



ARMY DOCTRINE PUBLICATION
VOLUME 1

OPERATIONS

JUNE 1994

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OPERATIONS

From Field Service Regulations, Part 1 - OPERATIONS 1909

'The principles given in this manual have been evolved by experience as generally applicable to the leading of troops. They are to be regarded by all ranks as authoritative, for their violation, in the past, has often been followed by mishap, if not by disaster. They should be so thoroughly impressed on the mind of every commander, that whenever he has to come to a decision in the field, he instinctively gives them their full weight.

The fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves very abstruse, but the application of them is difficult and cannot be made subject to rules. The correct application of principles to circumstances is the outcome of sound military knowledge, built up by study and practice until it has become an instinct.'

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

SELECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE AIM

MAINTENANCE OF MORALE

OFFENSIVE ACTION

SURPRISE

CONCENTRATION OF FORCE

ECONOMY OF EFFORT

SECURITY

FLEXIBILITY

CO-OPERATION

ADMINISTRATION

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Army Doctrine Publication **OPERATIONS** is to interpret The British Military Doctrine (BMD) in the light of current United Kingdom security policy in order to guide commanders in the planning and execution of future Campaigns and Operations. In short, it sets out the Army's approach to fighting in future conflicts.

OPERATIONS provides the conceptual link between the **BRITISH MILITARY DOCTRINE**, which sets out the enduring British understanding of the nature of conflict, and the tactical level **ARMY FIELD MANUAL** series which describes how the doctrine should be put into practice.

OPERATIONS is a handbook of neither practice nor procedures. It sets out, in three parts, a coherent approach to the employment of military force by the British Army in the future:

In **Part One** it relates the employment of force to the current security environment (Chapter One). It recognises the influence of the past and the foreseeable demands of the future, in outlining the British Army's current approach to the conduct of operations (Chapter Two).

In **Part Two** it addresses issues faced by commanders and staffs tasked to plan and execute campaigns. It translates the requirements of military doctrine, itself based on Government policy, into an understanding of Operational Art (Chapter Three) and a guide to the planning and execution of Campaigns (Chapter Four).

In **Part Three** practical issues of warfighting are addressed. The approach to the conduct of operations is developed into doctrine for Joint Operations, Battles and Engagements (Chapter Five) and related to Combined Operations with allies and coalition partners (Chapter Six), before finally applying the approach to Operations Other Than War (Chapter Seven).

This Doctrine is authoritative yet is essentially descriptive and not prescriptive. It complements the professional and intuitive judgement of commanders at all levels. It does not establish dogma but is rather a statement of how to think about all facets of conflict. Consistent with this approach, the document avoids use of jargon wherever possible describing concepts in detail rather than simply using words that are popular but potentially misleading.

FOREWORD

The dramatic events of 1990 and the subsequent collapse of the Warsaw Pact heralded profound changes in the security environment. No longer were we faced with the monolithic threat which had dominated military practice and thinking for the previous 40 years, and almost overnight the concept of deterrence and GDP upon which our approach to operations had been based became wholly inappropriate. We needed as a result to reappraise our doctrine. This Army Doctrine Publication is the result of eighteen months work and, as stated in the Introduction, it sets out the Army's approach to fighting in future conflicts. In so doing it provides the link between the essentially timeless content of the British Military Doctrine (BMD) and the tactical level Army Field Manual series, which describes how the doctrine should be put into practice. Specifically, it endorses and develops the manoeuvre approach to warfighting proposed in BMD.

This approach to warfighting is not new. It has been espoused and developed by military philosophers throughout the ages and is rooted in the writings of Von Clausewitz and Fuller. It provided the basis for military operations during World War II, but subsequently became obscured by the circumstances of the Cold War and the approach to conflict within the Central Region, where force ratios and the primacy of armoured warfare were accepted as the major determinants of the outcome of conflict. ADP Operations recognises the end of this period and reflects the Army's thinking in a new era where the risk of conflict is difficult to determine. It provides an authoritative guide to the conduct of operations, including operations other than war, and sets out the basis of how to think about operational problems, not what to do about them. Its primary focus is warfighting and how commanders should apply operational art to achieve victory across the spectrum of conflict. It acknowledges that all future operations increasingly will be joint and that most are likely to be combined. ADP Operations also reflects the adaptation of technology to new weapon systems and capabilities, and in so doing provides the doctrine which drives organisations, structures and training.

It has been written for the whole Army, but formation commanders and their staffs, who need to apply the doctrine in campaigns and on operations; those involved with force development and equipment procurement; and those charged with teaching and training throughout the Army will find it invaluable.

To be effective in promoting a coherent approach to operations, it must, however, be read and understood by all and not allowed to gather dust on coffee tables, bookshelves or in pamphlet libraries. In short it is essential reading for all professional officers and students of the profession of arms.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Peter Duffin". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

June 1994

Inspector General Doctrine and Training

PART ONE - FOUNDATIONS

CHAPTER ONE

THE EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCE

The purpose of Chapter 1 is to describe the current security environment and the nature of conflict in order to identify those factors which will influence the employment of military force by the British Army on operations in the future

THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

0101. The legacy of the Cold War is a strategic environment that is both dangerous and uncertain. Whereas the main threat to the security of the United Kingdom used to be a monolithic, ideologically-hostile Warsaw Pact, the risks to our security now are more diverse. In the former bi-polar environment of the Cold War, the possession by both superpowers of nuclear weapons arguably created a stalemate which, while not constituting peace, at least prevented catastrophic war. While the situation in Europe was therefore one in which the ever-present risk of conflict developing into war was kept low through effective deterrence, the consequences of the conflict turning to warfare were potentially far-reaching. Outside Europe the opposite prevailed - the likelihood of conflict was always high but the consequences for the security for the United Kingdom were minimal. However, the present security environment has changed the formula. In the absence of the stability born of the nuclear balance, the risks of conflict worldwide remain high but although the consequences of an individual conflict may appear not to be of great concern, their longer term significance may be more profound.

0102. Although the possibility of the kind of East-West conflict that threatened Europe in the past has currently disappeared, allowance still has to be made for unpredictability in the former Soviet Union where, for the foreseeable future,

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an enormous concentration of conventional, nuclear and chemical warfare capabilities remains. These capabilities are widely available on the open market, providing states and dissident groups with the lethal means to pursue territorial ambition and ethnic rivalry or to compete for resources through resort to armed conflict. Narrowing down the focus on risks to security worldwide, there would seem to be four fault-lines to watch: the after shocks from the collapse of the Soviet Empire; disputes arising from challenges to artificial state borders which separate areas of common ethnicity; endemic religious antipathies; and finally, the irrational and unpredictable motivations of dictators such as Galtieri in 1982 or Saddam Hussein in 1990.

0103. Outside Europe, the proliferation of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated conventional weapons could pose a threat to the United Kingdom's dependencies or to the vital interests of either our allies or the United Kingdom itself. Thus it is increasingly difficult to predict which states, nations or dissident groups may threaten our national or international interests and how or when such threats will emerge. In such an imprecise security environment, the United Kingdom might expect to contribute to international stability by being prepared to take action under the mandate of organisations such as the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community or the Western European Union (WEU). Such action, or the deterrent threat of it, may be confined to diplomatic, economic or legal measures. It could however involve direct military action, in one of two basic forms: first, unilaterally, to protect a solely national interest; secondly, with allies in a formal alliance such as NATO or within an ad hoc coalition.

THE NATURE OF CONFLICT

0104. ***Peace and Conflict.*** In simplest terms, any nation, state or definable group can be said at any one time to be at peace or in conflict (including at war). While peace remains the goal above all to be prized, the current security environment places all countries somewhere in the spectrum of conflict, many actually in situations of conflict **other than war**, and some at war itself. For the United Kingdom to be clear on its defence requirements an understanding of the nature of conflict is a necessary baseline. This is fully discussed in the British Military Doctrine¹, which concludes that:

- a. ***Peace.*** Peace is a **condition that exists in the relations between groups, classes or states when there is an absence of**

1. The British Military Doctrine (BMD) - Edition 2.


violence (direct or indirect) or the threat of violence². Although the **absence of violence** can be identified objectively, the **threat of violence** is a far more subjective matter and highly susceptible to differing perceptions. Thus while peace may appear to be well established, it is invariably a fleeting condition, not enjoyed for long. In reality, the boundary between peace and conflict will often be blurred and frequently crossed. In circumstances where **peace** is threatened it can be said to have become **vulnerable**. When internal or external disputes cannot be resolved peacefully, violence is an inevitable outcome and the boundary to **conflict** will be crossed. Similarly, once the resultant conflict has ended, the peace that is restored will be **fragile** and will demand careful steps to rebuild and consolidate it. It should also be recognised that the peace which follows a crisis, conflict or war will carry the scars of what has gone before.

b. **Conflict**. Conflict is **a situation in which violence is either manifested or threatened. It is a struggle or a clash between contending wishes**. It does not always explicitly demand violence although the risk or threat of violence is implied: even when violence has broken out diplomacy, or other non-violent activity, may continue. A situation of conflict may exist not only **between** states - commonly called conflict **between** peoples or **inter-state** conflict - but also within states - commonly called conflict **among** the people or **intra-state** conflict. Although conflict can take innumerable forms, it is helpful for the purpose of shaping the military response to analyze its causes, which broadly break down into two main categories:

(1) **Interest Based Conflict**. A conflict arising, for example, from a dispute over trade, resources, international or regional status can be considered to be **interest based**. It will frequently, but not always, be amenable to resolution around a negotiating table. In other words there is a strong possibility that the conflict can be ended on terms acceptable to all the parties involved in it. In these circumstances, the attempt to achieve conciliation between the parties in the conflict will be a diplomatic or politically led **peacemaking** initiative with the military acting in support, as required. Such military activity in support of resolving conflict is

(2) **Value Based Conflict.** A conflict arising, for example, from a dispute related to territory or resulting from religious or ethnic antipathy can be considered to be **value based**. Such disputes tend to be deep-rooted and hence they are generally less amenable to conciliation. Although diplomatic or political attempts to resolve the conflict will invariably be tried first, the nature of such a conflict based on deeply held values is that the peaceful instruments of dialogue will be quickly exhausted. One or both parties are then likely to resort to the use of force in seeking to conclude the conflict solely on their terms. Such a party, or more properly now called a combatant, may well have initiated the conflict with the clear intention of terminating it on terms that are only acceptable to him. In so doing he will have set out to impose his will on his enemy - a key ingredient of **war**. In these situations where peacemaking efforts have failed, outside military intervention will often be required to lead in **peace enforcement**. Such military action in support of terminating conflict is also discussed further in a later section.

0105. Figure 1.1 illustrates the relationship between peace, conflict other than war and war.



PEACE, CONFLICT AND WAR

Figure 1.1

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN PEACE AND CONFLICT

0106. ***The Relationship between the Nature of Conflict and Military Operations***³. Having recognised that there are definable components within

3. The word **operation** has several meanings in common English usage. This manual concentrates on its generic sense of the application of military force or the carrying out of a military mission. Operations in either the generic or specific sense are not linked to a specific level of war. For example, Operation MOTORMAN in 1972 was a major operation within the Operation BANNER campaign in Northern Ireland in the same way that Operation DESERT SABRE was within Operation DESERT STORM (Gulf War 1990-91).

Operations³. Having recognised that there are definable components within the spectrum of conflict, it assists next to clarify the relationship between those components of the spectrum and the military activities that take place within them. It is the characteristics of a given conflict that will determine the military activity within it, and not some predetermined or templated response based on arbitrary guidelines. It is therefore the **purpose** of the use of military force within a given situation of peace, conflict other than war or war that is the focal point for all activity.

0107. **Peace**. During peace the purpose of military forces is to take part in activities in support of the civil authorities either at home or abroad, to contribute to deterrence and to train for operations.

a. **Military Activities in Peace**. Within the United Kingdom, the Army contributes unarmed general support to the civil authorities under arrangements known as Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) and to the Civil Ministries (MACM). In exceptional circumstances the Army may provide specialist armed skills to the civil authorities under the Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) programme. In addition, the Army provides training assistance and advice to the armed forces of other countries in support of foreign or defence policy interests, by deploying Military Assistance Overseas (MAO) teams. Where British nationals become threatened overseas by a conflict to which the United Kingdom is not a party and the host nation is able to guarantee the security of the evacuation, the Army may be called upon to contribute to a Non Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). These activities are all broadly characterised by the non-violent use of military capabilities and skills and although their planning and conduct will follow general military principles, their execution does not require the same conceptual approach as operations other than war and operations in war.


b. **Deterrence**. The possession of well trained, equipped and motivated armed forces in peace is a major factor in containing conflict and deterring war. To be effective the deterrent force needs to be visible and therefore credible. It needs to be capable of achieving deterrence at all possible levels of threat. The Army has a significant role to play in achieving such deterrence. It is often necessary to deploy garrisons overseas as part of deterrence, as well as demonstrating the ability to project power by air and sea.

c. **Training**. Without in any way undermining peace but instead acting as a major contributor to deterrence, the Army in peace must

train for operations and meet the level of readiness required to conduct such operations in support of overall defence interests. The general approach to the conduct of operations is outlined in Chapter 2.

0108. **Conflict.** When either the interests or values of the United Kingdom are at risk in situations of **conflict other than war**, the Army, either unilaterally or with allies or coalition partners, will be required to carry out **operations other than war** with the **purpose** of supporting the overall policy to resolve or terminate the conflict. These Operations Other Than War are likely to be joint with other Services or with civil agencies, such as with the Police as in Northern Ireland. Operations designed to support diplomatic and political initiatives to achieve the resolution of a conflict will be conducted in a highly charged and complex international environment in which military operations will be governed by tightly controlled mandates. These operations are likely to be protracted and militarily frustrating. Missions are likely to be changed unexpectedly, inactivity may characterise long periods, hard won successes may have to be given up and chains of command may be unclear or confused. In short, some elements of conventional warfighting military wisdom may become irrelevant, while flexibility, versatility and use of initiative will be at a premium. In other situations, direct intervention operations may be mandated where there is no alternative other than to terminate a conflict by force. Meanwhile, the requirements to contribute to deterrence of more wide-scale conflict and to train for further combat will run in parallel with the conduct of Operations Other Than War. Detailed consideration of the conduct of Operations Other Than War is in Chapter 7.

0109. **War.** The earlier analysis of the nature of conflict has already indicated that those conflicts which are value based are likely to be characterised by one side or the other seeking to achieve the termination of the conflict by imposing their will on the other. When one side is no longer willing to seek resolution of the conflict through negotiation there is no alternative than to prosecute the dispute through the use of force in war. This is therefore the **purpose** of such operations in war. This was the case in 1982 when the British had no alternative left open than to fight the Argentinians for the Falkland Islands and for the Coalition in 1990-91 than to fight the Iraqis for Kuwait. In prosecuting war, one side seeks to impose its will on the other by the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations, executed through a series of battles and engagements. For the British Army, these battles and engagements will most usually be conducted on a joint and combined basis. The planning and conduct of **Campaigns** are considered in detail in Chapters 3 and 4, the execution of **Joint Operations, Battles and Engagement** is considered in Chapter 5 and the implications of **Combined Operations** are considered in



MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN PEACE, CONFLICT AND WAR
Figure 1.2

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF OPERATIONS

ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF OPERATIONS

0110. **Fighting Power.** Fighting is a violent clash between hostile, independent and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose themselves on the other. The means to that end is either the threat or the organised application of fighting power to the enemy. Fighting power defines the Army's ability to conduct operations. The British Military Doctrine (Edition 2) recognises three components of fighting power - the conceptual, the moral and the physical:

- a. **The Conceptual Component - Doctrine.** Doctrine is a formal expression of the military knowledge that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time; it considers the nature of current and future conflicts and the Army's likely involvement in them in order to provide the basis against which to prepare it in peace and employ it successfully on operations.
- b. **The Moral Component - The Ability to get People to Fight.** Simplified as the possession of high morale, the ability to get people to fight has three fundamental elements: the motivation to achieve the task in hand; effective leadership from those placed in authority; and sound management of all personnel and resources.

c. ***The Physical Component - Combat Power.*** Combat power furnishes the means to fight; the resources to be employed in combat. It is created in peace, adjusted and enhanced for a specific operation when conflict threatens and committed and sustained once conflict is joined.

A history of the development of warfighting doctrine in the British Army is at Annex A to this chapter.

0111. ***Friction.*** Friction is the force that resists all action and which makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible. Friction may be mental - indecision over what to do next. It may be physical - the effects of intense enemy fire. It may be externally imposed - by enemy action, the ground or the weather. It may be self-induced - by a poor plan or a clash of personality. The means to overcome the effects of friction is determination - the essential frame of mind needed to overcome the inevitable setbacks caused by friction. High morale, a sound organisation (understood by all) and an effective command system will allow the force to continue to operate effectively on the battlefield, despite friction.

0112. ***Uncertainty and Chaos.*** Combat is uncertain and chaotic. Actions will invariably be based upon incomplete, inaccurate or contradictory information - the so-called fog of war. Combat can only be conducted against a background of probabilities, arrived at by judgement and a balancing of risks. Risk is reduced as information on the enemy is increased but is exacerbated by the adverse effects of chance. The beneficial effect of chance is the creation of opportunities, which should be exploited relentlessly. Improvisation, decentralised command and seizure of the initiative are the keys to exploiting chaos and thereby magnifying the effects of chaos upon the enemy.

0113. ***Violence and Danger.*** Overwhelming violence - whether applied or threatened - is the means by which combat power compels an enemy to do one's will. Violence results in bloodshed, destruction and human suffering. Violence brings danger and with it fear. All men feel fear - to a greater or lesser degree. Courage represents the strength to overcome fear. Some men find this strength from within, but most need help from outside. This is found from belief in the cause in hand or from within the group around and from inspired leadership. Leaders must study and understand fear in order to control it and bring from within their men the necessary courage to ensure success.

0114. ***Human Stress.*** Although the technology available in combat has transformed its conduct, the presence of violence and its effect on the key actor on the battlefield - man - has not changed. Combat in any age is an horrific

activity and the effects of danger, fear, exhaustion, loneliness and privation adversely effect the willpower of all men - albeit of some more than others. The will of an individual man to stand and fight, magnified across the breadth of a unit or formation will dictate the scope of success or disaster. Therefore the bedrock of an army's fighting effectiveness is the determination of its members to fulfil their mission despite their circumstances. The seeds of an enemy's defeat is the erosion of his soldiers willpower. Success on the battlefield has, and always will, turn upon the relative resolve of opposing soldiers.

CONSTRAINTS ON CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONS

0115. ***Access to Information.*** The ability to send instant reports worldwide from the scene of combat, risks political leaders and the general public receiving information about military activities at the same time, or even before, the responsible commanders. While good news may be welcomed, adverse or inaccurate reports are likely to erode public support. A commander must therefore understand the needs of the media, the implications of their activities on the prosecution of contemporary warfare, and ensure where possible that he establishes a sound working relationship with its members. In situations where it is not possible to exercise any formal control over the media, a commander must accept their presence and take their activities into account, especially regarding operational security. In these circumstances it is particularly important that an effective chain of command is established to ensure a workable interface between political direction and the conduct of operations, while at the same time allowing the timely rearward transmission of information to those who need it.

0116. ***Minimum Casualties.*** Access to images of violence and danger from the theatre of operations lower the public threshold to tolerance of casualties. While the mission must not be compromised, a balance will have to be struck between destruction and coercion by other means to ensure that unwarranted casualties do not erode public support and the morale of the force. Keeping friendly casualties to the minimum will continue to be a major planning factor, while controlling the number of enemy casualties may also have to be considered.

0117. ***Resources.*** Operations as presently envisaged do not presuppose that the nation will be on a war footing and they will therefore be conducted against the background of normal national business. Consequently, resources in terms of manpower and materiel may be constrained, thereby imposing limits on the deployed force.

0118. ***Coalition and Alliance Interests.*** Except when deployed for purely national purposes, a force is most likely to be part of a coalition or alliance. Membership of an alliance such as NATO assumes a clearly articulated common interest. Nations contributing to a coalition created on an ad hoc basis in response to a specific crisis will have a common purpose but may have differing national interests. Awareness and sensitivity to these will be vital in order to preserve the cohesion of a coalition and the combat effectiveness of a multinational force.

0119. ***Weapons of Mass Destruction.*** Although the British Army no longer plans to conduct operations with theatre nuclear weapons and has not considered offensive use of biological or chemical weapons since World War I, the range of potential hostile threats includes the possible use of such weapons against a British or combined force. It therefore remains of paramount importance that adequate protection is maintained against the effects of such weapons and that British forces remain capable of operating in a contaminated environment.

CHARACTERISTICS OF FUTURE OPERATIONS

0120. ***Future Operations.*** While recognising the nature of conflict and both the enduring and contemporary characteristics of operations, the essential element on which to focus is the purpose of an operation itself. It is fundamental to recognise that every campaign and operation is unique and should be planned on that basis. Attempts to categorise conflict as a preliminary to planning operations according to a previous or templated pattern will at best be unhelpful and at worst be a recipe for disaster. Between the extremes of peace and war, conflict has a dynamic of its own, and therefore operations must be tailored to suit each set of circumstances. Furthermore the nature of the operations to be undertaken is likely to change during the course of its conduct. A force which is deployed, for example, as a peacekeeping force could find itself becoming more a part of the problem than of the solution. It will therefore have to adapt. The dilemma in these circumstances is the accurate identification of the desired policy objective. The consequent structuring of the force must enable it to achieve not only its initial mission but also the transition from one operation to another during the course of the campaign.

0121. ***Characteristics.*** Operations are therefore now likely to be distinguished by the following characteristics:

- a. ***Limitations on Ends and Means.*** Operations in future are likely to have limited strategic objectives which in many cases may only be loosely defined at the outset and be subject to change during the

changes in the nature of the conflict. Legal and diplomatic considerations may impose limitations on the means, including certain weapon systems, to be employed. Such considerations may not necessarily preclude the deployment of such weapons to the theatre of operations, thus allowing the force subsequently to respond swiftly to changes in the nature of the conflict. Decisions on **deployment** should be seen as separate from decisions on **employment**.

b. **Force Projection.** Regardless of the circumstances under which British military forces are committed to operations, they will almost certainly have to deploy over a considerable distance from bases, principally in the United Kingdom and Germany. The availability of military and civil transport from national and international resources and infrastructure in theatre may influence the size and composition of the force and the rate of subsequent build up. A capacity to **project force rapidly** will significantly contribute to either the deterrence, resolution or termination of conflict or war.

c. **Joint Operations.** Military operations will always be conducted on a joint basis with air or maritime forces or other agencies, such as the police. While recognising that all services have their discrete contributions to make to the total effort, a **fully integrated approach** based on agreed doctrine and procedures will achieve both unity of effort and maximum effect.

d. **Combined Operations.** Other than in pursuance of solely national objectives, a British force is most likely to be deployed as part of an ad hoc coalition or as part of an alliance established by treaty. Thus the operation will normally be legitimized by international mandate or mounted in accordance with alliance obligations. A British contribution to a multinational force must be capable of operating with its alliance or coalition partners and germane to this is a requirement for British Army doctrine to have the highest degree of standardization with that of our potential allies. Combined military activity greatly expands the scope and complexity of potential operations. British commanders and planners therefore need to consider, and train for, participation in campaigns and operations on a far larger scale than Britain could mount unilaterally.

e. **Control of the Electro-Magnetic Spectrum.** Reliance on use of the electro-magnetic spectrum for command systems is so widespread in military forces that it is an assumption relevant to all

modern combat. One's own vulnerabilities must be protected and the enemy's exploited. Control of the electro-magnetic spectrum is of value to the degree to which the enemy exploits it for military purposes. We should not seek to deny the enemy total use of the electro-magnetic spectrum; we need to leave him with enough channels to receive our deception plans and reveal his own intentions.

f. ***Duration.*** Although a quick decisive victory, with minimum casualties, will undoubtedly be the political and military ideal, such a result may be impossible to deliver. The British Army must therefore be prepared to undertake protracted operations.

g. ***Professional Expertise.*** Recognising that even as part of a coalition or alliance, the deployed force may be required to fight outnumbered and that some opponents may be in possession of technologically comparable, or even superior, weapons, the decisive advantage on operations must come from a cohesion born of high training standards, sound leadership, a determination to succeed and a code of personal conduct in peace which does not threaten unit cohesion on operations. Thus a high level of professionalism, focused by an accepted and authoritative doctrine, is the foundation of the British approach to the conduct of operations.

WAR FIGHTING DOCTRINE AND THE BRITISH ARMY

Brian Holden Reid

INTRODUCTION

1. The evolution of warfighting doctrine in the British Army is inextricably linked with the problems posed by mass involvement in the two World Wars in the first half of the twentieth century. As the British Army (and indeed the regimental system itself) evolved in the nineteenth century as a response to the problems of Imperial Defence, its prime role was as an imperial gendarmerie. The Army's main duty was to garrison the Empire in stations often great distances away from Europe - the battlefield where it was most likely that the British Army would engage an opponent of the first rank (although other scenarios occasionally recommended themselves, such as the possibility before 1906 of engaging the Russians in Central Asia). The very strengths of the regimental system, the camaraderie of the regimental 'family', the esprit de corps, and the dash, ability to gain the trust of indigenous peoples, skill at intelligence and minor tactics - which relatively small bodies of men can acquire if stationed for long periods of time in environments far from home - were characteristics ideally suited to making war in the Empire. But such a structure, if subject to the quite different and more rigorous challenges of war with great powers was sometimes found wanting. It expressed a fundamental and instinctive reality in the British Army - and in British society generally - a widespread reluctance to formulate scientific, doctrinal statements; a preference upheld by the pragmatic and empirical tradition to view and resolve each problem as it occurs on its own terms free from any system. The theme underlying any assessment of war fighting doctrine, even over a short historical perspective confined to this century, which runs like a red thread through the tapestry of British military experience, is improvisation. This was sometimes deliberate, sometimes forced, occasionally for the good and occasionally for ill. But it is abundantly clear that throughout the twentieth century, the army has lacked a coherent doctrinal **philosophy**, for the want of a better word: philosophy in the military context as defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as 'The study of the general principles of some particular branch of knowledge, experience or activity...'.

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2. Secondly, though substantial tactical doctrine and theoretical writing emerged after the end of the nineteenth century, best summed up in the title of C E Callwell's book, *Small Wars* (1896), this was developed out of the experience of imperial wars in which Britain did not need allies. Yet the experience of general war demanded the closest possible co-operation with allies of one kind or another. It is too often forgotten that the two greatest British generals, Marlborough and Wellington, both commanded armies in which British troops formed a minority. Marlborough commanded no more than 10,000 and Wellington rarely more than 30,000 British troops. In the great World Wars British armies were engaged with the forces of numerous allies, yet in doctrinal writings little attention was devoted to this aspect. As we enter the Twenty-First century this aspect needs to be underlined: allies, like the poor, will always be with us; indeed it is almost inconceivable that future military operations on a sizeable scale could be mounted without their assistance.

3. Two further points by way of introduction need to be made, which relate to one another. The British Army has produced an abundance of military thinking - especially in the first half of the twentieth century. But military thought and doctrine are not synonymous. The first is personal, the latter institutional. A military thinker may inspire admirers to emulate or implement his ideas; but this can never be a substitute for institutional acceptance. Those who listen (or read) the works of any thinker are free to reject as much or as little as they choose from the corpus of his works. A senior officer may cry 'Rubbish' and not allow a theorist's ideas to have any influence on the workings of his formation. But doctrine, which may or may not incorporate a theorist's views, should establish a framework of understanding and action, which should inform the decision-making process. Doctrine at the higher levels should permeate the language and thinking of those in high command, and their subordinates should be able to gauge their thoughts, and indeed, anticipate them because of a common background and training. Doctrine should not be, and is not designed as a substitute for thought. Yet it must be said that on occasions, especially during the Second World War, an ill-digested and sometimes confused appreciation of certain ideas drawn from progressive military theory, rushed to fill the doctrinal vacuum with disastrous results. This was due to the lack of any Army-wide framework of understanding, and under the pressures of war, higher commanders and their staffs latched on to the forms of doctrinal discussion without necessarily understanding its substance. This leads to the second point. The variegated structure of the British Army, with its complex (and to the outsider confusing) gatherings of regiments and corps, all fiercely exhibiting independent, tribal loyalties, has proved a strong barrier to establishing an Army-wide doctrine on war fighting. Publishing a doctrinal pamphlet or circulating a paper is no more proof of the acceptance of a doctrinal policy than

shouting its conclusions from the roof of the old War Office. It needs to be accepted and its provisions enforced from the top down. But the many vested interests and innumerable layers of senior officers have prevented doctrinal dissemination in this straight forward way, **except during war itself**. This has sometimes led to as much confusion as enlightenment. The regimental perspective in peacetime has dominated the officer corps. To quote Michael Howard on the Second World War:

'The evidence is strong that the Army was still geared to the pace and perspective of regimental soldiering as it had been before 1914; that too many of its members [of the officer corps] looked on soldiering as an agreeable and honourable occupation rather than as a serious profession demanding no less intellectual dedication than that of a doctor, lawyer or the engineer.'

In general, the demands of improvisation in general war were very considerable, and the limits of improvisation dictated how the war would be fought and in what formations.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

4. In 1914 the British Army had evolved a tactical doctrine aimed at fighting a short war on the continent of Europe. This allowed it to develop doctrine within the existin**small wars** tradition. The British commitment was indeed small, four and then six divisions, plus the cavalry division, and these forces, it was believed, would be deployed for no more than six months. The emphasis in the *Field Service Regulations* was increasingly on moral factors. The opening of the 1912 *FSR* implored that 'Success in war depends more on moral than on physical qualities'. It continued:

'Neither armies, armament, resources, nor skill can compensate for lack of courage,energy, determination, and the bold offensive spirit which springs from a national determination to conquer. The development of the necessary moral qualities is, therefore, the first object to be attained in the training of an army.'

This emphasis was hardly unique to the British Army, and its inspiration was the school of Colonel Foch and Grandmaison in the French Army. It is a striking feature that the more pervasive firepower became on the modern battlefield, the more moral factors were emphasised as an antidote to it. These aspects provided the background to the British reaction to the problems of trench warfare on the Western Front.

5. It was the offensive and the decisive battle that animated decision-makers before 1914 and during the Great War itself. There was a corresponding enthusiasm for action with the bayonet. As Major General E A Altham noted in 1914, the 'Manchurian campaign has wiped out the mistaken inference from South African experiences that bayonet fighting belonged to the past...'. Determination to win come what may had to be the underlying message of training. Major General W R Robertson observed in January 1914 the need for avoiding anything which would 'Interfere with the desire of the troops to push into the fight at all costs'. And *Infantry Training* (1914) underlined this all-important aspect, 'The main essential to success in battle is to close with the enemy, cost what it may'. Thus closing with the enemy forces, whatever the casualties with **cold steel**, was the basic idea around which military preparation was geared. Those who propounded this notion were not unaware that it would result in heavy casualties, but given the short time-scale expected for the next European war, they calculated that this would not result in a grievous national loss. And battle itself would be **decisive**. These elements blended into a war fighting doctrine that while calling for **decisive** victory, stressed the **superior staying power** of our own men while stressing that the enemy would be **beaten and demoralised**. The result of these calculations was a tremendous faith in the **weight** of the attack, giving **vigour** and **energy** to the side with the strongest moral qualities. In the words of Tim Travers, 'Yet the constant belief of the General Staff in sheer superiority of numbers revealed a basic assumption that it was weight of human beings that was the key to offensive success'. Or in the more sarcastic words of Major General J F C Fuller, 'Human tonnage is the co-efficient of victory'.

6. Professor Travers perhaps exaggerates the extent to which these notions pervaded the Army as a coherent **doctrine** in the same way as they developed in the French Army. They certainly shaped tactical responses to war as British forces grew in numbers during 1914-15, and invariably influenced its response to the higher levels. These ideas were an important influence in GHQ because of the large measure of improvisation forced upon it. Under these circumstances, with armies of unprecedented size, the General Staff fell back on what they had been taught, or what had been propounded before 1914. And furthermore, these notions seemed well suited to the fighting material they were trying to shape into soldiers. As Haig confided to his diary in 1916, he commanded a force that was virtually untrained by the standards of 1914. They were enthusiastic and keen to have at the enemy; but they were incapable of sophisticated, sweeping manoeuvres. The main necessity was finding a means of protecting their advance across the shell and machine gun swept 'no man's land' between the two rival trench systems. This protective form could be supplied by artillery fire. In January 1915 in a conversation with Repington, the military correspondent, who believed the German defensive line

'Impregnable', Haig replied 'As soon as we were supplied with ample artillery ammunition of high explosive, I thought we could walk through the German line at places'. This germ of the **artillery mania** that gripped GHQ in 1916-17 can be found in the view that artillery fire could demoralise the defenders. Haig's view may have been true six months after the declaration of war in 1914, but not eighteen months later. It is testimony to Haig's faith in quantity of materiel, and his keenness to 'apply old principles to new conditions'.

