

# **Chapter 4: The Roles and Responsibilities of Responding Organisations**



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## Scope

- 4.1.1 This chapter provides a general overview of the roles and responsibilities of organisations in the planning and response to a nuclear emergency. It identifies the requirements placed on organisations by legislation and regulation, and draws upon custom and practice where roles have developed through exercising or from experience gained from real emergencies.
- 4.1.2 These roles have been developed by NEPLG and its constituent organisations over a number of years and continue to develop as a result of changes to the law, organisational changes and restructuring and, more generally, through a process of continuous improvement.

## Legal Position

- 4.1.3 The responsibilities of organisations when responding to a nuclear emergency, both in relation to protecting the public and to protecting their own workforces are governed by a number of Acts, principally the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA), the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 as amended (NIA) and the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR).
- 4.1.4 REPPIR place legal duties on operators, transporters of radioactive material, local authorities and employers of people who intervene in a radiation emergency, such as the emergency services. The regulations adopt many of the emergency planning principles of the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (COMAH) and formalise into regulations previous emergency planning arrangements with local authorities that have been in place around nuclear licensed premises for many years.
- 4.1.5 Off-site emergency plans, prepared by first tier local authorities in consultation with the emergency services and site operators are therefore produced in accordance with REPPIR. These emergency plans cover procedures, facilities and equipment and are practised regularly in a rolling programme of local site-based exercises involving the site operators and the relevant local and national agencies.
- 4.1.6 The successful demonstration, through exercising, of the site operator's emergency response capabilities is also a requirement of the Site Licence which is granted by the Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear

Installations Inspectorate (NII) under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 as amended (NIA).

- 4.1.7 Additionally, the HSWA places a general duty on all responders to do all that is reasonably practicable to reduce risk whilst the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999 (made under the HSWA) contain specific requirements for the protection of employees and the public from radiation.
- 4.1.8 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) places a duty on all Category 1 responders to carry out risk assessments of generic risks, above a scale pre-determined by Cabinet Office, within the local area. Multi-agency co-operation in maintaining a Community Risk Register is also a statutory duty.
- 4.1.9 Circumstances permitting, the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Home Secretary and other senior ministers, would decide whether existing legislation was adequate to manage the emergency or if there was a need to take Emergency Powers under Part Two of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA). It should be noted that it is unlikely that emergency powers would be required for responding to a reasonably foreseeable civil nuclear emergency.
- 4.1.10 Other legislation governing the response of specific organisations, such as the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 and the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985, is identified in the relevant sections of this chapter.

### **Custom and Practice**

- 4.1.11 A number of elements which influence or form these roles and responsibilities have developed organically through exercising and from experience taken from emergencies. For example, the role of the Government Technical Advisor (GTA), for civil nuclear emergencies, came into effect following the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in the United States, whilst the Radiation Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET) came into being to protect the UK from overseas emergencies following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Neither is required by law but - together with the equivalent arrangements for responding to accidents involving defence nuclear assets - would be important aspects of an emergency response and help to protect the critical national infrastructure and are therefore universally accepted by government departments and responders. They are incorporated into emergency plans, and bring with them certain roles and responsibilities.

## **Conclusion**

- 4.1.12 NEPLG brings together representatives from organisations involved in the planning and response to nuclear emergencies. The members draw on their understanding of the wider developments in emergency planning and lessons from exercises and real events, to develop the arrangements for nuclear emergency response captured in the following sections of this guidance. The guidance is disseminated to responders around the country and fed into central Government's contingency planning.
- 4.1.13 The most significant changes to the roles and responsibilities of responding organisations come with organisational restructuring and the passing of new legislation. Other developments are perhaps more subtle but nonetheless important to the overall response.

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### **4.2 The Fire and Rescue Service**

#### **Introduction**

- 4.2.1 The primary role of Fire and Rescue Services in an emergency is the rescue of people trapped by fire, wreckage or debris. They will prevent further escalation of an incident by controlling or extinguishing fires, rescuing people and undertaking other protective measures. They will deal with released chemicals or other contaminants in order to render the incident site safe and establish exclusion zones. Also, they will assist other agencies, especially the ambulance services with casualty handling and the police with the recovery of bodies and other matters, such as the removal of large quantities of flood water.
- 4.2.2 The Fire and Rescue Services would therefore, expect to be called to any incidents to which they can contribute towards the saving of life, property, the environment or our heritage.
- 4.2.3 The Service would expect to be one of the first emergency services on the scene and take control of the inner cordon for any incidents involving fire and rescue, and, where necessary the containment of hazardous substances.

#### **Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004**

- 4.2.4 The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 ('the Act') received Royal Assent on 22 July and came into force on 1 October 2004. The Act also gives statutory effect to the Fire and Rescue National Framework ('the Framework') which establishes Central Government's vision of service delivery for the future.
- 4.2.5 Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Act place specific duties on all Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRAs). Section 6 places a duty on all FRAs to make provision to promote fire safety within their area. Section 7 requires that all FRAs must make provision for extinguishing fires and protecting life and property in the event of fire in their area. Section 8 places a duty on all FRAs to make provision for rescuing people from road traffic accidents and protecting them from serious harm in the event of such an accident.
- 4.2.6 Section 9 enables the Secretary of State, by order following consultation, to place other duties on FRAs to make provision to respond to particular types of emergency other than fires and road traffic accidents. This can include specific direction as to how they should plan, train and equip for

such emergencies. An example is the deployment of mass decontamination equipment following a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incident.

4.2.7 Historically, the Fire and Rescue Services could be said to have focused their attention on operational response, with perhaps, some community safety work and some involvement with local authorities in the development of Emergency Planning and Preparation activities. However, these duties and focus have changed since the introduction of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, the 'National Framework' and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

#### **Civil Contingencies Act 2004**

4.2.8 Today, civil protection in the UK is based on the concept of integrated emergency management.

4.2.9 Modern Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRAs) now recognise that prevention is better than cure and so are becoming increasingly involved in all five Integrated Emergency Management areas, i.e. the Assessment, Prevention, Preparation, Response and Recovery phases.

4.2.10 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 defines a focus on local arrangements for civil protection, establishing a statutory framework of roles and responsibilities for local 'category one' responders. These duties include the duty to assess the risk of an emergency occurring and to maintain plans for the purposes of responding to an emergency.

4.2.11 Fire and Rescue Authorities, as Category 1 responders, are at the core of emergency response. Therefore FRA responders are subject to the full set of civil protection duties. They are required to:

- \* Assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform contingency planning
- \* Take measures to prevent emergencies
- \* Maintain plans for dealing with an emergency
- \* Collaborate on sharing information, training and exercising in relation to emergency preparedness
- \* Put in place Business Continuity Management arrangements
- \* Put in place arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency
- \* Share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination
- \* Co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency

- 4.2.12 Section 2 of the Act establishes a definition of 'emergency' and provides that the Category 1 Responders' duties under the Act only apply to events or situations which require the "use of assets beyond the scope of normal operations" and require a "special deployment".
- 4.2.13 The principal emphasis in developing response and recovery plans must be on responding effectively to the common consequences of incidents or events (rather than the prime focus being on different causes). The generic planning arrangements for responding to a range of emergencies must be cohesive and consistent, whether the emergency arises from natural causes, human error, technical failure, or through malicious acts.
- 4.2.14 Fire and Rescue Services therefore have a pivotal role to play in the risk assessment of and response to a wide range of emergencies, both fire and non-fire related, although the co-ordination role of fire and rescue is generally restricted to operations inside the inner cordon. Their expertise and equipment for dealing with chemical emergencies, including decontamination, and their search and rescue capabilities, also give them a key role in multi-agency planning.

