

Annual Report for 2000
on the operation of
the Chemical Weapons
Act 1996



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Department of Trade and Industry

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on the operation of the
Chemical Weapons Act 1996
by the Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry

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Executive Summary

- 1.1** This report covers the third full year of the operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force on 29 April 1997. In 2000, the United Kingdom augmented its experience in handling inspections by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and in processing and submitting declarations required under the CWC. The UK also implemented licensing and trade control changes in the light of OPCW decisions. Within the OPCW, the UK continued to make an important contribution to discussions on these and other matters affecting implementation of the CWC.
- 1.2** The UK received a total of seven OPCW inspections in 2000: one at an industrial site; three at former chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs); one at the single small-scale facility at the Chemical and Biological Defence Sector of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA Porton Down); one at the facilities for storage and destruction of old chemical weapons at DERA Porton Down; and one at the UK's protective purposes facility at the Royal Military College of Science at Shrivenham (RMCS). All of the inspections were successfully concluded, and none raised concerns about the UK's compliance with the CWC.
- 1.3** In 2000, the UK CWC National Authority (in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)) again co-ordinated the preparation and timely submission to the OPCW of declarations of past and anticipated future activities involving chemicals covered by the CWC Schedules. In addition, the National Authority submitted the annual plan for, and the annual report on, the destruction of old chemical weapons (OCW), plus ad hoc declarations of new finds of OCW. The National Authority also submitted on behalf of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) the UK's programme for protection against chemical weapons.
- 1.4** The National Authority and the DTI's Export Control Organisation (ECO) ensured that the ban from 29 April 2000 on transfers of Schedule 2 chemicals to States not Party was implemented in the UK on time. Following a decision on this issue by the Fifth Conference of States Parties in May 2000, the National Authority immediately implemented guidelines for declaration of low concentrations of Schedule 2B and Schedule 3 chemicals.
- 1.5** National Authority and other UK staff continued to play an active role in support of the work of the OPCW, with a view to ensuring full and effective national and international implementation of the Convention. The UK provided advice and support on administrative, export control, financial, industrial, information technology, scientific, verification and other matters, provided training assistance, and participated substantially in all the OPCW's major meetings in 2000.
- 1.6** A UK practice challenge inspection was mounted at the Royal Naval Air Station, Culdrose, including inspectors and observers from the OPCW and overseas. This exercise provided another useful training opportunity for both the UK and the OPCW. The UK also held a challenge inspection seminar, jointly with the OPCW, in The Hague on 11 February.
- 1.7** The National Authority Advisory Committee continued to oversee the implementation of the CWC and the Chemical Weapons Act 1996 in the UK.

Introduction - The Chemical Weapons Convention

- 2.1** The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) came into force on 29 April 1997 as the first arms control treaty to introduce a verifiable ban on an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. It is administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), based in The Hague. The UK is an original signatory and a founder State Party, and ratified the CWC on 13 May 1996. A total of 141 States Parties had ratified, or acceded to, the CWC by the end of 2000, an increase of 13 on the preceding year.
- 2.2** The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) provides the National Authority responsible for implementing the CWC in the UK. The powers to implement the declaration and verification provisions in the CWC are contained in the Chemical Weapons Act 1996 (the Act). The three main elements of the CWC's verification and compliance provisions have a direct impact on Government civil and military facilities, on industry, and on academia. These are: declarations; inspections; and trade controls. Under the CWC, a State Party must submit detailed declarations on activities involving specified chemicals. Some of these declarations are subject to verification by inspectors from the OPCW. Trade in chemicals listed in the Schedules in the CWC Annex on Chemicals is controlled through the UK's export and import licensing regulations, enquiries about which should be made to the DTI - to the Export Control Organisation (ECO) for exports or to the National Authority for imports. (See Contacts on page 18.)

UK Export Controls

The UK is committed to a range of international agreements (of which the CWC is one) affecting our exports of defence and dual-use equipment and technologies which could be useful to a country planning to develop weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them. Any exports which fall into these categories are considered for approval under one of four types of export licence - standard individual (allowing shipments of specified goods to a specific consignee up to the quantity specified by the licence), open individual (specific to an individual exporter and allowing multiple shipments of a range of goods to a range of specific destinations without necessarily specifying consignees), special categories of open individual (for protective clothing and equipment, mainly for journalists and aid agency workers working in areas of conflict, and exports to the UK section of the Continental Shelf for use in connection with offshore installations and associated vessels) and open general (allowing unlimited exports of specified goods to specified destinations by any exporter registered with the ECO). Open General Licences may be subject to conditions. About one hundred licences covering chemicals in the CWC Schedules were issued in 2000.