7. Thus the prime characteristics of First World War battles - artillery bombardments, the massive infantry assault with the bayonet, their duration and the stress on the endurance of the assault, which should be pressed home regardless of loss - was an extension on a huge scale of pre-war thought. This was thinking which was not designed for a World War of this magnitude. Old principles were relevant if only they were magnified. The emphasis was on more of everything - if quantities were increased then the old principles could be validated. Materiel provided its own logic. As Haig observed in 1917:

1. Send to France every possible man
2. " " " " " aeroplane
3. " " " " " gun

8. From 1915 onwards, the place allotted by GHQ to the artillery bombardment continued to grow in importance, first as a means of weakening the enemy's defences so as to permit the infantry to advance through them to reach his more vulnerable defences, and then as a way of protecting the actual advance of the infantry. But this tendency only underscored a major characteristic of the British style of warfare on the Western Front: it was rigid and over-controlled. This was justified on the grounds that soldiers, commanders and their staffs were untrained and inexperienced. The advance was focused around moving forward to a series of lines drawn on the map, regardless of tactical or topographical reality. The artillery bombardment moved slowly forward from one line to another; the direction of the advance was revealed, surprise impossible. Haig and GHQ operated a highly centralised command system and yet submerged themselves in organisational and administrative detail, which neglected the systematic study of the lessons learned from previous operations, and evolving operational and tactical doctrine. When as late as June 1918 Lt Col Fuller of the Tank Corps asked Guy Dawnay of GHQ whether it was going to win the war using old methods (infantry and guns) or new mechanised methods (infantry and guns with tanks and aeroplanes), Dawnay admitted he did not know. 'Have you no idea?' Fuller pressed. 'None', replied Dawnay. Innovation did emerge, but in an unco-ordinated way much lower down the chain of command. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the co-operation of arms was neglected.

9. The tank, once it became an important factor on the battlefield was integrated in an ad hoc manner, with little or no centralised direction exerted by GHQ, but which arrogated to itself all final decisions; this resulted in too much interference in the work of those who understood its potential. There was no attempt to envisage the tank as a weapon, and establish its tactical functions and then work back towards organisation. If anything this process was reversed. There was a need for larger numbers of tanks and above all their concentration. But as Brigadier General Sir James Edmonds observes, throughout 1918 the strength of tank offensives was frittered away in piecemeal operations. The exception to this generalisation was the Battle of Amiens on 8 August 1918. This offensive was expected by the Germans but nonetheless achieved surprise. Thereafter the vague possibility that organisation would be modified to reflect new technological potential and tactical functions rapidly passed. Victory could be achieved using the old infantry-centred methods supported by artillery and the available tanks, but resulted in the heavy casualties of 1918. BEF casualties from August-November 1918 amounted to 400,000 men. At the end of August Haig signalled his Army commanders that the 'Tanks must join the Army', not only in organisation but manoeuvre in a very similar way to the infantry, as laid down in *FSR*. In September 1918 Dawnay at GHQ displayed what Travers has called the complete dominance of the 'Traditional manpower-orientated, infantry-artillery style of war'. The battles of 1918, Dawnay believed, showed that the Army was 'Back to our old pre-war principles, which proves their soundness every time'.

BETWEEN THE WARS

10. The heated debate over mechanization and the structure which would evolve to sustain it had, therefore, opened during the Great War itself. The continuance of the importance of the **cold steel** approach is underlined in several letters of the post-war CIGS, General Lord Cavan. He stressed to Major General Sir Frederick Maurice that what was needed in future war was 'The actual physical threat of steel' which would force the enemy to retreat, 'And this threat the mechanized battalion is comparatively powerless to give'. These opinions are revealing, the more so because they are expressed in private correspondence, and not in official papers written for the CIGS by some other author. Although they are easy to caricature and ridicule they do denote the tenacious grip of the old pre-war attitudes in the post-war years. The resulting editions of the *FSR* emphasise that infantry was the 'Queen of Battles' and that mobility, and more importantly **manoeuvre** was tied to the speed of the infantry advance.

11. The 1920s were, of course, a period of immense intellectual ferment - the greatest ever experienced by the British Army. It produced two of the greatest

military thinkers of the twentieth century, Major General J F C Fuller and Captain B H Liddell Hart. The former especially laid down a conceptual framework fundamental to an understanding of the art of war. But the enormous welter of writing produced by these two men in a variety of forms, books, articles, and lectures, does not constitute doctrine; although on occasion it might influence the formulation of doctrine. For instance, the 1920 edition of the *FSR* included a codification of the principles of war, which was the prime concern of Fuller and Liddell Hart during the years before 1928. They were only the most able representatives of a reforming impulse that assumed that something had gone **awfully wrong** in 1914-18, and that **something** had better be put right before the next war. The representatives of this group of reformers were highly critical of methods and personalities of the Great War and it is perhaps not surprising that such criticism was resented in the higher echelons of the Army.

12. The debate sparked off by the writings of Fuller and Liddell Hart, their admirers and allies, and their many detractors, was essentially a debate about ideas, not doctrine. These two great military writers were also prone to special pleading and had a polemical aim - the acceptance of a certain view of armoured operations of the future, among other issues. But the core of their ideas have a timeless quality about them, for the simple reason that they adumbrated a number of core concepts about the art of war which lie at the heart of doctrine. These are of profound value because they are valid irrespective of any given stance on a polemical issue.

13. Central to their vision of warfare is the defensive-offensive. Technology would, in their opinion, break down any tendency to view the defence and offence as separate compartments (indeed they suggested that the greatest soldiers in the past had ignored this compartmentalisation). Success in the art of war demands that it be viewed as one conceptual whole. **A secure offensive** should be the aim: 'To strike at an enemy who preserves his freedom of action is to risk hitting the air and being caught off one's balance', Liddell Hart observed in 1926. Thus one way of avoiding this danger is to tempt the enemy to strike first, while remaining on the defensive, and then once the enemy's offensive has exhausted itself, attack. But this should not take the form of a crude frontal assault on the opponent's position unless no alternative can be found. And the tactical formula of **fixing plus decisive manoeuvre** is, after all, but the domestic proverb 'First catch your hare then cook it'. The enemy should be **fixed** or **held** to his positions, Liddell Hart believed. Thus:

'A fixing attack should be on the broadest possible front in order to occupy the enemy's attention and prevent him turning to meet the decisive blow elsewhere.'

Once pinned to his position, Fuller agreed, 'The next step is to circumvent this fixed point and by a rapid movement strike at the enemy's vitals in rear of it. Should this be accomplished, then this front will crumble to pieces'. But what was the object of the move? It was to **seize and then hold the initiative**. 'Only when the enemy is held, is liberty of manoeuvre gained, and liberty of manoeuvre', Fuller argued, 'Carries with it freedom of action which is the aim of all generalship'. Wars of manoeuvre also required a flexibility of mental attitude, because manoeuvres will take place in all directions, not just in front. As Liddell Hart noted in 1946, 'While density is primarily a matter of the scale of forces in proportion to the extent of the **front**, it becomes a matter of **area** wherever means of attacking, or even disturbing, the opponent's rear are available'.

14. Thus **velocity** was central to a war of manoeuvre. 'One hour is not sixty minutes', Fuller never tired of reiterating, 'But what can be achieved in sixty minutes?'. This required that all plans be flexible, including alternate objects, 'as to economise time in action will become the soul of every plan' and make heavy demands on subordinates. The object of velocity was the **psychological paralysis of the enemy's command**: an idea which Fuller had propounded since the composition of *Plan 1919* in the summer of 1918. These two elements, freedom of movement and psychological paralysis would blend to enable the attacker to inflict the maximum damage and dislocation on the enemy with **least cost to himself**. This would result in **economy of force** which Fuller and Liddell Hart saw as the central feature of the future conduct of war. Indeed in 1926 Fuller went so far as to conclude that it was a 'law'. This was rather an ambitious claim, and is difficult to prove, except that there is **always** a limit, no matter how much expenditure is invested, to the resources available for war.

15. In development of these themes, Fuller and Liddell Hart stressed the importance of surprise, deception and thoroughness of preparation. They also called for concentration, mobility and a devastating pursuit. This approach has led many to believe that they were both advocates of the indirect approach to strategy. Certainly Liddell Hart was passionately attached to it. But Fuller believed 'It is wrong to look upon the indirect approach as a cure-all'. Indeed, in *War and Western Civilization, 1832-1932* (1932), Fuller wrote, 'In war a general should aim at a decisive point, if this spot is also a soft spot so much the better, but if it is only a soft spot he is not a great general'.

16. But whatever their differences over details, Fuller and Liddell Hart agreed that it is the commander who is the pivot which determines success or failure once the campaign begins. Only he can take the decisions, whether they be right or wrong. In *Lectures on FSR II* (1932), Fuller wrote: 'The common deficits

in command are lack of balance, sudden elation or depression, fear of what the enemy is going to do in place of concentrating upon what you are going to do to him; setting tasks which are outside the ability of troops to accomplish; over caution and waste of time; calling conferences in order to pick the brains of subordinates, and lack of originality which often leads to doing something which the enemy expects in place of what he does not look for'. A general, Liddell Hart agreed, should have **profound self-confidence** but eschew arrogance, complacency and obstinacy. He must possess **self-command and balance of mind**. Above all, he should **command**, and at the right level. It was not desirable for a senior commander to behave like a platoon leader or as an aloof office manager. But these important observations on command were often obscured by bitter, and sometimes intemperate attacks on British generalship on the Western Front in the Great War.

17. The most important document indicating official thinking on operational methods is the report, *Notes on Certain Lessons of the Great War* (War Office 1934). It is indeed amazing that the lessons of the First World War were not studied in detail in the early 1920s while they were still fresh in soldiers' minds. This report 15 years too late in many ways, is a cautious document. It stresses the paramount importance of surprise.

'In conclusion we are of the opinion that our training manuals require to emphasise more strongly the vital importance of surprise and of the indirect approach, and we suggest that a sentence be added to the *Field Service Regulations*, Vol II, Sec 25 (2) to the following effect:

"A commander who selects the offensive and fails to surprise his opponent has lost the main advantage which the offensive confers".'

It acknowledged candidly 'That our practice during the war did not, and our training during peace does not, usually pay sufficient attention to surprise in defence'. And generally speaking, 'In consequence our methods are apt to be too stereotyped, which again tends to produce the same weakness in our methods of attack'. A stimulating by-product of a desire to break the stranglehold of stereotyped methods was giving subordinates power to act on their own initiative:

'In mobile operations, however, precise orders cannot be issued to meet every possibility, and commanders will have to act on general instructions. All commanders should, therefore, be trained to work at times on instructions, and not to rigid orders.'

But there was one pernicious consequence of this discussion, and it was nourished by the theoretical prognostications of Fuller and Liddell Hart. They assumed, and many agreed with them, that in future war the great artillery bombardments of 1916-17 that had sacrificed surprise and smashed communications rendering movement all but impossible, would be unnecessary - they would be obsolete. Indeed this type of thinking is acknowledged by the *Lessons of the Great War* if only indirectly and in passing. 'The pause during the elaboration of the fire-plan', it notes, 'leaves the enemy free to manoeuvre, and when the fire-plan is ready it may no longer be applicable. Such methods may well put a tame finish to a promising situation created by manoeuvre and surprise'. The *Lessons* concludes cautiously - and significantly:

'This question of speeding up the organisation of artillery fire plans has been closely studied but so far the results have not been very encouraging.'

The solution in the 1930s was the decentralisation of artillery command systems, which resulted, especially in North Africa, in an inability to concentrate artillery fire at the decisive point.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

18. Thus by 1939, stimulated by the sometimes over-heated discussion of mechanisation, the Army lurched towards the Second World War. Although a number of papers were circulated, and some documents issued the actual war fighting doctrine was remarkably unsettled. It should be emphasised that this was in large part because the Army's role was not firmly and clearly established. The Cabinet failed to lay down what the Army was **for**, and thus whatever the progressivism of certain individuals, as an institution it could not train on a universally accepted doctrine to meet its next challenge. The essence of the doctrine was that the Army would fight with an infantry-centred army, with armour being used in a highly mobile way in support of the infantry, not dissimilar to the cavalry in the American Civil War. Some of the terms employed in the mechanization debate were deployed but without understanding - and sometimes erroneously. Given these conditions a great deal of improvisation would be needed. There was no doctrine of high command.

19. Space does not permit a detailed discussion of all theatres of war in which the British were engaged, one case study will be selected to illustrate these themes, Operation CRUSADER. It is ironic that though the theorists of armoured warfare were written off for using extravagant analogies in advancing their case, once war was declared and armoured forces were deployed in North Africa, these were taken up. Given the terrain of this theatre, one of the most popular was that armoured operations resembled the movement of naval

forces. The aim of CRUSADER was the relief of Tobruk. In the course of this movement, XXX Corps of Eighth Army sought to destroy the armour of the Afrika Corps in a decisive tank battle; it sought to do this by tempting the German armour to come out and fight: 'The enemy armour would be compelled to fight on ground of XXX Corps' choosing'. This sounded very impressive but the actual choice of the ground, around Gabr Saleh, was not particularly important to anybody, lacked any noticeable defensive advantages, and had been chosen as a compromise between organising a concentrated armoured punch and providing flank protection to the mainly infantry XIII Corps. It imposed upon the enemy a wish that they should fight in a particular way, and did not provide the means by which they should be forced to do so. In fact, the German armour did not fight like naval fleets, but as the armoured theorists had recommended, in close co-ordination with their anti-tank guns in an integrated defensive-offensive. This was overlooked by Eighth Army staffs, who, seduced by impressive sounding tags, failed to study the substance of their meaning. Under the pressure of war itself it is perhaps not surprising that they committed this sin. But whatever the merits of the staff or their commander, it must surely be agreed that if the British Army had had recourse to an accepted body of doctrine that Cunningham's plan could have been based on it and that it would have served as a **focus** for his judgement, experience and intuition, even though he had come from East Africa, where he felt at home. Cunningham would not have had to start from scratch which he found so emotionally and mentally exhausting before the operations began.

20. Eventually, after some hard fighting Operation CRUSADER was a success. The resulting failures of British armour *vis-a-vis* the German were further studied, and the remedies decided on were radical. It was argued that the day of the division was numbered. Infantry masses were too vulnerable to the rear attack by armour and a need had to be found to enhance the co-operation of arms in a more flexible formation that was not tied to the speed of the advance of the slowest troops. The 'brigade group' was created. This smaller and more mobile formation would have de-centralised supporting artillery formations of their own. Regrettably, in the absence of a really effective anti-tank gun, the Eighth Army's main antidote to the Afrika Corps's armour, the artillery, was effectively neutralised by this reform. It underlined the failure to make the most of firepower; it revealed that the British Army did not understand that manoeuvre constituted a blend of mobility **and** firepower. There was a certain degree of sense in this reform, however, but changing doctrine and organisation so radically in the midst of a campaign is not the best way to effect an improvement.

21. The arrival of Montgomery in the autumn of 1942 signalled that these radical innovations would be halted. He was of the view that the Army should fight with its existing structure. Furthermore, British soldiers, like their

predecessors in the First World War, were insufficiently trained to undertake the ambitious manoeuvres sometimes demanded of them. The doctrine that should be propounded should take full account of this; switching to a 'panzer' style was impossible.

22. This leads to the second brief example. As he became more senior, Montgomery was able to impose a doctrine on the British Army in the Second World War, at least in Europe, which enabled it to fight in a certain way. This style in some ways resembled that which emerged in the First World War. It was effectively a response to the ever present reality that British armies were made up of ill-trained conscripts. Operations therefore had to be highly structured and controlled. There was another factor that did not exercise the minds of First World War generals over much. His operations had to be guided by **economy of force**. The legacy of the First World War was so painful that British troops would not endure, and their commanders would not wish to repeat, the massive casualty lists of 1914-18. Every effort was made to keep casualties to an absolute minimum. In this British generalship was eminently successful.

23. It is significant that the first thing Montgomery tried to do was establish a **framework for understanding**. It is very typical of British methods that this had to be achieved in the war itself. The object of the Tripoli Tactical Talks, 15-17 February 1943, was:

'To see how we stand; to get a solid framework or base which will serve as a background to everything we do; to check up on the things that really matter when we go battle fighting; to examine the technique of certain more important types of operations; to disseminate knowledge amongst ourselves.'

Of course, all armies adjust their conduct in accordance with the lessons of campaigns just fought. But it was significant that Montgomery had to do more than adjust the details; he had to lay down a solid framework. In large part this was due to a lack of central direction and co-ordination of doctrine and the multiplicity of agencies involved in its formulation. Here Montgomery's own rather conceited approach, which deprecated the literary production of anything not produced by his own staffs, was self-defeating. His own well intentioned efforts always smacked of vainglory.

24. But what emerged from this discussion was a certain approach to war fighting which has had an enduring influence within the British Army. It bears a close resemblance to the style that emerged from the First World War. Paradoxically, an essential element of this emerged out of criticism of First

World War methods, namely, the stress on economy of force. It was a vital component of Montgomery's methods:

'There shall be no failures; if I tackle a thing it must succeed; I train the troops in the technique I am going to use in the next battle, and I do not crack off until I am ready.'

It followed that commanders had to be trained in doctrinal matters so that there was a common approach. As Montgomery observed in 1943 of the American preparations for battle, 'The proper way to get the American Army ready for battle is to **teach the Generals**. It is no good having Battle Schools for the young officers and NCOs. In the Eighth Army I concentrate on the Generals. If they know their stuff, they will teach the soldiers'.

25. In his diary notes, *The Battle for Egypt, 23 October-7 November 1942*, Montgomery observed of Eighth Army that 'The training of commanders by their superiors was unknown; there had been no firm doctrine of war on which to base training'. Although some of Montgomery's strictures on his predecessors were exaggerated and unfair, this one seems just. Montgomery had the strength of character to cut across competing and disparate factions and impose his style of operations on Eighth Army. He was also able to place in command his proteges who had been trained in his methods. With command of 21st Army Group, Britain's largest and most powerful force fielded in 1939-45, he was able to bequeath a powerful doctrinal legacy. What were his methods?

26. Montgomery's style was simple but not simplistic. It addressed the fundamental elements of warfighting.

1. Be clear about the fundamentals. 'We are very apt in our army to start by becoming immersed in detail without being clear about the fundamentals on which all detail is based. Our training pamphlets err badly in this respect.'

2. The Master Plan must be developed once the commander has decided his course of action. This must **never** be decided for him by his staffs. The Master Plan sought to consider the aims and tailor the means to match the end. It considers, in immense detail the sequence of moves by which the commander seeks to impose his will on the enemy.

3. All plans must be administratively sustainable. It was better to field a small force than a large army that lacked a solid administrative basis.

4. 'Win the air battle before you fight the land, or sea battle. This policy will save you many lives, and many ships, and much materiel.'
5. The stage-management of the battle. 'An essential feature of high command is skilful grouping and regrouping as the situation changes.'
6. Battlefields must be **tidy**. This is a synonym for the maximisation of concentration, the reduction of wasteful fighting power, and the determined, centralised control of the commander.
7. That firepower should be traded for lives and tanks. Artillery fire must be centralised and directly responsive to the needs of the army group commander.

However, this and other of the above methods did contribute to a certain stereotyping of operations and occasionally, as in the crossing of the Straits of Messina in September 1943, of taking a sledge hammer to crack a nut.

27. To conclude, this brief study has sought to develop three main arguments. First, that doctrinal developments in the sphere of warfighting have been haphazard and have largely been the product of hasty improvisation rather than doctrinal debate and the exchange of ideas in the calm of peace. Secondly, on the contrary, this has often been undertaken in the midst of war itself with consequent errors. Thirdly, in the first half of the twentieth century, there has been a good deal of continuity in the approach to warfighting. This has stressed somewhat rigid, cautious methods relying on a great weight of firepower to cover an advance. There has been a tendency to regard the art of war as composing certain separate compartments, offence, defence, firepower, mobility, morale, and so on, with insufficient understanding that these are **intimately related**. At certain stages one or the other has enjoyed immense favour. So before 1914, moral factors were emphasised without relating these to firepower. Mobility became the watchword in 1941 without relating this to firepower. Many of these factors were brought together in a synthesis by Montgomery, but the resulting doctrine was very cautious and closely resembled the operations of 1918 which were highly centralised. Needless to say, these tendencies are present in other armies besides the British. It is inaccurate and not very helpful to single out our own army for special, and misguided, criticism. Nonetheless, we should be aware that the lack of a fundamental, doctrinal framework of understanding has contributed to a tendency towards superficial fads and a failure to understand the reality behind certain terms.

28. The present operational environment in which the British Army finds itself in some ways resembles that of the inter-war years. The Army now finds itself

restructuring after a major world event: in the 1920s it was the Great War, in the 1990s it is the Cold War. There are, of course, some major differences, not least the fact that during the Cold War no shot was fired between the major participants; nonetheless, the same opportunities present themselves. Surely the challenge facing the British Army is to build on the lessons of the past and formulate a warfighting doctrine as the focus and framework for a commonly agreed approach to the conduct of operations.

PART ONE - FOUNDATIONS

CHAPTER TWO

THE APPROACH TO THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

The purpose of Chapter 2 is to outline the British Army's approach to the conduct of operations

SUCCESS IN OPERATIONS

VICTORY AND SUCCESS

0201. Conflict, as Chapter 1 described, is either **resolved** or **terminated**; military force contributes through the **defeat** of an opposing force. Defeat, however, is a difficult and elusive idea but is defined here as: **To diminish the effectiveness of the enemy, to the extent that he is either unable to participate in combat or at least cannot fulfil his intention.**

0202. Defeat is not an absolute condition but a matter of degree. The concept of unconditional surrender for example is of limited practical use; outside declared general war it implies a degree of defeat which may overstep public tolerance, exceed the mandate for operations and frustrate conflict resolution. In reality, circumstances are likely to be less straightforward.

0203. The Army fights to win and winning is definable, given an understanding of the approach to operations. Success in modern conflict will be defined by an end-state - a state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of the campaign either to terminate or resolve the conflict on favourable terms. (End-state is further discussed in Chapter 3).

0204. In modern conflict there will be degrees of success, to be weighed against the costs of operations in terms of both their physical and human

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components. As the objective varies, so must the application of violence be matched accordingly. Such considerations will exercise the relationships between the Armed Forces, the Government and the People and the influence of the news media, public opinion and economic factors will impinge on military decisions, particularly in those operations which the UK **elects** to conduct. Success equates to compelling an enemy to conclude a conflict on favourable terms: resolution to the satisfaction of all parties or termination, in which case the conflict has ended on our side's terms alone. **Victory** may not therefore always be appropriate to describe the desired outcome of an operation; it may have to be defined in other terms such as reconciliation, stabilisation (acceptance of the status quo) or acceptance of an agreed peace plan. Where such acceptance is hesitant or reluctant, the prospect is of protracted involvement.

0205. This notion of graduated success is important because it has a direct bearing on the two ends to which military operations are directed: the tangible effects on an enemy's physical means of fighting and the other intangible effect on his cohesion, in terms of his morale and will to resist. This doctrine embraces both components.

DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY

0206. Physical destruction of the enemy's capacity to fight will be but one of a number of means to defeat him. Political and diplomatic pressure will be exercised through international bodies, economic pressures by restricting commerce and human pressures by influencing domestic public opinion. JFC Fuller set out the context in which military action takes place. The object is:

'Not to kill soldiers or sink ships but to change a policy which those ships and soldiers are protecting. The aim.....is, therefore to subdue the enemy's will to resist with the least possible human and economic loss to oneself.'

0207. Physical destruction of enemy forces may not in itself lead to success; success cannot be measured in solely numerical terms. As Basil Liddell Hart said:

'There are... plenty of negative examples to prove that the conquest of the main armed forces of the enemy is not synonymous with victory. History has no more complete victories than Cannae and Sedan, yet the one failed to bring Hannibal to his goal and the other was only consummated when Paris fell several months after.'

0208. Although numerical superiority is always desirable, it is not a prerequisite for success. The reality today is that there may be stringent limitations on the size of force deployed and a tenet of this doctrine is therefore that the British Army must prepare to fight without decisive numerical advantage, even within a coalition. Relying on numerical superiority guarantees no success: 'War favours the big battalions' is not necessarily a universal truth, as the US experience in Vietnam suggests:

'Perhaps the most dramatic finding of the Office of Systems Analysis was that the United States was not winning the war of attrition and that the addition of more troops would not solve the problem.'¹

0209. The most potent effect achieved by destruction is to damage the enemy's belief in his ability to win. An effect of the series of actions at South Georgia, Pebble Island and Goose Green was arguably to give UK Forces moral ascendancy in battle over the occupying Argentinean Forces at an early stage of the Falklands campaign, 1982. Marshal Ferdinand Foch, an ardent exponent of the power of destruction, recognised this psychological dimension:

'Ninety thousand defeated men withdraw before ninety thousand victorious men solely because they have had enough, and they have had enough because they no longer believe in victory, because they are demoralized and they have no moral resistance left.'

0210. Physical destruction of the enemy is not therefore a wholly reliable means of inflicting defeat in isolation. The costs and the potential gains of the enemy's destruction must be weighed realistically and not overemphasised. In modern conflict, identifying the enemy will be difficult and targeting him will risk collateral damage, especially in operations against irregular forces and in situations of chaos. Protracted and inconclusive battles or engagements may erode public and political support. These are not arguments for overcaution or the avoidance of fighting; a resolute enemy may eventually need to be crushed and destroyed. The calculated assessment of risks and the ruthless seizure of opportunities are fundamental to this doctrine. But there are other complementary means of defeating an enemy.

ATTACKING THE ENEMY'S WILL

0211. Conflict is subject to political, economic, ethical and moral constraints. These limit the freedom of military action. In this context, attempting to destroy

1. Van Creveld, Martin. *Command in War*. Harvard University Press. 1985. p254.

an enemy's will solely by **direct attack** on his forces may be both costly and at times counter-productive. The essence of this notion was summarised in two maxims by Basil Liddell Hart (and was graphically illustrated by the campaign plan in the 1990-91 Gulf War):

'(First) in the face of the overwhelming evidence of history, no general is justified in launching his troops to a direct attack upon an enemy firmly in position. The second, that instead of seeking to upset the enemy's equilibrium by one's attack, it must be upset before a real attack is, or can be successfully launched.'

One of the three Operational Imperatives of the plan for Operation DESERT STORM was that Coalition Forces should fight only those enemy units necessary to achieve Coalition objectives while bypassing other enemy forces.

0212. It is however possible to amplify the physical effects of violence by harnessing the human effects. JFC Fuller, writing in 1943, put it this way:

'At Cambrai what was the predominant value of the tank? It was its moral effect. It showed clearly that terror and not destruction was the true aim and end of armed forces. That is to say, to attack the nerves of an army, and through its nerves the will of its commander, is more profitable than battering to pieces the bodies of its men.'²

0213. Combat must never be seen as a fair fight between equals. Guile and ruthlessness are needed to ensure that by the selective application of violence appropriate to the ends, the enemy is left dead, wounded, captured, marginalised, frozen by fear and uncertainty, confused and isolated. He must be overwhelmed with a sense of hopelessness, a feeling of paralysis born of the realisation that his aims are not achievable. If defeating the enemy by destruction alone has limitations, the complementary approach is to attack the enemy's will to resist. He must be made to feel constantly off balance as a result of his actions being preempted, dislocated and disrupted; three approaches to attacking the enemy's will.

APPROACHES TO ATTACKING THE ENEMY'S WILL

0214. ***Preemption.***³ **To preempt the enemy is to seize an opportunity, often fleeting, before he does, in order to deny him an advantageous**

2. Fuller, J F C. *Armoured Warfare*. Eyre and Spottiswood. 1943. p12.

3. This paragraph deals with preemption at the operational and tactical levels and does not describe the type of strategic preemption exemplified by the Israeli air attacks which opened the Six Day War in 1967.

course of action. Its purpose is initially negative - it seeks to frustrate the enemy's plan or his likely course of action; in doing so it has a positive value - it wrests the initiative from the enemy. Its success lies in the speed with which the situation can subsequently be exploited. Preemptive operations rely on rapid decision making and surprise for protection rather than ponderous preparation. Sun Tzu called preemption 'A victory before the situation has crystallized'. In 1942 the Allies were unable to develop their initial Operation TORCH landings in North Africa sufficiently quickly to secure the port of Tunis. Realising that Tunis was a key Allied objective, the Germans boldly flew an ad hoc force from Sicily and Southern Italy to Tunis, thereby securing this vital port and effectively preempting the Allied plan. In the event it took a further four months hard fighting before the Allies gained control of Tunis and could make use of its port facilities, as originally intended. Preemptive moves may even make subsequent battle unnecessary.⁴ Preemption demands a keen awareness of time and a willingness to take risks which offer a high payoff. These risks can now be reduced with the benefit of information from real time sensors to allow a more accurate assessment of the enemy's true situation.

0215. **Dislocation. To dislocate the enemy is to deny him the ability to bring his strengths to bear.** Unlike pre-emption, dislocation is a deliberate act, not an opportunistic gambit and is critically dependent on sound intelligence rather than intuition. Its purpose is much wider than the frustration of the enemy's plan; it is to render his strength irrelevant. It seeks to avoid fighting the enemy on his terms. This can be done in two ways: by avoiding his strengths or by so fixing them that they cannot be used effectively. Both deep penetration thrusts and envelopment are classic forms of dislocation. The German panzer thrust through France in 1940 rendered the Allied strengths irrelevant by sidestepping them, thus paralysing the Allied High Command. Equally, the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad was enveloped in a way which denied it the opportunity to use its strength effectively; it suffered dislocation.

0216. **Disruption. To disrupt is to attack the enemy selectively to break apart and throw into confusion the assets which are critical to the employment and coherence of his fighting power:** 'to put a spanner in the works'. It is also a deliberate act that requires sound intelligence. Its purpose is to rupture the integrity of the enemy's fighting power and to reduce it to less than the sum total of its constituent parts. JFC Fuller likened this to having the

4. Similarly, in May 1942, Churchill urged General Auchinleck to preempt the then impending German offensive: he likened the situation to '... the celebrated tale of the man who gave powder to a bear. He mixed the powder with the greatest care and accuracy. He rolled it up in to a large paper spill, and was about to blow it down the bear's throat. *But the bear blew first* - '. Churchill W S. *History of the Second World War*, Vol IV. Cassell 1951. p279

enemy: 'Shot through the brain'. The definition and identification of the most critical assets may not be easy. Key strategic and military targets might include command centres, high value base facilities, air defence systems, weapons of mass destruction, choke points and critical logistic and industrial facilities. In operations against irregular forces, command structure and logistics may be the best targets to disrupt. Priorities will have to be allocated, taking account, inter alia, target accessibility. It could be argued for example that one critical vulnerability of the Provisional IRA is the support it enjoys within the Republican Community but it is another thing to get at it, by military means alone. The classic vulnerability identified by Liddell Hart was the command and control organization of an enemy and its supplies, something the German proponents of Blitzkrieg were not slow to pick up. The combined effects of physical destruction, preemption, dislocation and disruption will be more keenly felt by a military force which lacks cohesion.

COHESION

0217. At its simplest, cohesion is unity. It is a quality that binds together constituent parts thereby providing resilience against dislocation and disruption. It minimises vulnerability to defeat in detail and the adverse effects of preemption.

0218. *Principles of War.* The bedrock of cohesion is adherence to three principles of war above all: **selection and maintenance of the aim, concentration of force and morale.** The effective employment of military forces requires them to be directed relentlessly towards a common aim, expressed as an intention, purpose or end-state. Conflict is dynamic and the selected aim must be subject to constant review to ensure that its appropriateness is maintained; this implies neither being easily diverted nor unwilling to modify the aim when necessary to adapt to changing circumstances. The corollary is that it will greatly contribute to the enemy's defeat if his aims can be made increasingly inappropriate or irrelevant and his cohesion thus broken. Concentration of force is achieved through the application of main effort; this implies an acceptance of risk and preparedness to economise on force employed on subsidiary actions. Conversely the enemy must be encouraged to dissipate his force both in time and space, thus reducing his cohesion. Historical examples illustrate these principles.