### **Fire and Rescue Operations**

- 4.2.15 The Fire and Rescue Services would attend any emergency situation at a nuclear installation to which they are called. The primary duties would be fire fighting, preventative measures to contain or prevent escalation of the incident and search and rescue operations at the incident. Fire and Rescue services are trained and equipped to manage gateways into the inner cordon, liaising with the police to establish who should be granted access (particularly where terrorist action is the suspected cause) and recording entry and exit. However, responsibility for the health and safety of personnel working within the inner cordon remains with individual agencies, which should ensure that personnel arriving at the scene have appropriate personal protective equipment and are adequately trained and briefed. Health and safety issues will be addressed collectively at multi-agency meetings on the basis of risk assessment.
- 4.2.16 Although the National Health Service (NHS) is responsible for the decontamination of casualties, fire and rescue services will – where required – undertake mass decontamination of the general public in circumstances where large numbers of people have been exposed to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances. This is done on behalf of the NHS, in consultation with ambulance services.

## 4.3 Local Authorities

### General

4.3.1 Local government in Scotland, Wales and some areas in England is provided by Unitary Authorities where a single top tier council is responsible for the delivery of all services. However in other areas of England, there exists a two tier structure comprising of a number of lower tier District Councils, grouped within the boundary of a top tier County Council. In this situation, responsibility for the delivery of services is divided between these two tiers of local government.

### Legal Position

4.3.2 REPIR. The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPIR) require those top tier local authorities that have in their area premises and rail transport operations where storage levels exceed certain thresholds to prepare an off-site emergency plan to protect the public from the effects of a radiation emergency.

4.3.3 In addition, under Regulation 17, all local authorities must prepare plans to supply information and advice to the public about any kind of Radiation Emergency which may affect them.

4.3.4 Civil Contingencies Act 2004. The basis of the Civil Contingencies Act is the definition of “emergency“ which is:

- \* an event or situation which threaten serious damage to human welfare,
- \* an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment; or
- \* war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to security .

“Human welfare” includes loss of life and illness and damage to the “environment” involves contamination of land, water or air with radio-active matter.

The Act also creates categories of “responders” and local authorities (of both classes) are Category 1 Responders. As a consequence local authorities are required to carry out a number of key duties:

- \* Assess the risk of emergencies occurring
- \* Put in place emergency plans
- \* Business continuity management arrangements

- \* Arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency
- \* Share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination
- \* Co-operate with other local responders
- \* Provide advice and assistance to business and voluntary organisations.

It should be recognised that whilst local authorities have various duties under the Act they are only required to carry out those duties in relation to functions they perform as a local authority.

In addition it should be noted by virtue of Regulation 12 of the Civil Contingencies Act (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 that Category 1 Responders are not required to perform the above duties in relation to an “emergency” which is a “radiation emergency” under Regulation 2 of REPPIR. This is taken to mean that REPPIR duties override the CCA duties.

Whilst from a legal perspective REPPIR and CCA create a separate legislative framework in practice the experience gained from implementing the requirements of the CCA and associated guidance impact on the implementation of REPPIR (and vice versa) e.g. the experience gained in discharging the duties relating to warning and informing the public under the CCA inform the identical requirements under REPPIR. In practice, the arrangements for responding to emergencies by local authorities are essentially the same regardless of the type of emergency.

## **Contingency Planning**

### 4.3.5 The REPPIR Regulations require top tier local authorities to:

- \* Prepare off-site emergency plans for any premises notified to them by HSE as being capable of causing a Radiation Emergency
- \* Consult the public when preparing the off- site emergency plan
- \* Review and test the off – site emergency plan at least once every three years.
- \* Advise the Nuclear Site Operator concerning the content and distribution of pre-prepared information to members of the public.
- \* Train staff in their response roles as laid down in the off –site emergency plan
- \* Prepare plans to inform the public of the measures they should take for their health protection following any Radiation Emergency (applies to all Local Authorities)

## Response

4.3.6 The role of the local authority in relation to the initial response phase is to provide support for the people in the area. Resources of the local authority will be utilised to mitigate the effects on people, property and the environment and to co-ordinate the response from the voluntary sector. In the event of an emergency, as part of a wider multi-agency response, local authorities will, if required:

- \* Attend the Strategic Coordination Group.
- \* Support the Emergency Services (road closures, signing etc)
- \* Establish and manage Emergency Support Centres (including Reception/ Rest Centres and Humanitarian Assistance Centres)
- \* Co- ordinate the response of the voluntary agencies
- \* Provide welfare and trauma support
- \* Provide public information about the emergency
- \* Assist with the media response.
- \* Provide emergency mortuary facilities.
- \* Establish and operate a Disaster Fund
- \* Provide emergency feeding
- \* Support the local community
- \* Provide emergency transport facilities
- \* Provide facilities for waste disposal
- \* Arrange emergency accommodation and relocation.
- \* Assist the Food Standards Agency by enforcing restrictions on the sale of foodstuffs.
- \* Monitor private water supplies and issue advice concerning their safety.
- \* Provide environmental health advice/ enforcement.
- \* Provide plant and demolition/ site clearance facilities.
- \* Take the lead in the recovery phase of the emergency.

Responsibility for providing these services varies across the UK, depending upon the nature of Local Government in the area concerned. For example: District Councils have no responsibilities in relation to social services or education; County Councils have no environmental health officers or building control inspectors and there are various arrangements for managing the road network. In addition, some of these services may be supplied by contractors and/ or the voluntary sector on behalf of the local authority.

## **4.4 The Health Service**

### **Strategic Health Authorities**

(for Scotland these functions are undertaken by the NHS Boards)

### **Contingency Planning and Response**

4.4.1 In association with Regional Directors of Public Health (RDsPH), Chief Executives of Strategic Health Authorities ensure that:

- \* All NHS Organisations (Primary Care Trusts, NHS Trusts, Foundation Trusts and Ambulance Service Trusts) within their areas have appropriate emergency and response arrangements which are regularly tested in accordance with national guidelines. This is a strategic and performance management responsibility.
- \* appropriate arrangements are in place to co-ordinate the health contribution to the overall response to a widespread incident or one that significantly threatens NHS capacity and that these arrangements are set out in explicit local arrangements;
- \* satisfactory arrangements are in place for representation at Strategic Co-ordination Centres/Strategic Co-ordination Groups (“Gold Commands”)
- \* appropriate arrangements are in place with Chief Executives of adjacent Strategic Health Authorities where Police Authorities are not co-terminus.
- \* there are clear arrangements with all PCTs for upward reporting of major incidents, including out-of-hours and media handling.

### **Primary Care Trusts (PCTs)**

(also applies for NHS Boards/NHS Trusts in Scotland)

Legal Position

4.4.2 PCTs have responsibility for promoting the health of the population in their area and securing the provision of health services to that population. This includes all aspects of health protection, including emergency planning and response.

