

Annual Report for 2001 on the operation of the Chemical Weapons Act 1996



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Department of Trade and Industry

**Annual Report for 2001
on the operation of the
Chemical Weapons Act 1996
by the Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry**



Department of Trade and Industry

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1 Executive Summary

- 1.1 This report covers the fourth full year of the operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force on 29 April 1997. In 2001, the United Kingdom again provided declarations required under the CWC and received inspections by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The UK also implemented licensing and trade control changes in the light of OPCW decisions. Within the OPCW, the UK continued to make an important contribution to discussions on all matters affecting implementation of the CWC.
- 1.2 The UK received a total of five OPCW inspections in 2001: three at industrial sites; one at the single small-scale facility at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory at Porton Down (Dstl Porton Down); and one at the UK's protective purposes facility at the Royal Military College of Science at Shrivenham. All of the inspections were successfully concluded, and none raised uncertainties about the UK's compliance with the CWC.
- 1.3 In 2001, the UK CWC National Authority (in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)) again co-ordinated the preparation and timely submission to the OPCW of declarations of past and anticipated future activities involving chemicals covered by the CWC Schedules; submitted the annual plan for, and the annual report on, the destruction of old chemical weapons (OCW), plus *ad hoc* declarations of new finds of OCW; and submitted, on behalf of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the UK's statement on its programme for protection against chemical weapons.
- 1.4 National Authority and other UK personnel within and outside Government continued to play an important role in support of the full and effective national and international implementation of the CWC. The UK's inputs to the OPCW again covered administrative, export control, financial, industrial, information technology, scientific, verification and other matters, plus training assistance. UK representatives participated substantially in all the major meetings of the OPCW in The Hague in 2001.
- 1.5 A practice challenge inspection was mounted at Royal Air Force Stafford; this exercise included inspectors and observers from the OPCW and overseas.
- 1.6 The National Authority Advisory Committee continued to oversee the implementation of the CWC and the Chemical Weapons Act 1996 in the UK. While content that the National Authority is meeting fully the requirements of the OPCW, the Committee considered what additional efforts could be made by the National Authority and the OPCW to reinforce the importance of the General Purpose Criterion (GPC) of the CWC, particularly in the light of the events of 11 September.

THE CIVIL CONTINGENCIES COMMITTEE AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001

Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11th September, the Government gave careful attention to all arrangements for securing public safety in the event of such attacks being inflicted on the UK. The Civil Contingencies Committee, which is chaired by the Home Secretary, initiated reviews of existing contingency planning arrangements, including responding to the threat from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism. These reviews are being undertaken to ensure that everything is being done to enhance the UK's resilience and to protect key facilities, utilities and essential services. The Civil Contingencies Committee works closely with other Government Departments, the UK's devolved administrations, the police and other agencies to ensure that the UK has contingency plans for any eventuality. Detailed guidance has been issued to local authorities, emergency services and the National Health Service on the response to the deliberate release of chemical and biological agents.

The Government also introduced the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, which received Royal Assent on 13th December. Among other measures, this Act creates a new regime to ensure the security of premises keeping or using one or more of 47 specified pathogens and toxins, and, subject to Parliamentary approval, provides for future additions to be made to the list of restricted substances, to cover animal and plant pathogens, and toxic chemicals. The Act also makes it an offence to aid or abet the overseas use or development of chemical weapons, punishable by life imprisonment. The Act will prove useful in assisting the UK to meet its international obligations under Article VI of the CWC to ensure that activities with toxic chemicals are carried out only for permitted purposes (the General Purpose Criterion, in connection with which there is a more specific report at paragraph 9.3).