- a. The Luftwaffe failed to subdue Malta in 1941-42 because it failed to stick to its aim and failed to concentrate force. 'In spite of the policy laid down, Luftflotte 2, in its offensive against Malta, failed to keep to any scientific system of target priorities. Due to the consequent dispersal of effort, the power of the enemy's offensive always fell just short of the Island's recuperative ability. Airfields were put out of

action and then a respite followed, with a diversion of effort to other targets, giving time for the airfields to be put back into commission again. In this way the Luftwaffe never, except for very short periods, prevented the Royal Air Force from being able to hit back.⁵

b. The plan for Operation CRUSADER in the Western Desert in 1941 shows how effectiveness is dissipated without cohesion. 2 NZ Div had two missions: to participate in the 13 Corps action to 'Seek out and destroy enemy armour' or 'Assist 30 Corps in the relief of Tobruk'. A NZ Div Staff Officer commented: 'This [latter mission] was seen as only a possibility. Freyberg [GOC] however saw it from the outset very much as a probability'. He naturally wanted to keep the three brigades of the Division together but in the event was unable to. 5 Bde became tied to the 30 Corps mission and was defeated in detail, while the rest of the Division fought for control of the SIDI REZEGH ridge which Freyberg had identified as the key to the relief of Tobruk and the heart of the campaign. 'Freyberg had appreciated the weakness in the Army plan...the dangerous dispersal of British Forces, so giving Rommel the chance to destroy them piecemeal.'⁶

c. 'My third great anxiety ... was morale. There was no doubt that the disasters in the Arakan, following an unbroken record of defeat, had brought morale in large sections of the Army to a dangerously low ebb ... So when I took command, I sat quietly down to work out this business of morale ... It was on these conclusions that I set out consciously to raise the fighting spirit of my Army ... Morale is a state of mind. It is that intangible force which will move a whole group of men to give their last ounce to achieve something, without counting the cost to themselves; that makes them feel they are part of something greater than themselves. If they are to feel that, their morale must, if it is to endure ... have certain foundations. These foundations are spiritual, intellectual and material, and that is the order of their importance. Spiritual first, because only spiritual foundations can stand real strain. Next intellectual, because men are swayed by reason as well as feeling. Material last - important but last - because the very highest kinds of morale are often met when material conditions are lowest.'⁷

5. Air Historical Branch unpublished Draft Narrative quoted in *Malta* by Laddie Lucas. Stanley Paul, 1992, p130.

6. Cox, Geoffrey. *A Tale of Two Battles*. William Kimber. 1987. p146.

7. Slim, William. *Defeat into Victory*. Cassell. 1956. pp 181-182.

0219. **Doctrine, Cohesion and Fighting Power.** A common and authoritative doctrine maximises fighting power. Commanders who are in each others' minds and who share a common approach to the conduct of operations are more likely to act in concert. Command is also more effectively exercised when less needs to be explained through detailed orders. An enemy who lacks an operational doctrine may be unpredictable but he is unlikely to enjoy the cohesion of an Army which does. Finally, a common approach to operations and unity of command are particularly essential to cohesion in Joint and Combined Operations.

0220. **Operational Integrity.** A force can only act cohesively if the activities of its component parts can be fully integrated, without detriment to the most capable.

'In the Second World War one of the factors which...led to the Germans' failure, ...was an excessive difference in the velocities of the mobile and main force. In the German offensives, the *Panzertruppe* tended to move five or six times faster than the rest. Either the mobile force pressed on...and had to fight a battle of its own without benefit of leverage. Or, when logistics dictated, the mobile force was held back until the rest caught up, giving the Red Army time to respond to the situation.'⁸

The enemy must be denied the opportunity to disrupt operations by focusing his efforts on a single arm, agency or nation. In order to attack one capability or element, the enemy makes himself vulnerable to another.

MEANS OF ATTACKING COHESION

0221. The qualities that promote cohesion are also those that if attacked destroy it. For example, seeking to overload the enemy decision making process at critical levels, is likely to cause paralysis, inaction and a breakdown of resistance. It is preferable to make the enemy incapable of resisting us by shattering his moral and physical cohesion than to seek his wholesale destruction. By manoeuvring to surprise the enemy and using firepower selectively to attack the targets that give him his cohesion, by imposing on him the effects of tempo and simultaneity, his cohesion can be shattered to the point where he is defeated.

0222. **Firepower.** **Firepower destroys, neutralises, suppresses and demoralises.** It is delivered by sea, land and air platforms and achieves both

8. Simpkin, Richard. *Race to the Swift*. Brassey's. 1985. p103.

lethal and non-lethal effects (laser sensor damage weapons for example). Firepower provides the violent, destructive force to amplify the effects of three other means of attacking cohesion; tempo, simultaneity and surprise. Firepower has no intrinsic value: it can only be judged by its effect on the enemy. For this reason battle damage assessment is important. Firepower effects are the sum of volume, accuracy, lethality and suddenness (or unpredictability) and these are magnified by synchronising the effects in time and space. The effects of firepower must be exploited if the results are to be more than transitory. The factors which determine how precisely firepower effects can be applied are: the quality of target acquisition and command systems, ammunition supply and tactical and operational mobility. The most important qualities of firepower are the precision with which effects can be applied (and collateral damage avoided), the ability to synchronise the effects of different systems against one target and flexibility to switch between targets rapidly. The application of firepower in modern conflict is rarely a single Service activity at the tactical level and invariably a joint activity at the operational. If the application of firepower is the core technique for destroying cohesion, others can amplify its effects.

0223. **Tempo.** **Tempo is the rhythm or rate of activity on operations, relative to the enemy.** Tempo seeks to pose increasingly compelling threats with which the enemy is unable to cope. The situation the enemy believes he is facing is repeatedly changed in such a way that his responses are inappropriate; this can be by speeding up or slowing down, or changing the type of activity. In conflict each party assesses the situation, decides and acts, then reassesses to see what effect his actions have had. He who consistently completes the cycle faster gains an advantage which increases with each repetition. The enemy's actions become less and less appropriate to the real situation until he loses the cohesion needed to continue the fight. It is not sufficient however to decide faster; speed of execution matters and forces must therefore be organised for tempo, for example by grouping at each level of command for independent action, to the greatest extent possible. Tempo is thus sometimes explained as 'being ahead of the game'. The enemy may not be surprised in the sense that he is unaware of what is coming but in the equally telling sense that he cannot do anything about it. He must be made to see that his situation is not only deteriorating but doing so at an ever increasing and unstoppable rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist. Tempo has three elements; speed of decision, speed of execution and the speed with which the force transition from one activity to another. The impact of tempo was illustrated by Liddell Hart, commenting on the Wehrmacht invasion of France in 1940:

'The pace of panzer warfare paralysed the French Staff....the orders they issued might have been effective but for being, repeatedly, twenty four hours late for the situation they were intend to meet.'

0224. **Simultaneity.** **Simultaneity seeks to overload the enemy commander.** He is attacked or threatened from so many angles at once that he is denied the ability to concentrate on one problem at a time or even establish priorities between them. He faces menacing dilemmas about how and where to react, he is torn in different directions and even if he is not paralysed, he finds it hard to respond coherently. If the effect is repeated simultaneously against a number of levels of command, a cumulative effect on cohesion is felt throughout the enemy force. His problems are then compounded by using the full gamut of firepower so that the response to one form of attack either makes him vulnerable to others or it exacerbates a different problem. Thus for example the enemy will have his use of the electro-magnetic spectrum curtailed, he will be attacked on the ground and from the air at ranges he is unable to match and he will be coerced into a position from which he can neither fight effectively nor escape. In pursuing simultaneity, risk may be accepted in having a small reserve or none at all. The Wehrmacht did so in the campaign to occupy Norway in 1940. Judging that the Allied response to the initial airlanded invasion would be fragmentary and isolated, the OKW plan sought to seize as many key objectives as possible throughout the country simultaneously, at the expense of a phased operation with substantial forces held in reserve. Like tempo, simultaneity must be seen through the eyes of the enemy and its use judged by the effect on his cohesion.

0225. **Surprise.** Surprise is fundamental to the shattering of the enemy's cohesion. As with tempo and simultaneity, time is the key factor. Recognising the power of modern sensors, it is not essential that the enemy is taken unaware but only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively. Absolute surprise is an important bonus but relative - or operational - surprise is the crucial effect to be achieved. Absolute surprise may totally paralyse the enemy, but relative surprise will certainly degrade the enemy's reaction. To be thoroughly effective, our tempo must be such that he is unable to respond effectively and our use of simultaneity must make it difficult for him to decide upon which threat to focus. Exploiting surprise involves creating and exploiting opportunities which may be fleeting. Surprise is built on speed, secrecy and deception. It means doing the unexpected thing, which may be the more difficult option but one the enemy least expects. Whilst surprise is always desirable, its achievement does not rest entirely within our gift. The enemy's susceptibility, his expectations and preparedness must be taken into account.

0226. **Concluding the Operation.** The successful shattering of an enemy's cohesion will not in itself guarantee his immediate defeat. A resolute enemy may consider it worth fighting on piecemeal, prolonging the struggle in the hope of a failure of will by his opponent. He may consider it vital to preserve one element of his combat power in the hope that he can use it after an apparent capitulation. How the enemy's fighting power is finally to be overcome will decide what action is appropriate; this may range between physical destruction, involving further fighting at one extreme and disarming and demilitarising his forces at the other. Once his cohesion is shattered, an enemy may be incapable of achieving success but it may well require further operations to terminate or resolve the conflict.

THE CORE FUNCTIONS - FIND, FIX AND STRIKE⁹

0227. To put our warfighting approach into practice, an understanding of the fundamental elements of operations is important. At its simplest, there are two: to **fix** and to **strike** - implicit in both is the need to **find**. In the 5th century BC, Sun Tzu coined the terms **Ordinary Force** for the function of fixing the enemy or denying him the freedom to achieve his purpose and the **Extraordinary Force** for the function of manoeuvring into a position of decisive advantage from which he can be struck. In Northern Ireland this is illustrated by likening the uniformed troops to the ordinary force and Special Forces to the extraordinary force. These core functions, find, fix and strike, can be carried out consecutively as they were in the Gulf War, or concurrently as they are in Northern Ireland.

0228. **Finding** the enemy is a basic function which endures throughout an operation. It spans locating, identifying and assessing the enemy. Finding the enemy may be an incidental result of operations to fix and strike him. But this will rarely suffice and, particularly in the initial stages of an operation, forces may be directed specifically to the battle for information: this will invariably be a wise investment of resources, particularly in operations other than war and in situations of chaos. Information will never be wholly reliable; it is a form of friction, for which intuition may partially compensate.¹⁰

0229. The following model helps us to understand the functions of **fixing** and **striking** further.

9. AAP-6 defines strike as 'An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize or destroy an objective'. In air power doctrine, strike may have specific nuclear connotations: in ADP *Operations* it is used exclusively in the AAP-6 sense.

10. See ADP Vol 2 *Command*, Chapter 2.

To **fix** is to :

Deny the enemy his goals and....
Distract him and thus....
Deprive him of freedom of action

in order to gain **us** freedom of action.

To **strike** is to use that freedom of action to:

Manoeuvre - that is to get into a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied.¹¹
Hit him unexpectedly, or in superior force, at the point selected in order to defeat him.

0230. Today it is possible to achieve all three core functions - find, fix and strike - simultaneously or sequentially. The campaign plan for Operation DESERT STORM (1991) chose to do both:

'We will offset the imbalance of ground combat power by using our strength against his weakness. Initially execute deception operations to focus his attention on defense (sic) and cause incorrect organization of forces. We will initially attack into the Iraqi homeland using airpower to decapitate his leadership, command and control, and eliminate his ability to reinforce Iraqi forces in Kuwait and Southern Iraq. We will then gain undisputed air superiority over Kuwait so that we can subsequently and selectively attack Iraqi ground forces with air power in order to reduce his combat power and destroy reinforcing units. Finally, we will fix Iraqi forces in place by feints and limited objective attacks followed by armored force penetration and exploitation to seize key lines of communication nodes, which will put us in a position to interdict resupply and remaining reinforcements from Iraq and eliminate forces in Kuwait.'¹²

11. AAP-6 defines manoeuvre as: 'The employment of forces through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy ...' We have here defined manoeuvre in a way which is equally applicable in operations short of war.

12. United States, Secretary of Defence. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*. Final Report to Congress. US DOD. April 1992.

FIXING THE ENEMY

0231. ***Denying the Enemy his Goals.*** To gain freedom of action, we have to deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve his goals and put him in a reactive frame of mind. The aim is to throw the enemy off-balance and the principal means are to **surprise**, to **deceive** and to lure. When the enemy is surprised, he is uncertain how to react to ambiguous information until it is too late. When he is deceived he is certain how to act - but his decision is wrong. The lure positively invites the enemy to take a course of action which will make him vulnerable: inviting him to illuminate a target with radar, which is then destroyed with anti-radiation missiles is an example. At the operational level, Field Marshal Slim's plan for the Battle of Imphal and Kohima sought to lure the Japanese into offensive operations which fragmented their cohesion. In Spring 1944, preparing for offence, Slim became aware that the Japanese 15th Army was doing likewise. Slim had three courses: to continue offensive preparations, to stand and fight or to retire to the Imphal Plain, where his major logistics assets were dispersed. He chose the last course and in so doing, despite ceding hard won ground, lured the Japanese into the only open plain in Burma. Here 14th Army could concentrate decisively to defeat them. He likened the concentration of administrative units around Imphal to a tethered goat, which could not fail to attract the Japanese, whose supplies were short. Slim realised that uncertainty pervades conflict. The fog of war covers unknowns about the enemy, the environment and even about the friendly situation. Uncertain of friendly objectives and threats, the enemy is forced to cover all options, thereby dissipating his force and being driven off his purpose. Unless he is denied and distracted from his goals, he is able to continue with his plan, maintain his reserves and hence retain the potential to cause damage. A measure of success is the proportion of combat power tied to protecting critical vulnerabilities. The classic tactics of the insurgent who strikes hard but apparently at random is an example of how a relatively small force can tie up a much larger one and show the value of distracting the enemy.

0232. ***Distracting and Fixing the Enemy.*** Our freedom of action depends on distracting the enemy and fixing him, thereby reducing his ability to interfere with our operations. There are three strands; **to deny the enemy information**, to deny him the **ability to pass orders** and to **inhibit their execution**. Central to the enemy's ability to concentrate force against us are his information sources and his command system. Both depend in many armies on use of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Domination and exploitation of the latter greatly help us in fixing the enemy. An unsophisticated enemy or one who decentralises command will be less vulnerable. Distracting and fixing the enemy is further achieved by embroiling him in subsidiary actions which divert him from his main purpose. He must also be denied physical mobility. The operations which

preceded the Normandy invasion fixed the German mobile reserves by a combination of interdicting routes, direct air attack and a deception threat into the Pas de Calais. This example highlights the value of fixing the enemy by a variety of means, making it difficult to counter any one. In Northern Ireland, patrolling, vehicle checks, searches and observation all contribute to fixing the terrorists by limiting their freedom of action. Sun Tzu describes the relationship between fixing and striking:

'If I wish to take advantage of the enemy I must perceive not just the advantage in doing so but must first consider the ways he can harm me if I do.'

Fixing him may require the use of more direct and lethal means in toe to toe battles or engagements in which firepower may have a major role. Such operations (Sun Tzu's Ordinary Force) can swallow combat power all too quickly. Thus how much the enemy's freedom of action should be degraded must be carefully judged to ensure that the resources devoted to fixing are no more than the minimum needed. Furthermore fixing operations must not unduly attenuate the resources that are needed to strike.

0233. **Timing.** Time is an important consideration of fixing. It may be necessary to fix and strike the enemy simultaneously. However, fixing the enemy may lose its relevance once he has lost the initiative, is being struck and its importance begins to diminish. In this case the timing of the transition of resources from one to the other will become a critical decision (reflected in a switch to the main effort).

STRIKING THE ENEMY

0234. **Manoeuvre.** **To manoeuvre is to seek to get into a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied.** Manoeuvre means more than movement in combination with fire; it is the process by which combat power is focused where it can have a decisive effect, to preempt, dislocate or disrupt. Manoeuvre in this sense involves trade-offs: speed against time, width against depth, concentration against dispersion; a degree of risk taking is implicit. The concept of water flowing over surfaces and gaps is useful to understand the notion. Water runs off surfaces - enemy strengths - and pours through gaps - enemy weaknesses. Enemy strength is avoided and combat power focused through his weaknesses to strike at his critical assets directly. Where possible existing gaps are exploited. Failing that, they must be created. Gaps may be physical, a boundary for example, or structural, a weakness in his passage of information, but there is usually also a time factor, a period when the enemy is over-extended or suffering the effects

of tempo. To exploit this time dimension requires agility, flexibility and anticipation, together with decentralised decision making. Manoeuvre exploits weakness. This places a premium on reconnaissance and information to command by **pulling** combat power towards enemy weaknesses rather than **pushing** from the rear. Shaping events in this pragmatic way opens up several options for striking the enemy, presenting him with a multitude of threats to which he is unable to respond coherently and thus achieving simultaneity.

0235. ***Hitting the Enemy.*** **Hitting the enemy means using force or violence to achieve the purpose of a mission or directive by direct action.** Striking is thus the decisive function, finding and fixing are essential enabling functions. Simultaneity, tempo and surprise are the techniques by which the effects of firepower are focused to break the enemy's cohesion. Hitting the enemy is an all arms and joint activity, requiring the synchronisation of land and air power. Such synchronisation makes the most of the complementary characteristics of the different capabilities, to concentrate sufficient superior force at the selected point to guarantee a favourable outcome. Deception, Special Forces operations, exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrum, firepower and manoeuvre all converge to confuse, demoralise and destroy the enemy's cohesion in general and specific parts of his force in detail. There is also a time dimension to hitting the enemy: whilst the preference is to apply irresistible lethal force to win quickly at minimum cost, constraints may dictate a more protracted approach without the prospect of any single decisive action. In these circumstances, the effort must be sequenced and sustained so that the effects on the enemy are cumulative. But whatever precedes it, hitting the enemy involves his selective destruction. In the 1991 Gulf War, having fixed the Iraqi Army and having manoeuvred, the Coalition leadership was quite clear about the object of hitting him:

'We need to destroy - not attack, not damage, not surround - I want you to **destroy** the Republican Guard. When you're done with them, I don't want them to be an effective fighting force anymore. I don't want them to exist as a military organization.'¹³

INTEGRATION OF OPERATIONS

0236. ***Deep, Close and Rear Operations.*** At both the tactical and operational levels, operations to find, fix and strike the enemy may well be simultaneous and should be closely integrated. The core functions are organised within a framework of **deep, close** and **rear** operations. The terms **deep, close** and

13. Schwarzkopf, Norman. *It Doesn't Take a Hero*. Bantam Press. 1992. p381.

rear are used to describe how these three operations relate to each other primarily by **function** (ie **what** they are to achieve) and by **geography** (ie **where** they are to achieve it).¹⁴ These three operations must be considered together and fought as a whole at both the operational and tactical levels. They require continuous and careful synchronisation and, where necessary, integration between levels of commands. For example within a corps-size formation, a division striking deep into the enemy's rear area will be conducting its own close operation while carrying out the Corps' deep operation. While **finding** the enemy is a function common to all operations, **fixing** and **striking** him may be achieved by either deep or close operations, according to the overall design for battle. In order to achieve concentration of force, one of them will be designated as the main effort at any one time. Rear operations will invariably protect and sustain the force, while ensuring that freedom of action for future operations is maintained. This operational framework is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

0237. **Command of Operations.** The simultaneous prosecution of deep, close and rear operations requires a decentralised philosophy of command - Mission Command; this is the subject of **ADP Vol 2 - Command**.¹⁵ The essence of Mission Command is **decentralisation** of command which rests on **initiative**, **timely decision making** and **unity of effort**. To be successful, it also requires an unbroken chain of **trust** and **mutual understanding** throughout the span of command. Command is decentralised to allow subordinates to use their initiative within their delegated freedom of action, to fulfil their commander's intention without constant reference to him. This enables fleeting opportunities to be seized with alacrity in order to magnify the effects of chaos on the enemy. It encourages flexibility, the mental ability to recognise changes in the situation and make timely and appropriate adjustments. **Unity of effort** is enhanced through selection and maintenance of the aim and concentration of force, the latter through use of the technique of main effort. This promotes cohesion, the antithesis of chaos. Underlying this approach to command are two beliefs: that forces act with greater cohesion and effect if they know not only **what** to do but **why**; and that the man best placed to decide **how** to act is the one with the best information, who may be the one closest to the action.

14. Deep, close and rear operations should not be confused with the Cold War GDP terms 'deep', 'depth' and 'contact' battle areas which were purely geographical areas and formed the fixed framework of the battlefield at all levels of command within a corps in the NATO Central Region.

15. Mission Command is explained in Chapter 2 of ADP Vol 2. *Command*.

PART TWO - CAMPAIGNING

CHAPTER THREE

OPERATIONAL ART

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to describe the Levels of Conflict in order to provide the conceptual basis on which to conduct planning of campaigns and major operations

0301. **Operational Art is the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of campaigns and major operations.** Operational art requires a commander: to identify the military conditions - or end-state - that constitute his given strategic objective; to decide the operational objectives that must be achieved to reach the desired end-state; to order a sequence of actions that lead to fulfilment of his operational objectives; and to apply the military resources allocated to him to sustain his sequence of actions. Technology can help the commander, but his intellectual capacity to conceive and craft his plan are the critical factors in achieving success. As Field Marshal Slim put it: 'The prime requirement is for a commander to: Think Big'. In alluding to thinking big, he was emphasising all dimensions of thought - the antithesis of muddling through.

0302. The key to successfully achieving strategic objectives is through a thorough understanding of the levels of conflict and of the skill of operational

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art - generalship. Generals design, plan and execute campaigns.

'A prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither too much nor too little.'¹

Or, as Field Marshal Montgomery stated:

'It is essential to relate what is strategically desirable to what is tactically possible with the forces at your disposal. To this end it is necessary to decide the development of operations before the initial blow is delivered.'

THE LEVELS OF CONFLICT

THE LEVELS OF CONFLICT ²

0303. British military doctrine recognises four levels of conflict:

- a. **Grand Strategic.** Grand Strategy is the application of national resources to achieve policy objectives. This will invariably include diplomatic and economic resources as well as military.
- b. **Military Strategic.** Military Strategy is the application of military resources to achieve grand strategic objectives. Thus the Grand Strategic and Military Strategic Levels, together, encompass the art and science of employing armed force to achieve a political objective.
- c. **Operational.** Joint campaigns and major operations are constructed and directed at the Operational Level in fulfilment of a strategic directive. It is the level that provides the gearing between military strategic objectives and all tactical activity in the theatre of operations.
- d. **Tactical.** Battles and engagements within a sequence of major operations are planned and executed at the Tactical Level in order to achieve the operational objectives of a campaign.

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War* edited and translated by M Howard and R Paret. Harvard University Press. 1984. p177.

2. Sometimes known more narrowly as the **Levels of War**, in this context the term **Levels of Conflict** is equally applicable across the spectrum of conflict, as defined in Chapter 1 and BMD Edition 2 - 1994. For convenience, the term will be simplified to **The Levels** in the remainder of this doctrine.

THE GRAND STRATEGIC LEVEL

0304. **Grand Strategy is the application of national resources to achieve policy objectives.** The purpose of grand strategy is to direct and provide coherence to overall national, alliance or coalition policy, including all military and non-military aspects. Grand strategy is therefore the exclusive province of governments, whether acting independently or in concert with other governments through a multinational organisation such as the United Nations, an alliance established by treaty such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or an ad hoc coalition such as that formed to prosecute the 1990-1991 Gulf War. From this definition three broad responsibilities flow:

- a. To lay down the policy objectives for the activities to be instituted.
- b. To stipulate the limitations to be imposed on those activities, including the circumstances in which military activity should cease.
- c. To make available the requisite resources, including, when necessary, direction of the national industrial base.

0305. In short, grand strategy defines objectives in terms of what the government wishes to be achieved. It provides the resources needed to achieve the desired objective and, without detailing how these resources are to be employed, imposes any political limitations deemed necessary.

THE MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVEL

0306. **Military Strategy is the application of military resources to achieve the military aspects of grand strategic objectives.** A national, multinational or alliance strategic authority will consider the realistic contribution that military force can make to the achievement of the grand strategic objectives and set such activity in hand. Specifically, the military strategic authority will:

- a. Decide what campaign or campaigns need to be fought to achieve the strategic goals and in the light of political, legal and economic circumstances, decide those in which British Forces should participate.
- b. Identify the military strategic goals and define the campaign objectives which will constitute success - in other words - to identify the end-state.³

3. The **End-State** is defined as 'That state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of the campaign either to terminate or resolve the conflict on favourable terms'.

- c. Recognise any political, financial or legal limitations on the use of the force, with particular regard to alliance or coalition partners.
- d. Allocate forces and resources to each campaign theatre and appoint theatre commanders who will exercise operational level command.
- e. Agree operational objectives with theatre commanders and where necessary adjust resources.
- f. Establish the outline command arrangements.

0307. The distinction between the military strategic and operational levels of war will rarely be tidy. In seeking to differentiate between these two levels the key delineation is, that whereas the operational level commander **orders** the activities of his assigned formations and units in pursuit of his own plan of campaign, the military strategic authority is confined to **allocating** objectives and resources and setting necessary limitations.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

0308. **Joint campaigns and major operations are constructed and directed at the Operational Level in fulfilment of a strategic directive. It is the level that provides the gearing between military strategic objectives and all tactical activity in the theatre of operations.** It is at the operational level that military resources are directed to achieve the campaign objectives - the end-state - defined by the military strategic authority, within any limitations imposed. An operational level commander will design a campaign within his delegated theatre of operations; he will plan and direct the major operations within the campaign. He will be responsible for:

- a. Deciding what tactical objectives are necessary to achieve the campaign objective. These decisions will be taken with due regard to political and coalition considerations.
- b. Deciding in what sequence these tactical objectives should be achieved.
- c. Allocating forces and resources as necessary for subordinate commanders to be able to achieve their tactical missions.
- d. Setting priorities for the provision of combat service support to sustain the tactical battles.

e. Directing the activities of those formations, ships, aircraft and other units or assets not delegated to subordinate commanders, especially those earmarked as operational level reserves.

0309. Answering three questions helps to establish whether an action is operational or tactical:

a. **Is there a political dimension?** The decision to attack Goose Green carried operational implications in that it satisfied the political pressure to be seen to take early military action in the campaign.⁴

b. **Does the action materially alter the situation?** The air attack on Port Stanley did not materially alter the tactical situation but the demonstration of the UK's ability to bomb targets 8000 miles from the UK caused the Argentineans concern about the security of their own airfields and hence the diversion of air resources from the Falkland Islands to defend them.

c. **Does the action contribute directly to the strategic goal?** Direct attacks against Argentina were rejected as an unacceptable heightening of international tensions and the giving of grounds for loss of support within the United Nations.

THE TACTICAL LEVEL

0310. **Battles and engagements within a sequence of major operations are planned and executed at the Tactical Level in order to achieve the operational objectives of a campaign.** At the tactical level battles and engagements are fought to achieve tactical missions, within the overall campaign design. It is at the tactical level that troops are deployed directly for combat.

THE LINK TO COMMAND

0311. ***The Levels of Conflict and the Levels of Command.*** The levels of conflict are not tied to particular levels of command.⁵ A commander must be clear at which level of conflict he is operating, in order to understand his responsibilities. The essential business of command differs at each level of conflict, although there may be some overlap of detail. Furthermore the level

4. The examples in Paragraph 0309 are all taken from the Falklands War in 1982.

5. Within NATO, the operational level has generally coincided with the corps level of command. In GDP this was true by virtue of the corps commander being de facto the national component commander; it is now as a result of COMARRC's relationship with SHAPE and his multinational responsibilities.

at which a commander is operating may change as operations develop. He must therefore constantly review where the levels of conflict lie.

0312. ***The Levels of Conflict in a Coalition.*** In a coalition, particularly when forces from cooperating nations are of different sizes, the line between the operational and tactical levels will be particularly blurred. For even if a force is only of small tactical value, but from a different nation, its employment will have a political context. The force commander and his superior will therefore have an operational component to their essentially tactical level considerations.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

PRINCIPLES

0313. Although the principles of war apply equally to all levels of conflict and war, there are two principles which require particular emphasis at the operational level. These are:

0314. ***Concentration of Force.*** The operational level commander must concentrate the effects of his force against the point at which it will have the greatest impact. This point or set of points may consist of those elements of an enemy force, the dislocation, disruption or destruction of which renders the attainment of that force's objectives impossible. The destruction or neutralisation of any or all of these vital elements should aim to destroy the cohesion of the enemy force. Unlike a tactical battle where the formation or unit may have to destroy the enemy or remove him from vital ground, at the operational level the effectiveness of the enemy will be reduced by a concentration of means of which physical destruction is only one part.

0315. ***Economy of Effort.*** Economy of effort demands the judicious allocation of resources in order to achieve objectives as efficiently as possible. This implies the operational level commander's willingness to accept risks in one area in order to concentrate force in another. The operational commander will always keep in mind the quest to preempt, dislocate or disrupt the enemy in order to strike at the enemy's critical vulnerability. He will regard these techniques as preferable to general destruction of the enemy through battle, which will waste valuable resources and may risk not achieving his aim. However, when the decisive element of the enemy has been identified and exposed, the commander will concentrate all his resources on the violent destruction of that part of the enemy's force or capability.

CHARACTERISTICS

0316. Commanders and staffs working at the operational level should be aware of a number of characteristics that are distinct to the function of command at this level, many of which complicate the issue. Not all these characteristics are, however, equally evident in all theatres of operation and will vary with the nature of the campaign to be conducted.

0317. ***Relation to Military Strategic Objectives.*** The operational level is concerned with the employment of the total force towards attaining military strategic goals through the conception, planning and execution of campaigns and major operations. Operational level activity must contribute directly towards achieving previously defined military strategic objectives, which may have both a national or alliance/coalition component. Tactical activity cannot take place purposefully outside this context.

0318. ***Freedom of Action.*** The operational level commander is required to conceive, plan and orchestrate all activities that are needed to gain and retain the initiative, in pursuit of the strategic goals. He will thereby dictate the nature of major operations, battles and engagements. Freedom of action to deploy reserves, set priorities and allocate naval, marine, ground, air and combat service support assets is therefore of critical importance. This freedom of action, however, will be subject to certain constraints, both political and military. While recognising these constraints, the commander will convey a clear statement of his intent which outlines his concept and establishes the objectives to be achieved by subordinate commanders within his delegated theatre of operations.

0319. ***Political Interface.*** Military activity at the operational level will clearly be influenced by political considerations. Less obviously, military activity may adversely affect the political situation by exacerbating rather than resolving it. With this in mind, a commander at the operational level may well require political advice which should be in the form of strategic guidance and be provided through the chain of command.

0320. ***Joint Operations.*** At the operational level, forces will always conduct joint operations. These may involve an air, maritime or amphibious dimension or the police or other civil agencies. Ideally, the operational commander should command all the elements of his force and thereby will be able to switch resources swiftly to concentrate on the main effort. If, however, the operational level commander does not have, for example, air assets under his direct command, he will co-ordinate operations with the appropriate air commander to achieve operational level objectives.

0321. **Combined Operations.** Although the United Kingdom may engage in a purely national campaign, forces will more often be deployed as part of an alliance or coalition force. This emphasises the need for good personal relationships between senior national commanders and achieving the minimum levels of standardisation of doctrine, operating procedures and equipment. In most cases, the United Kingdom element must expect to sustain itself from national resources while cooperating operationally in support of the combined plan. The political dimension will be even more complex in a combined campaign.

0322. **Resources.** The resources a commander is given to fulfil his operational objectives may be tangible, such as formations and units or combat service support assets, or intangible, such as delegated authority over the time allocated to achieve the given objectives. Resources should be held at the level which ensures their most effective use. Diplomatic activity will be necessary to allow the commander to have the use of local infrastructure such as ports, airfields or training areas. In formal alliance operations, such as under NATO, these host nation arrangements will already have been agreed. However, in a coalition operation, especially one in which the force is projected far from its home base, speedy in-theatre negotiation will be predicated on timely government to government agreement.

0323. **Civil Affairs.** The operational level commander may have certain explicit or implicit responsibilities for civil affairs within his theatre of operations. He will possibly have to consider the movement of refugees and minimising damage to civil infrastructure, in addition to his legal and moral obligations to minimise civilian casualties. Once the operations have ended, the military may be the only form of government and authority in the area, and therefore responsibilities for civil affairs will assume greater importance, at least during the transition to civil control.

CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN

0324. In seeking to structure major operations, battles and engagements in pursuit of the strategic objective, the operational level commander will design his plan of campaign around a number of building blocks, which help him visualise how the campaign will unfold. His skills at this stage form the essence of operational art. This paragraph provides a summary of these concepts which are covered in greater detail subsequently.

- a. **Operational Objectives.** These are the military strategic goals that need to be achieved in the campaign to achieve the desired end-state.

- b. **The End-State.** The end-state is that state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of the campaign to either terminate or resolve the conflict on favourable terms.
- c. **Centre of Gravity.** The centre of gravity is that aspect of the enemy's overall capability which, if attacked and eliminated, will lead either to his inevitable defeat or his wish to sue for peace through negotiations.
- d. **Decisive Points.** Decisive points are those events, the successful outcome of which is a precondition to the successful elimination of the enemy's centre of gravity. Decisive points are the keys to unlocking the enemy's centre of gravity.
- e. **Lines of Operation.** Lines of operation describe how military force is applied in time and space through decisive points on the path to the enemy's centre of gravity.
- f. **Sequencing.** Sequencing is the arrangement of events within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the enemy's centre of gravity.
- g. **Contingency Planning.** Contingency planning is the process by which options are built into a campaign plan to anticipate opportunities or reverses.
- h. **Manoeuvre.** To manoeuvre is to seek to get into a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied. Such manoeuvre should be directed towards a decisive point or directly at the centre of gravity.
- i. **Tempo.** Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations. It incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one operational posture to another.
- j. **Operational Pause.** Because operations cannot be conducted continuously, there may be a need for periodic pauses, while retaining the initiative in other ways.
- k. **Culminating Point.** An operation reaches its culminating point when the current situation can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage.

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND THE END-STATE

0325. **Operational objectives are the military goals that need to be achieved in the campaign to achieve the desired end-state. The end-state is that state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of the campaign to either terminate or resolve the conflict on favourable terms.** Therefore a crucial early task facing the commander at the operational level is to determine what military conditions constitute success in relation to the strategic goal. Once identified, these conditions must remain uppermost in planners' minds from first to last. The strategic direction received will help identify these conditions, but is unlikely, in itself, to solve the problem. Analysis of strategic direction as part of a rigorous estimate process is a vital prelude. This suggests the need for a dialogue between the operational level commander and the originator of the strategic direction to ensure unity of effort and the early and unequivocal establishment of operational objectives which can then become a firm basis for campaign planning.