### **Contingency Planning**

4.4.3 All PCTs have suitable plans in place to respond to a nuclear incident, or an incident involving the spread of radioactivity, including:

- \* an accident at a nuclear site within their boundary
- \* the spread of radioactive contaminants across their border
- \* a transportation accident,

- \* an accident involving the non-nuclear use of radioactive materials (e.g. medical uses or industrial radiography).
- 4.4.4 PCT plans cover arrangements for the provision for health care; advice to health professionals and the public; radiation monitoring for people exposed or possibly exposed to radiation.
- 4.4.5 PCTs with nuclear sites within their boundaries are closely involved with the site operator's emergency planning and response arrangements. However, all PCTs are required to designate hospitals prepared to receive radiation casualties and ensure that appropriate facilities are available in hospitals for both contaminated casualties and for persons suffering from significant radiation injury.
- 4.4.6 PCTs with nuclear sites within their boundaries take the lead in planning for the distribution of stable iodine tablets in consultation with the operator, local authority and emergency services. Tablets may be distributed by various agencies, for example the police or site operator.

### **Response**

- 4.4.7 Within designated Police Authority areas PCT emergency plans will establish appropriate arrangements for the co-ordination of the health response to an incident involving radioactivity. In some areas a "lead PCT" will take responsibility for co-ordinating the NHS response with implications for an area wider than that of a single PCT or where the local PCT is unable to manage an incident within its own resources. In other areas, this role is taken by the strategic health authority. Local policies will make this clear.
- 4.4.8 These co-ordinating arrangements will include:
- \* managing the response by the PCT's own services
  - \* co-ordinating the overall response by the NHS in the area (but see the section on ambulance services below for management at the scene)
  - \* in the recovery phase, take responsibility for co-ordinating more detailed assessments of any immediate health impacts
  - \* provide staff for the Scientific Technical and Advisory Cell (see below)

### **Scientific & Technical Advisory Cell (STAC)**

- 4.4.9 In any incident in which the Police convene a Strategic Co-ordination Centre/Strategic Co-ordination Group (SCG/SCG), a STAC is likely to be formed. This will be manned by representatives of all relevant agencies. It

will usually be chaired/coordinated by a Director of Public Health, although this may be varied according to the nature of the emergency. The public health input to STACs will be provided by PCTs and staff from the Health Protection Agency

The role of the STAC is to:-

- \* co-ordinate the knowledge available regarding the health hazards presented by the incident,
- \* assess the consequent risks to public health
- \* advise on strategies designed to minimise these hazards
- \* following consultation with the Government Technical Adviser (GTA), Military/MOD Coordinating Authority, or Site Emergency Controller that the relevant parameters have been met, authorise the implementation of plans for the issue of potassium iodine.
- \* establish the information base needed to evaluate the long-term epidemiological consequences of the incident
- \* instigate any investigations found to be necessary

### **NHS Hospital Trusts**

4.4.10 Hospitals with Emergency Departments should plan for the reception and treatment of irradiated an/or contaminated casualties should ensure that:

- \* detailed emergency plans are drawn up and regularly exercised
- \* there are clear procedures for activating the plan
- \* appropriate staff are designated and given specific training
- \* space is allocated where reception and treatment can take place without risk of further contamination of areas and people (The facilities are the same as those required for chemical contamination)
- \* space is allocated for vehicles that may be contaminated
- \* special equipment and materials are provided and properly maintained
- \* specialist advice and assistance is readily available from a designated local medical physics department
- \* someone in authority is appointed to deal with enquiries and with representatives of the press and other media.

### **Response**

4.4.11 When accident cases are received, the hospital trust will be responsible for ensuring that the emergency plan is put into effect, and that employers and relatives of the accident victims are informed.

## **4.5 Ambulance Service (including the Scottish Ambulance Service)**

### **Legal Position**

4.5.1 The Ambulance Service role in a nuclear incident forms part of the NHS's statutory responsibility for the care of sick or injured persons in the UK.

### **Contingency Planning and Response**

4.5.2 The key roles and responsibilities of the Ambulance Service in a major incident are to:

- \* Co-ordinate the on-site operational NHS response. The necessary procedures would be initiated from the Ambulance Control Centre as soon as a major incident is suspected, or confirmed.
- \* Assess the health implications of the incident. The first officer or crew to arrive at the scene would assess the incident and report to the Ambulance Control Centre. The assessment would include the nature of the incident, apparent or confirmed hazards, estimate of casualties and assessment of NHS resources needed to deal with the incident.
- \* Identify and activate the resources needed to respond. The Ambulance Control Centre would access and mobilise NHS resources as required.
- \* Manage the NHS activity at the scene. An Ambulance Incident Officer would be assigned for this task.
- \* Co-ordinate NHS communication and liaison regarding immediate management of the incident. This would be between the Ambulance Incident Officer, the Ambulance Control Centre and other NHS control Centres and facilities.
- \* Treat casualties: Extricate, in line with agreed policies on the initial rescue of contaminated/possibly contaminated and irradiated/possibly irradiated people, triage, stabilise, initially treat and transport to hospital.

## 4.6 Nuclear Operator

### Legal Position

4.6.1 The Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (as amended) requires that emergency arrangements must be in place. Under this Act the site licensee is required to hold a nuclear site licence which imposes 36 licence conditions and gives many responsibilities to the licence holder. Site Licence Condition 11 states the requirement for the licensee to have emergency arrangements and Licence Condition 9 puts a duty on the licensee to ensure that every person on the site receives adequate instruction as to the actions to be taken in the event of an accident or emergency.

4.6.2 Licence Condition 11 requires the licensee to:

- \* make and implement adequate arrangements for dealing with an accident or emergency arising on its site and the effects;
- \* seek approval for these arrangements, and any changes to these arrangements, from the Health & Safety Executive (HSE);
- \* consult certain agencies involved in the arrangements;
- \* hold rehearsals at such intervals and at such times as the HSE may specify; and
- \* ensure that employees with duties under the arrangements are properly instructed to perform those duties.

4.6.3 Facilities under the direct control of the MOD are exempt from licensing under the Nuclear Installation Act 1965 (as amended), thus the facilities at Faslane, Coulport, Vulcan, and Devonport Naval Base are exempt from licensing. Although these sites are not licensed, they are regulated by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) under Authorisation, a regulatory mechanism similar to licensing by the Health and Safety Executive, Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (HSE NII). DNSR works in close co-operation with the HSE NII.

4.6.4 The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPPIR) require the operator to:

- \* prepare a Hazard Identification and Risk Evaluation assessment and report for all accidents identifying the reasonably foreseeable emergency;
- \* develop emergency plans to mitigate the effects of the radiation to personnel and public;
- \* where a radiation emergency is reasonably foreseeable the operator must provide information to the local authority enabling them to prepare an off-site emergency plan;

- \* management of radiation exposures that exceed the dose limits of the IRR 1999; and
- \* distribute information in conjunction with the local authority to persons and premises that are likely to be affected by an off-site hazard. This includes basic facts about radiation, types of radiation emergency, emergency measures to be taken and appropriate actions by members of the public. UK Nuclear Operators fulfil this legal requirement at their various sites either by the production of an annual calendar distributed within the detailed emergency planning zone, or with information leaflets distributed at regular intervals within the zone.