2 Introduction - The Chemical Weapons Convention

- 2.1 The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which came into force on 29 April 1997, remains the first and only arms control treaty to introduce a verifiable ban on an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The UK is an original signatory and a founder State Party, and ratified the CWC on 13 May 1996. A total of 145 States Parties had ratified, or acceded to, the CWC by the end of 2001, an increase of four during the year.
- 2.2 The powers to implement the CWC's declaration and verification provisions in the UK are contained in the Chemical Weapons Act 1996 (the Act). The three main elements of the CWC's verification and compliance provisions (declarations; inspections; and trade controls) have a direct impact on Government civil and military facilities, on industry, and on academia. Under the CWC, a State Party must submit detailed declarations on activities involving specified chemicals. Some of these declarations are subject to verification by inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Trade in chemicals listed in the Schedules in the CWC Annex on Chemicals is controlled through the UK's export and import licensing regulations, enquiries about which should be made to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) - to the Export Control Organisation (ECO) for exports or to the National Authority for imports. (See Contacts on page 19).
- 2.3 DTI officials in the National Authority continued to work closely with the Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and with technical advisers at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory at Porton Down (Dstl Porton Down), and with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Officials from all of these organisations attended meetings at the OPCW to maximise the UK's effectiveness in that forum. Representatives of UK academia and industry also provided invaluable input.
- 2.4 The Act requires the Secretary of State to prepare a report on its operation in each calendar year, and to lay a copy of the report before each House of Parliament.

3 Preparing and Submitting UK Declarations and Other Information

3.1 States Parties must submit annual declarations to the OPCW covering activities in the preceding calendar year, and activities planned for the following calendar year, involving chemicals listed in CWC Schedules 1, 2 and 3. States Parties must also declare past activities with Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOCs). The timetable for these declarations is set out below:

DECLARATION	TIMING
Annual Past Declaration	90 days after the end of the calendar year
Annual Anticipated Declaration for Schedule 1 Chemicals	90 days before the beginning of the calendar year
Annual Anticipated Declaration for Schedule 2 and 3 Chemicals	60 days before the beginning of the calendar year

3.2 Information on any old chemical weapons (OCW) held also has to be submitted, annually, as follows:

Annual plan for the destruction of OCW	60 days before the end of the calendar year
Annual report on the destruction of OCW	60 days after the end of the calendar year
Ad hoc declarations of new finds of OCW	Within 180 days of discovery

3.3 Reports are also required annually on activities at any chemical weapons production facility (CWPF) that has been approved by the OPCW for conversion for use for non-prohibited purposes, and on State Parties' programmes for protection against chemical weapons.

CWC ADVICE PAMPHLETS

The National Authority brought up to date and re-issued its three CWC advice pamphlets, which had originally been issued in 1997. The pamphlets explain the requirements for declarations, for inspections, and also for licensing and trade controls on Scheduled chemicals. The new pamphlets were issued to declarer companies, to all member companies of the Chemical Industries Association, and to other relevant UK organisations.

ANNUAL PAST DECLARATION FOR 2000

- 3.4 The National Authority began preparing for the Annual Past Declaration for 2000 in November 2000, when revised declaration forms and guidance notes were prepared. These were sent to industry on 12 January 2001. As in the previous year, and in order to assist companies, the National Authority first entered onto the forms data provided for the initial declaration in 1997 and which were likely to remain unchanged (eg facility name, its owner, its operator and its address). Companies were, therefore, only required to provide any additional information, revise existing details as necessary, and sign and date the forms, before returning them.
- 3.5 The declarations submitted were converted by the National Authority database into the format required by the OPCW. The UK's declaration was sent to the OPCW on 28 March.
- 3.6 In addition to the declarations on industrial facilities, the UK's declaration to the OPCW also covered:
- i) activities relating to Schedule 1 chemicals undertaken at the single small-scale facility at Dstl Porton Down and at the UK's protective purposes facility at the Royal Military College of Science; and
 - ii) the transfer of Schedule 1 chemicals to and from other States Parties.

ANNUAL ANTICIPATED DECLARATION FOR 2002

- 3.7 The National Authority submitted the Annual Anticipated Declaration for 2002 for the Schedule 1 facilities at the single small-scale facility and the protective purposes facility to the OPCW on 21 September.
- 3.8 The forms for Schedule 2 and 3 sites were sent to industry for completion on 13 September. The National Authority consulted Dstl Porton Down and the Chemical Industries Association before finalising the guidance notes and forms.
- 3.9 Following receipt of the required information from companies, the National Authority sent the Annual Anticipated Declaration to the OPCW on 30 October.