0326. Failure by Allied planners to understand the requirement to identify the strategic goals bedeviled the attempts to formulate proper operational objectives in the invasion of Italy in 1943. Montgomery reflected bitterly on this:

'One cannot get away from the fact that I was ordered to invade the mainland of Europe without being given adequate resources, and without being given any object. Hence the long fight. One has to admit that the High Command in the Mediterranean Theatre of War invaded Italy and thus embarked on a major campaign on the continent of Europe without having any clear idea - or plan - as to how they would develop and fight the land battle. There was no object laid down. The whole affair was haphazard and untidy - in fact typically British.'

0327. In contrast, in 1943 General Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, received a directive which was wide ranging but implied the winning of a total victory:

'You will enter the continent of Europe and in conjunction with other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.'

He was primarily concerned with the **destruction and dismemberment** of German armed forces, not with Germany's subsequent form of government - if the Russians inflicted the destruction his own forces would incur fewer casualties. In early April 1945, when his armies were approaching the Elbe, he expressed reluctance to press on to Berlin:

'I regard it as militarily unsound at this stage of proceedings to make Berlin a major objective, particularly in view of the fact that it is only 35 miles from the Russian lines.'

He showed his awareness of the strategic-operational link and the need for a dialogue with the strategic authority (the Combined Chiefs of Staff) by adding:

'I am the first to admit that a war is waged in pursuit of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighed purely military considerations in this theatre, I would cheerfully readjust my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an operation.'

CENTRE OF GRAVITY

0328. **The centre of gravity is that aspect of the enemy's overall capability which, if attacked and eliminated, will lead either to the enemy's inevitable defeat or his wish to sue for peace through negotiations.** A fuller definition is: that characteristic, capability or locality from which a military force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. It is a concept useful mainly at the strategic and operational levels, and even then a centre of gravity may be less clear than such a concise definition suggests. At the strategic level the centre of gravity will often be an abstraction such as the enemy's public opinion or perhaps the strength of political purpose. Thus even if the centre of gravity is discernable it may not be accessible at the strategic level and as a consequence, the selection of the operational centre of gravity may require a readjustment of strategic goals.

0329. There is therefore an obvious interrelationship between the strategic centre of gravity and the selection of operational objectives and the operational centre of gravity. The destruction of an operational centre of gravity which is more readily accessible will contribute significantly to the elimination of the strategic centre of gravity. This was well illustrated by a quote from the principal planner for DESERT STORM:

'At the strategic level we decided that Saddam Hussein was the key, but that we could do nothing about him legally and ethically. We could and did isolate him and cause the battle to be fought without centralised command. The Republican Guard (RG) was the focus at the operational level. If we could mass our ground forces on the RG without fighting any other force, we had perfect success. Also, if the

RG left the theatre, surrendered, or were defeated, we still had, to our opinion, dealt appropriately with the C[entre of] G[ravity].⁶

Saddam Hussein's power base was heavily dependent on the continued existence of the Republican Guard, as was his ability to defend Kuwait. Eliminating the Republican Guard was the key to achieving the operational objective - the mandated liberation of Kuwait - and, if totally successful, would have eliminated a major source of his power.

0330. The interrelationship between strategic and operational centres of gravity can also be illustrated with respect to the Malayan campaign. The centre of gravity of the terrorists was their physical access to the Chinese Malay population and thereby their ability to influence them. Templer countered this by identifying the need to make the Chinese population feel they had a stake in the future of the country and this required a commitment to independence. Once this had been established, the necessary elements of the subsequent campaign were easily identifiable.

0331. Another example of the key role that the political interface and civil affairs may play in defining operational centres of gravity can be found in the Dhofar campaign. The promises of the insurgents - improved living conditions for the population - were in the event delivered first by the Sultan's Armed Forces, thereby cutting the ground from under the insurgents' feet and isolating them from the people.

0332. Should the centre of gravity at the strategic level be identified, for example, as a state capital or vital installation, or at the operational level as a military formation like the Iraqi Republican Guard, then the problem is not so great. However, if it is identified as an abstraction such as the enemy's cohesion, the problem of its elimination is more complex. Destroying the enemy's cohesion, as discussed in Chapter Two, may have to be through a combination of attacks on selected aspects of the enemy's fighting power. In these circumstances an enemy force operating on conventional lines may find it difficult to conceal and protect the source of its cohesion and therefore this will become the most attractive target. The enemy's command, control and communications system or the morale of his troops may well be the key to the cohesion of his force and therefore a possible centre of gravity. At the tactical level, the enemy's centre of gravity is often likely to be his critical vulnerability, which once identified will become the focus of the current battle or engagement. However, within the context of operations other than war, an irregular military

6. Schwarzkopf, Norman. *It Doesn't Take a Hero*. Bantam Press. 1992.

force like the IRA, which appears amorphous and has diverse military objectives, means and methods may present a less easily identified centre of gravity, which is therefore likely to prove difficult to eliminate.

0333. Just as a commander needs to assess his enemy's centre of gravity and to consider the most effective way of getting at it, so too he must be clear as to his own centre of gravity and review the enemy's means of attacking it. During the Gulf War the integrity of the Coalition was arguably its strategic centre of gravity. It would have been imperilled had Israel embarked upon military operations against Iraq. Saddam Hussein's provocation of Israel was a well-judged attack on this centre of gravity. The prompt dispatch to Israel of a high-level US negotiating team and of Patriot missiles was a deft response and was reinforced by the high priority subsequently allocated to 'SCUD hunting'.

0334. 'The essence of operational art,' observes FM 100-5, 'lies in being able to mass, in some way, our resources against the enemy's main source of power - his centre of gravity - so that we can destroy or neutralise it'. There is no reason why a centre of gravity must be attacked directly, especially if it is judged to be his Army itself. Indeed, since a judicious enemy commander will strive to protect his centre of gravity, logic suggests that an indirect approach, which applies pressure to vulnerable points on which that centre of gravity depends, will offer the best prospects of success.

DECISIVE POINTS

0335. **Decisive points are those events, the successful outcome of which is a precondition to the successful elimination of the enemy's centre of gravity.⁷ Decisive points are the keys to unlocking the enemy's centre of gravity.** An event is not necessarily a battle; it may be the elimination of a capability; decisive points may therefore not have a geographical relevance. The key consideration is the effect on the enemy. Identifying decisive points is a fundamental part of campaign planning and is an exclusively military function. Notwithstanding this, during the course of the campaign, opportunities may present themselves or need to be created which require a rapid reappraisal and an adjustment to the previously determined decisive points. Defeat of the centre of gravity is made possible by successfully attacking the decisive points which allow access to it. Conversely, the term decisive point may be used to describe an event required to protect one's own campaign plan. It follows that

7. This is a development of the original Clausewitzian notion of decisive point which has a geographical interpretation.

an enemy vulnerability is probably not worth attacking unless it contributes to the elimination of his centre of gravity.

0336. Decisive points will be selected to allow access towards the enemy centre of gravity; they are part of the core function of striking. Most will be pre-planned. For example, it was the fixing operations of the British Second Army in the eastern part of the Normandy bridgehead around Caen in 1944 which allowed the US First Army the freedom of action to develop decisive operations to the west. Some may be opportunistic. For example, the premature commitment of the 4th and 21st Egyptian divisions across the Suez Canal in 1973 allowed the Israeli divisions of Generals Sharon and Adan access to the Egyptian centre of gravity on the West Bank of the Suez Canal.

0337. Decisive points may appear to have little immediate relevance, but their significance may lie in the protection that they provide to the successful development of the campaign plan. For example, during Operation DESERT SABRE the pre-planned elimination of the potential enemy flank threat ensured that the operations of 1(UK) Armoured Division could be conducted without significant interference. While the opportunistic counter-attack by British Forces in the area of Arras in 1940 had limited tactical significance, at the operational level it contributed to the decision to hold back the German panzer divisions, thereby buying time for the BEF as they sought to withdraw through Dunkirk.

LINES OF OPERATION

0338. **Lines of operation describe how military force is applied in time and space through decisive points on the path to the centre of gravity.** Lines of operation are not synonymous with physical axes of advance. They establish the interrelationship between decisive points, in order to construct a critical path to the centre of gravity and ensure that events are tackled in a logical progression. Lines of operation are established to flow through the defined decisive points towards the enemy centre of gravity. The approach to the centre of gravity may be direct or indirect and the best approach may be along multiple lines of operation, a concept which has common usage in the term a 'twin-track approach'. Trying to respond to multiple lines of operation overloads the enemy commander - the object of simultaneity. Where the decisive points are physical, a line of operation can be defined in physical terms; connecting the force from its base of operations (from which it draws its combat power) to operational objectives (where it applies its combat power against the enemy). Where the decisive points are equally substantive but intangible, the linkages between them will be harder to define. Furthermore, exploitation of these decisive points

by electro-magnetic, psychological or moral attack will be more protracted and a successful outcome will be harder to confirm with precision.

0339. Physical lines of operation may be **interior** or **exterior**. A force (at whatever level) inside separated enemy forces enjoys the advantage of **interior** lines, and, by moving quickly, could defeat each opposing force in turn. At the strategic level, the concept was of great value to Germany, often faced with enemies on both flanks. At the operational and tactical levels, a commander can use manoeuvre to exploit enemy dispersion, achieving interior lines of operation and defeating a larger force in detail. For example in 1914, the marching infantry of von Kluck's First Army on the outside flank of the German envelopment was fighting with the increasing disadvantages of operating on **exterior** lines while Gallieni's force, debouching from Paris in taxis, enjoyed the advantages of **interior** lines. It is of little surprise that the German grand manoeuvre was thwarted.

SEQUENCING

0340. **Sequencing is the arrangement of events within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the enemy's centre of gravity.** When considering physical lines of operation, sequencing is the conduct of a logical progression of operations, battles and engagements fought at the decisive points. It is unlikely that a commander will be able to achieve success by a single operational gambit. He must therefore have a clear conception of the relationship between events in terms of time, space and resources. Without this he cannot establish which events can be done simultaneously, which events have to be done in sequence and in which order events should be taken.

0341. This concept of sequencing will determine the instructions given by the operational commander to his subordinates, who must understand the operational purpose of the tactical missions they are given. In both World Wars, sequencing was often disregarded by the Allies. In contrast, Russian conduct of the war in the Eastern Front in 1943-5 gives many examples of sound sequencing. After their victory at Kursk, the Russians mounted a series of offensives, sequenced by robust operational logic, which eventually took them to Berlin. Tactically they were sometimes outfought by the Germans. Sometimes bad political decisions had baneful military consequences: the capture of Berlin was made especially costly by Stalin's exploitation of rivalry between Zhukov and Koniev, two of his army group commanders. But operational sequencing was sound enough to cope with occasional tactical failure on the one hand and political interference on the other.

0342. The original campaign plan for DESERT STORM illustrates a clear sequence of operations, leading to the intended elimination of the Iraqi centre of gravity, the Republican Guard:

- | | | |
|----|-------------------|---|
| a. | Air Campaign | Command Systems
Counter Air - Air Force and Air
Defence systems
NBC Capabilities |
| b. | Air Campaign | Logistics targets
Communications (transport) |
| c. | Air Campaign | Ground Forces, Republican Guard |
| d. | Land/Air Campaign | Republican Guard |

In the event, unexpected success allowed the sequence to be altered, thereby increasing the simultaneity of operations.

0343. In 1940, the original plan for the Luftwaffe campaign to gain air supremacy over Britain prior to a possible invasion had a similarly clear sequence: destruction of the Chain Home Radar system, elimination of the Fighter Command Sector stations, drawing in the reserve squadrons from Northern England - leading to air supremacy. In the event, they were distracted by a tactically insignificant RAF raid on Berlin, which in itself became a decisive point because the Germans abandoned their logical sequence of events and furthermore diverted resources to escorting bombers attacking London - a new and irrelevant operational objective.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

0344. **Contingency planning is the process by which options are built into a campaign plan to anticipate opportunities or reverses.** This process gives the commander the flexibility to retain the initiative. The sequence of events to the desired end-state is not immutable. The elder von Moltke warned that no plan survived first contact with the enemy. Inherent in sequencing is the requirement for a commander to be prepared to adjust the stepping stones, to change the order in which they are used, or to create new ones. In sequencing operations, the commander avoids foreclosing future options through constant contingency planning. Options can be built into the initial plan, enabling a commander to adjust his lines of operation or to vary his policy on offering or declining battle. A commander should also aim to orchestrate operations which logically follow one another. He may conduct a withdrawal which might be

followed by a period of formal defence; that period of defence might be followed by a counter-offensive, and so on. The process of contingency planning must be continuous so that a commander is never without options. This enables him to impose his chosen tempo of operations on the enemy. However, contingency planning should always have a logical basis, rooted in the estimate process, and not rely on 'Operational Micawberism' - going on in the hope that something will turn up. A calculated risk is one thing; persistence in the face of damning evidence is however quite another.

0345. In September 1950 General MacArthur mounted the Inchon landings in spite of warnings that tides made the operation extremely hazardous. It was a brilliant stroke which transformed the Korean War. In contrast, General Rawlinson of 4th Army attacked on the Somme in 1916 with profound doubts as to his chances of success, having been ordered to replace a modest 'bite and hold' operation with one designed to achieve a breakthrough. He confided to his diary that he did not expect the rapid breakthrough about which he had spoken so enthusiastically. A recent reappraisal of the battle concludes that the chief responsibility for failure was Haig's, for he had amended Rawlinson's plan in a way which was bound to diminish the intensity of the bombardment, yet appeared to disregard the potential consequences of such a change. It must be concluded that the calamity awaiting Rawlinson's infantry on 1 July 1916 cannot be excused as an unforeseeable misfortune, such as is bound to befall an inexperienced commander required to execute a leap into the unknown. It was more in the nature of a foregone conclusion.

MANOEUVRE

0346. **To manoeuvre is to seek to get into a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied.** At the operational level, such manoeuvre will invariably be directed towards a decisive point or directly at the centre of gravity. Manoeuvre is the means of concentrating force to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, and moral dominance. But at the operational level, manoeuvre involves more than just movement; it requires an attitude of mind which seeks to do nothing less than unhinge the entire basis of the enemy's operational plan. Manoeuvring forces may achieve their principal effect by the surprise or speed of their arrival or their avenue of approach; manoeuvre however embodies fire potential and thereby the means to inflict destruction, if necessary.

0347. For much of history manoeuvre was relevant primarily in the tactical context. At Leuctra in 371 BC the Theban commander Epaminondas recognised that pushing head-on against the Spartan phalanx, which outnumbered his own by almost two to one, would inevitably result in his defeat. Accordingly, he

concentrated his best troops in a great block on his left: they turned the Spartans' right flank and then pressed in on their shieldless side, thereby crumpling their phalanx.

0348. Napoleon, when at the top of his form, used manoeuvre triumphantly at the operational level. In the Jena campaign of 1806 the theatre of operations stretched from the lower Rhine to the Austrian border. His Prussian adversary, although slow-moving and hidebound, was likely to prove a formidable adversary if attacked frontally. Napoleon concentrated his forces in southern Germany and then advanced against the Prussians, his corps moving through the Thuringerwald close enough to be mutually supporting but widely enough separated to make the best use of scarce road-space. Although both his intelligence and the judgement of a corps commander let him down, the Prussians were unable to cope with the speed and flexibility of his eruption. French victory at the double battle of Jena-Auerstedt was vigorously exploited in a pursuit which resulted in the almost complete destruction of the Prussian army.

0349. At the operational level, the notions of fixing and striking are complementary. In 1864 the Union Army of the Potomac fought a campaign to distract and fix the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, with General Grant, the overall Union commander, announcing: 'I intend to fight it out on this front if it takes all summer.' But if the Union armies were attritional on one front, they manoeuvred on another. In what ranks as a classic preamble to an operational mission order, Grant told his subordinate Sherman, who was ordered to disembowel the Confederacy in his march from Atlanta to the coast:

'I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign...but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way.'

Had the Army of Northern Virginia not been pinned to destructive battles in the northern theatre of operations, then resources might have been diverted to deal with Sherman. Attrition and manoeuvre were essential ingredients of the overall Union plan.

0350. While some commanders have used attrition to fix a hostile force in one area so as to manoeuvre elsewhere, others have used a fixing operation as an essential precursor to manoeuvre. Manoeuvre demands space - the cliché 'room for manoeuvre' has it perfectly. One of the reasons for the attritional character of the fighting on the Western Front for much of the First World War was sheer troop density. Numerous costly Allied offensives were launched in the hope of breaking through the deepening defensive crust to manoeuvre in

the open country beyond it, while at the strategic level one of the attractions of switching the main effort of the Alliance to another theatre of operations was the belief that room for manoeuvre existed elsewhere.

0351. In an era when the limitation of casualties (the enemy's as well as one's own) and a timely ending of hostilities are likely to be political imperatives dictated by public opinion, a plan which decapitates or unhinges an enemy force by manoeuvre is likely to be more acceptable than one which pulverises it by attrition. However, the pursuit of manoeuvre at the operational level is not a replacement for attrition. The most successful plans involving manoeuvre are likely to include elements of attrition through the devastating application of lethal firepower and the paralysing effects of lethal and non-lethal weapons. This particularly applies to the coordination of firepower in deep operations.

TEMPO

0352. **Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations. It incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one operation of war to another.** Tempo seeks to impose threats to which the enemy is increasingly unable to react; his responses are made inappropriate in terms of either time or space. He reacts too late or in the wrong place. Successful commanders have long recognized the importance of time in battle: Napoleon declared that he could recover ground but never time. Tempo involves attacking an enemy at a point when time - rather than a material or moral resource - is scarce, for instance before he is ready or after he has reached a culminating point. Like tempo in the musical sense, military tempo is often perceived in beats or pulses. At the operational level tempo is profoundly influenced by the speed with which a formation is ready for the next major operation. It is the ability of the force to prosecute the next operation, while still fighting the current one and being able to transit from one to the other without delay. At the tactical level this speed is relevant to the capacity of the force to transition between operations of war within battles and engagements. At both levels, tempo hinges on responsiveness and agility, which in turn depends on the decision-making process. It also embodies spatial dislocation which may involve one of the classic manoeuvre ploys such as an outflanking movement.

0353. Tempo can only be measured in relative terms. A force which acts slowly but at a higher rate than the enemy has high tempo. In the opening phase of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the Germans were so much faster than the French that they outflanked the northern corps of the Armée du Rhin. More significantly, they unbalanced an already unstable French high command, which flirted with a number of plans before deciding to fall back on Metz and then

on Verdun. 'It was,' writes Sir Michael Howard, 'the panic reaction of morally defeated men seeking safety in flight.'

0354. High tempo can be achieved at the operational level by conducting tactical activity simultaneously rather than phasing it. The United States attack on Panama, in which twenty six objectives were attacked at the same time is a recent example. However, at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915 the British attack plan was, in the words of Captain G.C. Wynne: 'Like an Aldershot Tattoo, most difficult to alter...'. Tactical activity, at least some of which could have been simultaneous, was laboriously phased and an attack which briefly offered the prospect of making an operationally significant breakthrough bogged down with eleven thousand of the attackers 'Packed like salmon in the bridge-pool at Galway, waiting patiently to go forward'.

0355. A significant contributor to high tempo is decentralised command⁸ - a style of command exemplified by Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps in France in May 1940. Its operations order for the Meuse crossing on 13 May was less than three pages long, embodying Guderian's view that: 'Good-looking operations orders are immaterial. What counts are clearly stated intentions which can be executed with all one's heart and determination.' In its subsequent advance the Corps crashed through French forces in the process of still deploying to meet it, with decentralised command assisting rapid movement. The French, in contrast, reacted slowly. General Touchon, commander of an Army sized force, was only able to issue orders for the defence of a line well after the Germans had passed it.

0356. Fighting reduces tempo. A further precept for the operational commander is therefore: only fight when you have to. Moreover, the maintenance of high tempo reduces the enemy's ability to join battle on his terms. General James H. Polk wrote of Patton that: 'On many occasions [he] drove his command to exhaustion when he sensed a time advantage and never permitted his enemy to have the hours or days to mount a coordinated counter attack or prepare a solid defensive position'.

OPERATIONAL PAUSES

0357. **Because operations cannot be conducted continuously, there may be a need for periodic pauses, while retaining the initiative in other ways.** Operational pauses may be needed when an operation has temporarily reached the end of its sustainability; this could be because the troops involved are exhausted; terrain and climate compel a halt; the character of the campaign

8. This is fully covered in ADP Vol 2 *Command*.

has changed (for instance a pursuit meets a hardening defence) or due to a combination of these factors. The initiative is retained by ensuring that when an operational pause is imposed on one line of operations, activity on another must be stepped up. This in itself contributes to simultaneity. Thus sequencing involves activity conducted at different rates (tempo) - periods of high activity, followed by periods where activity is lower. Operational pauses are useful control measures to help synchronize operations and do not imply the abandonment of the quest for high tempo overall.

CULMINATING POINT

0358. **An operation reaches its culminating point when the current operation can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage.** In the offence, the attacker reaches his culminating point when he can no longer sustain offensive operations and switches onto the defensive. In the defence, the defender reaches his culminating point when he can no longer maintain the defence and is compelled to disengage and withdraw or risk inevitable defeat. Identifying a culminating point is one of the operational commander's hardest tasks, because he will always be open to the temptation to make one further effort to achieve his original aim. That extra effort may, however, be beyond his culminating point and spell disaster for him. **The culminating point is therefore an involuntary operational pause**, but one that a commander must anticipate.

0359. It is notoriously difficult to recognise a culminating point at the moment it is reached, for a commander's instincts may impel him to press matters to a conclusion that seems tantalisingly close. However, the operational level commander who hopes to push on regardless, risks doing so without sufficient momentum, and passing the point where his own combat power is exceeded by his opponent's. In the early autumn of 1944 the United States 3rd Army advanced from Verdun towards Metz without adequate resources and instead of an operational pause on the Meuse, its culminating point, it received a bloody nose on the Moselle beyond. In contrast, Russian operations on the Eastern Front were cushioned by pauses which enabled gains to be consolidated and the next phase of the offensive to be prepared.

PART TWO - CAMPAIGNING

CHAPTER FOUR

CAMPAIGNING

The purpose of Chapter 4 is to describe the process and techniques of planning and executing campaigns by commanders at the operational level

'War is a question not of winning battles but of winning campaigns.'

Bernard Brodie

INTRODUCTION

0401. **A campaign is a sequence of planned, resourced and executed joint military operations designed to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and space more usually involving the synchronisation of land, sea and air forces.** Campaign plans focus the efforts and activities of operational commanders to achieve overall strategic objectives (**the ends**). Commanders will calculate the sequence of actions necessary to achieve success (**the ways**) and the application of military resources to accomplish the sequence of actions (**the means**). A campaign plan is thus the practical expression of operational art and addresses the following questions:

- a. What military conditions constitute success in relation to the strategic goal?
- b. What sequence of events is most likely to produce the desired end-state?
- c. How should resources be applied?

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STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

0402. ***Military Response within Crises.*** The current multi-faceted security environment suggests that military force is likely to be employed on operations in response to a **crisis**, defined as **a politico-military situation, often unforeseen but occasionally predicted, which threatens either national or alliance interests or international stability.** Each new crisis and each development during a crisis brings unforeseen complexities for which there may be no preplanned solution. Formal military planning may have to begin in the absence of a clear mission. Thus military options will tend to evolve and may be constrained by complicated command and control arrangements, restrictive rules of engagement and hedged with political limitations. Furthermore, preparation time may be limited. The most important and often the most difficult requirement will be for commanders and staffs to anticipate crises, plan for them and act in parallel with political and diplomatic activity to ensure that, if the use of force is sanctioned, then it will be as effective as possible.

0403. ***Strategic Directive.*** An operational commander should expect to be given a strategic directive. The Strategic Directive will be issued by the military strategic authority, which in the case of most United Kingdom operations will be the Chief of the Defence Staff. It should, as a minimum, identify the strategic goals and define the conditions which determine success, often described as the End-State. The Strategic Directive should also stipulate political constraints and financial limitations and allocate the forces available and their levels of sustainability. Military planning in a crisis will never be simple because political and diplomatic activity will be proceeding in parallel and other than in purely national operations the ideal contents of a strategic directive are unlikely to be available at an early stage.

THE ESTIMATE PROCESS

0404. ***Mission Analysis.***

a. ***Operational Objectives.*** In answering the first of the three campaign planning questions at Paragraph 0401, a commander must be quite clear as to what is to be achieved in the campaign. Operational objectives are derived from the military strategic goals given in the strategic directive and any further guidance in terms of aims (ends), resources (means) and any other limiting factors. The more intense the conflict, the more predominant are the military factors and the easier it is to translate strategic direction into operational level

objectives. The operational commander will attempt to focus the campaign against the enemy's centre of gravity and orchestrate the effort of all land, sea and air forces towards the common purpose. The achievement of the operational objectives will be influenced by the operational environment, which is itself a composite of circumstances and conditions, and by those limiting factors that affect the employment of force and bear on the decisions taken at the operational level of command.

b. **Limiting Factors.** Limiting factors dictate how the commander uses resources to achieve a particular operational objective. These limiting factors will be articulated in terms of restrictions and constraints:

(1) **Restrictions.** Restrictions prohibit the operational commander from undertaking specific actions. They are either imposed by law, treaty or convention such as the Geneva convention or apply to a particular operation or conflict. For example, the use of certain types of weapons or the use of certain geographic areas may be restricted and limitations placed on the use of certain tactical methods such as the mining of harbours.

(2) **Constraints.** In contrast to restrictions, constraints apply to the way a commander executes his mission, reducing his options. They may require him to act in a certain way or limit his freedom of action. Whilst they could be unrelated to the overall military aims, they may have inherent strategic significance. Examples might be a requirement to employ combined forces despite making the operation less efficient and more complex or the retention or protection of an area deemed politically or psychologically important but tactically insignificant. Alternatively, constraints may be imposed by the states of command of national components of his force.

0405. **Concepts of Operational Design.** The second campaign planning question is tackled by addressing the problem in relation to the **concepts of operational design** set out in Chapter 3. As with any estimate process, the commander must first concentrate upon the enemy, with the particular purpose at the operational level of identifying the enemy's centre of gravity and the decisive points which enable that centre of gravity to be attacked. When this process has been successfully completed it will be possible to build a logical sequence of activity into the campaign plan.

0406. **Critical Factors.** Amongst the many factors that must be considered in the estimate process, there are three of critical importance:

a. **The Enemy.** From the outset the commander must clearly state his priority intelligence and information requirements and must understand enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. At the operational level, the intelligence effort should be concentrated on the collection, identification and analysis of information relating to the enemy's strategic and operational centres of gravity and those high value targets which, if successfully attacked or neutralised, will achieve the assigned operational objectives. Intelligence effort will also be focused to establish the enemy's order of battle, his doctrine and the organisation and effectiveness of his command structure. In addition, commanders will attempt to probe the mind of the senior enemy commanders to establish what freedom of action the enemy commander may have, how aggressively he is likely to exercise that freedom and the degree of compliance he can expect from his subordinates.

b. **The Operational Environment.** The characteristics of the theatre of operation will also be studied to provide a wide range of information on political, economic, industrial, geographic and climatic factors. The aim must be to understand how all these factors will affect the enemy's current and future decision making process. Analysts and commanders must of course be alive to the danger that such projections could be vulnerable to deliberate enemy deception. In order to reduce risk it will be necessary to isolate and distinguish fact from subjective judgement. This can only be achieved with the careful use of the estimate process and the reassessment of any established expedients, notions, expectations and preferences. The operational commander will designate an area of intelligence responsibility the extent of which will be limited by the joint reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities available to the force. The commander will also require intelligence from wider sources about adjacent areas which may influence his mission.

c. **Friendly Forces.** The level and type of friendly force committed to an operation can, even at the very early stages in a campaign, have a major effect on the outcome of the operation or campaign. The presence of a credible force or the threat of its deployment and committal within the conflict area can often discourage enemy aggression. Campaign planners and operational commanders will wish to deploy with all the capabilities and forces they may need in the

worst case to gain the initiative, establish superiority and ensure military success. In reality, force levels are dictated by the political situation and the political will to commit forces, public perception and its influences on the politicians and any competing strategic priorities. It is to be remembered, however, that decisions on **deployment to the theatre** of certain weapon systems and capabilities can be taken separately from decisions on their **employment within the theatre**. The force structure should, however, be driven by the complexity of the assigned mission, reflecting the enemy capability, terrain, the host nation support available and any political sensitivities and considerations. It is also important that the force is capable of acting in a cohesive way both in itself and in conjunction with allies. It must therefore be constructed in such a way that the capabilities deployed cover all the main functions in combat¹ and that they can operate together. This is particularly important with early entry forces, when the overall campaign will be at its most vulnerable. Moreover, in circumstances where a force may deploy initially into a conflict area short of war but then become exposed to increasing violence, there is an over-riding need to design the force right from the start to be able to respond appropriately to changes in the nature of operations. It is also crucially important to ensure that the infrastructure and the command and control arrangements are satisfactory and robust enough to absorb such changes to operations during the campaign. It may be prudent to deploy initially an apparently over-elaborate command and control structure to provide this robustness.

OPERATIONAL DIRECTION

0407. ***Statement of the Commander's Intent.*** Having completed his initial analysis of the mission given to him, the commander will wish to issue a concise expression of the purpose of the campaign, the desired results and how operations will progress towards achieving the desired end-state. This statement of the commander's overall intent should seek to define his operational objectives in terms of the enemy's centre of gravity. However, this cannot realistically be done in isolation and a dialogue will usually be needed between the operational level commander and the military strategic authority. Implicit in this is further negotiation on force levels and the capabilities to be deployed. At the operational level, the commander will wish to guide and focus subordinate land, sea and air forces as to the objectives to be achieved together with the required end-state. Thus the commander's intent is a vital element of the

1. See Chapter 5 Paragraphs 0503-0516.

estimate process. It precedes the detailed staff analysis of the various factors which will shape both the options and the plan. The commander's intent therefore acts as a constant reference point for the staff, ensuring that they concentrate their efforts on the factors that are essential to the success of the mission and in particular upon those which could ultimately force the commander to amend or change his original intent.

0408. **Initiating Directive.** Probably during the mounting and deployment phase of the campaign, the commander will wish to issue an initiating campaign directive with the aim of: setting the scene, providing a framework for planning, stating his initial main effort, indicating his freedom of action and constraints, allocating resources, giving guidance on special training, outlining the likely command arrangements and the order of battle. This directive may have to be written in a vacuum, without clear direction from higher levels and before the final nature of the **mission** has emerged. Issuing an **initiating campaign directive** during the early stage of an operation is an essential feature of **mission command**, because it will enable subordinates to concentrate their efforts, develop plans and make decisions. The aim should be to ensure that if an unexpected situation arises, the land, air and maritime component commanders understand the purpose of the campaign well enough to act decisively within the bounds of the higher commander's intent.

0409. **Campaign Directive.** As more detailed plans begin to develop, so the content of the main campaign directive will become more specific, enabling the commander to refine his concept of joint operations, assign missions to subordinates or discuss various options in which they will play a part. Where possible, a campaign directive should strive to impart the following information: **the Situation; the Commander's Mission, the Concept of Joint Operations**, clearly stating the intermediate and ultimate purposes of the intended action; **Subordinates' Missions**, and their purpose; **Allocation of Resources** and **Limitations on Freedom of Action**. The Operational Commander will also make clear at this stage which components of his force are in the lead in certain operations and which are in a supporting role. Clear direction on this issue early on will smooth the planning process and avoid disputes over priorities later. Such direction is consistent with the principle of stating a main effort.

0410. **Operation Order.** The campaign directive will be complemented by such **operation orders** as are necessary for the conduct of major operations within the campaign. They will provide confirmation of or adjustments to the missions or options already issued and details of the control measures necessary for their execution. In this respect, the campaign directive paves the way for the operation orders, making their assimilation much quicker. Where possible, the issue of a campaign directive and operation order will be

supplemented by personal contact, briefings, exercises and visiting (all time allowing), all important to the process of preparing subordinates for major operations, without telling them exactly what to do.

SUSTAINING THE CAMPAIGN

0411. ***Combat Service Support - The Art of The Possible.*** A force must not only be mobilised and deployed but also sustained over an extended period to give the commander the freedom of action necessary for him to formulate and execute the plan. Of fundamental importance will be a need to ensure that there are adequate combat service support staffs in all major headquarters, supported by reliable communication and information systems. Combat service support estimates should be undertaken to ensure that combat forces remain combat effective and thus able to accomplish their missions. Combat service support staff at the operational level provide that essential link between the tactical formations and the strategic base. Combat service support priorities, which may well differ from the commander's main effort, must be understood as these will shape the combat service support task organisation in support of combat formations. Areas of risk must also be identified and made known to commanders before any intent is given to the staff, who must be involved from the outset in order that agencies are primed and focused to provide the required level of support.

