions will have to be recognised.

Cordon enforcement

29. Section 33 of the Terrorism Act 2000 gives the Police powers to establish a temporary cordon from which pedestrians and motorists may be excluded if it appears advisable to do so, while they investigate or deal with an act of terrorism. It is an offence not to leave, or to enter, the cordoned area when ordered to do so by a police officer in uniform. The police also have the power to remove vehicles from, or move vehicles within, the cordoned area.
30. The Terrorism Act does not give a specified power to keep people inside a cordon. On medical advice, the police may believe it to be reasonable to prevent people who may be contaminated leaving the scene and posing a threat to public health. Advice to the Home Office from senior police officers and legal advisers is clear that the police have adequate powers under public order legislation and common law to preserve the peace and prevent crime at the scene of an emergency in the interests of public safety.

Decontamination

31. Comprehensive advice concerning the decontamination of people is contained in the Home Office, Strategic National Guidance published in February 2003.
32. Advice on environmental decontamination is contained in Annex C below.

ANNEX C

ENVIRONMENTAL DECONTAMINATION AND RECOVERY MANAGEMENT

Local Authority Role

1. Local authorities will play a lead role recovering from the effects of a chemical, biological or radiological (CBRN) terrorist incident²³. At some point after the immediate response to the incident has ended, the police will hand over the chair of the multi-agency strategic co-ordination group to the local authority and the transition to the reconstruction of the community is likely to be led through the work of this.
2. Tasks facing the strategic co-ordination group will include organising and managing the decontamination and restoration of the environment to normal use. The timescales for environmental clean-up will depend upon the incident location(s), the type of agent(s) used, their persistence in the environment and the severity of contamination.

Government Support to the Local Authority Recovery Strategy

3. For some CBRN incidents, the affected area could be relatively localised. In other scenarios the affected area may be more widespread, e.g. in a populated urban city centre. In either case Central Government would assist the local authority to develop and implement its recovery strategy. Government has an important supporting role to play by:
 - (a) Providing technical advice on chemical and biological agents from centres of excellence such as the Dstl²⁴, and the Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research (CAMR), which is now part of the Health Protection Agency.
 - (b) Arranging for technical advice on radiological agents from other centres of excellence including the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE).

²³ The local authority would normally lead the rehabilitation of the community following a major incident. See *Recovery: An Emergency Management Guide* published on the Cabinet Office web site <http://www.ukresilience.info/contingencies/business/recovery.pdf>

²⁴ The Ministry of Defence's (MOD) approach to managing CBRN risks is explained in *Defending Against the Threat from Biological and Chemical Weapons*, published July 1999, on the MOD web site at <http://www.mod.uk/issues/cbw>. MOD will not take the lead in responding to civil CBRN emergencies but can provide expert advice and support which would normally be funded by local authorities. See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/cm030430/text/30430w06.htm#30430w06.html_sbhd1

- (c) Providing assistance to local authority emergency response teams under Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) arrangements²⁵.
 - (d) Co-ordinating the activities of individual Government Departments responding to the incident and providing a framework within which individual departments can discharge their specific responsibilities.
 - (e) Co-ordinating the collection of information on the incident and its effects for the purposes of:
 - (i) providing information to the public and media at the national level;
 - (ii) briefing Ministers; and
 - (iii) informing Parliament.
 - (f) Acting as the focal point for communications between the local authority's strategic co-ordinating group and Government.
4. As set out in paragraph 3.6 on page 4 above, in the event of a terrorist attack, the Home Office would initially co-ordinate the Government's response during the crisis phase of the incident. Subject to paragraph 3.6 on page 4 above, Lead Government Department responsibility for incidents primarily affecting the open environment would later transfer to Defra to advise and support the local authority's longer-term environmental restoration strategy and return to normality^{26,27}. However support to the local authority may be required from Government for a considerable period of time after the immediate response phase has ended.
5. Other Government Departments also have important roles when responding to CBRN incidents. For example, the Department of Health (DoH) is responsible for managing the impact on public health of all forms of terrorism. The Department for Transport (DfT) has strategic responsibility for transport security, including airports.
6. Government Departments will begin to scale down their involvement in the response to a CBRN incident only when Ministers are satisfied that it is prudent to do so. In considering this, Ministers will take into account when the consequences of the incident have been contained, the conditions at the affected area properly dealt with and central assistance is no longer required. The following decision-making criteria would be likely to be applied by Ministers:

²⁵ Arrangements for Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) are described in the Home Office Publication, *Dealing with Disaster*, published on the Cabinet Office web site <http://www.ukresilience.info/contingencies/dwd/index.htm>.