OTHER INFORMATION

- 3.10 A statement, provided by MoD and submitted with the UK's declaration on past activities, outlined the aims of the UK's chemical defence programme, particularly the need to provide effective protection against possible attack by chemical weapons. The UK provided information on the objectives for equipment procurement resulting from this programme and on the chemical defence training which takes place in the UK. Information was also given on the main components of the programme, comprising detection, identification and monitoring; warning and reporting; protection; contamination control; and medical countermeasures. All of this information was provided under Article X of the CWC. A copy of the statement has been placed in the Library of each House of Parliament. In the absence of an internationally-agreed format for such statements, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has encouraged States Parties to adopt the UK's format.
- 3.11 The UK also submitted a destruction plan for the former CWPF at Norton Disney, Lincolnshire; a conversion plan for the former CWPF at Valley, Rhydymwyn; a report on activities at the former CWPFs at Nancekuke, Cornwall, and Randle, Cheshire; a report on the destruction of OCW during 2000; reports of *ad hoc* finds of OCW up to 30 September 2001; and a plan for the destruction of OCW during 2002.

ISSUES AFFECTING DECLARATIONS

- 3.12 The Sixth Conference of States Parties in May 2001 mandated the Executive Council to take a consensus decision on low concentration limits for declarations of mixtures containing Schedule 2A and 2A* chemicals as soon as possible and before the Seventh Session (which is due to take place in October 2002).
- 3.13 The National Authority was in touch with companies dealing with the disposal of chemical waste and with the Environmental Services Association (their trade association) about declaration issues.

4 OPCW Inspections in the UK

- 4.1 In 2001, the UK received a total of five routine inspections: two at Schedule 2 industrial sites; one at a Schedule 3 industrial site; one at the single small-scale facility; and one at the protective purposes facility. As usual, the sites inspected provided first-class co-operation - which the OPCW acknowledged - and all the inspections were completed without incident.

SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS

The OPCW performed sampling and analysis for the first time during an inspection at a UK industrial site. This development was welcomed as the UK had urged the OPCW to begin sampling and analysis during routine inspections in accordance with the CWC. The OPCW sampling and analysis equipment was ferried from The Hague to Felixstowe, and conveyed from there by van to the Point of Entry at Manchester Airport, where it was examined by the National Authority technical adviser. Following arrival at the site, the inspectors appointed a sub-team comprising a sampler/record keeper, sample preparer and gas-chromatography/mass-spectrometry operator. The latter two set up the laboratory. Collection of the samples was carried out by site staff, under the inspectors' supervision. Sampling and analysis was carried out, successfully and with no major problems, over a period of four days. This experience indicates that, as long as the Technical Secretariat are mindful of a State Party's ability to cope with sampling and analysis, including accommodating the equipment, the sort of positive and helpful attitude which the UK site provided should enable further such events to proceed smoothly in other States Parties.

It is important for the wider integrity and effectiveness of the Convention's verification regime that the OPCW is able to conduct sampling and analysis during routine inspections. The UK hopes that, once the OPCW's current financial difficulties are overcome, such operations may occur over a larger number of inspections. Only when a reasonable number of analyses have been carried out during inspections can the strengths and weaknesses of current procedures be assessed fully.

INDUSTRIAL INSPECTIONS

- 4.2 The companies that were inspected in 2001 by the OPCW commented favourably on the support provided by the National Authority and its technical advisers.

ISSUES AFFECTING INSPECTIONS

- 4.3 During the inspection at the single small-scale facility, the inspectors sought access to four specified non-declared areas where Schedule 1 chemicals produced in the single small-scale facility were consumed. Whilst not a CWC requirement, the UK gave the inspectors access within these areas on a voluntary basis, and answered their questions fully, without prejudice to any future provision of access (if requested) outside the single small-scale facility. With sufficient notice from the inspectors, the UK was able to ensure the protection of classified information in the non-declared areas. (See also the newsbox on managed access on page 10.)
- 4.4 The draft facility agreements for the UK industrial sites inspected in 2001 (and for those in 1998 and 1999) have still to be finalised as a consequence of a backlog of work at the OPCW.