0412. ***Planning Factors.*** In addition to observing the principles of combat service support, namely foresight, efficiency, simplicity, cooperation and flexibility, planners will consider factors under the headings of **distance**, **duration** and **demand**:

- a. ***Distance.*** Clearly the most important questions are where will the force be operating, how far is the line of communication to the theatre of operation from the United Kingdom and what is the anticipated length of the main supply routes within the theatre. This essential information will determine whether a forward mounting base is needed and a most suitable point of disembarkation into the operational area. From an analysis of this information will come the strategic lift requirement, an initial assessment of the movement requirements and an early identification of any movement problems.
- b. ***Duration.*** The other crucial but often most difficult questions are how long the force is likely to be committed to operations and how long the force could expect to remain in theatre before committal. Of equal importance will be the possible requirement to reconstitute part of the force and thus the necessity to provide War Maintenance Reserves

and Battle Casualty Replacements. Reconstitution also includes the provision of essential command and control systems and the time required for any mission-essential training.

c. **Demand.** The Sustainability Statement will be of crucial importance to the operational commander as it will almost certainly influence the campaign plan. It will confirm, usually in days of supply, the amount of stock which will be deployed with the force, stock which will be moved to the theatre and therefore immediately available to the force, stock which will be moved to the theatre specifically for training purposes, stock thought necessary to support the force during operations and any reserve stock. The Sustainability Statement will also include direction on the desired availability of major equipment which will itself influence the level of spares support required for a particular operation. The commander will establish any limitations on the use of either equipment or stocks. For example, in order to reduce the level of demand and consumption, it may be necessary to restrict track mileage, fuel or ammunition. It will also be important to identify likely dependencies and, in particular, the requirement to support other elements of a Joint and Combined force.

0413. **G1 Matters.** G1 matters are an important aspect of overall sustainability and will address such areas as manning, reserve asset management, provost, chaplaincy, prisoners of war, field records and legal matters. Of particular importance will be the drawing up of a careful estimate of the level of casualties not only in terms of ensuring that sufficient medical assets are made available but also to ensure that plans are made for the evacuation of the dead and wounded. An early decision will be required concerning the repatriation of the dead or burial within the theatre of operation. G1 staffs will plan all personnel matters in tandem with G3 and G4 staffs in order to ensure a cohesive approach between administrative operations and tactical matters. G1 staffs will be closely associated with Public Information staffs as issues affecting personnel have a high public relations profile and will often demand careful, rapid and accurate responses to both media and political enquiries.

0414. **G4/G5 Matters.** Stock levels and the number and size of logistic bases will to a large extent be dependent upon the composition of the force, the sustainability requirements, anticipated climatic conditions and their effect on both man and machine and the current or required serviceability state of the battle winning equipments. In addition it will be important to identify as early as possible what could be made available in terms of stocks, equipment or facilities from Host Nation resources if for no other reason than to minimise the use of scarce strategic lift. Arrangements made with other nations must in most

cases be formalised within a Memorandum of Understanding and never taken for granted, particularly if another nation is in danger of becoming the sole source of supply. Planners will also need to know what levels of standardization they can expect with other participating nations and what degree of combat service support they can expect to receive and provide. As a means of achieving economies of scale, commanders will need to be supported by a fully integrated multinational combat service support system although this is likely to be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in practice. One of the key requirements of any logistic system is the ability to track the assets made available to support the force and the operation. Asset visibility will be a most important factor in the success of any campaign as will the ability to cope with an ever changing operational environment by either improvisation or focusing the combat service support effort at the point of interest or concern.

0415. ***Combat Service Support in the Field.*** More detailed consideration of other aspects of combat service support can be found in Army Field Manual Vol 1 Part 6 *Combat Service Support*.

COMMANDING THE CAMPAIGN

0416. The three key aspects of command on which the operational commander should focus are: first, the responsibility for mounting and deploying the operation; second, the chain of command which applies to the campaign; and third, the state of command of the components of his force.

MOUNTING AND DEPLOYMENT

0417. ***The Mounting Headquarters.*** For national and ad hoc coalition operations, the mounting headquarters will be a JHQ nominated by the MOD. Within NATO, HQ AFCENT is likely to fulfil the role. Aside from any role it may have in defining strategy, the principal functions of the mounting headquarters are to move the force to the theatre of operations in accordance with a Desired Order of Arrival Staff Table (DOAST) and to sustain it in theatre thereafter.

0418. ***Deployment.*** Deployment is a term used to describe the entry of a force into a theatre of operations, be it opposed or unopposed. It includes establishing a point of entry, the build up of the complete force and preparations to execute the campaign plan. All these tasks take time to complete and require the allocation of sufficient forces to provide security. The organisation of the movement of the force will differ depending on whether the entry is opposed or not. If it is opposed then movement will be tactical, controlled by the G3 staff with formed combat units leading. If it is unopposed then movement will be administrative, controlled by the G4 staff with units possibly broken up to make

the best use of the available transport. A staging area will be needed in the communications zone to allow formations and units to reform. Forces are therefore particularly vulnerable at this time. The commander must insist on the correct balance of combat, combat support, combat service support and command assets in order to develop operations. Commanders will wish to be kept up to date with the rate of build up of combat power in theatre as a means of determining the combat effectiveness of the formation, whilst at the same time monitoring the flow of forces into the area. A theatre commander may consider making one subordinate headquarters solely responsible for all joint deployment matters in theatre. Should he choose to do this, this headquarters is likely to assume responsibility for all aspects of rear operations within the communications zone of the theatre of operations.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

0419. ***Chain of Command.*** The arrangements for the command and control of the campaign will normally form part of the strategic guidance given to the operational level commander by the military strategic authority. They will be based on either existing national or NATO arrangements or be designed around established principles in the case of ad hoc coalition operations. In order to provide an illustration and a reference for future coalition operations the outline command arrangements used in Op GRANBY are at Figure 4.1. It should be noted that Comd BFME was a commander at the operational level on two counts: first, as an operational level commander in his own right exercising command over certain British units and second, as the senior national commander in a multinational force. The main operational level commander who planned and executed the campaign and exercised de facto command at the operational level was CINC USCENTCOM. However, CINC USCENTCOM and Comd BFME were both **operational level** commanders, albeit with differing responsibilities.

0420. ***Organisation of Command.*** Within a joint, and possibly combined, force at the operational level, it will be usual for the Joint Force Commander to have subordinate Component Commanders under him. There will invariably be commanders of the Air, Land and Maritime components, sometimes of a separate Special Forces component and in the case of US forces a Space component. Unity of effort within the joint force will be enhanced from the outset if the joint commander gives clear guidance on the relationships within the force between the various components. Specifically he needs to establish which are the **Lead**² components and which are the **Supporting** components. For

2. US forces refer to the **lead** component as the **supported** component.


within an agreed mission statement. It must be emphasised that there is no direct relationship between the states of command and the levels of command. Thus, there is no requirement to modify the state of command simply because a formation is assigned to a different level of command. In order to establish the status of a formation or unit placed under his command, the commander must seek clarification on the following:

- a. Can he use it for any purpose (that is, give its commander a mission)?
- b. If the mission (purpose) of its deployment is not within his gift, can he give it tasks within the given mission (that is direct the execution of it)?
- c. Can he break up the formation or unit or must he retain its integrity?
- d. Are there any caveats on its use for example 'for hostilities only' or 'for a specified duration'?

0422. ***Current States of Command.*** According to these criteria, the following are the currently accepted definitions of states of command:

- a. ***Full Command (FULL COMD).*** **FULL COMD** remains a national responsibility which by definition cannot be delegated. Overall decisions will be exercised by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) as the senior military advisor to the Government. In this sense CDS is acting as the national military strategic authority. **FULL COMD** naturally covers every aspect of military operations and administration.
- b. ***Operational Command (OPCOM).*** The highest degree of command usually retained for the duration of the operation or campaign. It would be normal for the national military strategic authority to place assigned forces under **OPCOM** of a national joint operational level commander who will then have the authority to assign missions to those forces, to deploy or reassign elements of the formation.
- c. ***Operational Control (OPCON).*** This state of command gives a nominated commander the authority to direct forces assigned to achieve a specific mission within agreed limitations, usually related to function, time or location. The commander specifically does not have the authority to assign separate employment to components of the formation or units concerned.

example, in a campaign which has definable phases, either by time or activity, it may be appropriate to place the Air Component Commander in the lead during an Interdiction phase with the other components in support, while in an air-land Manoeuvre phase it may be appropriate to place the Land Component Commander in the lead. For this arrangement to be fully effective, the Lead Component Commander should be given authority to exercise general direction of the overall effort. This means that he will lead in the designation of objectives and targets in fulfilment of the delegated mission and the timing and duration of participation in the operation by the supporting components. Consistent with the philosophy of mission command, the Lead Commander will specify **what effect** he wishes the Supporting Commanders to achieve but he will not tell them **how** to do it.



OP GRANBY COMMAND AND CONTROL
Figure 4.1

STATES OF COMMAND

0421. **States of Command.** The 1990-91 Gulf War highlighted continuing difficulties over the understanding and application of states of command in both the joint and combined settings. In essence, the state of command describes the status of formations or units to another unit or formation and is therefore concerned primarily with the ability of the receiving unit to assign an independent mission, to reorganise the formation to suit its purpose or to direct specific tasks

d. **Tactical Command (TACOM)**. Whilst the nominated commander has command of the forces assigned to him under **TACOM** arrangements, he has the authority only to allocate tasks within the overall mission given by the higher authority. He may not alter the structure of the force by assigning separate employment to various components of the force. **TACOM** may not be further delegated to another commander.

e. **Tactical Control (TACON)**. A force assigned to a commander under **TACON** will execute missions or tasks as directed by the assigning higher commander. The commander of such forces will be responsible only for the coordination of movement and real estate.

0423. **Transfer of Authority**. Having established the states of command, the operational commander must determine at which point they become effective - a procedure commonly known as the transfer of authority (TOA). In NATO, TOA applies to the formal transfer of a specified degree of authority over designated forces between a nation and SACEUR or between two NATO commanders. For the majority of NATO Reaction Forces this will be once they are ready for employment in the theatre of operations. This principle seems likely to be followed in other coalition operations.

0424. **Command**. Further consideration of the British Army's philosophy and exercise of command can be found in Army Doctrine Publication Vol 2 *Command*.

CONDUCTING THE CAMPAIGN

INTELLIGENCE

0425. Directing the intelligence process is a command function. It therefore follows that the intelligence process does not stand on its own. From the very first indicators that an operation may be mounted, the intelligence process and operational planning are interdependent; intelligence will suggest objectives and the type and level of force to be used and in turn objectives and the type of force govern the **commander's intelligence requirements**.

0426. The intelligence dimension of operational planning is not an automatic, preplanned routine which readily transitions from peace to operational structures. The reasons for this are: the diversity of possible threats, the type and scarcity of current collection systems, the access that sources may or may not have to the intelligence targets, the nature of coalition and joint warfare, and the

complexities of force projection. Taken together, these mean that the intelligence architecture for a specific operation, the management of collection systems and the setting out of his intelligence requirements must all be actively managed by a commander throughout the planning and execution phases.

THE COMMANDER'S INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

0427. The start point for the entire intelligence process is for the commander to set out his requirements for the intelligence he needs to make his plan and execute it. He will need to augment and amend these requirements as his plan develops. This is a continuous, cyclical process which must receive the commander's personal attention. This requirement is converted by his intelligence staff into collection requirements, which are distributed to obtain either processed intelligence or the raw information, which the staff can fuse into assessed intelligence for the commander. The commander's intelligence requirements must be set out for all commanders and intelligence staffs to see so that, in keeping with mission command, collection managers can seize unforeseen opportunities to task and exploit sources which may support his requirements.

0428. Force projection operations are dependent on far more intelligence than was required in the traditional bipolar confrontation; planners will require information on political, economic, cultural, topographical and infrastructure matters as well as opposing force military capabilities. Such information may be collected in peace or during a period of crisis. There may, however, be gaps or insufficient detail. Early tabling of the commander's intelligence requirements is essential if national level collection sources are to be re-tasked.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SYSTEMS

0429. The nature of modern intelligence systems is a major factor in both intelligence and operational planning. Scarce, high value systems, which might not even be owned by the UK, have the ability to collect information immediately relevant to but not easily accessible by commanders at every level. To provide collateral and avoid deception, more than one source should be used to answer the same question. In addition, planners must exploit and take account of the very different strengths and weaknesses of the 3 primary sources: SIGINT, IMINT and HUMINT. Each has very different time and space characteristics and the correct cueing of each system is a complex task. Furthermore, information or intelligence from these sources may be in mutual conflict, incomplete or even inaccurate.

0430. The two key but conflicting principles of intelligence management are:

a. **Centralisation.** The high cost of modern collection systems, their wide area of coverage and the vast volume of data provided require centralised control at a high level. Furthermore, the rules governing the exchange of intelligence under coalition conditions may only allow access at the highest level.

b. **Dedication of Assets.** Ideally commanders at every level should have sufficient dedicated intelligence collection assets to provide the intelligence necessary for their mission. Only with dedicated assets or guaranteed access to assets controlled at another command level can the commander guarantee the incoming flow of information, produce the right degree of detail and ensure timeliness.

This conflict must be resolved in order to make the best use of the resources available while providing the intelligence and information needed by operational commanders. This is resolved through the intelligence architecture.

INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

0431. The term intelligence architecture is used to describe the construction of an intelligence organisation specifically tailored to meet the needs of the operation. Peacetime resources and structures are unlikely to be able to provide an operational capability without major reorganisation and reinforcement. The intelligence architecture will be determined by the needs of the commander; there is no single, ideal, solution but by definition it must cover every level of command. Furthermore, in doing so, it must be capable of providing both accurate information and predictive intelligence in order to allow commanders to conduct the full analysis which is required at the start of the estimate cycle. Thereafter it must continue to provide the intelligence that is needed to update the commander's estimate and to meet fresh intelligence requirements.

0432. At every level of command there is a need to focus intelligence activity. Each level requires the ability to assess intelligence directly relevant to its commander. Tactical commanders are, however, most unlikely to have direct access to all sources and thus cannot be entirely self reliant. The operational level commander needs an intelligence focal point in theatre which is able to: coordinate the collection effort of all systems committed to the operation; analyze, assess and disseminate the intelligence product to those requiring it and have the appropriate rank and status to be able to access national intelligence agencies.

0433. ***The Intelligence Management Plan.*** An intelligence management plan is likely to be initiated outside the theatre, at the point at which national level sources are tasked. The operational commander will, however, want to write his own once he has set up the links to national level and coalition sources and been allocated his own collection assets. The essentials of this plan are:

- a. The commander's intelligence requirements.
- b. The intelligence collection plan to meet it.
- c. The Intelligence Architecture.
- d. The allocation of intelligence collection responsibilities to each level of command.
- e. The allocation of collection resources or ground stations to subordinate commands.
- f. The responsibilities, manning and resources of the intelligence focal point.
- g. The authority to access national intelligence databases.

The intelligence management plan must make allowance for the need for questions and responses to skip intervening levels of command in order to avoid perception or interpretation difficulties and ensure timely and appropriate responses. This may require an element of the intelligence focal point to be directly available to subordinate commanders.

OFFENCE AND DEFENCE AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL³

0434. ***Synchronisation.*** On completion of deployment and having built up an adequate intelligence picture of the enemy, an operational level commander will seek success by the deft synchronisation of his land, air, sea and electronic capabilities, ideally striking the enemy simultaneously throughout the depth and breadth of his tactical and operational areas. He will seek to strike the enemy at decisive points on the lines of operation to the elimination of the enemy's centre of gravity. Large-scale ground manoeuvre will require protection of the force from enemy ground and air attack. Therefore the commander will continuously synchronise all the assets available to him to support the overall campaign plan and the critical ground manoeuvre operations.

3. Although this section is confined to offence and defence at the operational level, a full discussion of the operations of war, including the transitional phases between operations is included in Chapter Five.

0435. ***Scheme of Manoeuvre.*** Having identified the operational objectives and the necessary sequence of major operations, the force will first manoeuvre to gain a position of operational advantage over the enemy. Such manoeuvre requires agility and close coordination and relies on good intelligence on the enemy, comprehensive air defence and logistic support coupled with sound training and discipline. An active deception plan should be implemented. Considerable effort will be needed to distract and fix the enemy so that when he does realise genuine intentions, he cannot respond effectively. Meanwhile, rear operations must continue to protect vital logistic installations and uncommitted forces and sustain the force.

0436. ***Firepower and Manoeuvre.*** Technology has extended the range and depth of the area of operations in which to exploit the potential of both firepower and manoeuvre. Firepower and manoeuvre are not interchangeable at the operational level; each has a distinctive quality, complementary to the other. A fire support formation, for example, is not a substitute for a manoeuvre formation but it does create the conditions for the latter to operate with greater freedom. The effects of firepower are transitory and will diminish with time. However, when employed in conjunction with manoeuvre forces the total effect will pose a more enduring threat, to which the enemy must respond with more than just protective measures. Firepower and manoeuvre - like fixing and striking - are complementary. Just as at the tactical level fire and movement bring a force close to the enemy, so too, at the operational level, interdiction is irrelevant unless combined with manoeuvre. Deep interdiction operations are of maximum value when synchronized with the manoeuvre design for battle.

0437. ***Sequencing.*** Having gained a position of operational advantage over the enemy, the sequence of battles and engagements by tactical formations is unleashed but always within the overarching concept of the major operation. These actions aim to rupture the enemy's cohesion and isolate elements of his force. By concentrating the effects of combat power at the decisive points, surprise, psychological shock and moral domination result in creating a situation in which the enemy can neither fight effectively nor escape. His centre of gravity will have been eliminated, or terminally threatened, and he has one choice to make - to be destroyed or to surrender. *En route* to this operational ideal, the commander may have to realign forces in response to the operational situation or otherwise seek to adjust the terms of battle to his own advantage. The previously thought through contingency options to his plan will then come into effect.

0438. ***Reserves.*** A significant concern in offence or defence will be the defeat of the enemy's operational reserves and the committal of our own reserves at the decisive moment and place. Reserves are forces which are not

engaged in a current battle for one of two reasons. First, they may be committed to a specific subsequent mission, which is essential to the successful outcome of a major operation or battle; they are vital to the campaign plan and the maintenance of the initiative. They are sometimes known as **echelon or depth forces**. Alternatively, they may be reactive, held as a **hedge against the unexpected** and therefore given planning options but not specific missions. The requirement for them may reduce once the initiative has been firmly seized; indeed their security and timely committal at the operational level (but not the tactical) may be a distraction. The distinction between the two functions of a reserve is important because the diversion of echelon forces to a reactive task severely limits the commander's subsequent freedom of action. At the operational level, forces should be tasked to exploit the results of battle by penetrating deep into the enemy's rear areas and gaining the exponential advantages of a successful pursuit. In defence, such forces should be tasked to carry out the commander's offensive countermeasures to defeat the enemy's main attack and initiate the counterattack.

0439. ***Retaining the Initiative***. During current operations, the commander monitors progress against the anticipated requirements of future operations. He pays careful attention to the logistic sustainability of his force and to its morale and physical condition, constantly bearing in mind the potential culmination of its fighting power. If necessary, he will order an operational pause, retaining the initiative through other means, on other lines of operation, often by use of a stepped-up air programme. If the original plan cannot be resumed after resort to an operational pause, the commander will need to reassess future plans and possibly amend his immediate operational objectives.

THE OFFENCE

0440. As the decisive operation of war, the offensive is the commander's ultimate means of imposing his will upon the enemy. It may be possible to take the offensive at the start of operations but often it will only be realistic to do so after a period of defence, force build-up and preliminary operations. Although offensive operations follow different patterns, they are all likely to exhibit a number of common characteristics: the seizure and retention of the initiative; irrepressible momentum; fluidity - as the main effort is changed to take advantage of fleeting opportunities; controlled tempo - as the intensity and nature and sequence of operations is varied to keep the enemy off balance; and continual deep operations of all types. Offensive campaigns will sequence major operations on lines of operation through decisive points to the centre of gravity. The commander will expect to conduct close, deep and rear operations simultaneously, fighting a wide range of tactical battles and engagements. Some parts of the force may go on to the defensive to allow a concentration of

force for an offensive elsewhere. Risk will have to be accepted in order to achieve the necessary correlation of forces.

0441. Synchronisation is the key to a successful offensive operation. The commander will consider the use of airborne, airmechanized⁴ or amphibious operations and deep penetration by armoured forces or Special Forces as means to prevent the enemy from organising and maintaining a coherent defence. Interdiction will be synchronized with manoeuvre formations, possibly seeking to carry out one of the classic forms of manoeuvre.⁵ However, it will not always be possible to out-manoeuve the enemy and force may have to be applied either directly or indirectly to the enemy to remove him from a defended area that cannot be by-passed. Ideally, a commander should seek to concentrate his force to achieve a break-in to the enemy's defences and then a ruthless exploitation. This intention is best exemplified by comparison to an expanding torrent of water finding a weak spot in a defensive wall and rapidly causing chaos and destruction behind it. As Liddell Hart's study into apparent decisive battles throughout history showed, it is the destruction through surrender of an army in flight which turns campaigns rather than numerical destruction on the battlefield itself.

THE DEFENCE

0442. Although a view in military theory is that the defence is the less decisive operation of war, it may be imposed upon the operational commander through his strategic direction. He may be denied the freedom to initiate offensive action, either for political reasons or because his combat power is inadequate. The major challenge of the defence is to overcome the advantage that the attacker has in his ability to dictate where and when to attack. The defence can be characterized as a shield. While maintaining the integrity and cohesion of his force, the defender seeks to hold the enemy. He seeks to deceive the enemy and to encourage him to make a plan that is inappropriate. He seeks to lure the enemy into situations where he can exploit the advantage of surprise; he denies him information, both actively and passively. He denies him the ability to pass orders by attacking his command systems. He thereby fixes the enemy. Deep operations will be conducted to deny the enemy his freedom of action and to isolate current battles. Rear operations will sustain both the deep and close operations, while at the same time setting up future offensive operations to strike the enemy.

4. Although the UK does not yet possess airmechanized forces, a British commander should consider their use either by a superior coalition commander, or if such resources were to be made available, in a combined operation.

5. These include the following: Frontal; Penetration; Envelopment; Turning Movement; and Infiltration. See ATP 35.

0443. An effective defence is therefore rarely passive. The defender resists and contains the enemy only where and when it is necessary, while seeking every opportunity to move onto the offensive, to the degree that his strategic directive allows him. Such opportunities may be limited early in a defensive campaign or operation but the campaign plan should seek to ensure that as the situation develops they become more numerous. As soon as the attacker can be forced to make a wrong move or be held at a decisive point in time or place, the defender is able to manoeuvre then hit the enemy, always with the aim of breaking his cohesion. The defender's intelligence capability must be tasked to uncover enemy vulnerabilities and to predict culminating points which may become the opportunities at which the offensive is launched. Having interdicted the enemy's movement and reduced his freedom of action through deep operations, the defender will transition from the defence to the offence. Unleashing a carefully synchronized land and air operation aimed at an identified enemy vulnerability, the defender will seize the initiative, seeking to exploit the advantages previously enjoyed by the enemy. Thereafter, the fundamentals of the offence must be followed until the enemy, shattered and demoralized, seeks to end the conflict.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

0444. **Public Information concerns that information which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support.** However, although the operational commander will expect to be given a public information directive in order to develop a public information plan, in reality he will have to take a pragmatic approach governed by the level of public interest in his operation and the numbers of media representatives that appear in theatre. The influence of the media has become a major factor affecting operational judgements and therefore demands close and careful attention by the operational commander himself. He will construct his public information policy to try to maintain a positive relationship with all elements of the media and to execute the public information plan with determination and vigour. The relationship between the military and the media should be based on trust, cooperation and a thorough understanding of the requirements of the correspondents who in turn should be left in no doubt as to any restrictions on their freedom of action. The following factors will be considered when formulating a public information plan:

- a. **Security.** Statements issued by the force must not provide collateral information which would be of value to the enemy.
- b. **Accreditation.** Correspondents selected to deploy or work with the force must go through an accreditation process. Accreditation

guarantees correspondents certain facilities and access such as travel, accommodation, briefings and communications which are denied to those who are not accredited. A Public Information Centre is responsible for central briefings and for the allocation of correspondents and their military escorts to units.

c. **Facilities.** Arrangements must be established to allow accredited correspondents to transmit copy either using dedicated satellite or data links, local facilities or military communication systems if necessary.

d. **Freelance Journalists.** Although non-accredited journalists should not be afforded the same facilities as those who have been accredited, their presence in the theatre of operations makes them a factor which must be reckoned with. On balance, it is probably beneficial to brief freelance journalists as and when seems sensible in order to ensure that the reports that they send back are as well informed and balanced as possible. Totally ignoring them, or harassing them, is likely to turn a difficult problem into a potentially disastrous one.

e. **Censorship.** Censorship is a command and political function and is the means by which commanders endeavour to maintain the necessary degree of security. The exercise of this sanction is justified where operations could be jeopardised or the lives of servicemen put at risk by disclosure of certain information. The policy concerning censorship must therefore be articulated clearly to all accredited correspondents. It will, however, be normal to provide correspondents with a list of subjects or information which they may not report without first seeking permission; for example, locations of units, details of military movement, operational plans and the names of servicemen.

f. **Psychological Operations.** Psychological operations and public information must operate independently of each other although the activities of both organisations must be coordinated by G3 staff at the operational level to ensure that these activities do not conflict with each other.

g. **Command and Troop Information.** Although Public Information will be the concern of the operational commander and the dedicated G3 P Info staff, there are two other aspects of information policy which contribute to overall sustainability of the operation through the maintenance of morale and therefore should not be overlooked:

(1) **Command Information.** This is a G1 function and is important as a means of passing information back to the military home base for the benefit of reinforcements and roulement troops who may subsequently deploy into theatre and for the information of deployed soldiers' families.

(2) **Troop Information.** This is another G1 function, concerned with the passage of necessary but usually non-operational information within the theatre of operations itself, for the benefit of in-theatre troops.

SECURITY

0445. **Security enhances freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats.** Active and passive measures help to deny critical information to the enemy, to deceive him and to counter his actions throughout the area of operations. Attempts to protect against every threat could however result in weakness. Risk will inevitably have to be accepted and quantified in order to achieve a balance between those operations that enhance security, in particular offensive action and deception, and the allocation of resources to security itself. The key security measures involve protection and operations security (OPSEC).

0446. **Protection. Protection preserves the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at a decisive time and place.** In its narrower security sense it encompasses the physical protection of a force, the limiting of non-combat losses and the prevention of fratricide:

a. Forces, including their integral CSS, can be protected by making them difficult to locate, strike or destroy, from the ground and air, throughout their area of operations. Some survivability measures may degrade operational performance (such as NBC protection) and risks must therefore be balanced in order to prevent combat power being dissipated by an over-emphasis on protection. At the operational level, the means available for protection include air and maritime superiority operations, theatre air and missile defences and electro-magnetic activity

b. The moral component of fighting power can be protected by providing basic health needs and welfare facilities to preserve cohesion and morale. Systems are needed to provide preventive medicine, adequate medical care and the speedy return of minor casualties to duty. The physical component of fighting power is protected by

preventive maintenance and quick repair of equipment and replacement of equipment and supplies.

c. Fratricide is not a new problem but it now has a high public and political profile. It is exacerbated by the growing possibility of allies and enemies having the same equipments and the rapid tempo and fluidity of operations. The practical means available to minimise it include: common procedural and positive control measures, particularly for offensive support and movement; a common identification aid and accurate and timely information on dispositions and intentions. The risk of fratricide can therefore be reduced without unnecessarily limiting boldness or audacity in combat.

0447. **OPSEC.** OPSEC⁶ seeks to deny operational information to the enemy. However it will be difficult to conceal everything and OPSEC may have to be focused on those military activities whose security is fundamental to the campaign plan - an OPSEC main effort. This can be turned to advantage by allowing the enemy access to information which helps to confirm his perception of our intentions, thereby contributing to the deception plan (see below). This recognizes that the enemy will probably have considered which courses of action we may adopt and therefore the selection of a less ideal (and therefore less obvious) option may paradoxically increase the overall chances of success. OPSEC can be implemented in both a positive and negative fashion. The enemy can be denied the ability to gather information by the physical attack of his information gathering capability. Alternatively, OPSEC may influence the timing and sequencing of operations in order to make the enemy's response inappropriate. For example:

'... a proposal to begin a near-term build up of supplies at King Khalid Military City for the offensive was rejected. Such a build up was certain to compromise the intended position for launching the main attack.'⁷

OPSEC will not necessarily always be the prime consideration as an operation develops but it remains a mandatory factor in the continuing estimate process.

6. OPSEC - The aim of OPSEC is to provide a military operation or exercise an additional degree of security, using active or passive means, to ensure that knowledge of friendly dispositions, capabilities, intentions and vulnerabilities are denied an enemy. ATP-35.

7. United States, Secretary of Defence. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*. Final Report to Congress. US DOD. April 1992. p102.

DECEPTION

'The ultimate goal of stratagem is to make the enemy quite certain, very decisive and wrong.'⁸

0448. **Deception seeks to manipulate perceptions and expectations in order to mislead the enemy into acting in a way prejudicial to his interests.**

The main effort must therefore be concealed until it is too late for him to react effectively. The effects are increased security, surprise and ultimately economy of effort. Deception operations should therefore be integral to any campaign. The Allied deception operation prior to the Normandy invasion of World War II convinced the German High Command that the landings would take place in the Pas de Calais area. The Germans remained firm in this belief for several weeks after the actual invasion, delaying until too late the move of their operational reserves to counter the landings.

0449. Timing is critical in deception at the operational level. The objective is to influence the decisions of enemy commanders before battle occurs in order to ensure their favourable outcome and subsequent exploitation. Deception early in a campaign can lead the enemy to draw incorrect conclusions about objectives, force composition, groupings and dispositions as well as the nature and extent of air and maritime support. The enemy can therefore be induced to adopt a plan which is exploitable from the outset.

0450. Since deception seeks a response rather than merely confusion, it must be targeted against an enemy commander who has the freedom of action to respond appropriately. Plausibility is essential. Deception should therefore portray a logical sequence of events, a credible course of action and ideally be consistent with the enemy commander's perceptions of future friendly options and behaviour. It should not be so costly that it weakens the main effort. A deception designed to encourage an enemy to pursue his already selected course is likely to be more successful than one intended to induce him to choose another. The deception plans must be coordinated with and reinforced by other elements of the campaign or operation.

0451. A balance will have to be struck between the availability of resources for deception and the importance of such action. Prolonged deception cannot really be achieved by simulated activity alone in view of the number of enemy systems and possible levels of command which have to be fed false information.

8. Whaley, Barton. *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War*. Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969.

Real forces must therefore be allocated to the deception effort in order to achieve the necessary credibility and consistency. Commanders must coordinate their deception plans with their higher commander to prevent compromise of higher level deception efforts. Any forces allocated to deception must be capable of conducting purposeful action in support of the overall plan if compromised.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

0452. Psychological operations (PSY OPS) are planned activities carried out in both peace and conflict (including war) and can be directed at friendly, enemy and neutral audiences. Their **purpose** is to influence attitudes and behaviour thereby enhancing the achievement of one's own political and military objectives. Specifically PSY OPS seek to undermine an enemy's will to fight, strengthen the support of the loyal and gain the support of the uncommitted.

0453. PSY OPS must be an integral part of the campaign plan and will be coordinated at the strategic or operational level in order to ensure theatre wide consistency and compatibility with public information activities. The attack must be based on credible themes based on weak points in the enemy's character and capability and where appropriate the legitimacy of the enemy's action.

0454. PSY OPS require time to take effect and ideally should begin as early as possible with the intention of coming to fruition in time to avoid a conflict descending into hostilities. It is, therefore, a pre-emptive measure which aims to reduce the enemy's will to fight prior to the commencement of battle. The ideal is to avoid the battle altogether:

'PSY OPS focused on destroying Iraqi morale and encouraging mass surrender and desertion. After the cease-fire, an Iraqi division commander stated that next to the Coalition bombing operations, PSY OPS was the greatest threat to his troops' morale. PSY OPS leaflets and radio broadcasts undermined unit morale, provided instructions on how to surrender, instilled confidence that prisoners would be treated humanely, and provided advanced warning of impending air attacks, thus successfully encouraging desertion.'⁹

9. United States, Secretary of Defence. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*. Final Report to Congress. US DOD April 1992. pJ-20.

CONCLUDING THE CAMPAIGN

0455. ***Post Conflict Activities.*** Inherent in the politico-military nature of a crisis involving a military response is the concept of parallel political, diplomatic and military activity. Military planning must always be conducted against the expectation of the need to fight. Resolution of the conflict may, however, be achieved at any stage during military planning and the deployment. Indeed, these activities may in themselves contribute to the resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, the conflict may be terminated before the originally envisaged end-state is reached. These uncertainties will bear heavily on the operational commander who, while actually prosecuting the campaign, must consider the consequences of a premature termination and the need for his force to be able to undertake new missions, possibly of a humanitarian or peace support nature. In any event, the operational commander may well have to be the conduit for negotiations with the enemy political and military leaders as part of the conflict termination process. To fill the vacuum, the force may also have an important role in terms of being the only element capable of providing some measure of internal stability within the theatre of conflict. The force may also be required to provide a wide range of support measures including the restoration of communication systems, essential services and humanitarian relief and may have to assume - albeit temporarily - a peacekeeping role.