²⁶ For further information on lead Government Department responsibilities during CBRN incidents see *The Role of Lead Government Departments in Planning for and Managing Crises*, published July 2002 on the Cabinet Office web site <http://www.ukresilience.info/handling.htm>.

²⁷ For information on the roles and responsibilities of local emergency organisations when responding to a CBRN incident see *The Decontamination of People Exposed to CBRN Substances: Strategic National Guidance*, published February 2003 on the Cabinet Office web site http://www.ukresilience.info/cbrn/cbrn_guidance.htm.

- (a) when there is no longer a widespread threat to public health²⁸ or the environment;
- (b) when the consequences of the incident have been successfully reduced to the extent that local emergency services consider that they have adequate resources to deal with the situation; and
- (c) when a recovery plan has been prepared and agreed by the local authority and relevant organisations.

Principles of Recovery

7. Environmental monitoring to map affected areas after an incident would provide the main basis for strategic decision-making on the decontamination and disposal of CBRN wastes and the restoration of the environment. During the early response to the incident the local authority should establish a Remediation Working Group to prepare advice and recovery proposals for the local authority's management team to consider²⁹. The aim of the recovery strategy should be to return the environment to unrestricted use.
8. Key factors which will influence the recovery strategy include :
 - (a) **Detection and intervention timelines.** Terrorists could disperse chemical, biological or radiological agents in a number of ways, not necessarily by the use of static containers or explosive devices which signal that an incident has taken place. The immediate effects of a covert release of a chemical agent are likely to be noticeable more quickly than a biological or radiological agent. Biological agents may require an incubation period of several days before people become sick. Because of the delayed onset of symptoms in a biological incident, the area affected may be greater due to the migration of affected individuals. Exposure to radiological agents also may not produce any immediately noticeable health effects, resulting in contamination spread before it is detected by monitoring instruments.
 - (b) **Size of the affected area.** The area of land contaminated with a CBRN agent will normally be localised within a distance of not more than a few hundred metres from the original release points. However the hazard zone will be larger than the contamination area because of evaporation or resuspension of the agent, especially for chemical releases which produce a vapour hazard downwind of the contaminated area. Liquid chemical and biological agents are easier to manufacture than solids and can readily be

²⁸ For information on managing the risks to health from CBRN contamination, see the *Deliberate Release of Biological and Chemical Agents : Guidance to Help Plan the Health Service Response*, published August 2002 on the Department of Health's emergency planning and co-ordination unit web site <http://www.doh.gov.uk/epcu/cbr/intro.htm>.

²⁹ Two technical handbooks dealing with recovery from CBRN incidents are being developed for local authority use by Defra. These handbooks will give practical advice on the management processes and methods of recovery from CBRN incidents, supported by relevant technical and logistics information and decision-aiding flowcharts.

disseminated by improvised devices without damaging the agent³⁰. This could help to limit the size of the contaminated area because in general liquids are less easily spread than solid powders. Radiological agents are more likely to be dispersed as solid powders over a wider area than chemical or biological agents.

- (c) **Stability and persistence of the agent.** The recovery strategy will depend upon the persistence of the agent in the environment. Although chemical and biological agents vary considerably in their properties and in their effects on humans, agents are not always persistent for long periods of time and may safely break down over a few days when exposed to rain or sunlight or can be destroyed by using simple treatment processes such as spraying with dilute bleaching solutions. However most radiological agents, and some chemical or biological agents, are highly persistent. A further problem that the strategy must address is that CBRN agents may easily penetrate into cracks and crevices or be absorbed into materials such as rubber and paint. In either case they would be protected from the decontamination process and so could later be released, giving rise to a persistent contact or vapour hazard to members of the public.
- (d) **Development of the location.** Decontamination techniques for urban clean-up in towns and cities will be different to rural clean-up in the countryside. Natural weathering and wet decontamination techniques will be most effective for CBRN incidents which take place outdoors either in urban or rural environments.
- (e) **Effectiveness of potential recovery options.** Recovery decisions should take account both of the expected benefits of different decontamination options and also their likely contribution to promote an early return to normal living within the affected population. NRPB has developed a simple categorisation scheme for comparing different recovery options, based upon the likely scale, duration and resource requirement necessary to implement each option³¹. Potential recovery options may be broadly divided into three categories; those that are moderately dose-reducing, incur relatively little disruption or require few resources, and which can be completed soon after the incident (Category A); those that are more strongly dose-reducing but which incur significant disruption or require significant resources, or can only be carried out over protracted periods (Category B); and those that are either poorly dose-reducing or only moderately dose-reducing and incur significant disruption or require significant resources (Category C). The CBRN recovery strategy should focus initially on Category A and Category B options, although the local authority may still wish to implement Category C options for reasons other than health protection, for example public reassurance. There may also be a role for cost-benefit analysis in decision-making, for example when it may be cheaper to resurface a public highway rather than remove very low levels of persistent contamination.