### **Contingency Planning**

4.6.5 The operator, as a result of the Site Licence requirements and/or REPPiR, produces detailed emergency plans and handbooks for:

(a) On-site response arrangements and actions including:

- \* declaration and cancellation conditions;
- \* warnings on site;
- \* muster and roll call arrangements;
- \* emergency facilities and equipment;
- \* emergency duties, roles and actions;
- \* site emergency organisation (trained teams to manage the site and plant), assess and repair damaged plant, search and rescue missing persons, fire fighting, and radiological monitoring of conditions on the site and plant;
- \* off-site radiological monitoring procedures and countermeasure strategies;
- \* arrangements for personal dose assessment; and
- \* communication systems to be used in the event of an emergency.

(b) The company off-site support organisation, and company representation at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre and for providing information to the media.

### **Response**

4.6.6 The principle objectives of the operators' response are:

- \* to provide radiological data and plant information to formulate countermeasure advice for the protection of the public off site;
- \* to ensure the safety of personnel on the site;
- \* to configure the plant or process in a safe condition;
- \* to notify supporting agencies and organisations of the occurrence of the event;

- \* to terminate release of radioactivity as quickly as possible;
- \* to provide compensation (as specified in the Nuclear Installations Act 1965, (as amended)).

## **4.7 Department of Energy and Climate Change**

### **Legal Position**

4.7.1 The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) would be the lead Government Department in the event of an emergency at a civil nuclear site in England or Wales. The designation of lead departments, for various types of accident, was made by the Cabinet Office following a review of Government emergency responsibilities. There is no legislative basis for this arrangement.

### **Contingency Planning**

4.7.2 DECC chairs NEPLG and takes the lead in the preparation of NEPLG guidance (see Chapter 1). DECC also participates in off-site nuclear exercises, and contributes to their planning and follow-up.

### **Response**

4.7.3 DECC would be responsible at the national level for co-ordinating the response to an emergency at a civil nuclear site in England or Wales. The department would:

- \* assemble up to date information on the emergency, including measures being taken to protect the public and make the site safe again. This is done by liaising closely with other Government Departments, the National Assembly for Wales, agencies and organisations close to the affected site, such as the police, fire service and local authority, on measures being taken to protect the public and make the site safe again;
- \* as the lead Government department, ensure that information is available to the public and media;
- \* be responsible for alerting the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Commission and various neighbouring countries of the accident;
- \* provide the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, who is responsible to Parliament for civil nuclear safety matters, with briefing on the course of the accident and measures being taken to protect the public; and
- \* appoint a Government Technical Adviser (GTA) from HM NII to advise the police and emergency services on measures to protect the public (see chapter 8).

4.7.4 To facilitate its work, DECC would set up its Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room (NEBR) in London, as soon as possible after receiving notification of the accident. Staff for the NEBR would be drawn mainly from the

Department's Energy Group and from designated emergency response staff from elsewhere in the department, but senior representatives from other central Government departments and agencies which have roles in dealing with the emergency would also be invited to attend. DECC would send a Government Liaison Officer (GLO) and team to the Strategic Coordination Centre to provide a high level link with the NEBR.

4.7.5 In the event of an emergency at a civil nuclear site in Scotland, the lead department responsibility would fall to the Scottish Executive (see section 4.8).

### **Radiation Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET)**

4.7.6 A Nuclear Emergency in the UK:

- \* DECC has well established procedures to follow on receipt of notification of an incident. This includes maintaining a Nuclear Incident Room (NIR) that combined with 24 hour duty officers enables the department to be alerted to an incident whether it occurs in the UK or overseas.
- \* Upon receipt of notification DECC would contact the Environment Agency, as appropriate, and would activate the RIMNET Technical Co-ordination Centre wherein DECC and EA staff would respond to ad hoc requests for technical advice, information and contributions to Ministerial briefing. It would also activate RIMNET, as necessary, and send a representative to the NEBR if required.
- \* In the longer term, advice on clean-up operations would be provided by the relevant environment agency.

4.7.7 A Nuclear Emergency Overseas:

- \* DECC is the lead Government department for co-ordinating the response to an overseas nuclear emergency
- \* The UK has signed a number of international agreements covering exchange of information in the event of a nuclear emergency.
- \* The National Response Plan, implemented by DECC with support from EA provides arrangements for dealing with an emergency. This includes DECC maintaining contact arrangements and duty officers that ensure the UK can be notified of an emergency at any time. The RIMNET network, comprising 92 gamma dose rate monitors located throughout the UK provide a secondary alert mechanism in the event of non-notification. RIMNET is the UK's national radiological database.

## **4.8 Scottish Executive**

### **Legal Position**

- 4.8.1 The Scottish Executive would be the lead Government Department in the event of an emergency at a civil nuclear site in Scotland.
- 4.8.2 In the event of a defence nuclear accident in Scotland, MOD would be the Lead Government Department, but Scottish Ministers are responsible for the off-site consequence management aspects. Both administrations would work closely together.

### **Contingency Planning**

- 4.8.3 On notification of a nuclear emergency The Scottish Executive Fire & Civil Contingencies Division (FCCD) would open the Scottish Executive Emergency Room (SEER) on the instructions of the Energy and Telecommunications Division of the Enterprise, Energy & Tourism Directorate (EETD-EN&T). The response to the emergency at the national level would be co-ordinated by the staff of EETD-EN&T Division from the SEER in consultation with colleagues other Scottish Executive Directorates and other agencies.
- 4.8.4 The SEER would be staffed on a 24-hour basis if necessary and the following Directorates/Divisions would initially be represented as follows:

- \* EETD-EN&T
- \* FCCD
- \* Rural Directorate
- \* Environmental Quality: Drinking Water Quality Unit
- \* Health Department (Medical Services)
- \* Public Health & Substance Misuse: Emergency Planning†
- \* HMNII
- \* Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
- \* HPA-RPD
- \* SE -Media & Communications Group
- \* Ministry of Defence

### **Response**

- 4.8.5 The main functions of the Scottish Executive will be:
- \* to assemble up-to-date information on the emergency in order to provide co-ordinated briefing for Scottish Ministers;
  - \* to liaise closely with other Government Departments, agencies and organisations close to the affected site, such as police, fire service and

local authority, on measures being taken to protect the public and make the site safe again;

- \* to be the main source of information from central Government to the public and media;
- \* to appoint a GTA from HMNII to advise the police and emergency services on measures to protect the public;
- \* to liaise with, and provide up-to-date information to DECC or the MOD to ensure that UK Ministers are briefed on the emergency;

## **4.9 HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate**

### **Legal Position**

- 4.9.1 Under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, and supporting legislation, the Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate is responsible for ensuring that nuclear operators make appropriate arrangements to respond to a nuclear emergency.

### **Contingency Planning**

- 4.9.2 The Inspectorate has arrangements in place for co-ordination and deployment of staff to monitor and ensure that the operator is taking all reasonable steps both to restore the plant to a safe state and to minimise the risk to the general public.

### **Response**

- 4.9.3 The Inspectorate would send inspectors to the affected site and to the Strategic Co-ordination Centre and would set up its own emergency room at the Health and Safety Executive Bootle headquarters. This would enable the Inspectorate to assess the likely course of the accident and its consequences, to consider the implications for other nuclear installations and to advise central government accordingly.
- 4.9.4 The Inspectorate would also be responsible for monitoring the activities of the operator and for advising the Government Technical Adviser and central Government on the accident.

### **Defence Sites**

- 4.9.5 For defence Licensed or Authorised sites the position is similar. In view of specific exemptions from the Nuclear Installations Act, the Inspectorate would work closely with the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) inspectors at the site, Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) and the MOD Main Building in Whitehall. As the MOD does not appoint a Government Technical Advisor for defence accidents, advice would be provided to the MOD and to the chairman of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group at the SCC.