POLICE ESCORTS FOR INSPECTORS

Where the more crowded UK roads are likely to delay an inspection team's journeys, the National Authority uses police escorts from the Point of Entry to the vicinity of the facility and vice versa. This practice has been used for about half the UK's forty-five routine inspections since 1997. It has proved efficient, particularly in southern England. The cost is borne by the UK.

5 Licensing and Trade Controls

- 5.1 The Act contains provisions to control Schedule 1 chemical production, possession and use to ensure that the UK's CWC obligations are met. These controls, together with separate import and export licensing requirements, aim to ensure that quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals acquired or possessed by the UK do not exceed the 1 tonne ceilings specified in the CWC; that the chemicals are used only for purposes not prohibited by the CWC; and that the CWC's conditions on transfers are met. Licence-holders are obliged to report changes of circumstance to the National Authority.

PRODUCTION, POSSESSION AND USE LICENCES

- 5.2 An Open General Licence (OGL) permits those registered under it to produce, possess or use an aggregate total of 5 grammes or less of any Schedule 1 chemical for pharmaceutical, medical or research purposes in any calendar year. Sixteen organisations operated under the OGL during 2001. This number was significantly lower than in recent years as a result of the National Authority's action (which was reported in the Annual Report for 2000) to ensure that holders of saxitoxin were only licensed when necessary.
- 5.3 An Individual Production Licence is required to produce above 5 grammes of Schedule 1 chemicals and an Individual Possession and Use Licence is required to possess or use above 5 grammes of these chemicals. In addition, anyone wishing to import Schedule 1 chemicals must obtain an import licence from the National Authority. (Export licences are the responsibility of the ECO.) The table below details the number of licences issued in each of these categories for 2001.

TYPE OF LICENCE	NUMBER ISSUED
Individual Production	2
Individual Possession and Use	7
Import	0

ISSUES AFFECTING LICENSING AND TRANSFERS

- 5.4 The Sixth Conference of States Parties adopted a decision on transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States not Party to the CWC, to the effect that end-use certificates would not be required for products containing 30% or less of a Schedule 3 chemical, or for products identified as consumer goods packaged for retail sale for personal use or packaged for individual use. States Parties could adopt more restrictive measures if they wished to do so. The decision will be reviewed in 2007.

6 Activities in Support of the OPCW

PRACTICE CHALLENGE INSPECTION AT ROYAL AIR FORCE STAFFORD

- 6.1 In support of its view that challenge inspections are a key feature of the CWC's verification regime for ensuring compliance, the UK again hosted a practice inspection, this time at RAF Stafford between 25 and 29 June. This was the twelfth practice challenge inspection to be held in the UK since 1994. Four of them have involved OPCW participation. No other State Party has conducted as many exercises. The OPCW were invited to participate in the exercise and provided the inspection team leader and two inspectors. Other inspection team members were drawn from Australia, Pakistan, the UK and the US. Observers attended from the OPCW, India, the Netherlands, Pakistan and the US.
- 6.2 Over a period of almost a week, the practice inspection covered ground and air exit monitoring, management of inspection sub-teams, interrogation of logistic and medical databases, health and safety issues, interaction with the news media and the role of the requesting State Party observer. The UK expressed its gratitude to all concerned for making the 2001 practice event a success.
- 6.3 The UK considers that there is a need also to carry out practice challenge inspections at industrial and general research sites, where the problems encountered by OPCW inspectors might be quite different from those on military sites.

MANAGED ACCESS

Managed access is provided for in the CWC, which allows States Parties to take necessary measures to protect confidentiality provided that they fulfil their obligations to demonstrate compliance with the CWC. The concept of managed access was pioneered by the UK during the negotiations to establish the CWC, and practice challenge inspections and managed access exercises were conducted at sensitive Government sites between 1988 and 1990. Inspection exercises continue as part of the UK's CWC implementation procedures. These exercises demonstrate the utility of managed access as a means of enabling State Parties to meet the apparently conflicting objectives of granting access to sensitive facilities to an international inspection team, while protecting information unrelated to prohibited activities and simultaneously demonstrating compliance. There are many managed access techniques, approaches and procedures that can be used singly or in combination in specific situations at specific sites where access needs to be limited to protect national security or commercial proprietary information. Therefore, managed access offers a framework in which access to sensitive information, whatever its form, is controlled without preventing international inspectors from fulfilling their task. The application of managed access depends on the nature of the site; it can be designed to accommodate a wide range of difficult access problems, whether in the defence sector or in the biotechnology, chemical or pharmaceutical industries.