- 2.3** Technical advice is provided to the National Authority by the Chemical and Biological Defence Sector of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA Porton Down), whose staff are part of the National Authority when acting in that role. The National Authority also works closely with the Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat at the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

The staff of all of these agencies attend meetings at the OPCW to maximise the UK's effectiveness in that forum. Input is also provided by representatives of UK industry. The National Authority would welcome greater involvement by industry in advising it on the effects of the CWC verification regime and contributing to the UK position in discussions in the OPCW that affect industry. Generally, as time goes on, the National Authority will depend more and more upon industry - and, indeed, upon all organisations and institutions that are affected by the CWC, including academia - for input on the effect of the CWC in the UK.

- 2.4** The Act requires the Secretary of State to prepare a report on its operation in each calendar year, and to lay a copy of the report before each House of Parliament.

Preparing and Submitting UK Declarations and other information

- 3.1** Under the CWC, States Parties must submit annual declarations to the OPCW covering activities in the preceding calendar year, and activities planned for the following calendar year, involving chemicals listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 to the CWC. States Parties must also declare past activities with a category of chemicals known as Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOCs). Chemicals are grouped according to the risk that they pose to the object and purpose of the CWC, with the highest risk chemicals being in Schedule 1. The timetable for these declarations is set out below:

Declaration	Timing
Annual Past Declaration	90 days after the end of the calendar year
Annual Anticipated Declaration for Schedule 1 Chemicals	90 days before the beginning of the calendar year
Annual Anticipated Declaration for Schedule 2 and 3 Chemicals	60 days before the beginning of the calendar year

- 3.2** In addition, information on any old chemical weapons (OCW) held has to be submitted annually as follows:

Annual plan for the destruction of OCW	60 days before the end of the calendar year
Annual report on the destruction of OCW	60 days after the end of the calendar year
Ad hoc declarations of new finds of OCW	Within 180 days of discovery

- 3.3** Reports are also required annually on activities at any chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) approved by the OPCW for conversion for use for non-prohibited purposes. In addition, a State Party's programme for protection against chemical weapons has to be submitted annually.

Annual Past Declaration for 1999

- 3.4** The National Authority began preparing for the Annual Past Declaration for 1999 in October 1999, when revised declaration forms and guidance notes were prepared. These were sent to industry early in January 2000. As in the previous year, and in order to assist companies, the National Authority first entered onto the forms data provided for the initial declaration in 1997 and which were likely to remain unchanged (eg facility name, its owner, its operator and its address). Companies were, therefore, only required to provide any additional information, revise existing details as necessary, and sign and date the forms, before returning them.

- 3.5** The declarations submitted were converted by the National Authority database into the format required by the OPCW. The UK declaration was sent to the OPCW one day before the deadline of 30 March.
- 3.6** In addition to the declarations on industrial facilities, the UK's declaration to the OPCW also covered:
- i) activities relating to Schedule 1 chemicals undertaken at the Royal Military College of Science (RMCS) and at DERA Porton Down (the UK's protective purposes facility and single small-scale facility respectively); and
 - ii) the transfer of Schedule 1 chemicals to and from other States Parties.

Annual Anticipated Declaration for 2001

- 3.7** The National Authority completed the Annual Anticipated Declaration for 2001 for the Schedule 1 facilities at the RMCS and DERA Porton Down and submitted it to the OPCW on 20 September 2000, before the deadline of 2 October.
- 3.8** The forms for Schedule 2 and 3 sites were sent to industry for completion on 7 September. The National Authority consulted DERA Porton Down and the Chemical Industries Association before finalising the guidance notes and forms.
- 3.9** Following receipt of the required information from companies, the National Authority sent the Annual Anticipated Declaration to the OPCW on 23 October, before the deadline of 2 November.

Other information

- 3.10** Information provided by MoD and submitted with the UK's declaration outlined the aims of the UK's chemical defence programme, particularly the need to provide effective protection against possible attack by chemical weapons (CW). The UK provided information on the objectives for equipment procurement resulting from this programme and on the chemical defence training which takes place in the UK. Information was also given on the main components of the programme, which comprise:
- detection, identification and monitoring;
 - warning and reporting;
 - protection;
 - contamination control; and
 - medical countermeasures.