## **4.10 Food Standards Agency**

### **Legal Position**

- 4.10.1 In accordance with the Food Standards Act 1999, the Food Standards Agency's statutory objectives are 'to protect public health from risk which may arise in connection with the consumption of food' and to 'to otherwise protect the interest of consumers in relation to food'. In meeting these objectives, it is the Agency's function to provide, 'advice and information to the general public' or to 'any public authority' on matters relating to the safety of food. These objectives apply equally to issues regarding animal feedstuffs and users of animal feedingstuffs.

### **Contingency Planning**

- 4.10.2 The Agency has established procedures for responding to food incidents (Principles for Preventing and Responding to Food Incidents, July 2007 – available on the Agency's website: <http://www.food.gov.uk/foodindustry/guidancenotes/incidentguidance/principlesdoc>). Each incident response follows the same key steps of risk assessment, identifying risk management options and implementing decisions, and risk communication.

### **Response**

- 4.10.3 The Agency's role in a nuclear emergency will be to ensure that the public is protected from contaminated food. Specific responsibilities are as follows:
- \* To assess the risk of any contamination of food and determine whether statutory limits will be exceeded.
  - \* To take action to ensure that food contaminated to unacceptable levels does not enter the food chain, implementing, as necessary, restriction orders under the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985.
  - \* To provide advice and information to the public and public authorities, including advice on precautionary measures to be taken in the early stages of a response.
  - \* To provide advice to other organisations, including the Environment Agency, on issues relating to the safe disposal of contaminated food.
  - \* To ensure that subsequent recovery arrangements take account of food safety issues.

Chapter 12 provides guidance on the arrangements for the provision of precautionary advice and the making of food restriction orders by the FSA, and on the interface and liaison arrangements between the FSA and other organisations located at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre.

## **4.11 Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs**

### **Legal Position**

4.11.1 DEFRA has statutory responsibilities for protecting animal welfare and minimising the impact of emergencies on food production, fishing and farming. These are covered by various pieces of legislation on animal welfare and civil protection.

### **Contingency Planning and Response**

4.11.2 A prime responsibility of DEFRA in a nuclear emergency would be to protect animal welfare and to minimise the impact of the emergency on food production, farming and fishing industries. In addition to carrying out these responsibilities, DEFRA has a formal agreement with the Food Standards Agency to provide support to the Food Standard Agency's response.

## **4.12 Department of Health and Regional Offices of the NHS Executive**

Department of Health (for Scotland the devolved elements of these functions are overseen by the National Emergency Planning Officer of the Scottish Executive Health Department and implemented by the Director of Public Health for each of the NHS Boards).

### **Contingency planning**

4.12.1 The Department of Health's role in planning for radiological or nuclear incidents is to:

- \* provide guidance to other government departments and the NHS on the implications to public health in the event of any exposure to radiation;
- \* provide guidance to health authorities on arrangements for distribution of stable iodine tablets;
- \* liaise with Regional Directors of Public Health (RDsPH) to ensure that PCTs;
- \* have suitable plans to provide treatment and health advice to the public;
- \* provide monitoring facilities for people who may, or feel they may have been contaminated by exposure to radiation.

### **Response**

4.12.2 The Department of Health's role in responding to major incidents is to

- \* activate the DH Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room;
- \* activate an Operations Centre if necessary;
- \* liaise with the lead government department and send a representative to the lead department briefing room;
- \* provide representation in the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) if activated;
- \* alert RDsPH and PCTs if first indications of an incident are received nationally;
- \* provide authoritative information on the incident, where relevant, to regional offices and the health authorities involved;
- \* provide a focal point on public health issues at national level; and
- \* keep ministers informed;
- \* contribute to the Central government response.

4.12.3 The Department of Health is also the sponsor for the HPA-RPD and for the FSA whose responsibilities with regards to emergencies are described in paragraphs 4.10.

Regional Directors of Public Health (for Scotland similar arrangements are overseen by the National Emergency Planning Officer of the Scottish Executive Health Department and implemented by the Director of Public Health for each of the NHS Boards)

### **Contingency planning**

4.12.4 Their role in planning for an incident is to ensure that:

- \* appropriate support is provided to the Chief Executives of the Strategic Health Authorities and Primary Care Trusts;
- \* PCTs produce plans in accordance with national guidance;
- \* such plans are consistent with each other and deal adequately with inter-authority co-ordination of responses;
- \* leadership and co-ordination responsibilities are clearly designated when more than one PCT is involved; and
- \* there are satisfactory arrangements for representation at Police Strategic 'Gold Controls'.

### **Response**

4.12.5 Their role in responding to major incidents is to:

- \* provide appropriate support to PCTs and NHS Trusts;
- \* maintain contact with the DH Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room throughout any nuclear emergency; and
- \* provide briefing for ministers on the local aspects of the management of the incident.

4.12.6 Regional Directors of Public Health are supported by Health Emergency Planning Advisors who have particular expertise in planning for and responding to major incidents.

## **4.13 Department for Transport**

### **Contingency Planning and Response**

#### 4.13.1 Transport of Radioactive Materials by Road

- \* DFT's Inspectors of Radioactive Materials Transport (IRMT) in the Dangerous Goods Division execute, on behalf of the Secretary of State, the role of competent authority for the transport of radioactive materials by all modes of transport.
- \* DFT is responsible for the enforcement of the regulations governing the transport of radioactive materials by road, and for taking the lead in the Government response to accidents occurring during road transport of civil nuclear materials.
- \* For accidents involving the road transport of defence nuclear material MOD would take the lead in the Government response. For road transport accidents in Scotland, the Scottish Executive would lead on public protection and consequence management.

#### 4.13.2 Transport of Radioactive Material by Other Modes

- \* DFT IRMT would advise the appropriate lead division in the case of accidents occurring during transport of radioactive materials by other modes, and would provide advice as appropriate on transport issues arising from accidents at fixed sites.

## **4.14 Environment Agency**

### **Legal Position**

4.14.1 The Environment Agency has a broad role under the Environment Act 1995 to protect and enhance the environment as a whole in England and Wales. In the case of an emergency at a nuclear site, these responsibilities comprise some that are statutory, where there may be a breach of a law which the Agency is responsible for enforcing, and others that are operational, where the Agency effectively acts on behalf of or in support of DEFRA in providing a response and advice to other relevant participating organisations.

### **Contingency Planning and Response**

4.14.2 The Agency's roles and responsibilities, in the event of an emergency at a nuclear site, include the following:

- \* Provide advice on radiological aspects of environmental contamination to all relevant participating organisations during the course of the incident.
- \* Provide Agency representatives who have specialist knowledge of radioactive substances at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre, DEFRA Environment Operations Centre, DECC Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room, or MOD HQ Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (HQ NARO).
- \* Advise on appropriate disposal of radioactive waste.
- \* Advise DEFRA Divisions on technical and regulatory aspects of the response
- \* Provide information to the public and the media, in consultation with the Lead department and the Strategic Command at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre associated with the affected site.
- \* Manage flows of regulated waters if appropriate, to minimise impact.
- \* Ensure safety of any Agency staff who may be involved.
- \* Check for breach of the site operator's authorisation, where relevant.