OPCW ASSOCIATE PROGRAMME

- 6.4 The University element of the Associate Programme for 2001 was carried out at the University of Surrey during August (the Industry element took place in Belgium, France and the Netherlands). Its participants, who as in 2000 came from 12 States Parties, were again given skills development training in best practice in management, operations and safety in the chemical industry. The Programme is also aimed at assisting with future recruitment of OPCW staff. A National Authority official was present on the concluding two days and participated in a number of sessions.
- 6.5 The UK and Canada jointly funded this UK-based activity. The UK supports bringing States Parties together through International Cooperation and Assistance under Article XI of the CWC, and was pleased to contribute tangibly towards the Associate Programme in 2001.

TRAINING

- 6.6 The UK again provided training for OPCW personnel, funded from MoD's Defence Assistance Fund. Two non-technical training courses included equipping inspectors with the skills needed to handle demanding situations, interviewing techniques and team-working. A third course, on chemical agent handling and advanced analytical techniques, was designed to give analytical chemists suitable experience of the analytical methods used for the unequivocal identification of chemical weapon-related compounds. This course included specialised training in the handling and analysis of real chemical weapon agents. It was run by Dstl Porton Down, who also ran the two non-technical courses in conjunction with the UK's Civil Service College.

EXTRA BUDGETARY SUPPORT, INCLUDING FOR UNIVERSALITY

- 6.7 The UK, both nationally and through the European Union, continued to promote vigorously the universality of the CWC. In November 2001, FCO co-funded with Canada a regional seminar in Jamaica as part of this activity. Delegates from a mixture of States Parties and Caribbean and Central American States not Party, plus others from organisations in the region, attended. A number of the States not Party expressed interest in acceding to the CWC and in obtaining information about accession procedures and national authorities, which FCO and DTI will pursue.

UK/RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGREEMENT

The Annual Report for 2000 mentioned the delay in commencing the destruction of Russian chemical weapon stockpiles and the UK's offer of assistance. The Russian Federation subsequently said it would not meet the revised deadline of 29th April 2002 for destruction of 1% of its Category 1 chemical weapons, and that destruction as a whole would not be completed until 2012. On 20th December 2001, in London, Geoff Hoon, the Secretary of State for Defence, and Dr Zinovy Pak, Director General of the Russian Munitions Agency, signed a bilateral treaty which formalised the UK's assistance. Under the treaty, the UK intends during 2002 to fund construction of the water supply for the main Russian chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye. This will be subject to agreement on financial and technical provisions. Other States Parties in and outside the European Union have also announced measures of assistance. On 25th June 2001, the Council of the European Union decided to provide EUR 2 million towards the building of infrastructure at Shchuch'ye. This project is likely to be implemented through the UK's assistance programme. On 6th December, the UK and Norway signed a Memorandum of Understanding under which Norway will provide assistance at Shchuch'ye amounting to about £700,000. Again, this will be implemented through the UK's assistance programme. Canada, Italy and the US are also providing assistance at Shchuch'ye.

- 6.8 The UK offered to meet the replacement costs of three servers for the OPCW's secure critical computer network, and to contribute towards the cost of new laptop computers for inspectors to use on their missions. All of these items of information technology equipment needed updating.

INDUSTRY "CLUSTER" MEETINGS

- 6.9 UK representatives participated fully in all the industry "cluster" meetings that were held at the OPCW during 2001. Declaration- and transfer-related subjects that were considered included: low concentrations of Schedule 2A and 2A* chemicals; boundaries of production; aggregate national data on imports and exports; and transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States not Party to the CWC. The industry "cluster" meetings also considered a number of inspection-related issues, including verification at Schedule 1 facilities, and the methodology for selecting DOC sites for inspection and procedures for their inspection. Discussions will continue during 2002.