A copy of this statement has been placed in the Library of both Houses of Parliament.

- 3.11** The UK submitted a report on activities at the former CWPF, approved by the OPCW for conversion, at Nancekuke, Cornwall; a report on the destruction of OCW during 1999; reports of ad hoc finds of OCW up to 30 September 2000; and a plan for the destruction of OCW during 2001.

Issues affecting declarations

- 3.12** During 2000, a decision was adopted in the OPCW on **low concentrations** for declarations of Scheduled chemicals in mixtures. After entry into force of the CWC, concentration limits had been determined by States Parties on a national basis, which resulted in anomalies and an uneven burden on industry. Consequently, States Parties had become keen to establish guidelines that were both consistent with the non-discriminatory and effective implementation of the CWC, and recognised the economic and administrative implications for States Parties of their implementation. The Fifth Conference of States Parties, which met in May 2000, adopted a decision that declarations would not be required for mixtures containing 30% or less of a Schedule 2B or a Schedule 3 chemical. It also asked the OPCW's Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to study applicable concentration limits for declarations of mixtures containing Schedule 2A and 2A* chemicals, and to report in time for the Sixth Conference in 2001. The UK took a leading role in the negotiations on the 30% limits (which were in line with our objectives), and supported the emerging consensus on both non-proliferation and industrial grounds. Although not due to be applied until 1 January 2002, the UK implemented the decision on declarations with immediate effect in order not to unfairly handicap UK industry, as it represented a relaxation of the rules which had previously been applied nationally in the UK.
- 3.13** There has always been agreement in the OPCW that Scheduled chemicals produced by any means must be declared. However, various views were advanced regarding the meaning of '**production by synthesis**' used in the context of DOCs. Early in 1999, the SAB had concluded that the inclusion of biological and biologically-mediated processes would have a negligible impact on declarations, and that, as it was no longer possible to distinguish clearly between 'chemical' and 'biological and biologically-mediated' processes, further efforts to clarify 'production by synthesis' were pointless. The UK and other States Parties considered this issue further during 2000. DERA Porton Down prepared a paper which argued that, contrary to the SAB's view, to require the declaration of plant sites producing DOCs by biological and biologically-mediated processes would result in declaration of a large number of additional sites, such as those making alcoholic beverages, which could not pose a threat to the object and purpose of the CWC for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, DOC declarations should be required only where the production process involved conventional chemical synthesis. Where the production process involved solely the use of micro-organisms, or bio-transformation, declarations should not be required. UK industrial organisations that responded to the National Authority's requests for comments on the paper supported these views. The National Authority is giving further consideration to the matter and will continue to seek to influence developments on it in the OPCW.

- 3.14** Early in 1999, the SAB had considered whether the CWC provisions extended to **salts of Scheduled chemicals containing amino groups**. The SAB had concluded that there should be no differentiation in relation to the treatment of a free base and the corresponding salts under the CWC. The UK and other States Parties had regarded the Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers quoted in the CWC as delineating the scope of Scheduled chemicals. Thus, the UK considered the Schedule entry, for example, for saxitoxin to apply to the neutral form (free base), in accordance with the CAS number quoted; as no other CAS number appears in the entry, the UK did not regard the CWC as extending to salts of saxitoxin. Legal advice to the National Authority confirmed that this was the proper interpretation of the CWC's provisions, a view which was subsequently found to be held by the majority of States Parties. Again, the National Authority will continue to seek to influence developments on the matter in the OPCW.
- 3.15** As part of the UK's ongoing concern to include in its declarations all companies in the UK that might be carrying on declarable activities, DERA Porton Down had, in 1999, searched several databases, following which the National Authority had approached companies identified as carrying out possibly declarable activities. The National Authority is liaising with the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions to ensure that all waste disposal companies are fully aware of their CWC obligations.

OPCW Inspections in the UK

- 4.1** In 2000, the UK received a total of seven inspections from the OPCW: one at a Schedule 3 industrial site; three at former CWPFs; one at the single small-scale facility at DERA Porton Down; one at the facilities at DERA Porton Down for storage and destruction of OCW; and one at the UK's protective purposes facility at RMCS. Once again, the co-operation of the sites inspected was excellent, and all the inspections proceeded without incident. Four of the inspections were carried out consecutively, by one inspection team which was in the UK for twelve days. The National Authority was, exceptionally, able to arrange the storage and transport of that team's technical equipment, which the OPCW sent to the UK ahead of the team and which left the UK after the inspectors had departed.