³⁰ For example, see *Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook* published in 2002 by Jane's Information Group <http://www.Janes.com>. Jane's gives helpful advice mainly intended to help emergency organisations and first responders to stabilise a CB incident scene.

³¹ See *Intervention for Recovery After Accidents*. Documents of the NRPB. Volume 8. No 1. 1997. Available from the NRPB web site http://www.nrpb.org/publications/documents_of_nrpb/index.htm

(f) **Health and safety management.** Risks to the health and safety of people will need to be managed as an integral part of the recovery strategy. This will include local authority staff, clean-up contractors, sewerage company workers, the Police, external advisors, and possibly voluntary organisation workers or members of the civic community, who might potentially be exposed to residual levels of CBRN agents during different phases of the clean-up operation. The general approach to controlling exposure to hazardous substances is explained on the Health and Safety Executive's (HSE) *COSHH Essentials* web site³². HSE's principles of hazard control involve the following steps; assess the risks to health arising from potential exposure to a CBRN agent (Step 1); decide what precautions are needed (Step 2); prevent or adequately control exposure (Step 3); ensure that control measures are used and maintained (Step 4); monitor the exposure of people (Step 5); carry out appropriate health surveillance (Step 6); and ensure that people are properly informed, trained and supervised (Step 7). Each of these steps will need to be considered within the local authority's recovery strategy.

9. **Key priorities for the recovery strategy** will include :

(a) **Stabilising any further migration of contamination.** A physical quarantine barrier should be established around the suspected perimeter of contamination to restrict entry and exit. However because most types of CBRN release result in 'splatter' - small areas of contamination in a largely uncontaminated environment – it may not be possible to establish a precise boundary between uncontaminated and contaminated areas. Local authorities should use their judgement to decide an appropriate hazard management zone (which will be larger than the suspected contaminated perimeter). The hazard management zone should be physically sealed off, e.g. with plywood board similar to that used on construction sites, where the size of the zone is limited. Where possible contaminated water should be intercepted in storage tanks for treatment and safe disposal. In the open environment, CBRN contamination in watercourses may need to be temporarily blocked and the path of the watercourse diverted. Containment of any affected livestock, cats and dogs, and feral animals may also need to be considered to prevent the spread of infectious agents.

(b) **Surveying the affected area.** Environmental monitoring to map affected areas after a CBRN incident would provide the main basis for decision-making on the decontamination and restoration of the environment to normal use. The sampling strategy should focus initially on confirming the safety of the quarantine perimeter and detailed surveys of the hazard zone should wait until after initial decontamination has been carried out.

(c) **Deciding target clearance levels.** The recovery strategy will be influenced by knowledge of the risks to public health from the agent, what level of residual contamination may safely be permitted to remain ('safe clearance levels') and the availability of suitable detection technologies

³² COSHH Essentials is a free on-line risk assessment service for hazardous substances, provided by HSE at <http://www.coshh-essentials.org.uk>. The key principles of hazard control are explained at <http://www.coshh-essentials.org.uk/assets/indg136.pdf>

capable of monitoring and distinguishing between levels of residual contamination above and below the agreed safe level.