MEETINGS OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES

- 6.10 The National Authority and the UK chemical industry were represented at the meetings of national authorities and national chemical industries which were hosted by the OPCW in May.

WORKSHOP ON ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION ISSUES

- 6.11 A representative from the UK's Defence, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Training Establishment at Winterbourne Gunner, Wiltshire, attended the OPCW's Workshop on Assistance and Protection Issues in Vienna between 15 and 18 October.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- 6.12 UK representatives attended all the regular Sessions of the Executive Council and a number of shorter Council meetings, which were held to resolve specific issues. UK representatives also visited the OPCW to participate in various consultations and to attend OPCW advisory panels. The National Authority was regularly in touch with the Technical Secretariat on current issues. In all of these activities, the National Authority worked in close consultation with colleagues in FCO (including the British Embassy in The Hague) and MoD.

ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Under Article X of the CWC, States Parties have undertaken to provide assistance against chemical weapons, through the Technical Secretariat. As evidence of our commitment to meet this obligation, at the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Executive Council in December, the UK announced that it would provide £100,000 (equally funded by DTI and MoD) towards the OPCW's Voluntary Fund for Assistance. This news was welcomed at the Session. The importance of Article X has been sharpened by the events of 11th September, and the Session devoted part of its time to considering a paper by the Director-General on the role of the OPCW in the global struggle against terrorism. During the Session, the Council agreed that OPCW action against terrorism should focus on promoting universal adherence to the CWC and on national implementation legislation, and agreed to establish a working group under its Chairman to take matters forward.

7 Old Chemical Weapons Finds and Destruction

- 7.1 During 2001, 187 actual or suspected OCW found in the UK were transported to the storage and destruction facilities at Dstl Porton Down for evaluation and secure storage, pending disposal. During the year, 331 items of OCW were destroyed. Both figures include non-munition chemical weapon-related items and items which, in the event, proved not to be chemical weapon-related.
- 7.2 All munitions that were received at the Dstl Porton Down storage and destruction facilities were assessed for usability in accordance with the guidelines that were laid down by the OPCW in 2000.

8 Costs of CWC Compliance

INDUSTRY COSTS

- 8.1 The Chemical Industries Association estimated the cost to industry of the completion of declaration forms at £112,000 in total for the two declaration exercises in 2001. This figure is substantially lower than in preceding years and reflects the experience that has been gained by company staff in handling declaration matters. The costs break down to £800 per declaration exercise for each Schedule 2 facility, £500 for Schedule 3 facilities, and £300 for plant sites producing DOCs. These figures exclude the cost to industry of monitoring CWC compliance generally.
- 8.2 The OPCW inspections at the two Schedule 2 and one Schedule 3 sites (see paragraph 4.1) cost UK industry about £18,000. This is in line with past estimates that the cost to a company for each day of an inspection ranged from £500 to £4,000, depending on the number of personnel involved.

NATIONAL AUTHORITY COSTS

- 8.3 The cost of operating the National Authority of eight people in 2001 was approximately £520,000, including the cost of technical support from Dstl Porton Down. This amount was £30,000 less than for 2000, which, in part, reflected the reduced number of inspections by the OPCW caused by its budgetary difficulties. The UK's contribution to the budget of the OPCW, including costs incurred on behalf of the OPCW for certain inspections undertaken in the UK, amounted to about £1.5 million in 2001. This contribution was about £500,000 more than for 2000 as a result of no cash surplus being available for return by the OPCW.
- 8.4 As an indication of its general support for the aims of the OPCW, and to support the Organisation in its prevailing difficult financial circumstances, the UK paid its contribution for 2002 in December 2001. During the year, the UK urged all other States Parties to pay their contributions in full and on time.