Industrial Inspections

- 4.2** The company that was inspected in 2000 by the OPCW commented favourably on the support provided by the National Authority and its technical advisers from DERA Porton Down.

Advice to DOC Companies

The National Authority, in consultation with DERA Porton Down, produced an information sheet on how DOC plant sites should prepare for inspections and what they could expect to happen during them. The National Authority then visited selected DOC companies to discuss verification issues. During those visits, useful insight was obtained on how the companies, particularly the larger ones, might best be able to assist inspectors in the limited time they will have available for inspections. The National Authority has since circulated the information sheet to all DOC sites liable to inspection by the OPCW.

Former Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

- 4.3** Inspections at the sites of all the UK's eight former CWPFs took place in 1997, and the inspection teams had confirmed that they could never again be used for the production of chemical weapons. In that year, one former CWPF (Nancekuke) was approved by the OPCW for use for non-prohibited purposes. In 1998, the OPCW issued certificates of destruction for three sites (at Barnham Heath, Sutton Oak and West Cottingworth). Also in 1998, re-inspections took place at the sites at Lord's Bridge, Nancekuke, Norton Disney, Randle and Valley, Rhydymwyn. In 1999, the OPCW issued a certificate of destruction for Lord's Bridge; and re-inspections took place at Norton Disney, Randle and Valley, Rhydymwyn.
- 4.4** In 2000, two sites (Randle and Valley, Rhydymwyn) were approved by the OPCW for conversion for use for non-prohibited purposes. The OPCW subsequently issued a certificate of conversion for Randle. Both sites were re-inspected during the year, as was Norton Disney. All these inspections reflected the CWC's provisions for verifying compliance even where a State Party has long since ceased offensive CW activity.

DERA Porton Down OCW Storage and Destruction Facilities

- 4.5** This inspection was the third at this facility since the entry into force of the CWC. The declared facility was once again found to be operating in compliance with the UK's obligations under the CWC.

Issues affecting inspections

- 4.6** The draft facility agreements for the UK industrial sites inspected in 1998 and 1999 have still to be finalised as a consequence of a backlog of work at the OPCW.
- 4.7** In 2000, as in 1998 and 1999, a consensus still could not be reached among States Parties on guidelines to determine the usability of OCW. The UK had continued to assess OCW declarations on the basis of Technical Secretariat guidance. This approach had been endorsed by OPCW inspectors. However, in 2000 the OPCW issued new trial guidelines on determining usability which were successfully applied during the inspection of the OCW storage and destruction areas at DERA Porton Down.
- 4.8** The Fifth Conference of States Parties confirmed an Executive Council decision on the methodology of **selecting Schedule 3 sites for inspection**.

Licensing and Trade Controls

- 5.1** The Act contains a number of provisions to control Schedule 1 chemical production, possession and use to ensure that the UK's CWC obligations are met. These controls, together with separate import and export licensing requirements, aim to ensure that quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals acquired or possessed by the UK do not exceed the 1 tonne ceilings specified in the CWC; that the chemicals are used only for purposes not prohibited by the CWC; and that the CWC's conditions on transfers are met. Licence-holders are obliged to report changes of circumstance to the National Authority.

Production, Possession and Use Licences

- 5.2** An Open General Licence (OGL) permits those registered under it to produce, possess or use up to an aggregate of 5 grammes of any Schedule 1 chemical for pharmaceutical, medical or research purposes in any calendar year. For 2000, 25 organisations confirmed that they still wished to operate under the OGL. None registered a first-time intention to operate under the licence.
- 5.3** An Individual Production Licence is required to produce above 5 grammes of Schedule 1 chemicals and an Individual Possession and Use Licence is required to possess or use above 5 grammes of these chemicals. In addition, anyone wishing to import Schedule 1 chemicals must obtain an import licence from the National Authority. The table below details the number of licences issued in each of these categories for 2000.

Type of Licence	Number Issued
Individual Production	3
Individual Possession and Use	3
Import	0

Issues affecting licensing and transfers

- 5.4** The National Authority was in touch with all of its saxitoxin licence-holders during 2000 to ensure that they were appropriately licensed (see paragraph 3.14).
- 5.5** The Fifth Conference of States Parties adopted a decision that the ban on transfers of Schedule 2 chemicals to and from States not Party, which took effect from 29 April 2000, should not apply to products containing 1% or less of a Schedule 2A or 2A* chemical, to products containing 10% or less of a Schedule 2B chemical, or to products identified as consumer goods packaged for retail sale for personal use or packaged for individual use. The Fifth Conference also asked the OPCW's Executive Council to prepare a recommendation on transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals for consideration at the Sixth Conference of States Parties.