(d) **Developing phased recovery options.** The process of remediation may require a phased approach with different remedial actions being carried out in sequence. Remediation is likely to follow a progression from impact assessment, through to successive treatment actions and then monitoring to confirm successful clean-up. Several recovery options may be technically feasible, ranging from landfilling of demolition rubble, to a more selective neutralisation of localised patches of contamination using bleaching solutions and subsequent treatment of chlorinated waste waters. When deciding between different options the questions which local authority managers must address are similar to those which would apply to any pollution prevention and control strategy³³:

- (i) How effective will the recovery option be?
- (ii) Is the recovery option environmentally acceptable?
- (iii) What clearance level will adequately protect public health?
- (iv) What levels of residual contamination will be acceptable?
- (v) How will the authority establish public confidence in its clean-up strategy?
- (vi) How quickly can the option be implemented?
- (vii) What resources will be required?
- (viii) What wastes will be generated?
- (ix) How will they be managed and disposed of?
- (x) What are the environmental impacts of the disposal options?

In practice 'situational' constraints, such as intervention actions already undertaken during the emergency phase, may strongly influence the final choice of recovery management technique, especially where the permitted timescales for recovery are short because critical national infrastructure³⁴ is affected. Also, when making decisions on recovery options there is a balance to be struck between maximising protection of people and protection of the environment because these constraints will drive accepted levels of clean up in different ways.

(e) **Transporting and disposing of wastes.** Waste management planning is an integral component of the recovery strategy. CBRN recovery techniques may involve demolishing highly contaminated areas, pressure washing lightly contaminated surfaces, sandblasting walls and roofs, scabbling road surfaces, and sweeping and vacuuming streets. This will produce large volumes of contaminated aqueous slurries and solid rubble. Early intervention actions by the emergency services will also generate wastes, mainly large volumes of contaminated water and bags of

³³ For example, the European system of Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) includes formal licensing requirements to plan ahead for eventual decommissioning of Installations and to restore sites to their former condition. For further information see the site report requirements under IPPC, discussed in *Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control: A Practical Guide* published in August 2000 by DETR. <http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/ppc/ippcguide/index.htm> .

³⁴ The Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) are those parts of the United Kingdom's infrastructure for which continuity is so important to national life that loss, significant interruption, or degradation of service would have life-threatening serious economic or other grave consequences for the community. See <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorism/govprotect/infrastructure/>

contaminated clothing from mass decontamination of the public. The success of the recovery option may depend upon the availability of disposal routes for these wastes and also the receiving capacity of the disposal sites. The local authority may need to consider an interim waste management strategy - such as temporary storage of hazardous wastes in ISO containers at a Military Site or a Sports Stadium - to allow the operators of disposal facilities sufficient time to safely receive, store, treat and dispose of the wastes. The local authority may also need to consult the local community, regarding the temporary storage, transport routes and intended disposal locations of CBRN wastes to maintain public confidence.

(f) Insurance & funding issues.

(1) It is the responsibility of landowners and occupiers to ensure adequate insurance cover to meet the cost of dealing with the consequences of a CBRN terrorist incident, as it would be for any other potentially serious incident such as fire or flood. However, in many cases the CBRN risk being so open ended means that increasingly insurers are not willing to cover the risk to private property. Commercial property however can be covered by the Pool Re scheme set up by the insurance industry and underwritten by HM Treasury. In the public sector, central and local government bears its own risk.

(2) Powers exist under the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 for the Government to make financial assistance available to local authorities following an emergency or disaster involving destruction of, or danger to, life and property. The Bellwin Scheme exists for this purpose, although it is discretionary and has not to date paid out for the costs of dealing with past terrorist incidents. Alternative grant making powers are currently being considered by the Government and the Local Government Bill currently before Parliament includes provision for allowing Ministers to make special grants to local authorities. The local authority has a legal duty of care towards its contractors and may be vicariously liable for the actions of recovery contractors operating under the authority's instructions and directions. Military assistance may be required for the transportation of waste to disposal locations because commercial waste transport contractors also face similar insurance difficulties.