0456. ***Redeployment and Reconstitution.*** Overlaid on this may be pressures on the operational level commander for parts of his force that have been engaged in conflict to be withdrawn from the theatre - a factor of greatest relevance in coalition operations. Thus redeployment plans will be needed, which must take account of the degree to which the force must remain ready to meet a new crisis and also be capable of the protection of misplaced civilians and the control of prisoners of war. Redeployment should therefore not be considered as a final activity but merely movement geared towards a subsequent operation. The maintenance of unit and formation integrity will be important during the whole period of redeployment, as will be the availability of strategic lift and the continued requirement to protect the force against any resurgence of violence. Reconstitution of the force is an important aspect of sustainability and of the commander's overall responsibilities. It is therefore essential that careful plans are made and executed for the withdrawal of men and materiel from the theatre of operations and for proper reconstitution of the force in the home base, so that it is ready as quickly as possible for its next task.

PART THREE - OPERATIONS

CHAPTER FIVE

JOINT OPERATIONS, BATTLES AND ENGAGEMENTS

The purpose of Chapter Five is to relate the approach to operations set out in Chapter Two to the conduct of joint operations, battles and engagements

0501. Major operations involving the Army will always be joint; they are very likely to be combined. The doctrine and capabilities of other services and potential allies therefore influence our approach to operations.

0502. Success in conflict, as described in Chapter 2, stems from the appropriate interpretation and application of the **Principles of War**. Although they are the basis for the successful employment of military force in conflict, they do not in themselves alone amount to practical tools that can be used by commanders and staffs. It is possible, however, to make deductions from the Principles of War which constitute a practical summation of the concepts contained within them and which will therefore be fundamental to the successful outcome of any military enterprise. The ability to implement a manoeuvrist approach to operations depends in the first place upon **information and intelligence**, the exercise of an appropriate philosophy of **command**, the **protection** of friendly forces, and the provision of **combat service support**. Together with **firepower** and **manoeuvre** these are known as the **Functions in Combat**.¹ These are conceptual tools. By

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
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- Transitional Phases During
- Operations

1. The British Military Doctrine (BMD) - Edition 2.



THE PATH FROM PRINCIPLES TO ACTION

Figure 5.1

considering these Functions commanders may ensure that they are adhering to the Principles of War in their planning for, and conduct of, operations. Whilst the relative importance of the functions in combat may vary according to the purpose of an operation, together they form a coherent whole - the basis of a balanced force. The practical expression of the functions in combat is **combat power** - physical capabilities. When doctrine and the human (moral) dimension are added to combat power, the result is **fighting power** - the ability to fight. For fighting power to be successfully maximised, the **Core Functions** of Find, Fix and Strike must be integrated in the framework of Deep, Close and Rear operations (see Figure 5.1).

FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT

COMMAND

0503. **Command is the exercise of military authority by a designated commander for the planning, direction, coordination and control of a military force.** Control is a supporting means by which command is exercised and regulated, and is normally the province of the staff. The exercise of command rests on a number of command imperatives which apply to all operations. Successful command requires positive leadership and teamwork and the adaptive application of a common doctrine of Mission Command to a given situation. Commanders - supported by the staff - must acquire and communicate information, assess the situation and determine the actions required, in a timely manner. Thus sound intelligence, robust communications, and an efficient planning and decision-making organisation are essential. The

subsequent direction and tasking of subordinate forces rests on delegation of responsibility together with the necessary allocation of resources required to achieve their missions. Coordination, control and liaison ensure that unity of effort across a force is maintained. Command is covered in detail in ADP Vol 2 *Command*.

MANOEUVRE

0504. **To manoeuvre is to seek to get into a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied.** Manoeuvre has both a spatial and temporal dimension which can be exploited to keep the enemy off balance: it thus also protects. The use of time and space generates a faster operational tempo than the enemy posing him new problems which cause him to react, thus producing freedom of action - commonly termed 'room for manoeuvre'. Manoeuvre is the means by which the enemy is made vulnerable to damaging blows and it encourages an opportunistic and unpredictable approach; stereotyped operations lacking an element of manoeuvre increase vulnerability. It is the means of concentrating the **threat** of force at decisive points to achieve surprise, shock action, physical momentum and moral dominance. While manoeuvre enhances the potential effects of firepower and firepower in turn enables manoeuvre, firepower can rarely substitute satisfactorily for manoeuvre. Manoeuvre used to secure a position of advantage has an enduring effect, which compels the enemy to respond by acting on our terms. The effect of firepower is, however, not sustainable indefinitely and may not provoke a reaction that can be exploited.

0505. **Ground Manoeuvre.** The positional advantages gained by ground manoeuvre forces are unique and irreplaceable by other means. Seizing, holding and denying ground, blocking and penetrating enemy forces all contribute directly to success. The effects of ground manoeuvre can be sustained and a long term presence can be established in a given area.

0506. **Air Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre by air platforms is significantly more flexible, long reaching and responsive than manoeuvre by ground platforms. But it has relative limitations; it has greater vulnerability, it is susceptible to weather (decreasing) and it can only sustain a presence or effect for a finite period. Manoeuvre is therefore enhanced when a ground element deploys to sustain the initial effects, particularly when operating in a compatible time scale. This should not constrain the long reach and flexibility of employment of air manoeuvre; on the contrary it can redress some of its inherent limitations. Air manoeuvre is manoeuvre unconstrained by ground. Air mobility is vertical envelopment, the positioning of a force by air transport.

0507. **Movement.** Movement is a manoeuvre function requiring mobility resources and control. Mobility operations preserve the freedom of manoeuvre of friendly forces. Typical missions include route development, obstacle crossing and breaching and movement control. Operational level movement is a function of air and sea lift and rail and road movement. Air lift provides quick insertion, albeit of limited load capacity but is dependent on a favourable air situation and adequate airheads. Sea lift has a high load capacity and reach but is comparatively slow, dependent on sea control and is likely to be based on commercial assets. Careful assessment of cargo priorities is essential to all movement problems; substantial savings in deployment times are achieved only if the whole force can be deployed by air. The critical factor in shipping is generally bulk rather than weight.

FIREPOWER

0508. **Firepower destroys, neutralises, suppresses and demoralises;** it is essential in defeating an enemy's ability and will to fight. In its broadest sense firepower includes conventional maritime, air and land delivered munitions as well as those lethal and non-lethal means which exploit the electro-magnetic spectrum. The traditional division between direct and indirect fire is becoming less meaningful. Indirect fire is increasingly able to achieve lethal precision effects: direct fire in the strict sense can be complemented by line of sight systems in which the firer directly observes the target but his platform may not be in view. The application of firepower should be judged solely by the effect required on the enemy in terms of neutralisation, suppression or destruction. This prompts considerations of the volume, duration and lethality of fire and the precision and range of the munitions. The appropriate mix of weapons systems can then be chosen to achieve the desired effect. It is always desirable to use a combination of systems to deliver firepower, thus complicating the enemy's response.

0509. **Firepower in Isolation.** Firepower may be used with confidence in isolation from manoeuvre to neutralise, suppress or demoralise - and hence to delay or disrupt enemy critical capabilities and uncommitted forces in deep operations. Firepower can be tasked to destroy but its effectiveness may be difficult to confirm. For firepower to be effective, the strike assets must be linked to the appropriate sensors to provide both target acquisition and damage assessment. The principle of directly linking recce, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition systems (RISTA) to firepower delivery systems is now widely accepted. At the theatre level, joint targeting is essential. Modern command systems obviate the need for rigid and immutable groupings of firepower delivery systems.

0510. ***Firepower and Manoeuvre.*** When firepower and manoeuvre are working together, the manoeuvre commander must control the fire. This requires flexible command and control arrangements which allow the effects of firepower to be allocated to those functions as appropriate, whilst not tying the delivery systems to one or the other. Firepower in deep operations is invariably a joint activity, but can also be so in close or rear operations. In close operations joint forces may provide the means but command must lie with the close operation commander.

PROTECTION

0511. **Protection preserves the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at a decisive time and place.** Protection in its narrower security sense is covered in detail in Chapter Four. In its wider sense, as a function in combat, protection is achieved by fixing the enemy and if necessary destroying him before he can attack effectively. The need for protection and the relative effort devoted to it may diminish as the operation progresses, as the initiative is wrested from the enemy and as he is increasingly unable to respond appropriately through losing cohesion. But he may still retain the ability to strike back, perhaps in desperation, as Hitler did in his winter offensive through the Ardennes in 1944. Whilst the need for protection will never disappear on operations, risks must be balanced in order to free as much combat power as possible for offensive action. Effort spent in protecting the force is necessary but does not contribute directly to striking the enemy.

0512. ***Protection Functions.*** Specific protection functions include: air and missile defence, counter-air (covered below), counter-mobility, NBC measures, hardening of facilities and field works, protective intelligence (security) and defensive EW. Survivability allows friendly forces to function despite the effects of enemy weapons and hostile natural environments. Deception, OPSEC and dispersion contribute to protection. Counter-mobility limits the manoeuvre of the enemy and enhances the effect of firepower; roles include obstacle creation, route denial and obscuration.

0513. ***Air Defence.*** Air defence is a key function in protecting freedom of action and it encompasses maritime, land and air capabilities. It prevents the enemy using a primary means - air power - of breaking our cohesion. Air defence artillery supports tactical operations, by both point and area defence; there will never be enough and commanders must decide priorities for protection. Of increasing importance given the proliferation of missile technology is theatre missile defence which protects the ability to generate combat power at the operational level.

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

0514. **Accurate and timely intelligence is fundamental to the success of all operations.** Intelligence is the product of the organised efforts of a commander to gather, analyse and distribute information about the enemy and the operational environment. The commander sets out his intelligence requirements which are translated into information requirements by the staff who manage the collection and collate the information to produce exploitable intelligence. The intelligence process should take place in real or near real time. Simultaneously, the enemy must be prevented from exploiting his own intelligence producing systems.

0515. ***Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RISTA)***. RISTA is a joint operation to link sensors, acquisition systems and reconnaissance directly to offensive strike assets which can be cued by them. Surveillance is the continual collection of information, usually across a wide geographical spectrum; reconnaissance is directed at specific targets. Ground reconnaissance includes scouting and screening. RISTA is a specifically focused concept which directs offensive action. But many of the systems involved will have wider roles; reconnaissance will serve the commander's information requirements and intelligence agencies will collect against a broader remit. Neither should be constrained.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

0516. **Combat Service Support sustains the force.** It sustains the force from its home base to and in the theatre of operations, critically influencing the tempo, duration and intensity of all operations. It concerns the ability of the force to maintain the necessary combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. It concerns the sustenance and moral well being of the men, the maintenance of materiel, the provision of expendable commodities and the replacement of casualties. It is not a discrete function but covers the means whereby combat power is maintained so that operations can be conducted successfully. It is therefore an integral part of the planning and execution of campaigns, battles and engagements. Combat Service Support is covered in detail in AFM Vol 1 Part 6 *Combat Service Support*.

JOINT OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W)

0517. **The purpose of countering enemy command systems is to destroy the enemy's ability to make and promulgate timely and appropriate decisions, whilst protecting our ability to do so.** Modern military forces depend on effective command systems.² The aims of countering or degrading them are twofold: first, to slow the enemy's tempo; secondly, to disrupt his operations and plans, his ability to generate combat power and his ability to make decisions and execute them in an appropriate time frame. Command systems consist of personnel, equipment and procedures; where these come together, vulnerable points are created. If the system lacks redundancy, attacking these vulnerabilities degrades the whole system in a disproportionate way. To remove critical early warning radars for example would severely degrade an air defence system.

0518. Countering command systems consists of influencing, degrading and destroying enemy capabilities, protecting our own and denying him information. This is achieved through the integrated use of OPSEC, deception, exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrum and physical destruction. It is a G3 or J3 function and at the operational level should be part of the operational plan. It may well be a line of operation demanding a sequence of decisive points.

0519. A variety of joint means are available to the commander to destroy enemy command systems: manoeuvre forces, long range firepower and special forces, maritime gun and missile systems and surface attack by aircraft. EW gives the commander an understanding of the enemy command system, from which to deduce vulnerabilities, the means to deny selectively the enemy use of the electro-magnetic spectrum, to feed him false information and to degrade his intelligence effort. It would be rare to engage on operations without prior attention to the need to dominate the use of the electro-magnetic spectrum in relation to the enemy.

0520. The protection of command systems requires a combination of electronic and physical measures to protect vulnerable points and links - denying the enemy the ability to disrupt our own decision making process - and good intelligence as proof against deception.

2. Command systems are dependent upon the passage of information and the communication systems which provide the bearers.

INTERDICTION

0521. **The purpose of interdiction is to constrain enemy freedom of action by dislocating, disrupting and blocking his military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces.**

Interdiction therefore **fixes** the enemy by limiting his freedom of action: it is a principal activity of deep operations, and is usually conducted on a joint basis at the operational level. It may be targeted well beyond friendly forces for operational level effect or closer for more immediate tactical effect on land (or sea) operations. It is not to be confused with striking targets deep where their **destruction** is the purpose of the mission itself - this is a close function, albeit conducted at long range. Interdiction is most effective as synchronised activity: ground, air, air delivered, maritime, EW and special forces all have a role. Interdiction directly attacks the enemy's cohesion; he is constrained in his ability to control tempo and achieve simultaneity and surprise and he cannot move without loss. Interdiction has application at tactical and operational levels of conflict; it can establish conditions for close operations, current or future. Air and maritime interdiction operations may take place beyond the range of land systems and thus require little coordination with the manoeuvre of land forces. In principle, however, interdiction and manoeuvre are complementary and require coordination. The enemy then faces a dilemma: if he attempts to concentrate to counter manoeuvre, he moves and is more vulnerable to interdiction; if interdiction forces dispersal, he succumbs more easily to manoeuvre. The effects of interdiction will rarely be immediate and may only be cumulative.

SPECIAL FORCES (SF) AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

0522. **Special forces are strategic troops who are selected, trained, equipped and organised to special levels and are usually employed in pursuit of national objectives.** They operate in support of conventional forces or independently. Politico-military considerations often shape SF operations: they offer potentially high gain but at comparatively high risk. They rely on high technology and high degrees of training but usually require detailed pre-mission preparation to be most effective. SF have been raised for specific campaigns but it is more usual to employ regular established SF. Their activities are likely to be politically sensitive; they are scarce in number and take a long time to regenerate.

0523. **Roles.** The principal roles of SF are **Reconnaissance**, including information reporting and target acquisition, **Offensive Action**, which includes direction of air, artillery and naval gunfire, designation for precision guided munitions, use of integral weapons and demolitions and **Military Assistance**.

They also provide the UK immediate response **Counter Terrorism** teams. Their roles are relevant to all levels of war and to any theatre of operations. SF capabilities are flexible and versatile and although their method of operation may differ according to circumstance and mission, the basic principles governing the employment of SF are enduring.

0524. ***Principles of Employment.*** Four principles govern the employment of SF:

a. ***Employment on High Value Tasks.*** SF must be employed with care and precision, exploiting their potential whilst husbanding their limited availability. SF are discrete and responsive and capable of protracted operations. They are particularly valuable early in a campaign. Their considerable initial usefulness may diminish however and their employment therefore requires constant review; circumstances may dictate their withdrawal and re-tasking. SF missions are integral packages which include infiltration, approach, execution, resupply and exfiltration.

b. ***Command at the Highest Appropriate Level.*** SF will always be commanded at the highest appropriate level compatible with ensuring the necessary tactical coordination between their operations and those of conventional forces. In practice this usually means at the level of command concerned with the operational level. This will normally be the theatre level; at a minimum SF will have direct access to theatre command. Their operations will nevertheless need deconfliction with operations by tactical commanders, although the latter may not be aware of the purpose.

c. ***Access to the Highest Level Intelligence.*** The importance and sensitivity of SF operations demands particular precision in targeting. It follows that SF require access to the best available intelligence, which they may then need to develop further by reconnaissance. This may itself carry risk of compromise and needs fine judgement.

d. ***Security.*** SF have relatively limited combat power, tactical mobility and sustainability once deployed. They therefore rely heavily on tactical surprise. The secrecy surrounding SF operations enhances their psychological impact but their compromise can have disproportionately serious penalties. This is compounded by naturally intense media and public interest. P Info policy will therefore normally be neither to confirm nor deny SF activity.

0525. **Strategic SF Operations.** Strategic SF operations are aimed at the enemy's long term capacity and will to sustain hostilities and at key strategic targets. The use of SF for information reporting and offensive action against SCUD and communications systems in DESERT STORM was an example of the use of SF at the strategic level. The former in particular helped prevent Israeli military intervention in the conflict.

0526. **Operational Level SF Operations.** At the operational level, SF extend the conflict in depth. Their operations will be designed to fix the enemy, to break his cohesion and prevent him controlling tempo. SF operations directly support theatre objectives and create opportunities for operations for conventional forces. In 1943-44, the Chindits conducted deep operations to interdict Japanese forces facing Fourteenth Army in Burma but at considerable risk in men, materiel and air transport. Missions may include: collecting and interpreting information about enemy dispositions, intentions and morale (during the 1982 Falklands War UK SF were the only source of such information for the three weeks prior to the main landings); attacking and interdicting high value operational level targets (such as the Argentinean tactical helicopter lift capability); working with indigenous populations in pursuit of political objectives. SF thus contribute directly to the success of a campaign plan. In NW Europe in 1944, SF worked with indigenous partisan forces to interdict movement of German logistics and forces.

0527. **Tactical Level SF Operations.** SF operations at the tactical level are possible but unusual; SF lack the combat power, tactical mobility, sustainability and responsiveness to be at their best in direct support of tactical operations. The operation to secure Mount Kent for 3 days, prior to the advance on Port Stanley in the Falklands campaign was an example of the use of SF in a preemptive operation which was a decisive point in the campaign.

0528. **Operations Other Than War.** In operations other than war, SF are a discrete, low-visibility asset with particular value in preliminary operations. They can demonstrate national resolve, provide a presence, support governments and non-governmental groups and improve the military capabilities of allied or friendly forces. Finally, in conjunction with other agencies they can undertake protracted operations to gain and sustain public support, or provide the striking element to the fixing operations of conventional forces. In Dhofar (Operation STORM), SF directly undermined the insurgency against the Sultan by contributing to many of the social and economic reforms the insurgents were themselves promising. SF provided intelligence, civil aid, reassurance and raised indigenous forces - the Firquat. SF activities however diminished in relative importance as other agencies assumed their roles.

CONTROL OF THE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC SPECTRUM

0529. The successful employment of all functions in combat is heavily dependant on the use of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Reliance on use of the electro-magnetic spectrum, particularly for command systems, is an implicit vulnerability which in the enemy is to be exploited, while protected oneself. Control of the electro-magnetic spectrum is of value only to the degree to which the enemy exploits it for military purposes.

0530. Domination of the electro-magnetic spectrum can contribute directly to **finding** the enemy through interception of his signals and **fixing** him through deception and denying him its use. Electro-magnetic means are but one method of finding the enemy and must always be supported by evidence from other sources. Similarly they can contribute to **striking** him by protecting our own manoeuvre through deception, masking of our signals, blinding his emitters, especially radar, and ultimately hitting him by use of both lethal and non-lethal forms of attack.

0531. Both the physical and electro-magnetic vulnerabilities of the enemy's systems must be attacked; most have high value critical nodes which disproportionately degrade the whole system if destroyed. This is particularly true of operations to counter his command systems and the suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD). EW systems are relatively scarce high value assets and it follows that ours require commensurate protection. Plans should reflect this and take account of the transitory nature of electro-magnetic effects.

0532. Electronic warfare (EW) is both an operational and tactical function. It is also a truly joint activity and many powerful systems are based on air or maritime platforms. EW must not be considered in isolation from other functions in combat and must be fully integrated into the appropriate deep, close or rear operation in order to focus efforts. A sophisticated enemy will be trying to do all the things that are planned against him; it is therefore necessary to take corresponding defensive measures. Furthermore, he should not be denied use of the electro-magnetic spectrum; but left with enough channels to receive our deception plans and reveal his own intentions, and for use by our own forces.

OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

0533. The framework of deep, close and rear is a means of visualising operations and aids synchronisation: see Figure 5.2. It helps the commander relate friendly forces to one another, and to the enemy, in terms of time, space, resources and purpose. Formations and units may engage in deep, close and rear operations at different stages of the battle. It is preferable to conduct deep

DEEP, CLOSE AND REAR OPERATIONS

0534. **Deep Operations.** Deep operations expand the battlefield in time and space, making it difficult for the enemy to concentrate combat power without loss, and thus diminish the coherence and tempo of his actions. They are usually conducted at long range and over a protracted timescale against the enemy's forces or resources not currently engaged in the close battle. Deep operations are essentially offensive and may themselves lead to close combat. By keeping the enemy from his objectives and constraining his freedom of action, they help to create favourable conditions for close operations. They disrupt his manoeuvre and protect the force by restricting the enemy's offensive capability before it can be brought to bear. Although the purpose of deep operations is often to find and fix the enemy, increasingly, the range and lethality of modern weapons, tied to accurate and responsive acquisition and communication systems, allow deep operations to contribute directly to striking the enemy. He is therefore delayed, diverted from his main effort and elements of his combat power are destroyed.

a. Deep operations embrace three principal **activities**: deception, deep surveillance target acquisition and interdiction. The latter seeks to prevent the enemy reinforcing or reacting to close operations and contributes to writing down his combat power. Specific targets for deep operations may include strategic key points, command systems, air defence assets, lines of communication, surface forces, combat supplies and stocks of materiel.

b. Deep operations **focus** selectively on key enemy vulnerabilities. They may well also have a psychological or moral flavour seeking, for example, to influence the enemy's will to fight through his media, public support and undermining his confidence by a series of carefully targeted blows; this is especially so in operations other than war. In Northern Ireland, for example, deep operations include the majority of deterrence patrolling and VCPs; these influence where terrorists choose to operate but are not themselves likely to lead to planned contacts - close operations. Long term surveillance work may either be directed towards the sustained interdiction of terrorist supplies - a deep operation; or it may seek to develop specific contact information leading to arrests - close operations. In this example, deep operations fix the enemy, close operations strike him and the basic function of finding is common to both.

c. While the principal **means** of prosecuting deep operations in war is firepower, the integrated application of firepower and manoeuvre produces the most effective results - hence **Joint** Interdiction.³ This is because the

3. See Chapter 5 Paragraph 0521.

effects of firepower alone diminish with time as the enemy implements protective measures: a combination of firepower and deep manoeuvre places him at risk in a way which demands he takes active measures to counter, exposing himself in the process. The land components of deep interdiction operations may include special forces, aviation and ground manoeuvre forces acting in concert, parachute and air assault troops, supported by electro-magnetic and deep fire weapons systems.

d. As with rear operations, the **time** dimension of deep operations is significant. Whereas close operations are invariably current and immediate, deep operations have both a current dimension and a delayed dimension which, in some types of conflict, may be protracted. For example, in counter-insurgency or peace support operations, the gaining and maintenance of popular support - hearts and minds - will be one of several lines of deep operations in the sense that it will set the conditions for close operations throughout the campaign. Equally, these types of deep operations offer little prospect of immediate results but will have long term pay-offs. Deep operations have a critical effect all all levels of conflict; they are the key to setting the tempo of operations.

0535. **Close Operations.** Close operations are those which involve friendly forces in direct contact with the enemy. They are usually conducted at short range and in an immediate timescale. Their purpose is primarily to strike the enemy in order to eliminate a discrete part of his combat power: the means range from destruction to arrest. Whereas deep and rear operations are designed to create the conditions for favourable close combat, close operations are about winning current battles and engagements. They are fought by forces in immediate contact with the enemy. They achieve their effect by direct action against enemy combat power: their effect is therefore likely to be immediate and palpable. Close operations normally include the deep, close and rear operations of subordinate units (see Figure 5.2).

a. Close operations may include: deception, manoeuvre, close combat, fire support, counter-battery fire, combat support and combat service support of forces in contact. Activities involved with close operations require precise control to avoid fratricide and unity of command is therefore vital.

b. Close operations place forces in the most obvious and frequently the greatest **danger**, therefore fighting at arms length has some attractions. Firstly, successful interdiction constrains enemy freedom of action and thus his ability to reinforce. The terms on which close operations are engaged then become more predictable and the

outcome more certain. Secondly, within close operations, fighting at arms length implies using the effects of simultaneity, manoeuvre and counter-fire to hit and disengage. It does not mean simply seeking to out-range the enemy: desirable though this may be, it is an uncertain product of favourable technology and terrain, neither of which can be guaranteed. Nor does it mean greater reliance on indirect rather than direct fire; each has a role and one is not a substitute for the other.

c. In balancing the **effects** of deep and close operations, one must be designated as the main effort at any time. Both will be conducted simultaneously but where they require common assets or resources are scarce, it must be quite clear which will take priority if either needs to be reinforced. The function of each operation must be expressed in terms of the desired effect - the commander's intent. Deep operations allow the commander to dictate where, when and under what conditions he fights his close operations. Whilst **striking**, the usual objective of close operations, is dependent ultimately on successful offensive action, **finding** and **fixing** give a force the edge in combat by giving it freedom of action.

d. In close operations, **quick, simultaneous** and **violent action** has greater potential for success than sequential or staged actions. This has implications for reserves. True reserves are a hedge against uncertainty; they allow a commander to exploit unforeseen success and they help him recover from a reverse. But if the enemy is satisfactorily fixed by deep operations, his freedom of action will be curtailed and the need for a hedge against uncertainty is reduced. In this desirable state of affairs the need for a large reserve to be held out of action is reduced. Forces may nevertheless be held in echelon to be committed sequentially but this is less desirable than achieving simultaneity by massing violent effects on an enemy level of command from a variety of directions.

e. Close operations **may well not be contiguous**. The responsibility for remaining aware of what is going on in the gaps must be directed to specific commanders, with a clear remit for them to maintain the security of their forces engaged in close operations. **By function** close operations are primarily concerned with striking the enemy: the **means** available allow targets to be struck both in close proximity to own forces and at considerable separation from them. Close operations may therefore be narrowly focused in a confined space (a contact in Northern Ireland for example) or may span a considerable area, in depth, width and height.

0536. **Rear Operations.** Rear operations both increase the overall depth of operations and provide the resources to vary the tempo of operations. Their purpose is to ensure freedom of action by protecting the force, sustaining combat operations and retaining freedom of manoeuvre of uncommitted forces. They are not synonymous with combat service support, but are much wider in scope.

a. The types of **activity** which may constitute rear operations include the reception into theatre, assembly, movement and security of reserves or echelon forces, redeployment of forces out of contact, Host Nation Support, establishment and protection of secure operating bases and lodgements, establishment of lines of communication and finally, support for and protection of civilians and civilian installations. Freedom of action is further enhanced by the generation of operational reserves. Rear operations control the provision of reinforcements, replacements, roulement, reconstitution and regeneration of forces.⁴

b. Rear operations will be the **target** of enemy deep operations; a balance must be struck between active and passive security measures. Active measures will seek out and neutralise or destroy enemy forces capable of deep operations. Defensive measures may include the use of guards, dispersal, camouflage and deception. In protecting rear operations, our freedom of action can be enhanced; the effort and resources used are not therefore entirely nugatory but the level of protection must be appropriate to the risk because close and deep operations have a higher claim to offensive combat power. In Northern Ireland for example, protection of Security Force Bases are necessary rear operations but the impact on the forces available for offensive tasks has to be minimised. The greatest risks occur where forces engaged in rear operations need to concentrate and lack integral protection. Their vulnerability was dramatically demonstrated by the bombing of the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1982, which effectively ended the campaign.

c. Rear operations must be focused clearly to support the commander's intent. In order to coordinate the many functions of rear operations, unity of command is essential. This may be complicated by the diversity of the units involved and their potentially wide geographic spread. Notwithstanding, it will usually be desirable to appoint a single functional commander with responsibility for all joint rear operations and the appropriate authority over the forces and resources involved, particularly where priorities are difficult to define.

4. See AFM Vol 1 Part 6 *Combat Service Support*.


CONTROL OF OPERATIONS

0537. **The purpose of control measures is to coordinate and deconflict operations.** Control measures, such as the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) and the Reconnaissance and Interdiction Planning Line (RIPL), as lines, are of declining utility; they are fire control measures and are in themselves insufficient for the needs of deep, close and rear operations. This section sets out the considerations and principles which will guide the choice of control structure appropriate to a specific campaign or operation.

0538. Control promotes cohesion; cooperation and economy of effort are key principles. These are best ensured by establishing a **lead commander** for joint operational activity; in executing his concept of operations, he establishes the effects required and the priority and timings for the activities of all **supporting commanders**, ie he exercises general direction. For example, land or maritime commanders will usually be lead commanders where interdiction and manoeuvre are synchronised. For counter-air operations, the air commander will lead. He will normally also lead for surface attack against targets of strategic or operational significance where air operations are the predominant capability used.

0539. Control may be procedural or positive. **Procedural methods** (previously agreed and promulgated orders) are the basis but will not in themselves allow for sufficient timeliness and flexibility. Linear measures such as RIPL and FSCL are procedural. There is an increasing need for **positive measures** - relying on positive identification and clearance to act. Positive control measures must be real time and interactive between all interested parties; this is demanding on C2 and communications. The balance of control is nevertheless clearly shifting from procedural towards positive control in joint operations.

0540. **Geographical Measures.** Geographical control measures can serve to distinguish between those things which a commander can **control, in time**, to fulfil his mission, those things which may **interest** him to the extent that they may affect the successful outcome of his mission and those things which he can **directly influence**, now. These equate respectively to an **area of operations** (which will be designated for a commander), an **area of interest** (which he will then decide for himself) and an **area of influence** (which will be a function of his eventual plan). See Figure 5.3.



CONTROL OF OPERATIONS

Figure 5.3

0541. **Area of Operations.** The purpose of allocating an area of operations to a subordinate is to define the geographical limits, a volume of space, within which he may conduct operations. It satisfies his requirement for depth to manoeuvre and protect his force and to fight at extended ranges. At any one level of command areas of operations will never overlap; conversely, in dispersed operations there may be gaps between them. The area of operations may be changed with a change in mission. Within these geographical limits, a commander has the authority to conduct operations, coordinate fire, control movement, develop and maintain installations. His authority should also include the control of all joint actions supporting his mission and allow him to employ his organic and supporting systems to the full extent of their capabilities. The means available to describe geographical limits include boundaries and height bands; where operations are joint or combined, a common agreed system is required. Such limits can be adjusted by agreement between levels of command. **Deep, close and rear operations** take place within the area of operations specific to each level of command.

0542. **Area of Interest.** The purpose of defining an area of interest is to identify and monitor those factors, including enemy activities, which may influence the outcome of the current and anticipated missions, beyond the allocated area of operations. A commander will decide for himself how wide he must look, in both time and space - forward, above, laterally and to the rear, wherever enemy action may affect his own force. His interests may overlap those of adjacent forces. The scope of this wider view is not limited by the reach of his organic intelligence sources; it depends on the reach and mobility of the enemy and where it does extend beyond his own collection ability, it is the basis for interrogating relevant intelligence fusion centres. Thus each level of command, having been given the geographical limits within which it will

operate, has in turn to decide for itself how far beyond those limits it must look in time and space for intelligence and warning.

0543. **Area of Influence.**⁵ The area of influence is the physical volume of space that expands, contracts and moves according to a formation or unit's current ability to acquire or engage the enemy. It will be determined by the reach of organic systems or those temporarily under command and at any time will be finite. For example, an independent armoured brigade with organic artillery might measure the space it can influence in terms of the range of its longest range system, AS90. But were an MLRS regiment and the appropriate STA capability made available, the brigade could influence operations further out:

- a. With extended range systems and rapid manoeuvre, the area of influence can be spread wide or narrowly focused; great flexibility is possible but concentration of force must be considered. At higher levels of command, it is possible that the area of influence and area of operations may coincide. At the lower tactical levels, terrain has a more restricting effect on reach and mobility. So the area in which a force can bring combat power to bear at any time will vary. It can only realistically be judged by a commander, who needs constant awareness of his area of influence.
- b. The reach of adjacent forces may overlap. Unity of effort is then essential to employ their respective assets to mutual advantage; ownership of assets or ground is less important than application towards a common purpose, for which lead and supporting commanders may need to be designated.
- c. By fixing the enemy his area of influence can be constrained. As the commander foresees the course of the operation, he can visualise how his own area of influence must change as he moves against the enemy and therefore how he might task organize and deploy his subordinates.

0544. **Control of Fire.** The land commander will always be the lead commander within his **area of influence** and will require **positive control** of all fire applied within it. He may well be the lead commander for activity within the remainder of his **area of operations** and will expect **coordination** of fire here; a combination of procedural and positive methods may be used. Beyond, in his area of interest, he will expect **information**. The control of fire in simultaneous

5. An alternative term for Area of Influence is 'Battlespace' - an alternative recognised in US Army Doctrine (see FM 100-5 Ch 6).

deep, close and rear operations is a joint activity. Rules of engagement will continue to be required (ranging in complexity from simple card systems to theatre ROE). In the integration of land and air fire, the **FSCL** remains the primary procedural control measure and must be established by the appropriate **land commander**, who may draw it to coincide with his area of influence (ie an area not a line). It is a permissive fire coordination line; inside it, attacks against surface targets require positive control by the land commander; beyond it, land and SF commanders should expect coordination of surface attack sorties. They in turn should expect to have to coordinate their attacks with air activity.