MoD COSTS

- 8.5 MoD estimates that its costs in connection with the CWC were about £2 million in 2001. In addition to the relevant costs of the Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, the Joint Arms Control Implementation Group and the Directorate of Military Operations, this figure includes the costs of MoD-funded work at Dstl Porton Down in support of the CWC (comprising expert advice, verification technology, training for OPCW inspectors and work to support the UK's Designated Laboratory), and the costs of disposing of OCW in accordance with CWC requirements.
- 8.6 Dstl Porton Down incurred costs of approximately £53,000 on preparing for and hosting OPCW inspections and declaration and licensing matters relating to Dstl Porton Down facilities. Other work arising from monitoring the movement of Schedule 1 chemicals there cost about £21,000. These costs are additional to those in paragraph 8.5.

9 The CWC National Authority Advisory Committee

9.1 The CWC National Authority Advisory Committee was created in 1997 to advise Ministers on the actions taken by the National Authority to ensure UK compliance with the CWC and the Act. Membership of this Committee was reviewed and, on 27 February 2001, Dr Kim Howells, then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Consumers and Corporate Affairs, announced the re-appointment as Chairman of Dr Tom Inch OBE, formerly Secretary General of the Royal Society of Chemistry, and the appointment, or re-appointment, of members, as follows:

Mr Ian Kenyon
Formerly Executive Secretary
Preparatory Commission for the OPCW

Dr Colin Kinnear
Health, Safety and Environmental Manager
Asahi Glass Fluoropolymers

Mrs Moira McMillan
Director
British Coatings Federation

Dr Kenneth Patterson
Site Process Safety Manager
Hickson & Welch

Dr Peter Plant MBE
Formerly Insecticides Manufacturing Manager
AstraZeneca

Professor Julian Perry Robinson
Science & Technology Policy Research
University of Sussex

Dr Richard Worswick
Chief Executive
Laboratory of the Government Chemist

9.2 The Committee met twice in 2001. The March meeting was addressed by Mr Ron Manley, then Director of Verification at the OPCW. The Committee again considered and advised on the effect of the CWC on industry; the basis of national decisions and the efficiency and effectiveness of the UK's compliance mechanisms; and the composition of this Annual Report to Parliament on the operation of the Act. At the Committee's request, the National Authority prepared a paper on the UK's experience of industrial inspections. The National Authority intends to share its findings with other States Parties.

9.3 Dr Inch and Professor Perry Robinson arranged a workshop at the University of Sussex on 12 October, at which the President of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry and most of the Committee, plus a mix of past and present Government officials concerned with arms-control matters, discussed the application of the CWC's General Purpose Criterion (GPC). The meeting agreed that it was essential for States Parties to recognise the importance of the GPC in requiring that **any** toxic chemical can only be used for permitted purposes: this stipulation does not apply only to the chemicals listed in the Schedules. All present believed that no State Party was doing more than the UK to meet the minimum degree of GPC application, but that States Parties should review their activities in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September. Concerns were also raised that relatively few States Parties have enacted legislation implementing the CWC, and that even fewer have addressed the GPC. This fuels other doubts about whether all States Parties fully recognise the significance of the GPC. At its October meeting, the Committee agreed that a second workshop, with a wider number of representatives, should be arranged for 2002. In the meantime, the UK, through the National Authority and the Committee, would mount an awareness exercise to remind actual and potential users of toxic chemicals of their responsibilities under the CWC and UK legislation.

10 Contacts

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE CWC AND ASSOCIATED IMPORT LICENSING REGULATIONS, CONTACT:

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The National Authority's website can be found at www.dti.gov.uk/non-proliferation/cwcna.

FOR INFORMATION ON EXPORT LICENSING REGULATIONS, CONTACT:

ECO Helpline

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The ECO website can be found at www.dti.gov.uk/export.control.

A list of Scheduled chemicals and precursors can be found on the OPCW website, at www.opcw.nl/cwc/cwc-eng.htm. The OPCW's Homepage can be found at www.opcw.nl/.

11 Glossary of Terms

CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
CWPF	Chemical Weapons Production Facility
DOCs	Discrete Organic Chemicals
Dstl Porton Down	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
ECO	Export Control Organisation
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GPC	General Purpose Criterion
MoD	Ministry of Defence
OCW	Old Chemical Weapons
OGL	Open General Licence
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
The Act	The Chemical Weapons Act 1996