ANNEX D

Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat National Capabilities Programme

1. In his statement to Parliament on 3 March 2003, the Home Secretary announced that government had in place a programme of work to enhance those key generic capabilities to allow the country to respond to the most demanding emergencies, however caused. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) manages this programme and drives the progress of departments involved in delivering each of the capabilities.
2. The list of capabilities and the government departments currently in the lead for each one are shown in the table below:

Capability	Lead Government Department
Central response	Cabinet Office, Overseas & Defence Secretariat
Regional response	Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Regional Co-ordination Unit
Local response	Cabinet Office, CCS
Maintenance of essential services <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Utilities • Food, water, flood and coastal defence, • Supply chain resilience, freight haulage capacity • Health Services • Financial Services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Department for Trade & Industry • Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs • Department for Transport • Department of Health • HM Treasury
CBRN resilience	Home Office
Site clearance	ODPM
Treatment of infectious diseases	Department of Health
Treatment of mass casualties	Department of Health
Assessment of risk and consequences	Cabinet Office, CCS
Mass Evacuation	Home Office
Warning and informing the public	Government Information & Communications Service
Mass fatalities	Home Office
Animal diseases	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

ANNEX E

Home Office CBRN & Operations Team & the CBRN Resilience Delivery Plan

1. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA and the anthrax attacks of the following month fundamentally altered the way that Governments need to plan for potential terrorist attack. In October 2001, a dedicated Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Team was established within the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in the Cabinet Office. This team was transferred to the Home Office in October 2002 to enable closer working with the Terrorism and Protection Unit (TPU) and with Home Office Ministers responsible for counter-terrorism and CBRN incidents.
2. The work of the CBRN team supports Aim 2 of the Home Office:
 - To reduce organised and international crime, including trafficking in drugs, people and weapons, and to combat terrorism and other threats to national security, in co-operation with EU partners and the wider international community.
3. The work of the team also directly feeds into the Cabinet Office's 'Capabilities' programme, the aim of which is:
 - To ensure that a robust infrastructure of response is in place country-wide to deal rapidly, effectively, and flexibly with the consequences of civil devastation and widespread disaster inflicted as a result of conventional or non-conventional 'disruptive' activity.
4. It is the aim of the team to deliver CBRN resilience and our strategy to do so can be summarised, colloquially, in four sentences: We all know what to do if there's a CBRN incident. We each have what we need to do our job. We've all used the best information in our planning. And we can respond effectively in a crisis. This translates to the following five key objectives:
 - A. **Partnership** - To ensure that all partners with a role in preparing for, dealing with or recovering from CBRN incidents know who they are and what each will need to do, and that they are trained and practised in responding effectively in a crisis;
 - B. **Decontamination** - To enable all partners to have the policies, the resources and the equipment they need to prepare for and respond to potential CBRN incidents and resulting contamination, whether of people, buildings or the environment;
 - C. **Evidence** - To establish a firm evidence base of the potential threat and best practice from high-quality, assessed intelligence, scientific research,

and testing and evaluation to inform policy and plans, and to improve our capability to deliver;

- D. **Communication** - To communicate effectively to delivery partners and to stakeholders, including the public, prior to and following any CBRN incident;
- E. **Co-ordination** - To deliver the strategy effectively through the work of the CBRN team itself.
5. The successful delivery of the CBRN strategy depends critically on the commitment and focus of a range of key partner organisations which are summarised in the following five groups.
- a) Our most immediate partners are other Units within the Home Office, and other Central Government Departments, including the Security Service, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury. These policy-making partners also include Government Offices and a number of other organisations, such as Transport for London. These bodies are central to delivery in that they must themselves set up and fund programmes to deal effectively with any CBRN incident.
- b) Our most important delivery partners are the frontline professionals, including in the emergency services, health service, in local authorities and elsewhere, who must be in a position to respond immediately and effectively in the event of a crisis.
- c) We also have many international partners, ranging from other sovereign states who face similar threats to bodies including NATO, the UN, and the EU.
- d) Other organisations, including all employers (particularly those in the utilities and transport sectors), the media and representative bodies including unions, are also important partners. They will need to have contingency plans in place to deal with emergencies on their own or their members' premises, and be in a position to inform and reassure the public in the event of an emergency.
- e) Our final partners and our customers are members of the public themselves. Their role is most critical in the event of a CBRN incident so that they can play the most effective and informed role to protect themselves and others.
6. We will work with and consult our partners using a variety of tools – from meetings, conferences and workshops, to guidance, press notices, focus groups and training exercises.
7. To help ensure the delivery of specific programme objectives, a Partners' Delivery Board comprising all key delivery partners from central government and the front line, has been set up. It is chaired by the Head of the CBRN Team and meets quarterly. Its remit is to inform partners of the latest developments in the CBRN programme and act as a forum for

discussion among all delivery partners, often prompting separate discussions between two or more members on specific issues. Its membership includes representatives of the Local Government Association, the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives and the Emergency Planning Society and the Regional Co-ordination Unit of ODPM.