AIR OPERATIONS

AIR POWER DOCTRINE

0545. Air power is fundamental to the success of all land operations. In its broadest sense it concerns the ability to use platforms operating in or passing through the air for military purposes. This section provides only the basis for understanding necessary to appreciate the significance of air power in the context of Army doctrine. In this manual, the terms air and aviation are given specific meaning, the former referring to systems operated by air forces, the latter to systems operated by land forces. This section should be read in conjunction with AP 3000, *Air Power Doctrine*:

'Of at least equal importance to air power's ability to destroy is its ability to disrupt and dislocate.....Dislocation causes delay and confusion and breaks up unit cohesion.....For example, in June 1944, the German Panzer Lehr Division was the subject of continuous air interdiction attacks during its deployment from Le Mans to contain the Allied D-Day landings. The attrition sustained by Panzer Lehr during this journey was significant.....but more importantly unit cohesion was lost and the division arrived on the battlefield in penny packets.'⁶

0546. There are three components to **Air Strategy: the Counter-Air Campaign, the Anti-Surface Force Campaign and the Strategic Air Offensive**. An **air campaign** is defined as a coordinated series of air operations designed to achieve a specific air strategic objective. The relationship between the three air campaigns will be complementary but will vary. In the 1991 Gulf War, the air strategy was conceived in four phases: control of the air and damage to strategic capabilities; suppression of Iraqi surface to air defences in Kuwait (a sub-element of the counter air campaign); anti surface operations against Iraqi forces in Kuwait; direct support of land operations to

6. AP 3000, *Air Power Doctrine*. 1993. p24.

liberate Kuwait. In the event, the frictions of war extended the timescale and phases tended to merge and overlap.

0547. ***The Counter-Air Campaign.*** Freedom from air attack is fundamental to successful operations and is achieved by conducting a counter-air campaign. The counter-air campaign will usually be given priority against any adversary who is capable of exercising air power. The components of the campaign are **Offensive Counter-Air**, which includes **Airfield Attack**, **Fighter Sweep**, **Escort** and **Suppression of Enemy Air Defence** and **Defensive Counter-Air**. The purpose of Offensive Counter-Air is to delay, disrupt or destroy enemy air as close to its source as possible. Defensive Counter-Air requires the detection, identification, interception and destruction of enemy air attempting to attack our forces or penetrate our airspace. The aim of Counter-Air operations is to win and maintain a specified air situation. There are three degrees of control of the air; **Favourable Air Situation** (in which enemy air effort is insufficient to prejudice the success of our operations), **Air Superiority** (in which operations at a given time and place can be conducted without prohibitive air interference) and **Air Supremacy** (in which the enemy is incapable of effective interference in our air operations). Although air superiority or air supremacy may be the given operational objective, it may be more realistic to talk of **Local Air Superiority**, maintained for a specific time and space in support of a specific operation.

0548. ***The Anti-Surface Force Campaign.*** The aim of the Anti-Surface Force Campaign is to deprive the enemy of the military power he needs to occupy territory or exploit seaspace. The Anti-Surface Force campaign has land and maritime components, both potentially calling on common resources. Land/Air Operations embrace Air Interdiction, Offensive Air Support and Armed Reconnaissance:

a. ***Air Interdiction (AI).*** Air Interdiction is conducted to destroy, disrupt, neutralise or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces. In Army terms it is a deep operation and is planned in consultation with the land commander. AI can greatly enhance deep operations especially when synchronised with land interdiction operations. AI targets may include surface forces, movement networks, C3I facilities and combat supplies. AI can delay the arrival or buildup of enemy forces, disrupt the enemy commander's concept of operations or cause him to divert valuable resources.

b. ***Offensive Air Support (OAS).*** Offensive air support has two components: Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) and Close Air Support

(CAS), which at the operational level are directed at the close battle. **BAI is air action against hostile land targets which are in a position to affect directly friendly forces but which are not yet in contact. CAS is air action against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces and requiring detailed integration of each air mission with ground manoeuvre.** BAI and CAS both require joint planning and coordination; CAS requires additional control, including positive identification of friendly forces and positive control of aircraft. CAS might equally be undertaken by aviation or air assets or both.

c. **Armed Reconnaissance.** **Armed Reconnaissance is air missions flown with the primary purpose of locating and attacking targets of opportunity.** It is a form of air interdiction against opportunity targets.

0549. **Other Air Operations.** The following Combat Air Support Operations directly concern the land commander:

a. **Tactical Air Reconnaissance.** Tactical Air Reconnaissance is a part of wider **Aerospace Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations**, which include collection from a wide variety of sensors, including photographic, radar, optronic and electronic systems mounted in space, air and ground platforms. **Tactical Air Reconnaissance collects information on the enemy, weather and geographical features required for the planning and conduct of land operations.** Aerospace Surveillance and Reconnaissance operations using systems such as Tornado GR1A, JSTARS and TR1A offer the land commander considerable potential advantage over an enemy but create their own difficulties in the management and dissemination of timely intelligence to the appropriate ground level of command to use it effectively.

b. **Electronic Warfare.** EW Support Measures search for, intercept, identify and locate radiated electro-magnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. This information forms the basis for attacking the enemy use of the electro-magnetic spectrum and for defensive measures to protect our use.

c. **Air Transport.** Air Transport Operations include Airborne Operations using fixed or rotary wing aircraft, Special Air Operations (in support of SF, clandestine, covert and psychological operations), Air Logistic Support Operations and Aeromedical Evacuation.

EMERGING AIR POWER DOCTRINE

0550. **Roles and Terminology.** The contribution of air power to land operations can also be seen in terms of the following functions: **Counter-Air, Joint Interdiction, Surface Attack,⁷ Support** (Lift, EW, RISTA). In particular, it is apparent that Air Interdiction actually embraces two functions, interdiction and attrition; the former is a joint function, the latter striking by air-surface attack. As for OAS, it is also increasingly difficult to separate the functions of BAI and CAS, which both perform the surface attack function. Surface attack operations are likely to require detailed joint coordination and integration, because land and maritime systems are now able to operate at ranges which impinge on areas previously considered exclusive to air systems.

0551. **Relationship Between Air and Land Operations.** Air and land operations are mutually supporting. The land component plan must conform to the reality of the air situation, in order to minimise casualties and seek economy of effort. The gaining of air superiority is a fundamental requirement of land operations, if the need to protect land forces (rear operations) is not to become an unacceptable constraint. To make most effective use of joint interdiction and surface attack, integration with ground manoeuvre is essential, in order to get the greatest mutual benefit. For example, the effects of joint interdiction are enhanced if at the same time the enemy is forced to respond to manoeuvre - fixing and striking in concert. Similarly, surface attack encourages enemy dispersion and makes manoeuvre easier; conversely, when the enemy concentrates against manoeuvre, surface attack is more effective.

0552. **Unity of Command.** To ensure unity of command, a joint commander should consider nominating **lead** and **supporting commanders** for specific operations. For example, in surface attack operations, the land commander will normally be supported and the air commander supporting, whereas in SEAD operations, the air commander may be supported by land systems such as AH and EW. The supported commander will make clear the required supporting mission and will provide the essential information required for cooperation and concentration of force. At the operational level, the attack of high value targets is best coordinated by joint targeting, the function of integrating reconnaissance and strike assets and setting target priorities in support of theatre objectives.

0553. **Space.** The impact of **space based systems** on land operations should be considered; they offer three capability areas, Surveillance, Anti Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence and C2W. These functions have a particular

7. Joint Interdiction is directly analogous to Deep Operations; Surface Attack is by function a Close Operation.

significance at the operational level of conflict and should be considered, particularly in combined operations.

MARITIME AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS⁸

0554. A key characteristic of maritime forces is the ability to maintain a presence without occupation, to achieve deterrence without commitment. Maritime operations, however, rarely take place in isolation from a land campaign. Even in the South Atlantic in 1982, when the maritime element was dominant initially, the outcome depended ultimately on success ashore. Maritime operations tend to have a cumulative rather than immediate effect on a campaign, except where engaged in direct support of a land operation. Maritime forces therefore anticipate joint operations and usually have considerable experience in combined operations.

0555. **Roles.** The three maritime roles are:

- a. **Sea Control.** Sea Control aims to achieve a desired degree of security for forces, facilities and merchant shipping within a designated area for a defined time. Sea control can only exist in conflict. Forces present in a theatre may anticipate the desired level of sea control before hostilities start and thereby deter the enemy from attempting to embark on a campaign to interdict the area but total sea control is impossible.
- b. **Sea Denial.** Sea Denial aims to prevent an enemy from using an area for a specific period.
- c. **Power Projection.** Power projection is defined as the use of naval force from the sea to engage hostile shore positions or facilities. This may be in the form of air strikes by organic maritime aircraft, land attack cruise missile from ships and submarines or an assault by troops with their equipment from amphibious and transport shipping.

In addition, maritime forces conduct the following principal military activities in peace: deterrence, demonstrations of presence, intelligence collection, MACP and maritime CT.

0556. **Relationship to Land Operations.** The generic naval term **inshore warfare** is applied to maritime operations which directly concern land commanders. Land commanders may consider the following areas:

8. This section draws on *RN Fighting Instructions*, Vol 1, which has a similar purpose to *ADP Operations* and parts of BMD.

a. ***Air Defence (AD)***. Naval forces have considerable AD capability and may extend protection over land operations. Joint AD is desirable but potentially constrained by limitations in compiling and passing a joint recognised air picture and by differences in weapon control states. The most effective coordination is the allocation of discrete areas for maritime and shore based assets.

b. ***Threats to Maritime Operations Inshore***. Maritime forces seek protection in mobility; limited sea room makes inshore ASW more difficult than open sea. The presence of an enemy submarine inshore will provoke a stronger response than one detected in international waters. Inshore, particular threats also include mines and fast patrol boats.

c. ***Joint Functions/ Functions in Combat***. Naval forces are particularly well suited to provide contributions to the following functions: RISTA, by virtue both of organic systems afloat, good communications to joint sources and a recognised threat picture; C2W and domination of the electro-magnetic spectrum; projection of SF ashore; firepower (naval air, NGS and missile). In many cases training and standardisation of procedures will be the significant limiting factors. Terrain will also degrade the open sea capability of maritime electronic systems.

d. ***Amphibious Operations***. The presence of an amphibious capability offshore is in effect a maritime manoeuvre function which can envelop or sustain a protracted threat against a hostile shore. Current UK amphibious forces would not, however, plan to land heavily opposed. Command will be vested in a commander, amphibious task force (CATF) and a commander landing force (CLF); command may pass to a land commander once the force is established ashore. Control will be exercised within an amphibious objective area (AOA - analogous to the area of operations). In both the timing and location of amphibious landings, the constraints of weather and terrain should be considered. The airmobile aspect of amphibious forces should not be overlooked. Amphibious forces have integral CSS, and once ashore they may utilise either water or land MSRs.

LAND OPERATIONS⁹

0557. The primary land operations of war are **Offence** and **Defence**. In line with current NATO doctrine a third operation is also recognised, at the tactical

9. See NATO publication ATP 35, which the UK adopted in Jan 1991.

level, **Delay**. Together they permit the flexibility and fluidity of the land battle to be maintained and allow tempo to be varied. They may all take place in contact with the enemy and be conducted simultaneously by elements within a force or sequentially by the force as a whole. To link them may require a simple transition from one operation to another without breaking contact, for example, from defence to offence, or it may be necessary to dis-engage or re-establish contact. To ensure the continuity of operations, the Operations of War are linked by **Transitional Phases during Operations**, in which the force is disengaging or seeking to re-establish contact. These are: **Advance to Contact, Meeting Engagement, Link-Up Operations, Withdrawal, and Relief of Troops in Combat**. The Transitional Phases during Operations can never be decisive and are only a means to achieve the ends in the primary Operations of War. The value of all land operations in war will be greatly enhanced by close coordination with air power.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

0558. The purpose of offensive operations is to defeat the enemy by imposing our will on him by the application of focused violence. It is the decisive operation of war. Subsidiary purposes are: preemption to gain the initiative, disruption of enemy offensive action, deception or diversion from the Main Effort, seizing ground, fixing the enemy as an economy of force operation or gaining information - reconnaissance in force. Offensive operations have a role in all the core functions, finding, fixing and striking the enemy. The attacker seeks to create the conditions for freedom of movement and manoeuvre, to break enemy cohesion and defeat his forces selectively, thus creating irresistible momentum.

0559. Although the purpose of offensive operations is to defeat the enemy, inflicting physical damage is merely a means to success. The real damage to the enemy's will is caused by destroying the coherence of his defence, fragmenting and isolating his combat power. By operating throughout the depth of the area of operations, the effects of firepower, tempo, simultaneity and surprise are exploited. Manoeuvre in depth poses an enduring and substantial threat to which the enemy must respond.

0560. **Types of Offensive Action.** There are a number of offensive operations directed at specific purposes:

- a. **Reconnaissance in Force.** The purpose of reconnaissance in force is to compel the enemy to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or possibly the intention of his force by making him respond to offensive action.

- b. ***Feint and Demonstration.*** The purpose of a feint is to distract the **action** of an enemy force by seeking combat with it. By contrast, the purpose of a demonstration is to distract the enemy's **attention**, without seeking contact.

- c. ***Counter Attack and Spoiling Attack.*** The purpose of a counter attack is to defeat an enemy made vulnerable by his own offensive action. The spoiling attack is similarly directed at enemy offensive operations but with the limited aim of disruption.

- d. ***Raid.*** The purpose of a raid is to destroy or capture a vital enemy asset. Its wider purpose is to disrupt the enemy.

- e. ***Deliberate Attack.*** The purpose of the deliberate attack is to defeat the enemy, with the emphasis on massing combat power at the expense of time.

- f. ***Hasty Attack.*** The purpose of the hasty attack is to defeat the enemy, trading mass for time, in order to seize fleeting opportunities. Other factors being equal, it is preferred to the deliberate attack.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

0561. The immediate purpose of defensive operations is to defeat or deter a threat in order to provide the right circumstances for offensive action. Defensive operations, alone, will not deliver a favourable and decisive outcome to a campaign; this will be dependent upon offensive operations.

0562. There are occasions when defensive operations will be necessary and even desirable. They may be required to gain time, for example, during the preliminary stages of an operation when inadequate forces are in place to adopt the offence. A commander may choose to conduct defensive operations in order to generate or maintain opportunities for the offence. For example, by holding key terrain, or undermining enemy efforts and resources in one area, he may be able to establish the conditions for decisive action in another. The object will be to force the enemy into action that narrows his options, reduces his fighting power and exposes him to a decisive counter offensive.

0563. In conducting the defence, the aim will be to develop the initiative for future offensive operations while limiting the enemy's. In this way, the enemy's effort will reach a culminating point, presenting the opportunity for decisive action to defeat him. Defensive operations should not, therefore, be regarded

as merely a reactive form of warfare; they should aim to create the right conditions for decisive offensive action.

0564. ***Characteristics of the Defence.***

a. ***Preparation.*** During the early stages of a defensive operation, the defender will usually have the advantage of fighting from prepared positions of his own choosing. Preparations involve the positioning of forces in depth, using and improving ground, conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations, developing plans for offensive operations and initiating deception measures to conceal dispositions, intentions and also to mis-direct the enemy's efforts.

b. ***Disruption.*** Defence gives the defender the opportunity to disrupt the enemy's offensive capability, thus preventing him from generating sufficient fighting power to conduct decisive operations. This is achieved by undermining his cohesion and tempo, by defeating, confusing or blinding reconnaissance forces and by attacking his combat support, combat service support and command and control assets.

c. ***Concentration.*** Defence also gives the defender the opportunity to concentrate his fighting power in order to defend himself and, in turn, defeat the enemy. Concentration cannot be achieved by being strong everywhere; trading ground for time or concentration of force elsewhere may be necessary to obtain an advantage at a decisive point. In order to minimise the risks of vulnerability through concentration of force, the commander uses deception, concealment, screen forces and air defence.

d. ***Flexibility.*** In order to turn defensive operations to his advantage, the defender will strive to avoid or counter the enemy's attacks while taking active measures to prepare for the time when he can take the initiative. This requires a high degree of flexibility, the ability to develop plans rapidly, shift a main effort and move to the offensive without loss of tempo.

0565. ***Types of Defensive Action.*** The two principal types of defensive operation are:

a. ***Mobile Defence.*** In mobile defence, the core functions combine to defeat the enemy rather than seize ground. A **fixing** force denies the enemy freedom of action while a **striking** force manoeuvres in

order to hit the enemy decisively. Commanders conducting a mobile defence use terrain, obstacles, depth and deception together with fire and manoeuvre to encourage the enemy to focus upon the wrong objective, thus rendering him vulnerable to attack from an unexpected direction. Depth and the ability to manoeuvre are particularly important factors in mobile defence.

b. **Area Defence.** The purpose of area defence is to hold ground or deny ground to the enemy. Unlike mobile defence, a force committed to area defence does not itself seek the outright destruction of the attacking force. Instead, it relies upon a separate but coordinated attack by other dedicated forces to deliver a decisive victory. In area defence, commanders employ most of their forces in a framework of static and mutually supporting positions, supplemented by an ability to conduct local counter-attacks.

DELAYING OPERATIONS

0566. Delaying operations are those in which a force being pressed by the enemy trades time for space by slowing down its opponent's momentum and inflicting maximum damage to the enemy without itself becoming decisively committed. Delaying operations can be a precursor to either defensive or offensive operations. Delaying operations may be conducted to slow the enemy's advance in order to gain time and reduce his fighting power, as a means of gathering information about enemy intentions in order to protect friendly deployments, and as a means of shaping the battlefield in preparation for later decisive action.

TRANSITIONAL PHASES DURING OPERATIONS

0567. Transitional phases link the primary operations of war. They are as follows:

a. **Advance to Contact.** The advance to contact seeks to regain contact with the enemy under the most favourable conditions. In order to achieve this, forces may be employed in both protective and information seeking missions. The advance to contact is normally executed in preparation for a subsequent offensive operation and therefore ends when the main force is positioned in accordance with the commander's plan. Subsequent operations will be determined by the mission assigned to the main force.

b. **Meeting Engagement.** A meeting engagement involves action between two moving forces. While these forces may be pursuing quite separate missions that conflict with the meeting engagement, there is the possibility that one or both may be conducting operations in which the engagement is, in fact, intentional. The dilemma for the commander is to consider how his plans may need to be modified by the unexpected.

c. **Link-Up Operations.** The aim of a link-up operation is to establish contact between two or more friendly units or formations which may have the same or differing missions. They normally occur in enemy controlled territory.

d. **Withdrawal.** A withdrawal occurs when a force disengages from an enemy force in accordance with the will of its commander. It seeks to break the main force's contact with the enemy although contact may be maintained through other means, for example, indirect fire, reconnaissance or surveillance. The withdrawal should be conducted in a manner that minimises enemy interference and preserves fighting power. The ability to move rapidly to offensive, defensive or delaying operations should always be retained.

e. **Relief of Troops in Combat.** Relief of troops occurs when combat activities are taken over by one force from another. There are three types of relief operation: **Relief in Place**, in which all or part of a force is replaced in a sector by an incoming unit; **Forward Passage of Lines**, in which a force advances through another, for example holding a bridgehead, or attacks through a unit in contact with the enemy; a **Rearward Passage of Lines**, when a force effecting a move to the rear passes through another unit in defence. In relief of troops in combat operations, command passes laterally between the forces involved and commanders are usually co-located appropriately.

PART THREE - OPERATIONS

CHAPTER SIX

COMBINED OPERATIONS

The purpose of Chapter 6 is to describe those facets peculiar to combined operations that need to be taken into account to ensure commonality of purpose and unity of effort with allies and coalition partners

'Know your enemy and know your own allies.'
Sun Tzu

ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS

0601. **Common Purpose.** In combined operations the political dimension is all encompassing but also more diverse. Within alliances and coalitions, nations may not have identical interests but there will be a sufficient coincidence to ensure a common purpose. Individual goals and objectives will be harmonized through consensus to form the key criteria for the campaign, in particular those regarding resolution or termination of the conflict. The resulting military objectives given to the theatre commander will reflect the common purpose. Inevitably nations will reassess their objectives, both political and military, as the conflict progresses. The need to maintain consensus within the alliance or coalition will be paramount in order to preserve political and military cohesion.

0602. **Unity of Effort.** Unity of command in national operations guarantees commanders unity of effort. In combined operations, even though nations will be united by a common purpose, contingents will have different motivations, organizations, equipment, doctrine and cultures. Nations will tend to ascribe only the minimum necessary authority to the coalition commander to achieve the common objective. This should facilitate unity of effort but nations may retain

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the ultimate sanction - the power of veto. In spite of these difficulties, it will be in all nation's interests to make the alliance or coalition work. Consensus will be important to ensure a unity of effort, without which the commander cannot achieve success. Personalities and relationships between senior commanders will have an important part to play in this respect by producing the necessary level of cooperation and goodwill. Equity of hardship, risk and reward are also critical requirements (see Paragraph 0623).

COMMAND OF COMBINED OPERATIONS

0603. It is preferable to use an existing headquarters for command of the combined operation. The specific tailoring of this headquarters should be kept to a minimum and should use existing procedures to ensure stability and simplicity, particularly during the early stages of the operation. It is likely to be based or modelled on an existing, integrated, multinational arrangement or make use of a framework nation.

COMBINED HEADQUARTERS

0604. ***Integrated Model.*** If nations are similar in culture, military ethos, doctrine, training and equipment, or if extensive experience exists in working with each other, a multinational headquarters may offer the best solution. However, such headquarters tend to be relatively large and unwieldy, primarily because many of the functions have to be duplicated (particularly in the G1/G4 areas) and also to allow an equitable division of responsibility between the different nations. Over a long period benefits may accrue from nations being treated as equal partners and receiving, planning and implementing missions together.

0605. ***Framework Nation.*** Alternatively one nation may be tasked to provide the framework of the headquarters. As such it will provide the force commander, the core of the combined headquarters staff and also the command and control systems to support the headquarters. The advantage of this approach is that the headquarters functions efficiently at an early stage and the staff of other nations can be readily integrated.

NATIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

0606. ***Relationship with National Headquarters.*** The combined force commander is unlikely to be given OPCOM of forces of other nations, although he might expect to be given OPCON once the national contingent is complete in theatre. He will need to know where OPCOM rests and the explicit limitations on the employment of forces under OPCON.

0607. ***Relationship with Combined Headquarters.*** The combined force commander will usually discuss specific issues with national commanders on a bilateral basis as part of the planning process. In this way, they can avoid competition, detect problems early and, in particular, be made aware of any national concerns or sensitivities. This allows the combined headquarters to produce plans which will be acceptable well in advance and to coordinate activities to achieve unity of effort.

0608. ***Combat Service Support.*** Combat Service Support will usually remain a national responsibility despite the obvious limitations this can place on the combined commander's overall freedom of action.

LANGUAGE

0609. The scope and magnitude of the potential language difficulties in combined operations is self-evident. The United Kingdom is used to operating with US, NATO and current and former Commonwealth nations where English is both the common and the operational language. This may not necessarily be true of a coalition. Time must be allowed for translation, for the resolution of differences in terminology. Interpreters and linguists are not always readily available, particularly for the less widely spoken languages. Language can therefore be a significant limitation in combined operations both for the staffs and units and will dictate the overall level of integration that can realistically be achieved.

LIAISON

0610. The importance of effective liaison in combined operations is a key factor. Effective liaison fosters understanding of missions, concepts, doctrine and procedures, provides for the accurate and timely transfer of vital information and enhances mutual trust, respect and confidence:

'At VII (US) Corps a liaison team was established under a colonel providing traditional LO functions. Many of the (liaison) officers knew GOC 1st (UK) Armoured Division and were well placed to interpret his views to the Corps Commander and, effectively, accept commitments and take decisions on his behalf. This level of mutual trust was essential; the likely speed of operations meant that liaison officers had to be more than messengers.'¹

1. Army Code 71520. *Operation DESERT SABRE*. 1993. p12.

Liaison officers are key appointments particularly if they are to represent the views of their commanders. They need to be selected with particular care and will often require specialized training. Where possible these officers should be fully integrated into the staff of the headquarters to which they are sent, and will be particularly effective if employed in the intelligence, logistics or operations staffs.

0611. Combined forces employing other nation's units or equipments with which they are not familiar should exchange specialist liaison officers, for example, aviation staff, engineers or intelligence specialists. Such liaison officers should be familiar with the requisite staff and operational organizations, doctrine and procedures of the force to which they are attached. They should also speak the language of that force or be accompanied by an interpreter.

INTEGRATION OF COMBINED FORCES

0612. **Organization of Combined Forces.** The capabilities likely to be required by the coalition or alliance set the criteria against which nations will assign forces. The allocation of resources is ultimately a national issue but if the combined force is not provided with the capabilities needed to achieve its strategic objectives, it will lack credibility. Achieving this may be politically difficult and protracted. All national contributions irrespective of size must be given an appropriate and achievable mission in order to bind them into the alliance or coalition. The factors to be taken into account include the unit or formation's combat power, sustainability, and intelligence collection assets as well as its preparedness and ability to operate in special environments, including nuclear or chemical.

0613. **Role Specialization.** To overcome political difficulties or differences in doctrine, training and equipment, a single coalition partner may elect to undertake a selected role or roles, for example, air defence or second line medical facilities. Certain nations may prefer to structure their contributions along such lines as a means of retaining closer control over their forces and of limiting their participation while still satisfying both their national and international obligations.

0614. **Standardization.** The lack of standardization will create difficulties. The key to resolving them will lie in the early identification of the level of command at which a particular level of standardization is critical and providing the resources or procedures to enable adequate interfaces to be established. For example, interoperable communications are only needed at the level of command at which information or orders need to pass between two or more nations. Common procedures will only be needed where one nation needs and

is able to draw on the resources of another. Differences in tactical doctrine will frequently be irrelevant providing they are recognized in the missions allocated to national components. However, a common approach to warfighting will greatly assist dialogue between different nations as well as enhancing cohesion.

PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF COMBINED OPERATIONS

0615. Campaign planning and the conduct of major operations, battles and engagements are described in Chapters Four and Five. The paragraphs below highlight the aspects peculiar to combined operations.

0616. ***Mounting and Deployment.*** Mounting and deploying is a national responsibility but assistance may be required of other nations. The combined headquarters will need to coordinate point of entry facilities and initial deployment areas to ensure as far as is possible the sequenced arrival of the force and its security in theatre.

0617. ***Intelligence.*** Intelligence systems tend to be national and as such are operated in support of national policies and requirements, though there is some sharing of intelligence on a multilateral basis. In combined operations, commanders will need to establish systems and procedures from the outset to harness the capabilities and product of national collection means in order to provide the necessary level of intelligence support to commanders at all levels. This is best achieved through the formation of a combined intelligence staff at theatre level. The staff will require the support of an integrated intelligence network including interfaces with the major national systems, dedicated communications support and liaison teams to link all the key headquarters in the coalition. National systems will vary widely in terms of scope, sophistication, focus and capability but will have something to contribute - often HUMINT - which must be used and exploited for the benefit of the coalition as a whole. Similarly all partners should be able to task coalition intelligence assets. Special arrangements may have to be made at the highest levels to provide the necessary access to certain sensitive collection means. Combined intelligence staffs must be aware of system capabilities and assign them throughout the force so as to realize the command's full potential for intelligence collection.

0618. ***Combat Service Support.*** Combat service support and the negotiation of host nation support arrangements are a national responsibility. However, by closely coordinating the efforts of the personnel and logistics staffs of participating nations, it may be possible to achieve economies by, for example, agreeing to share common items such as medical facilities and supplies, POL and some ammunition. Although movement is a G3 function, the distribution of supplies, the handling of PW, and the evacuation of casualties,

will require coordination, especially where the in-theatre infrastructure is unsophisticated. The combined headquarters should seek to ensure that the demands placed on the local infrastructure are kept in perspective and that there is an equitable split of resources such as medical, water, food and construction materials between national contingents.

0619. **Handling of the Media.** A common P Info policy will be highly desirable and the combined force commander will need to establish early who is responsible for producing it. The purpose of such a policy is to balance the need to maintain the cohesion of the coalition, while at the same time safeguarding the security of the operations in hand. With this in mind, the commander's minimum requirement might be the right and ability to impose a media blackout during critical stages of the campaign.

0620. **Termination of Conflict.** Conditions for conflict termination should be agreed by the alliance or coalition prior to committal of military force. They should be a principal factor in the formulation of the force structure and the overall campaign plan. Reality is such that, as political and military events unfold, nations will review those conditions but based on their own perceptions and expectations. The combined force commander will need to be aware of national sensitivities and the conditions which might result in a component of his force being prematurely withdrawn.

0621. **Redeployment.** The redeployment of the national forces out of theatre will be a national responsibility but theatre level coordination will be necessary. The time to complete this should not be underestimated. The commander will need to balance the wish of national governments to get their forces home quickly after hostilities cease with the need to preserve stability in the former conflict area. During protracted campaigns and operations, the rotation of troops should be discussed and ideally a common policy agreed at the outset.

WAR AS A COALITION PARTNER

0622. **Consensus.** The strongest nations in the coalition will often dictate its real strength not only in terms of the bond between the nations but also through their physical contributions. Smaller partners may feel overshadowed which could give rise to perceptions of unequal risk and burden sharing particularly when setbacks occur. The cumulative effect can be debilitating and can, *in extremis*, lead to the breakdown of the coalition or alliance. Consensus is therefore crucial to the maintenance of cohesion and unity of effort. It requires a clear recognition and understanding of other nations capabilities and perceptions as well as concessions to accommodate them as appropriate.

0623. **Equity.** There should be equity of hardship, risk and reward within the alliance or coalition according to the various forces' capabilities and characteristics. This will be hard to achieve particularly where the combined force is based on a disparate and diverse grouping of nations. All will tend to judge equity subjectively and often with the benefit of hindsight. Hardship and risk are essentially synonymous and often assessed in terms of casualties and equipment losses. Reward is perhaps the hardest to achieve equitably. It may require some orchestration on the part of the combined force planners to ensure that all nations are seen to be successful both internationally and domestically. It will be critical in terms of national pride. However, despite the obvious importance of equity to the maintenance of cohesion and unity within a combined force, it must not be allowed to prejudice the operation as a whole.

0624. **Goodwill.** There must be goodwill at all levels within an alliance or coalition and in particular there must be a readiness to cooperate and support other nations. Compromise will inevitably be required if consensus is to be achieved. It has been said that it is prudent to remember that 'when an ally is proving difficult to deal with, it is well to remind oneself that one is also an ally'.

0625. **Cultural Differences.** Nations with similar cultures based on the same language, like moral and ethical values and compatible social and economic outlooks tend to have comparable aspirations and objectives. Coalition forces comprising solely such nations will tend to face fewer problems in the planning and conduct of combined operations. However, coalitions are not formed on this basis alone. Political strength, cohesion and influence are key characteristics and not just military expedients. Nations may only be able to make small and hence relatively inconsequential military contributions but their willingness to be identified politically with the coalition may be significant by comparison. Campaign planners must recognize the cultural differences of the constituent nations in a coalition if they are to achieve a consensus and therefore maximize cohesion rather than undermine it. National pride will be significant in this respect. Other differences may involve work ethics, religion and dietary restrictions. These may be seen as relatively unimportant by some but, unless handled sensitively, they could cause friction, misunderstanding and cracks in cohesion. Planners will need to be aware of and be sensitive to these differences.

0626. **Training.** As participants in a coalition may not have worked together before, it may be necessary to establish training teams. For example, between 1950-1953 Korean soldiers were given 16 weeks basic training in American methods at the ROKA Replacement Centre before being allocated to their assigned divisions. Similarly in the 1990-91 Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf realised that the Saudi Army, although it had plenty of modern equipment, was

not well versed in the art of offensive operations. As a result US training teams were despatched to the Gulf to assist the Saudis in the practice of ground to air control procedures.

0627. **Rehearsals.** Commanders should carefully consider combined rehearsals. The value of such activities was forcefully driven home to 1st UK Armoured Division in the Gulf in January 1991 when, 3 weeks prior to the start of ground operations, the Division conducted a night forward passage of lines rehearsal with the Americans. This complemented liaison visits, map studies, procedural exercises and sand model exercises which took place down to sub-unit level.

0628. **Personalities.** Sustaining consensus in a coalition is very much the responsibility of commanders and staffs. It requires vision, honesty and respect as well as effort and a clear willingness to cooperate on the part of those involved. Commanders' personalities and interrelationships will therefore influence the balance within the coalition and, as a result, its cohesiveness and strength. However, commanders of coalition forces are not necessarily prepared for such challenges, primarily because they do not normally encounter them in single nation operations. The political dimension is key, particularly the realisation that the senior national commander of each contingent within a coalition, irrespective of his rank and the size of his nation's military contribution, will effectively be commanding at the operational level, from a national perspective. This can place considerable pressure on the individual commanders themselves and strain on command relationships, especially when they are also involved at the tactical level in coalition terms. If all participating nations understand the purpose of the coalition and have trust and confidence in its command and leadership, consensus and cohesion can be sustained.