- 5.6** The National Authority wrote to all declared Schedule 2 sites early in 2000 to remind them of the CWC's requirement that transfers of such chemicals must be limited to States Parties with effect from three years after entry into force of the CWC (ie 29 April 2000). No problems arose in the UK following implementation of this requirement. The National Authority will contribute fully to the OPCW's consideration of additional measures relating to transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States not Party from 29 April 2002.

Trade in Scheduled Chemicals

DTI's Export Control Organisation (ECO) requires licences to be sought for exports of Schedule 1 chemicals to all destinations, including other EU Member States. Export licences are not required for most Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemical exports to other EU Member States, unless they are then destined for a non-EU State. The National Authority advises ECO on all applications for exports of Scheduled chemicals, and keeps a close eye on the quantities and purposes involved, as well as the destination. The National Authority will continue to examine carefully all export licence applications.

Activities in support of the OPCW

Practice Challenge Inspection at the Royal Naval Air Station, Culdrose

- 6.1** The UK considers that challenge inspections are an important and fundamental feature of the CWC's verification regime for ensuring compliance. No such inspection has been requested to date but, in order to test UK procedures for receiving a challenge inspection, MoD has for several years mounted annual practice inspections at defence or DERA sites. A practice challenge inspection took place at the Royal Naval Air Station at Culdrose in Cornwall between 25 and 30 June 2000. The OPCW were invited to participate in the exercise and provided the team leader (from South Africa) and two inspectors (from India and the Russian Federation). There were also guest inspectors from the Islamic Republic of Iran and South Africa, along with five UK inspectors. Observers attended from Canada, the Russian Federation and the United States.
- 6.2** Over a period of almost a week, the practice inspection covered a wide range of subjects and areas, including sea and air exit monitoring, managed access to ammunition stores, management of inspection sub-teams, interrogation of logistic and medical databases, and health and safety issues. The depth and breadth of the participants' experience and backgrounds contributed to the success of the exercise, and the presence of OPCW inspectors gave the UK another valuable insight into how a real challenge inspection (which could involve up to 50 inspectors and considerable quantities of equipment) would be conducted. At the same time, the exercise again highlighted the clear differences between challenge and routine inspections and helped the OPCW to develop further their challenge inspection procedures and skills.

Challenge Inspection seminar

- 6.3** The UK and the OPCW jointly held a challenge inspection seminar on 11 February 2000 in order to increase international understanding of the nature and purpose of this key feature of the CWC. The UK highlighted its positive approach towards challenge inspections; referred to lessons learned from the programme of practice challenge inspections, including the need for standard operating procedures, training, technical advice and managed access strategies; and stressed the need to view the process of challenge inspection as a means of demonstrating compliance with the CWC.
- 6.4** The UK asserted its view that challenge inspections should be used as a means of verifying compliance with the CWC; that an absence of indisputable evidence of non-compliance would not invalidate their use; and that, generally, the use of challenge inspections was a vital part of the CWC's verification provisions, and essential for the CWC to function with full effectiveness. There was support for the UK's view from other States Parties (including Brazil, who spoke of their own experience of hosting a practice challenge inspection arranged for the OPCW) and from OPCW Technical Secretariat staff who were present. However, some States Parties expressed the view that a challenge inspection could only ever justifiably be used as a last resort and after extensive consultations. These differing views were reiterated at subsequent Executive Council meetings.

- 6.5 HE Mr José Bustani, the Director-General of the OPCW, thanked the UK for its initiative in instigating the seminar.

Meeting of National Authority and chemical industry representatives

- 6.6 The National Authority and a representative from the UK chemical industry were present at the second meeting of national authorities and national chemical industries which was hosted by the OPCW from 12 to 14 May 2000. The meeting included a one-day workshop on the role of Customs authorities in CWC implementation, culminating in a visit to Rotterdam Port. The meeting was addressed by Dr John Gee, Deputy Director-General of the OPCW, and by Technical Secretariat staff. National authority representatives spent part of the time in their regional groups discussing transfers of Scheduled chemicals, unresolved declaration and verification issues, and the fostering of international co-operation, among other topics. The whole event again provided a useful occasion for an exchange of views between the national authorities, responsible for implementing the CWC, and chemical industries affected by it.