8. To complement this arrangements, we have also developed formal and informal links with representatives from the devolved administrations and the regional resilience teams based in Government Offices, as well as the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat.
9. For more specific information on the government's CBRN resilience programme, please e-mail your enquiry to:

cbrnenquiries@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

ANNEX F

GLOSSARY OF COUNTER-TERRORISM ABBREVIATIONS /ACRONYMS

(Not all of these abbreviations appear in the foregoing text but they may be helpful in the event of a counter-terrorist exercise or incident.)

ACPO(TAM)	Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters)
ATO	Ammunition Technical Officer
ATSAC	ACPO(TAM) Strategic Advice Centre (normally established at Scotland Yard)
AWE	Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston
(CB)IED	(Chemical or Biological) Improvised Explosive Device
CCC	Civil Contingencies Committee
CCCG	Chief Constable's Co-ordinating Group (Strategic Group)
CMLO	Consequence Management Liaison Officer
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room(s) (Central Govt co-ordinating group)
Dstl	Defence, Science & Technology Laboratory, Porton Down – part of the Ministry of Defence
EHO	Environmental Health Officer
EOD	Explosives Ordnance Disposal
FSC	Forward Scientific Controller
FCP	Forward Control Point
FMC	Forward Military Commander
GLO	Government Liaison Officer
GLT	Government Liaison Team
HazMat	Hazardous material
IPE	Individual Protective Equipment
JHAC	Joint Health Advisory Cell
JIG	Joint Intelligence Group
JMC	Joint Military Commander
MACA	Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
MACC	Military Aid to the Civil Community
MACP	Military Aid to the Civil Power
MAGD	Military Aid to Govt Departments
NARO	Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (MoD)
PIC	Police Incident Commander

PMBS	Police Main Base Station
POLSA	Police Search Adviser
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
SAS	Special Air Squadron
SBS	Special Boat Squadron
SF	Special Forces
SIO	Senior Investigating Officer
SMC	Senior Military Commander
SO13	Met Police Anti-terrorist Squad
SSA	Senior Scientific Authority
TAG	Technical Assessment Group, Dstl Chemical and Biological Science
TRF	Technical Response Force (specialist military /scientific team)

ANNEX G

FURTHER READING & LINKS

Useful reading³⁵

Name & authors of document	Published by	Date
Arrangements for responding to nuclear emergencies	HSE Books	1994
Civil Nuclear Emergency Planning Consolidated Guidance	Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group	2003
Concise guide to customs of minority ethnic religions: Collins D, Tank M, Basith A	Arena, Aldershot	1993
Conventional & Non-Conventional CBRN terrorism: Fire Brigade Procedures	CACFOA	2001
Dealing with Disaster	Cabinet Office	Revised 3 rd edition, 2003
Dealing with Disasters Together	Scottish Executive	Revised 2001
Death and bereavement across cultures	Routledge, London	1997
Deliberate Release of Biological & Chemical Agents	Department of Health & NHS Executive	2000
Deliberate Release Guidance: Public Health Response (http://www.doh.gov.uk/epcu/cbr/response/introph.htm)	Department of Health	2002
Emergency Data Handbook	NRPB	2002
Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook	Jane's	4 th edition, 1999
Guidance for the Emergency Services on decontamination of people exposed to hazardous chemical, biological or radioactive substances	Scottish Executive	2002
Guidelines for Faith Communities when Dealing with Disasters	Church of England	1996
Major Incident Procedure Manual (5 th edition)	London Emergency Services Liaison Panel	1999
Military Aid to the Civil Community: a Pamphlet for the Guidance of Civil Authorities and Organisations	MOD	3 rd edition, 1989
Northern Ireland Standards in Civil Protection	Central Emergency Planning Unit of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister	1998
Protocol for the Disposal of Contaminated Water	Water UK	2002

³⁵ Advice on how to obtain these and other relevant publications is available from the Librarian at the Cabinet Office Emergency Planning College, Easingwold, near York – website www.epcollege.gov.uk

Recovery: An Emergency Management Guide	Home Office	2000
Refugee reception centre handbook	British Red Cross	1999