4.14.3 The Agency's broader responsibilities including fisheries, conservation, water resources, waste regulation and water quality could come into play at some stage during the short to long term remediation. More extensive statutory powers could be involved if an incident also involved significant chemical contamination.

4.14.4 The Agency does not have a specific statutory duty to monitor controlled waters for radioactive contamination. But in the event of an environmental incident involving a release of radioactive substances to controlled waters, the Agency would arrange sampling and radiochemical analysis with a

view to protecting the environment and advising downstream users and abstractors.

## **4.15 Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)**

### **Legal Position**

4.15.1 The Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Radioactive Substances Act 1993. Under the Act SEPA is responsible for authorising the accumulation and disposal of radioactive waste and the keeping and use of radioactive material.

4.15.2 SEPA also has a broad environmental role under the Environment Act 1995 to protect and enhance the environment as a whole in Scotland.

4.15.3 SEPA has duties under the Civil Contingencies Act for emergency planning, business continuity planning, risk assessment, communicating with the public, cooperation and information sharing.

### **Contingency Planning and Response**

4.15.4 Following an emergency at a licensed nuclear site in Scotland, SEPA's roles and responsibilities include the following:

- \* Provide advice on the environmental impact of a radiological incident to relevant organisations during the course of the incident.
- \* Provide SEPA representatives who have specialist knowledge of Radioactive substances at the Strategic Coordination Centre.
- \* Advise on and/or, where necessary, authorise appropriate accumulation and disposal of radioactive waste.
- \* Advise Scottish Executive on technical and regulatory aspects of radioactive waste disposal.
- \* Provide appropriate information to the public, the media and other agencies as appropriate.
- \* Ensure safety of any SEPA staff who may be involved.
- \* Check for breach of site operator's authorisation, and gather evidence, where relevant.

4.15.5 SEPA, in conjunction with the Food Standards Agency, maintains an independent monitoring programme for radioactivity in food and the environment in Scotland and would provide data from this monitoring programme to provide baseline information on radioactivity levels prior to any incident. SEPA may carry out environmental monitoring following any incident and will, if requested, provide advice to government on sampling and measurement of radioactive contamination in the environment, potable and surface waters.

## **4.16 Cabinet Office**

### **Civil Contingencies Secretariat**

#### **Contingency Planning**

- 4.16.1 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) was set up to improve the UK's resilience against disruptive challenges through working with departments and other responders to anticipate, assess, prevent, prepare and respond to and recover from nationwide crises. These aims have been strengthened by the establishment of regional and local response tiers and the Civil Contingencies Act 2005, including the ability to bring in statutory measures in an emergency. CCS defines resilience as the ability at every level - national, regional and local – to detect, prevent and if necessary handle disruptive challenges. This would include nuclear emergencies. CCS will provide a secretariat function in cross government coordination in a major emergency and this is detailed in the Concept of Operations <http://www.ukresilience.info/publications/conops.pdf>
- 4.16.2 The secretariat works in close partnership with DECC, MOD, the Scottish Executive, National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Office, and engages with them in:
- i. a co-ordinated cross-government response, sharing their learning with other departments
  - ii. horizon scanning and developing early warning systems;
  - iii. their preparation of plans against various eventualities and ensuring that those plans are properly integrated with existing emergency plans.
  - iv. the exercises needed to test the plans and enable continual improvements;
  - v. putting relevant information flows in place, particularly the key facts to inform strategic decisions made from the centre

#### **Response**

- 4.16.3 CCS has produced a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for emergencies, (irrespective of their cause) requiring co-ordinated UK central government response. This recognises subsidiarity – decisions at the lowest appropriate level, with coordination at the highest necessary level. Local responders should be the building block of response on any scale. Different categories of incident have been defined, at the lower levels these will be dealt with at local, regional and lead government department level without the need for central co-ordination (although due to the sensitivity of the nuclear industry there may need to be a central

government response, at least initially, for incidents with a widespread impact).

- 4.16.4 Any significant event that requires cross-government co-ordination and support would result in the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC) being activated with the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) and the News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) being opened. CCC can be convened at the ministerial level or official level (CCC(O)), but in practice for a major emergency both groups would sit. The decision to set up CCC would be made by the lead government department with CCS. CCC will normally be chaired by the lead government department minister but where there is an important civil unrest element this is likely to be the Home Secretary and for a major terrorist incident again the Home Secretary or the Prime Minister.
- 4.16.5 CCC's purpose is to act at strategic level across Government and it would be able to invoke emergency powers if these were deemed appropriate.
- 4.16.6 NCC's purpose is to pull together press officers from across Whitehall and the Devolved Administrations to co-ordinate nationally the provision of information to the media and public. Locally, the provision of information would continue to be met by the Media Briefing Centre (MBC), near to the site, working in close liaison with the NCC.
- 4.16.7 In the event of an emergency of a scale, or of a kind notified by the lead department as requiring central involvement, the CCS will engage in a way designed to enable ministers and senior officials to concentrate on strategic decisions. Key objectives will be smooth working between organisations and seamless transition to central co-ordination if required. Supporting DECC, MOD, and where appropriate the Scottish Executive, the CCS will:
- i. review the immediate needs at the centre and support their provision; plan for potential scaling-up, logistical management and exit;
  - ii. confirm that central government is being kept informed and is prepared to engage;
  - iii. help manage the response through either DECC's Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room (NEBR), MOD HQ Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (HQ NARO) or the Scottish Executive Emergency Room (SEER);
  - iv. with the lead government department activate COBR and establish a CCC and/or CCC(O).

## **4.17 Foreign and Commonwealth Office**

### **Contingency Planning and Response**

4.17.1 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office would provide guidelines to our posts abroad as well as passing up to date information to, and receiving reactions from, foreign governments and international organisations.

## **4.18 Health Protection Agency**

### **Legal Position**

4.18.1 The Health Protection Agency (HPA) Act 2004 came into effect on April 1st 2005 and established the HPA as a Non-Departmental Government Body. One of the fundamental roles of HPA described within the Act is:

- \* To provide a rapid response to health protection emergencies, including the release of biological, chemical, poison or radioactive substances

4.18.2 The responsibilities of the Agency, in the main, formally relate to England and in co-operation with the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) to Wales. In respect of radiation protection the remit is wider however covering the whole of the UK.

### Health Protection Agency – Radiation Protection Division

4.18.3 The Health Protection Agency (HPA-RPD) was formerly known as the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB). The role of HPA-RPD in a nuclear emergency has developed from the integration of NRPB into the HPA as part of the Health Protection Agency Act. The Act integrates the broad functions previously specified for NRPB in the Radiological Protection Act 1970.

### **Contingency Planning and Response**

4.18.4 HPA-RPD would work closely with other Divisions within HPA, in particular the Local and Regional Services (LaRS) to provide expert advice and information relating to the radiological aspects of any emergency (including public protection measures) to government and any strategic group set up to manage the response.

4.18.5 HPA would provide radiation protection experts to act as advisors at appropriate emergency response centres supported by the HPA-RPD emergency operations centre based at Chilton in Oxfordshire. This emergency centre would direct and co-ordinate monitoring activities assimilate data and information, undertake radiological assessments and formulate radiation protection advice.

4.18.6 HPA's national role in radiation monitoring co-ordination has been augmented under the auspices of NEPLG. The Group has agreed arrangements, which are set out in Chapter 15 of this document, whereby HPA would be responsible for co-ordinating the activities of monitoring resources made available by other organisations.