OPCW Associate Programme

- 6.7 The OPCW conducted its first Associate Programme at the University of Surrey, at chemical plants in the Netherlands and at the OPCW itself, between September and December 2000. The Programme was designed to promote the safe and peaceful use of chemistry among all States Parties, but in particular among those with developing or transitional economies. Its participants, from 12 States Parties, were enabled to acquire technical and practical knowledge of best practice in management, operations and safety in the chemical industry from their counterparts from more developed States Parties. The Programme is also aimed at assisting with future recruitment of OPCW staff.

Assistance Coordination Workshop

- 6.8 In October, the UK funded an Assistance Coordination Workshop, hosted by the Russian Federation in Moscow and jointly organised with the OPCW. The workshop aimed to raise awareness among other States Parties of the assistance available in the event of chemical attack or accident. It also covered the issues involved in coordinating and delivering such assistance. MoD attended and gave a presentation at the workshop.

Industry 'Cluster' Meetings

- 6.9 UK representatives participated fully in all the industry 'cluster' meetings that were held at the OPCW during 2000. Declaration- and transfer-related subjects that were considered included: **low concentrations; salts of Scheduled chemicals; captive use** (where a chemical is produced and consumed within the same production train); **boundaries of production** (whether or not the reactor is the end-point of the process for CWC purposes); **aggregate national data** on imports and exports; **rounding rules for Schedule 1 transfers**; and **transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States not Party** to the CWC. The

industry ‘cluster’ meetings also considered a number of inspection-related issues, including **inspection of records during Schedule 2, Schedule 3 and DOC inspections**; the **frequency of Schedule 2 inspections**; the **methodology of selecting Schedule 3 sites for inspection** (on which the Fifth Conference confirmed an Executive Council decision (see paragraph 4.8)) and the **methodology for selecting DOC sites for inspection**. Discussions on the unresolved issues will continue during 2001.

Other activities

- 6.10** UK representatives also attended all the regular Sessions of the Executive Council and a number of shorter Council meetings which were held to resolve specific issues (such as the OPCW budget and administrative matters). Matters that were approved at the Sessions included the two UK conversion requests (see paragraph 4.4), a Russian Federation conversion request, two Russian Federation destruction verification plans, an extension to the deadline for the destruction of 1% of declared Category 1 chemical weapons in the Russian Federation, and new validated analytical data for the central OPCW database. UK representatives also visited the OPCW regularly, for example to participate in consultations and to attend OPCW advisory panels. The National Authority was also regularly in touch with the Technical Secretariat on current issues. In all of these activities, the National Authority worked in close consultation with colleagues in FCO, MoD (including DERA Porton Down) and the British Embassy in The Hague.

Destruction of the Russian Federation’s CW Stocks

The CWC requires declared possessors of chemical weapons to destroy all their stocks by 2007 with the possibility of a five-year extension to 2012. At 40,000 tonnes (three-quarters of which consists of air and artillery munitions filled with nerve agent), the Russian Federation has declared the largest CW stockpile of any of the four declared possessors. The magnitude of the task of destroying such a huge stockpile within this timeframe, at an estimated cost of £4 billion, is exceptional given the Russian Federation’s economic situation. In May 2000, the Fifth Conference of States Parties agreed to extend the deadline for the Russian Federation to destroy 1% of its Category 1 chemical weapons to 29 April 2002, which is also the 20% destruction deadline. Several States Parties have agreed to provide assistance towards the Russian Federation’s own destruction efforts. In July, the UK announced that it would make available up to £12 million over three years for high priority chemical demilitarisation and biological non-proliferation projects in the Russian Federation. A priority for UK assistance will be support for CW destruction projects. The decision recognised that the scale of the problem in the Russian Federation was unique. The UK will continue to work closely with the Russian Federation and other States Parties on this major task.

Old Chemical Weapons Finds and Destruction

- 7.1** During 2000, 532 actual or suspected OCW found in the UK were transported to DERA Porton Down for evaluation and secure storage, pending disposal. During the year, 712 items of OCW were destroyed. Both figures include non-munition CW-related items and items which, in the event, proved not to be CW-related.