Useful Links

Title and Content	Organisation	Link
<p><u>BBC Nations and Regions</u></p> <p>Connecting in a crisis; meeting the public demand for information – A guide to working with the BBC during an emergency.</p>	BBC	http://www.bbc.co.uk/connectinginacrisis
<p><u>Civil Nuclear Emergency Planning</u></p> <p>Consolidated Guidance</p>	Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group	http://www2.dti.gov.uk/energy/nuclear/safety/neplg1.pdf
<p><u>Emergency Planning Co-ordination Unit</u></p> <p>Includes publications on good practice and public health response.</p>	Department of Health	http://www.doh.gov.uk/epcu/
<p><u>Emergency Planning College</u></p> <p>The college library contains many useful publications to borrow and purchase. The college also provides Emergency Planning training courses.</p>	Cabinet Office	www.epcollege.gov.uk
<p><u>Expecting the Unexpected – Business Continuity in an Uncertain World</u></p> <p>Planning and communications initiative by London First, the Business Continuity Institute and the National Counter Terrorism Security Office, a police unit working to the Association of Chief Police Officers.</p>	Business Continuity Institute, ACPO and London First	www.londonprepared.gov.uk/business/

<p><u>Health Protection Agency</u></p> <p>Advice on infectious diseases, chemicals and poisons, radiation risks, Regional Health Protection Teams and the HPA role in emergency response.</p>	<p>Health Protection Agency</p>	<p>www.hpa.org.uk</p>
<p><u>Health & Safety Executive</u></p> <p>Reducing Risks, Protecting People</p>	<p>Health & Safety Executive</p>	<p>www.hse.gov.uk</p>
<p><u>Home Office, Terrorism Pages</u></p>	<p>Home Office</p>	<p>www.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorism/</p>
<p><u>Local Authorities and Emergency Services Information</u></p> <p>A document providing the Emergency Services (Police, Coastguard, Fire and Ambulance), Local Authorities and health professionals with information on contingency arrangements for the transport of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material (SNM) and new and used submarine reactor fuel.</p>	<p>Ministry of Defence</p>	<p>www.mod.uk/issues/laesi/</p>
<p><u>London Prepared</u></p> <p>This site gives information about what London is doing to ensure its readiness to any type of threat.</p>	<p>Greater London Authority</p>	<p>www.londonprepared.gov.uk</p>
<p><u>National Steering Committee for Informing and Warning the Public</u></p>	<p>A partnership of central and local government, emergency services, public utilities, industry, the media and professional organisations.</p>	<p>www.nscwip.info</p>
<p><u>Protecting the Population from Infection</u></p>	<p>Public Health Laboratory Service (Health Protection</p>	<p>www.phls.co.uk</p>

	Agency)	
<p><u>RIMNET</u></p> <p>The site of the Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET), the national radiation monitoring and nuclear emergency response system, set up as part of the National Response Plan following the Chernobyl accident.</p>	<p>Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs</p>	<p>www.defra.gov.uk/environment/radioactivity/response/rimnet.htm</p>
<p><u>UK Resilience</u></p> <p>Website for government information and links on civil contingencies, including press releases, recently issued government guidance for example, for business.</p>	<p>Cabinet Office</p>	<p>www.ukresilience.info</p>

ANNEX H

Written Ministerial Statement to the House of Commons made on 8 July 2003 by the Minister of State, Home Office – CBRN equipment

The purpose of this statement is to confirm advice to businesses and inform the House of our view on the question of whether organisations should acquire their own equipment to detect chemical, biological or radiological materials as part of their contingency plans.

The Government takes contingency planning for potential terrorist attack very seriously and is working with the emergency services to ensure that they have the equipment they need to protect the public from the use of chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) materials. Government is also ensuring that effective measures are in place to detect such substances on a routine basis, where required. Such equipment is regularly tested by independent scientists and users in the relevant agencies, including the emergency services, to ensure that it is of the standard required. Staff are also well trained in its use.

The Government's advice is, therefore, that other organisations, including businesses, leave the demanding and potentially dangerous job of detecting CBR materials to personnel in the emergency services and responsible agencies who are professionally trained in the necessary equipment. Any business considering measures to prevent or reduce the impact of terrorism should contact the counter-terrorist security adviser in their local police force who will be able to give further advice.