4.18.7 HPA now has the responsibility, brought forward from responsibilities as NRPB, to specify Emergency Reference Levels (ERLs) of radiation dose below which countermeasures are unlikely to be justified in a nuclear emergency. This forms one of a suite of advice documents on nuclear emergencies which include advice on application of ERLs and intervention criteria for recovery. These documents are published by HPA.

## **4.19 Meteorological Office (Met Office)**

### **Legal Position**

4.19.1 As a Trading Fund within the Ministry of Defence, one of the key objectives of the Met Office is to contribute to the safety of the public by providing a range of weather warnings and emergency services specified by Civil Departments, including pollution tracking.

### **Contingency Planning**

4.19.2 In accordance with procedures documented in the PACRAM (Procedures and Communications in the event of a release of RAdioactive Materials) User Guide, the Met Office provides a forecasting response service in the event of an emergency atmospheric release of radioactivity anywhere in the UK. The Environment Monitoring and Response Centre (EMARC) is the unit within the Met Office Operations Centre which will respond to all nuclear pollution emergencies affecting the UK

### **Response**

4.19.3 Upon notification of an incident/exercise, the EMARC duty forecaster will respond with a verbal brief emphasising current wind speed and direction. A more detailed weather forecast is then prepared on the PACRAM Forecast Information Form (FIF) and upon completion is faxed to staff at the nuclear plant involved and to other relevant organisations. The Met Office has a multiple response target to return all PACRAM forecasts within 30 minutes and 70% within 20 minutes. Forecasts are updated as required.

4.19.4 Upon request, the Met Office will run NAME, its long distance pollution transport model, and send output from NAME to the RIMNET system. (See also DECC, RIMNET at Section 4.7.6).

4.19.5 After the declaration of an emergency at any UK nuclear site a forecast adviser will, upon notification, be detached to the Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room (NEBR) at DECC for a civil nuclear accident, or the MOD HQ NARO in the event of a defence nuclear accident. The forecast adviser will make every effort to arrive at the NEBR within a call-out response time of three hours. Additionally, if resources allow, a further adviser may attend the relevant Strategic Co-ordination Centre.

## **4.20 National Assembly for Wales**

### **Legal Position**

4.20.1 In the event of a nuclear emergency in Wales the UK Government is responsible for overall policy and strategy, and command and control mechanisms will remain through Police Gold and local mechanisms.

4.20.2 The lead division within the Assembly for a nuclear emergency is the Air and Environment Quality Branch located within the Environment Division. Their role is to:

- \* keep the First Secretary and other members of the Assembly's Cabinet fully informed of all aspects of the management of the emergency;
- \* help keep local and other authorities, and the public informed;
- \* advise central government on any adjustments to priorities or redeployment of resources necessary to meet Welsh needs; and
- \* act as a central reporting point for local agencies where this can assist central government.

### **Contingency Planning and Response**

4.20.3 In order to carry out these functions an emergency group based in the Assembly's operations centre would be established with representatives from various Divisions within the Assembly including Agriculture, Health Services, Management Services and Press. Representatives from other bodies such as Environment Agency Wales would supplement this. The Assembly's Agriculture Division would also set up an operations room at its Caernarfon office.

4.20.4 The Assembly would send a representative to the DECC NEBR, or MOD HQ NARO, if required.

## **4.21 Ministry of Defence**

### **Legal Position**

4.21.1 In the event of an accident at a defence nuclear site, or involving defence nuclear assets, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) would, in addition to its responsibilities as the owner/operator of the nuclear assets, become the Lead Government Department with responsibility at the national level for co-ordinating the central Government response to the defence nuclear accident. For defence nuclear accidents in Scotland, MOD will remain as the lead department, however, the Scottish Executive will lead on public protection and consequence management.

### **Contingency Planning and Response**

4.21.2 In accordance with the requirements of UK domestic legislation and MoD policy and in recognition of these responsibilities, a MOD Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (NARO) is maintained. A MOD Headquarters (HQ) NARO would be generated if an accident were to occur involving defence nuclear assets: it would comprise elements drawn from across the department.

4.21.3 As the Lead Government Department, the MOD will co-ordinate the Central Government response through meetings of the Nuclear Accident Information and Advisory Group (NAIAG). The NAIAG is an inter-departmental meeting of officials from all government departments and agencies. It provides the forum for discussing policy and for the agreement of actions to implement a co-ordinated central government strategy, the overriding principle being to ensure a cohesive, consistent and effective national response.

4.21.4 In addition to its responsibilities for defence nuclear accidents, the MOD has agreed to provide mapping and monitoring resources on a mutual aid basis in the event of a civil nuclear accident in the UK. It might also provide unarmed military assistance to the civil authorities under Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) when this is needed to help deal with a natural disaster or major incident. In such a case, the military would be deployed in a supporting capacity as responsibility for dealing with the emergency would lie with the civil authorities.

## **4.22 Maritime and Coastguard Agency**

### **Legal Position**

4.22.1 Her Majesty's Coastguard is part of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and is responsible for initiation and co-ordination of civil maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) within the United Kingdom SAR Region. In discharging this duty HMCG mobilises, tasks and directs adequate resources to respond to vessels and persons in distress at sea or at risk of injury or death on the cliffs and shoreline of the UK.

### **Contingency Planning and Response**

4.22.2 HMCG controls and co-ordinates the response to major sea and shoreline emergencies until such time as the incident is closed or has become mainly land based, at which point primacy is passed to the police service. In executing this duty the service co-ordinates the operations of Lifeboats, Rescue Helicopters, Coastguard Response Teams and Vessels in the vicinity of an incident. It liaises with Foreign SAR Organisations, Port Authorities, shore Emergency Services and the MOD.

4.22.3 HMCG is involved in emergency planning at local and national level and both alerts and responds to alerts from other emergency services and local authorities. MCA has agreed that HMCG resources will be put at the disposal of the shore emergency organisations for duties inland where it is considered that these resources can be used for public safety purposes without endangering the lives of MCA personnel, and where the integrity of the UK SAR Organisation is not compromised.

## **4.23 Government Offices for the Regions**

### **Planning**

4.23.1 To ensure that regional response arrangements are reflected in local off-site plans.

### **Response**

#### **The Emergency Phase**

4.23.2 The Government Office Representative (GOR) – a senior manager within GO – would be located at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre as a member of the Government Technical Adviser's (GTA's) team. He/she would work closely with the Government Liaison Officer (GLO), and would also liaise closely with representatives of other Government agencies. Their main duties would be as follows:

- \* to act as the GLO until he or she arrives at the SCC
- \* to support the GTA and GLO in the delivery of their duties
- \* where required, to assist co-ordination between Government, regional and local bodies by facilitating discussions and contact and by acting as a liaison point
- \* to assist in recovery planning from the outset of preparations, which might be expected to start in the emergency phase. For this, the GOR would be expected to attend meetings of the Recovery Working Group either on behalf of the GTA/GLO, or with other representatives of the GTA/GLO team.
- \* where local responders are overwhelmed or regional co-ordination is necessary the GO will facilitate preparation for and implementation of a regional response through the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC)

#### **The Recovery Phase**

- \* to continue to facilitate co-ordination between Government, regional and local agencies by acting as a key liaison and contact point.
- \* to represent national and regional interests at local groupings set up to co-ordinate the recovery. This might include the Recovery Working Group.
- \* to support the overall recovery effort by ensuring key agencies are brought on board and that appropriate effort is deployed regionally to assist with the response.
- \* to continue to support the GTA/GLO teams in their continuing roles to assist the recovery to the emergency taking over the GLO function at an appropriate stage as agreed with DECC.