Costs of CWC Compliance

Industry Costs

- 8.1** The annual cost to industry of the completion of declaration forms has been estimated at approximately £1.5 million in total for two declaration exercises each year. This was based on estimates by industry of the time taken to complete the declaration forms. The overall figure reflects a significant difference between the costs to companies of declaring Schedule 2 or Schedule 3 plants (estimated at £2,000 to £7,000 per plant) and the costs to those submitting information on plants producing DOCs (estimated at under £1,000).
- 8.2** The Chemical Industries Association told the National Authority that the OPCW inspection at the Schedule 3 site (see paragraph 4.2), where the inspectors were present on three days, cost UK industry just over £3,000. This is in line with past estimates that the cost to a company for each day of an inspection ranged from £500 to £4,000 depending on the number of personnel involved.

National Authority Costs

- 8.3** The cost of operating the National Authority of eight people in 2000 was approximately £550,000, including the cost of technical support from DERA Porton Down. The UK's contribution to the budget of the OPCW, including costs incurred on behalf of the OPCW for certain inspections undertaken in the UK, amounted to just under £1 million in 2000. This was significantly lower than in 1999 because the OPCW had allocated to the UK a proportion of its cash surplus from 1997.

MoD Costs

- 8.4** MoD estimates that its costs in connection with the CWC were about £1.7 million in 2000. In addition to the relevant costs of the Joint Arms Control Implementation Group and the Directorate of Military Operations, this figure includes the costs of other MoD staff, MoD-funded work at DERA Porton Down in support of the CWC (comprising expert advice, verification technology, training for OPCW inspectors and work to support the UK's Designated Laboratory), and the costs of disposing of OCW in accordance with CWC requirements.
- 8.5** DERA Porton Down incurred costs of approximately £43,000 on preparing for and hosting OPCW inspections and declaration and licensing matters relating to DERA Porton Down facilities. Other work arising from monitoring the movement of Schedule 1 chemicals at DERA Porton Down cost about £20,000. These costs are additional to those in paragraph 8.4.

The CWC National Authority Advisory Committee

- 9.1** The CWC National Authority Advisory Committee was created to advise Ministers on the actions taken by the National Authority to ensure UK compliance with the CWC and the Act. The eight-person Committee, which comprises representatives from academia, industry and Government, met twice during 2000 under the chairmanship of Dr Tom Inch OBE, formerly Secretary General of the Royal Society of Chemistry. The Committee again considered the effect of the CWC on industry, the basis of national decisions and the efficiency and effectiveness of the UK's compliance mechanisms. The Committee also advised on the production of this Annual Report to Parliament on the operation of the Act. The Advisory Committee will continue to provide advice on the operation of the CWC and of the Act in the UK.
- 9.2** The Committee advised DTI on a number of issues which it had identified in 1999. In June, Dr Inch met with Government officials to discuss four of these. For two of them (the use of analytical procedures during routine inspections, and designated laboratories and proficiency tests), DERA Porton Down subsequently prepared papers which were considered in the OPCW. The Committee discussed the third issue, 'production by synthesis' (see paragraph 3.13), and salts of Scheduled chemicals (see paragraph 3.14), and understood the position the National Authority had taken. The Committee hoped that further advice and clarification would be provided by the Executive Council in due course. The Committee would be watchful that progress and decision-making in the Executive Council and, indeed, in the OPCW generally was not unduly delayed.
- 9.3** During the year, the Chairman advised Dr Kim Howells (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Consumers and Corporate Affairs) that, having assured itself that compliance mechanisms were working well in the UK, the Committee had turned its attention to the effectiveness, fitness for purpose and cost of OPCW declaration, licensing and inspection procedures. The Committee believed that opportunities existed to simplify and reduce the overall costs of some of the procedures and to improve and clarify some of the definitions. The Minister expressed his thanks for the Committee's good work.

Contacts

For further information on the CWC and on import licensing regulations, contact:

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The National Authority's website can be found at
www.dti.gov.uk/non-proliferation/cwcna

For information on export licensing regulations, contact:

Export Control Organisation (ECO) Helpline
Department of Trade and Industry
Bay 419
4 Abbey Orchard Street
London
SW1P 2HT

Tel: + 44 (020) 7215 0560
Fax: + 44 (020) 7215 0558

The ECO website can be found at <http://www.dti.gov.uk/export.control>

A list of Scheduled chemicals and precursors can be found on the OPCW website,
at www.opcw.nl/cwc/cwc-eng.htm.

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