4.23.3 In both the emergency response and recovery phase the GOR will be supported by a number of officials from the GOR. These representatives will be scaled back as appropriate as and when DECC and other government department officials arrive.

## **4.24 Nuclear Decommissioning Authority**

### **Legal Position**

4.24.1 As of 1 April 2005, the NDA assumed ownership of the sites previously operated by British Nuclear Group, and responsibility for UKAEA sites. NDA has entered into contracts with incumbent Site Licence Companies (SLCs) for decommissioning and clean up work, and in some cases commercial operations, on these sites. In due course NDA will initiate new contracts for these sites.

### **Contingency Planning**

4.24.2 In the event of an emergency, NDA's contracts confirm the primacy of responsibility on SLCs to take all actions deemed necessary to regain control and mitigate the consequences of the accident. NDA expects SLCs to take such actions immediately. NDA will NOT question operators' decisions on proportionality of response.

4.24.3 NDA's role is to support and where necessary facilitate and support the responses of SLCs and other responders, and to manage the implications of any event for NDA's programmes. NDA will also support the Lead Government Department where appropriate.

4.24.4 NDA itself is not an emergency response organisation and has no intervention role. However NDA will participate in off-site nuclear exercises for relevant sites. Where appropriate NDA will participate in planning and follow up for these exercises.

### **Response**

4.24.5 Notification: The NDA will be notified by the SLC, at the same time as other responders are notified that an emergency has arisen. The notification will be sent to a permanently staffed duty officer post, from where others in the NDA will be alerted as necessary. This will include: CEO; the Director of Safety and other HQ and Regional staff as appropriate.

4.24.6 An NDA representative will attend the Strategic Co-ordination Centre to liaise on communications and to support the work of the Recovery Working Group as required.

4.24.7 NDA HQ Role: A spokesperson will be required to deal with any media questions that are directed at NDA. This will be a senior manager or a member of the Communications team. To support this NDA will set up a Communications Cell at its Westlakes HQ.

4.24.8 NEBR/SEER Role: The NDA representative at the Government emergency centre will provide information relating to the emergency response at sister stations; assist in providing briefing; and provide assurance that the emergency response will be funded.

## **4.25 Government Decontamination Service (GDS)**

### **Legal Position**

4.25.1 The GDS has three primary functions. It will;

- \* Provide high quality advice and guidance to responsible authorities during their contingency planning for CBRN incidents, civil nuclear accidents, MOD nuclear accidents, major HAZMAT incidents and during actual incidents, and regularly help validate and test the arrangements that are in place.
- \* Work with specialist suppliers and advisers to rigorously assess the ability of companies in the private sector to carry out decontamination operations, and ensure that responsible authorities have ready access to those services if the need arises.
- \* Advise central Government on the national capability for the decontamination of buildings, infrastructure, mobile transport assets and the open environment, and will be a repository of information, and a source of expertise in the event of CBRN incident or major release of HAZMAT materials. The GDS will regularly review the United Kingdom's capability gaps.

4.25.2 The above three objectives all include GDS desire and capability to work with others to improve decontamination technologies and capabilities. This aspect of their work is managed by the dedicated GDS science team.

### **Contingency Planning**

GDS – General Principle

4.25.3 GDS has a UK wide remit and aims to offer a common range of services to Responsible Authorities across the UK, irrespective of whether the lead responsibility for recovery sits with Local Authorities and/or with Devolved Administrations.

4.25.4 GDS will offer a range of interventions, depending on the nature of the incident or whether it is one of a series taking place (or expected to take place) across the UK.

GDS will maintain a capability to:

- \* Offer advice, guidance and facilitation on options for decontamination of the built and open environment, for infrastructure and for transport to a Responsible Authority from its HQ location;
- \* Offer advice and guidance on issues relating to decontamination of the above to Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) from its HQ location;

- \* Establish liaison with specialist suppliers to prepare for possible deployment for decontamination of the above;
- \* Provide an early presence at an SCC to provide direct advice on the potential impact of decisions made during the incident response phase on short, medium and longer term decontamination approaches;
- \* Provide advice and guidance to a Responsible Authority at an SCC in the development of a decontamination strategy as part of an overarching recovery strategy;
- \* Work with specialist agencies (e.g. specialist police and military resources) on specific aspects of decontamination as they might impact positively or adversely on their operations;
- \* Work with other Government agencies (e.g. the Environment Agency/SEPA, HPA/HPS, FSA) to develop joint strategies to deal with the consequences of a CBRN or major HAZMAT event upon the environment;
- \* Work with responders to identify, address and resolve operational issues arising from the possible deployment of specialist suppliers to undertake decontamination following a CBRN or major HAZMAT event;
- \* Provide guidance and advice to a Responsible Authority during delivery of a decontamination strategy;
- \* Participate in the development of decontamination priorities at Local, Regional and National levels.

## Response

### GDS Contact Arrangements

4.25.5 GDS will maintain a 24/7 contact capability and supporting incident management and response arrangements that will allow it to engage with Responsible Authorities and tailor a GDS response to the scale and nature of the incident.

### **GDS Alert Requirements**

4.25.6 To ensure that GDS can assess the appropriate level and nature of its response to a CBRN or HAZMAT event, GDS expects to be informed of a CBRN or major HAZMAT event by the appropriate police control room within 15 minutes of that control room having received notification of such an event or that an existing event is being treated as such.

## **4.26 Police**

### **Legal Position**

4.26.1 The police service does not have a specific statutory role in respect of either contingency planning for nuclear emergencies or for responding to those emergencies. The police role in England and Wales is based on custom, practice, the Common Law and positive obligations that may arise in respect of human rights. For Scotland, the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 states that the police have a duty to protect life and property and this would be their responsibility in the event of a civil nuclear emergency.

### **Contingency Planning**

4.26.2 Contingency Planning by the police involves:

- \* Consultation on a national and local basis to agree co-ordinated multi-agency response to manage a nuclear emergency.
- \* The preparation of local contingency plans dealing with the police response and co-ordination.
- \* The exercising of those plans.

### **Response**

4.26.3 The police response will be guided by the following principles which are based on the response to any major incident:

- \* The saving of life in conjunction with the other emergency services.
- \* Assisting where possible in communicating public protection information and advice to the public following a declaration of a nuclear emergency.
- \* The co-ordination of the emergency response to a nuclear emergency. This would normally include the provision of a Gold (Strategic) Commander at a police Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) to manage the response at the strategic level and normally supported by a Tactical level. Co-ordinating the response to the media at the local level.
- \* The protection and preservation of the scene.
- \* The investigation of the incident, (in Scotland on behalf of the Procurator Fiscal) to establish any criminal liability and, if no such liability, the provision of assistance in the investigation of the incident where appropriate.
- \* The collation and dissemination of casualty information, usually by the establishment of a Casualty Bureau.
- \* The identification of victims on behalf of HM Coroner, who is the principal investigator, where fatalities are involved. In Scotland the

task of identifying the dead is the responsibility of the police, who in this regard are agents of the Procurator Fiscal and work under his/her overall policy direction.

- \* Working with the other partner agencies towards the restoration of normality at the earliest opportunity.