PART THREE - OPERATIONS

CHAPTER SEVEN

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

The purpose of Chapter 7 is to relate the approach to operations in Chapter 2 and the approach to campaigning in Chapters 3 and 4 to Operations Other Than War, (less Peacekeeping and Wider Peacekeeping which are considered separately at Annex A)

0701. Operations Other Than War are those military operations which are conducted in situations of **conflict** other than war. Chapter 1 explained that the United Kingdom might need to take such military action when either its interests or values were threatened. In these circumstances peace will have become vulnerable and violence will be either threatened or manifest. Such operations, in which military activities are likely to be firmly subordinated to the political throughout, will be designed to **prevent** conflict, restore peace by **resolving** or **terminating** conflict before escalation to war, or assist with the **rebuilding** of peace after conflict or war.

0702. Operations Other Than War cover peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement (together termed Peace Support Operations), counter insurgency and limited intervention. However, these operations, which are likely to be joint and conducted either unilaterally or multinationally, fall into two subcategories: those in which the United Kingdom is a combatant, either through choice or necessity; and those in which the United Kingdom is a third party to the conflict.

0703. Those operations in the first category include: peace enforcement, counter insurgency and limited intervention and are covered in the main body

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of this chapter. These Operations Other Than War are conducted in much the same way as operations in war and are therefore approached according to the doctrinal principles set out in Chapters 2-6 of this manual, tempered by the additional considerations covered in this chapter.

0704. Peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping operations which form the second category are, however, undertaken in the role of a third party. Peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping operations are therefore essentially supervisory in nature. The neutral or impartial status of peacekeepers does not allow the conduct of operations to be predicated on the identification of an enemy. The doctrinal imperatives of peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping, particularly those relating to the use of force, require that these operations are treated separately at Annex A to this chapter.

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

BACKGROUND

0705. ***The UN Charter.*** The first article of the UN Charter states that the UN's main object is 'To maintain international peace and security'. Chapter VI of the Charter provides for the peaceful settlement of disputes by a variety of peaceful measures including negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement. Chapter VII, on the other hand, permits the use of political and economic pressure as well as armed force to coerce sovereign states. Peace Support Operations is the term given to military operations conducted on behalf of the United Nations. It embraces all operations mandated under Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter. Peace Support Operations will be considered under three main categories: Peacekeeping, Wider Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement.

0706. ***Peacekeeping.*** Peacekeeping, which requires the cooperation of the parties to the conflict in question, is not specifically provided for in the UN Charter but has evolved as a pragmatic response to the variety of international conflicts which have been placed on the UN agenda since the Second World War. In effect, peacekeeping seeks to settle disputes through the medium of peaceful third party initiatives. Notwithstanding its limitations, peacekeeping (usually mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter) has often proved a valuable technique for the control and resolution of conflicts.

0707. ***Peace Enforcement.*** Peace enforcement operations, mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and involving coercion by armed force, also took place during the Cold War. Principal examples of these operations are Korea (1950-53) and the Congo (1960-64). Peace enforcement operations are

not typical of UN military operations, however, and have occurred much less frequently than peacekeeping with varying degrees of success. In the main, the UN views such operations as high-risk and generally regards the peace enforcement option as an undesirable last resort.

0708. ***A Changed Environment and New Opportunities.*** The removal of regional superpower interests and ideological pressures has resulted in new conflicts emerging, often characterized by the fragmentation of former sovereign states and frequently based on intractable national, religious or ethnic disputes. The post Cold War era, however, has seen a greater unity within the Security Council and has thus far been marked by a broader UN consent to international security measures as well as an increased participation in peacekeeping operations by the Permanent Five.

0709. ***UN Response.*** The UN's resolve to seize the new opportunities to support international peace and security post Cold War has been characterized by an exponential increase in the number of troops committed to peacekeeping operations. This commitment has been manifest in both peace enforcement operations and peacekeeping. Operations in the latter category have placed a greater emphasis on addressing the wider aspects of peacekeeping such as the provision of humanitarian aid and the supervision of elections. These activities have been grouped together in the category termed **Wider Peacekeeping**.

0710. ***British Involvement.*** Although the British Army is most likely to become involved in Peace Support Operations under the direct auspices of the UN, the conduct of such operations could also be delegated to a regional security organization, an ad hoc coalition or a UN member state. The possibility of a unilateral peace support operation, however, still remains.

PEACEKEEPING

0711. Peacekeeping may be defined as: **operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict.**

0712. For further consideration of peacekeeping see Annex A to this Chapter and AFM Vol V Part 1 *Peacekeeping Operations*.

WIDER PEACEKEEPING

0713. Wider Peacekeeping may be described as: **the wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile.** Wider peacekeeping therefore describes those broader aspects of UN peacekeeping operations which have attracted a greater emphasis post Cold War.

0714. For further consideration of wider peacekeeping see Annex A to this chapter and AFM *Wider Peacekeeping*.¹

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

0715. Peace Enforcement operations may be defined as: **operations carried out to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities.** The absence of consent and the absence therefore of the need for impartiality thus differentiates peace enforcement from peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping. Although peace enforcement is the third category of Peace Support Operations, its fundamentally different nature to peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping demands that doctrinally it be addressed with the remaining categories of *Operations Other Than War*. A peace enforcement contingent will be mandated to use military force to achieve the desired end state. Peace enforcement is therefore a conflict termination activity using either direct or indirect intervention.

0716. **Approach.** Given the absence of consent, peace enforcement techniques used need not necessarily be those that promote and sustain consent - although the consideration of such techniques should by no means be abandoned. There will thus be fewer limitations on the modus operandi of the peace enforcement contingent. Missions are likely to be relatively clear cut. However, the operational level commander should not regard the enforcement of peace as an end in itself. Enforcement is no more than a vehicle for transition to post conflict activities, including peacebuilding. This longer term perspective is likely to have a profound influence on the way in which a peace enforcement campaign is planned and executed. Such perspective should act as a mission analysis tool in determining the enforcement methods that are to be used. The operational level commander should retain this perspective at all times and, whenever possible, plan and conduct his campaign in a way that will support the longer term post conflict objectives and activities.

1. Published in 1994.

0717. **Categories of Operation.** Operations mandated to enforce peace are likely to fall into two main categories:

a. **Sanctions Enforcement.** The imposition and enforcement of sanctions under Article 41 of the UN Charter will require the sophisticated coordination of military operations in the air and at sea. They may also include land operations. A military contingent enforcing sanctions will have distinct characteristics and the role of the operational level in providing the gearing between the strategic direction and tactical tasks will be fundamental. The force will comprise joint assets and will rely, for its deterrent capability, on the presence, and thus the implied use, of heavy weapons. Confrontation is likely to take place between aircraft and warships and possibly between ground forces. However, a well coordinated and carefully directed sanctions force should not become involved in combat with the sanctioned party. A sanctions force may have to continue its operations over an extended period.

b. **Direct Intervention.** Whereas a sanctions force seeks to avoid military contact with the sanctioned party, under Chapter VII of the Charter the UN may mandate an existing regional security organisation, such as NATO, or an ad hoc coalition to intervene directly on behalf of a threatened or violated state. The operation mounted in 1990-1991 to eject Iraq from Kuwait is a clear example of this type of direct intervention. Alternatively, a force may be mandated to interpose itself forcibly between belligerent parties, engaging any or all of these parties until peace negotiations can be resumed. Although conducted in the name of the UN, such interventions would be planned and executed in the same way as any campaign and sequence of major operations conducted by a joint and combined force. The approach would therefore be as covered in Chapters 2 to 6 of this publication.²

0718. **Characteristics.** The peace enforcement environment, including the indigenous population, is likely to be hostile. The intervening contingent may face multiple 'enemies' and the level of ambient violence is likely to be high. There are likely to be fewer constraints on the use of force than in a peacekeeping operation (see Annex A). The operation will probably be less hybrid - that is to say, fewer non-governmental agencies are likely to be involved. Command and control may therefore be simpler. However, to offset that, the operational level commander will be subject to the demands of UN mandates and associated

2. See also AFM *Formation Tactics* (published in 1994).

international controls. The composition of the force may also be multinational - and incorporate unreliable and poorly trained elements. The force itself is likely to be exponentially larger than an equivalent peacekeeping force and exposed to significantly greater risks. The contingent's need to protect itself may well prove paramount.

COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

0719. ***Insurgency.*** The generic terms 'insurgency' and 'counter-insurgency' are used to describe a wide spectrum of activities which may occur in the area of conflict which lies between peace and war. Insurgency may be defined as: **the actions of a minority group within the state intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of the people to accept such change.** It is an organised, armed political struggle, the goals of which may be diverse. Some insurgencies aim for a straightforward seizure of power through complete revolutionary takeover, while others attempt to break away from state control and establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or religious bounds. In some instances an insurgency may strive to extract limited political concessions which are unattainable through less violent means. Insurgencies tend to arise when state authorities are unable or unwilling to redress the demands of significant social groups. Insurgencies may therefore be coalitions of disparate forces united by a common enmity towards a government and a willingness to use violence to challenge its legitimacy. Insurgents may be acting as proxies on behalf of others, or as an instrument of state policy. Whatever the source of their motivation, however, insurgents generally follow a radical political doctrine, and use armed force as one of the instruments to put it into effect. Experience to date shows that, to be successful, an insurgency must develop unifying leadership, doctrine and organisation, and a vision of the future acceptable to the general populace: a desired end-state. This form of conflict has proliferated since 1945. Until recently it would be true to say that only an insurgency which was capable of attracting widespread popular support posed a real threat to a state authority, but arms proliferation, and in particular the availability of weapons of mass destruction, may necessitate a reassessment of the threat posed by insurgents in the future.

0720. ***Insurgency Characteristics.*** Each insurgency will be unique, although there may be similarities between them. Insurgencies are more likely to occur in states where there are inherent social divisions, based on racial, cultural, religious or ideological differences, leading to a lack of national cohesion. Insurgencies may thrive in states that are economically weak and lack efficient, stable or popular governments. Additional factors such as corruption and

external agitation may help to create a climate in which politically inspired violence erupts. Various models or patterns of insurgency have been proposed, but whichever patterns are examined, the key point to note is that the insurgents' aim is to force political change; any military action is secondary and subordinate - a means to an end. It is also worth stressing that few insurgencies fit neatly into rigid classifications. In the past, attempts have been made to categorise insurgencies according to particular characteristics; for example by their environment (rural or urban), or by ideological origin (Leninist or Maoist). As the Sandinistas showed in Nicaragua in the late 1970s, and as Sendero Luminoso demonstrated in Peru in the early 1990s, effective insurgents 'pick and mix', taking those parts of previous campaigns which seem to have worked and adapting them to their own particular needs. While principles and techniques derived from previous experience will provide valuable guidance, the key to an appropriate response will be a rigorous and objective estimate, based on a broad perspective. Examining the complete range of characteristics will enable the commander and his staff to build a more accurate picture of the insurgent and hence develop an appropriate military campaign plan. Such an examination will identify the root cause or causes of the insurgency; the extent to which it enjoys support, both internally and externally; the basis on which the insurgent will appeal to his target population; his motivation and depth of commitment; the likely weapons and tactics he will use and the operational environment in which he will seek to initiate, and then develop, his campaign. This approach will not only help the commander to identify the insurgents' centre of gravity and design an effective campaign plan, but should ensure that he interprets the specific cultural signals and acts accordingly.

0721. ***Counter-Insurgency Strategy.*** Counter-insurgency may be defined as: **the actions of an existing state authority to combat insurgency and prevent its recurrence.** A successful counter-insurgency strategy encompasses the full range of measures taken by a state to safeguard political life and economic growth, and to protect itself from subversion and lawlessness. The fundamental goal for the state must be to identify and eventually eliminate the conditions that give rise to violence. The key is to ensure the integration of civilian activities, military operations and indigenous security forces, recognising that the true nature of the threat to the state lies in the strength of the insurgents' popular support and not in their military power. Any strategy that does not take heed of the political claims and demands of the insurgents is severely handicapped or worse. There is unlikely to be a purely military solution to insurgency.

0722. ***Counter-Insurgency Operations.*** Counter-Insurgency Operations are military operations carried out to complement those political, economic, psychological and civic actions necessary to defeat an armed insurgency

and thereby sustain an existing state authority. These operations may be conducted unilaterally to protect a United Kingdom Dependent Territory, or multinationally at the invitation of a threatened state. They must be addressed by political, psychological and socio-economic means, as well as military, within the overall campaign framework. The legitimacy of the state authority and its control of the infrastructure will dictate the direction of the campaign, not purely military requirements. The response to insurgency involves the use and adaptation, where necessary, of classic counter-revolutionary warfare and counter-terrorist techniques, developed in the course of numerous British campaigns this century. Guidelines for planning a counter-insurgency operation and for the design for operations are shown below:

a. ***Planning Guidelines.*** The principles of legitimacy and minimum necessary force will apply. British experience suggests that successful COIN operations must satisfy certain key tenets: a recognition that, as the problem is essentially political, so must be the solution; the creation of a co-ordinated and politically dominated command and control system in the form of joint committees; the provision of information and its collation into usable intelligence; a policy of splitting the active insurgents from their potential and actual supporters by civil affairs programmes ('hearts and minds'), psychological operations, and, if necessary, by physical barriers; the neutralisation of isolated activists using appropriate military operations, and the development of long-term political and socio-economic reforms to prevent a resurgence of trouble. The campaign must be responsive to any change in the perceptions and attitudes of the insurgents, and opportunities should be exploited for enabling insurgents to surrender and, through reform, be used in government service.

b. ***Design for Operations.*** The overriding factor will be the need to gain maximum intelligence about the insurgents (finding them), without which no focused operations can be mounted. The design of military operations will then aim to separate the insurgents physically from both their internal and external support; appropriate tactics will frustrate their plans and restrict their freedom of movement by means of deep operations (fixing them), while selectively destroying them in close operations through physical and psychological attack, and legal action (striking them). At the outset of an insurgency, the population will tend to hesitate before deciding whether to support the government or the insurgents. Hence, although the commander will be keen to secure his base areas (rear operations) as a priority, he will also need to initiate action throughout the framework of operations, at the earliest opportunity, to seize the initiative in the 'hearts and minds'

battle. If an insurgency can be identified at the outset, its inherent weaknesses may be exploited by timely, bold and imaginative state action.

0723. ***Future Scenarios.*** Other than operations in Northern Ireland, the British Army is most likely to be engaged in counter-insurgency for the protection of Dependent Territories or by invitation of another government. In the latter case the legitimacy of such operations is likely to stem from a bi-lateral defence agreement. Involvement may range from the provision of non-combatant support (training teams, logistic resources, equipment etc), through limited participation (Special Forces, specialist operators etc), to greater involvement. Some COIN techniques may also be applicable to other forms of operation - protecting peacekeeping personnel for example. The decision to become involved and on what basis is a political one, and operations are most likely to be both joint and combined with the host nation's security forces.

LIMITED INTERVENTION OPERATIONS

0724. ***Limited Intervention.*** **Limited Intervention Operations are those operations which have limited objectives such as the rescue of hostages, security of non-combatants or re-establishment of law and order.** Invariably they would be planned to be of short duration and specific in objective and scope. They may be mandated by the Security Council of the United Nations or legitimized under international law and mounted unilaterally or multinationally.

0725. ***Non Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO).*** British forces may be required either to conduct or participate in operations to evacuate UK or other specified nationals from a conflict area. Certain preconditions should ideally be present, including the agreement of the local government to the evacuation, the provision of logistic facilities, the availability of suitable airfields in the host country or a neighbouring country and the availability of reliable intelligence. In any event the deploying force must be prepared to provide, not only for its own security, but also for the physical security of the evacuees from their point of assembly in country to their final departure from the area of conflict. Such operations will invariably be joint and be planned, commanded and executed in the same way as any other intervention operation.

DEFINING SUCCESS

0726. Success in Operations Other Than War will be measured in terms of the degree to which they contribute to the achievement of the strategic end state. The military participation in the resolution or termination process should be regarded as but one component of the overall campaign. Military operations undertaken will normally represent the means of transition to post conflict

activities, which will invariably include the rebuilding of peace. The operational level commander's mission will reflect this perspective and influence his selection of operational objectives.

0727. An understanding of the wider definition of success, described more fully in Chapter 2,³ must permeate every level of command, each of which must act to support it and recognise that the unnecessary or inappropriate use of force may jeopardize the desired operational end-state and prejudice longer term post conflict activities. However, military forces should not be committed to operations at a disadvantage; nor are military defeats acceptable: in the contest of wills, the psychological advantage must be retained. This psychological, or moral, dimension is as important in Operations Other Than War as it is during operations, battles and engagements in war. The operational level commander must therefore recognise that he will be significantly, and properly, constrained in his freedom of action by social, economic and political imperatives and may be subject to shifting and inadequate strategic direction.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

SCOPE

0728. **Scope.** The consideration of campaign planning which follows applies to those operations in which the United Kingdom is an active participant in a conflict - that is to say peace enforcement, counter insurgency and limited intervention. They do not apply to those operations where the United Kingdom acts in a supervisory third party capacity (as in peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping). Operational level guidance for peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping is at Annex A to this Chapter.

OPERATIONAL DIRECTION

0729. **Strategic Guidance.** The tenets set out in Chapter 4 are the basis of campaign planning. However, in *Operations Other Than War* political imperatives are likely to be less well defined, more volatile and of greater direct influence on all four levels of conflict. In planning campaigns, therefore, military objectives and activities will have to be defined, refined and subsequently reviewed against shifting political direction. Whilst, initially at least, this may not translate into precise military strategic guidance, at the very least the campaign must be designed to achieve a clearly articulated end-state, in order to give the operational level its planning start point. To build in the required robustness to

3. See Chapter 2 Paragraphs 0201-0205.

changes in the strategic aim, the development of several contingency options along multiple lines of operation will help to provide the necessary flexibility.

0730. **Commander's Statement of Intent.** Through a rigorous application of the estimate process, the operational level commander will analyse his mission and the strategic guidance given in order to frame his statement of intent for the campaign. He will issue this to his force, first in his Initiating Directive and then later when fuller information is available, in his Campaign Directive. Having stated his mission, the commander will set out his operational objectives, indicating the purpose of the campaign and how he sees operations developing towards the achievement of the required end-state. In a peace enforcement operation requiring direct intervention, the aim is likely to be to terminate the conflict by force. Thus the overall concept will be expressed in terms of the core functions to find, fix and strike the key belligerent at his centre of gravity through a series of sequenced operations conducted at the decisive points and organised on the basis of deep, close and rear operations. However, the military contribution to the overall effort in counter insurgency may only be one of many aspects to the campaign and possibly be secondary to political, economic or legal measures.

0731. **The Use of Force.** In all operations, the use of military force at the tactical level will be closely controlled by Rules of Engagement. These will be laid down through dialogue between the military strategic authority and the operational level commander and designed to ensure that when and where military force is used, it is demonstrably appropriate, proportionate and reasonable, confined only to the specific and legitimate target intended. This concept of minimum necessary force is well established in the British Army and whenever force is not seen to be proportionate, the success of an operation is undermined. The issue is a sensitive one in multinational operations in which coalition forces will be required to observe the same policy on the use of force regardless of national doctrine and ethos. The concept of minimum necessary force is not universally accepted and the issue will test both the operational and military strategic levels.

APPROACH TO OPERATIONS

0732. In circumstances where the use of force is both necessary and appropriate, the operational level commander will then select the most effective approach to operations. In peace enforcement and counter insurgency operations, the key decision will be how best to terminate or resolve the conflict by applying a combination of the approaches to **attacking the enemy's will**: destruction, preemption, dislocation or disruption⁴. The balance between them will be different from that in war:

destruction, preemption, dislocation or disruption⁴. The balance between them will be different from that in war:

a. ***Preemption.*** To preempt is to seize an opportunity, often fleeting, to deny another party an advantageous course of action; the aim is to anticipate the actions of an enemy or belligerent party, thereby denying him the initiative. Preemption at the strategic and operational levels is of critical importance in these operations. This is most apparent in operations which are subject to the powerful influence of the media. Preemption is especially demanding of international consensus and leadership. The potential complexity of coalition command and control arrangements may inhibit preemption at the operational level. Preemption is a classic counter insurgency tactic; for example, real and potential points of grievance must be removed before they can be exploited by insurgents. Security forces must exploit favourable events with active public relations and counter the potentially adverse before the insurgent exploits them himself. The success of preemption at the tactical level is heavily dependent on a good knowledge of the other party's intentions.

b. ***Dislocation.*** To dislocate is to deny another party the ability to bring his strengths to bear or to persuade him that his strength is irrelevant. Revolutionary theory is based on dislocation: it aims to make the very strength of the state its main weakness. Conversely the weakness of the insurgent becomes his main strength in the decisive battle for hearts and minds and public opinion. To nullify this strength, security force operations must be governed by the principle of minimum necessary force.

c. ***Disruption.*** To disrupt is to attack another party selectively, to break apart and throw into confusion the assets which are critical to the employment and coherence of his fighting power. His vulnerabilities must be assessed and attacked both politically and militarily. In counter insurgency, the insurgent's major weakness is his lack of legitimacy and authority, which is exploited in part through psychological operations, designed to isolate him from popular support. Disruption through the measured and precise application of combat power will be essential to an intervention force which is likely to be disadvantaged numerically and perhaps positionally, at least in the initial stages. The belligerent's command and control systems in such operations may well be highly vulnerable to disruption.

4. See Chapter 2 Paragraphs 0206-0216.

0733. Selective **destruction** may be appropriate, particularly in the case of counter insurgency operations, where attrition of insurgent forces is valuable. But in general, political objectives are unlikely to be served by high casualties or collateral damage on either side and therefore attacking the will and cohesion of the opposition through **preemption, dislocation and disruption** will be more appropriate and practicable approaches to success. Although a direct intervention to enforce peace may demand operations to terminate a conflict by force, such force remains but a means to an end and that end is the achievement of the desired post conflict end-state. After the peace enforcement or counter insurgency operations are over, further military involvement may be needed to assist the rebuilding of peace.

DESIGN OF OPERATIONS

0734. **Identification of Critical Factors.** The design of Peace Enforcement and Counter Insurgency Operations puts particular emphasis on certain critical factors:

a. **The Belligerents or Insurgents.** In addition to the consideration of belligerents' or insurgents' capabilities, strengths and weaknesses, orders of battle, doctrine, political and military objectives, there will be internal and external influences on the conflict which, whilst not directly affecting military operations, will have an indirect effect on the approach. These may include support of third parties, imposition of sanctions, and economic and humanitarian considerations.

b. **The Operational Environment.** The operational environment embraces the history of the conflict, psyche and culture of the belligerents. This will include any ethnic or religious factors, the geography of the region, the economic environment including the industrial base, national infrastructure, climate, communications and the public perception of the operation both in-theatre and worldwide.

c. **Allocation of Resources.** The allocation of manpower, equipment and the level of sustainability will define the character of the campaign to be conducted. The policy on roulement of units or individuals will have a direct bearing on the timescale of operations.

0735. **Force Planning.** The campaign plan will be developed in the recognition that constraints will apply to restrict overall force levels, the range of capabilities deployed into theatre and the sustainability of the deployed force. In addition, there may be a requirement to balance the contributions of national components to a combined force, taking into account all the imbalances

identified in Chapter 6. There will be a natural inclination to see Peace Enforcement and Counter Insurgency Operations requiring a lesser range of capabilities than operations in war but consideration must be given to the potential for the conflict and therefore the operation to change. Decisions on **deployment** of particular units and capabilities can therefore and should properly be taken separately from decisions on the **employment** of those units and capabilities.⁵ Force planning should also take account of host nation support, intended duration of operations and therefore the sustainment of the force, restrictions and constraints on national contingents, lead time for assembly and deployment, command and control structures and liaison.

THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

0736. A peace enforcement or counter insurgency operation will necessitate the projection of a force either on a unilateral or more likely on a coalition or alliance basis to bring about the termination of the conflict by defeating the forces of a target state, group or party, or to so change the military situation, that negotiations can be resumed to satisfactorily resolve the conflict. The nature of individual conflicts will dictate the style of operations, which could range from a direct intervention seeking a swift and decisive military conclusion to a more protracted or militarily limited intervention. However, the conduct of all such interventions will be founded on the core functions in combat - Find, Fix and Strike - which are explained in Chapter 2; and will be planned and conducted within the framework of deep, close and rear operations, explained in Chapter 5. Deep operations will primarily find and fix the enemy, while close operations will primarily strike the enemy. However, a wider interpretation will need to be placed on these concepts particularly in counter insurgency. As the use of military force is constrained in all Operations Other Than War, the **threat** posed, for example, in deep operations by manoeuvre, either physical or psychological, may increase in relative significance to the actual **use of force** in close operations. Rear operations will continue to protect and sustain the force, maintaining the freedom of future action.

0737. **Finding** describes the requirement to locate, identify, recognise and assess an enemy or belligerent party. As in any operation the commander cannot plan effectively until his key intelligence requirements have been met, nor can tactical level development of operational plans be properly carried out until an adequate knowledge of the opposition has been built up.

5. See Chapter 1 Paragraph 0121a.

0738. **Fixing** involves denying goals and restricting freedom of action, putting the other party in a reactive frame of mind. As much of the hitting element in striking may be constrained, fixing will increase in importance. Indeed, it may be the main effort in order to create the conditions for decisive political and diplomatic activity. The main direct means of fixing in direct intervention operations will be to **surprise**, to **deceive** and to **lure**, although in counter insurgency and more protracted operations the main means may be the **influence** of public opinion both within the conflict area and abroad. These ideas associated with fixing may usefully become the basis for framing operational direction and for defining end states, particularly where overall campaign objectives are difficult to define.

0739. **Striking** involves both manoeuvre and hitting. Although the direct application of combat power may be necessary and appropriate, the threat of military force implicit in manoeuvre may well have greater significance than the elimination of a discrete part of the opposition's combat power. Manoeuvre, either psychological or physical, confers initiative, the ability to change and therefore dominate the situation. Whereas striking may be heavily constrained, manoeuvre should rarely be if military forces are both to protect themselves and make a positive contribution to the campaign. There are many examples of operations becoming stale or locked in stalemate in the absence of manoeuvre, in its wider sense. In general, where it is not possible nor appropriate to strike physically at the other party, an appropriate response may then be to manoeuvre by changing the situation, posing new threats and challenges. One way to do this is to change organisational structures and deployments.

FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT

0740. The functions in combat, explained in Chapter 5, enable the force to turn the commander's statement of intent into action. However, the complexities associated with legitimacy will influence their interpretation and relative importance. The value of **manoeuvre** is a consistent theme to this doctrine. It involves not only physical action to change the situation using, where appropriate, movement in combination with fire or fire potential, but more fundamentally a particular attitude of mind. This attitude of mind seeks to undermine the belligerents' resolve through psychological pressure exerted against a background of patience, restraint, professionalism and impeccable discipline. On the other hand, the implicit and credible use of **firepower** coupled with manoeuvre is fundamental. Heightened sensitivity to casualties will in most of these operations place **protection** high in priority but not to the extent that it makes the wider aims unachievable. **Command** and **sustainment** are no more or less demanding than in warfighting but different. The structures for both should be designed from the outset to allow the transition of an operation from

one stance to another, according to the situation and mandate, without the need for fundamental reorganisation. However, command arrangements in particular may be complicated by combined and political issues and sensitivities, which may override a purely functional approach. Unity of command, achieved on a lead nation or framework basis, should be vigorously sought in multinational force situations.

JOINT OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

0741. ***Intelligence.*** Intelligence is a command function and its coordination, particularly between military and civilian agencies, will require firm and clear direction founded on unity of command. Its importance in Operations Other Than War is fundamental. The gathering of all relevant information about belligerents or insurgents in an area of conflict will increase the security of the force and better enable it to understand the overall situation.

0742. ***Control of the Electro-magnetic Spectrum.*** Electronic warfare is both selective and deniable. It is therefore of considerable value but only to the extent that the belligerents or insurgents depend on use of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Electronic warfare must not, however, be considered in isolation from other functions but synchronised and coordinated at the operational level.

0743. ***Psychological Operations.*** The purpose of psychological operations will be to influence the attitude of those directly and indirectly involved in the conflict. They must also be coordinated at the operational level, in view of their potential sensitivity. In counter insurgency, the objective will be to erode the will of the insurgents, promoting abandonment of the insurgent aims and defection from its ranks. In peace enforcement operations, the objective will be to mobilise opposition to prolonging the conflict and to emphasise the benefits of the restoration of peace and consequent prosperity.

0744. ***Media.*** The activities of the various dimensions of the news media will have a profound effect on the prosecution of all Operations Other Than War. Indeed they may have the decisive effect. Although the positive influence of media activity will be complementary to psychological operations activity, the activities of the two must be kept separate. Where orchestration of the two activities is suspected the risk of a sharply negative reaction from the media can be expected. Although there may be circumstances where it is practical and desirable to run an accreditation system for the media, it is more likely that its members will operate on a largely free-lance basis following the action as it develops. Account of this should be taken in the planning of operations in order to capitalise on the potential benefits of such exposure. There is a strong case to be made for a thoroughly open approach to be taken in briefing the media,

who will then be able to send reports based on facts not rumour and hearsay, even if in the short term some reports seem damaging. Nevertheless, the coordination of public information policy must be controlled by the military strategic authority through the operational level commander in order to prevent uncontrolled responses at the tactical level having adverse effects on the overall campaign.

0745. **Special Forces.** Special Forces may have particular utility in Operations Other Than War with their ability to act discretely and selectively. For example, they are particularly useful in finding the enemy, carrying out liaison tasks, engaging in highly selective strike and in advising and training indigenous forces. Their use may also have a strong psychological impact on opposing irregular forces. However their emotive image in the public perception has to be balanced in determining their employment. In combined operations, the multinational command and control of national SF will need careful handling.

0746. **Air and Sea Power.** Air power, projected from either land bases or from the sea, is essential to the success of most land operations. Independence from the ground environment and the reach of air power allow it to be used in circumstances where the risk to ground forces may be unacceptable. There is, however, a need to restrict the risk of collateral damage in surface strike missions, which may therefore require close ground control, embracing the identification and designation of targets. Air and sea lift will greatly aid ground manoeuvre. Air and sea power may predominate in fixing operations intended to interdict - for example, the imposition of sanctions.

PEACEKEEPING AND WIDER PEACEKEEPING

1. The United Kingdom is likely to be involved in peacekeeping operations on either a unilateral or multinational basis, probably acting on behalf of the United Nations. Such operations, carried out in situations of conflict other than war, will be characterised by national participation on a third party basis and as such require a clear understanding of the demands of such operations, in particular the use of force.

PEACEKEEPING

PEACEKEEPING AND WIDER PEACEKEEPING

The purpose of this Annex is to describe Peacekeeping and Wider Peacekeeping operations

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PEACEKEEPING

2. Peacekeeping may be defined as: **operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict.** The core activities of peacekeeping are observation and interposition - techniques that are well covered in existing British doctrine (see AFM Vol V Part 1 *Peacekeeping Operations*).

THE FUNDAMENTALS

3. **Consent.** Peacekeeping will seek to resolve conflict by conciliation rather than terminate it by force. As a conflict resolution activity, therefore, peacekeeping operations depend principally on the consent of the parties to the conflict. However, the inherent tensions and volatile environment of peacekeeping will place that consent under strain and make it difficult to sustain. In practice, therefore, consent may only be partial within the many activities and levels of a peacekeeping operation. A principal feature of the conduct of peacekeeping will therefore be the struggle to promote and sustain consent. Whilst doing everything he can to develop the overall consensual framework of a peacekeeping campaign, the operational level commander should seek to transmit whatever consent he may have at his level down to the tactical level and avoid sponsoring

activities (for example sanctions or the pursuit of individual faction leaders) that might prejudice that consent and destabilize the overall campaign.

4. ***Impartiality.*** Since peacekeeping seeks to resolve conflict with the consent of the belligerent parties, the peacekeeping contingent cannot itself be party to the conflict. Instead it will be conferred a supervisory third party status in overseeing the implementation of international agreements to resolve the conflict. This supervisory status is critical to the force's security, freedom of action and operational effectiveness and is crucially dependent on the contingent retaining its perceived impartiality. The operational level commander's approach to peacekeeping must therefore emphasize the need to preserve the force's impartial third party status. Prejudicing impartiality will undermine the consensual framework of the overall mission. A peacekeeping force that fails to act impartially and takes sides in a conflict will be rapidly identified as a party to the conflict, thus becoming part of the problem rather than the solution, and risking an uncontrolled transition to a high-risk, resource-intensive peace enforcement situation. The practice and exterior perception of impartiality is thus a crucial element of the peacekeeping force's legitimacy and a critical factor in both campaign design and tactical activity.

CONDUCT

5. ***Approach to Peacekeeping.*** The crucial importance of impartiality means that the commander's approach to peacekeeping operations should not be framed in terms of opposition or enemy forces but should instead regard belligerent factions as parties to the conflict requiring guidance and supervision in coming to terms with each other and meeting international agreements. The preservation of impartiality is therefore the key determinant of operational conduct in peacekeeping. Operations must be predicated on an understanding of the third party role that the peacekeeper is required to play. The operational techniques employed should reflect this perspective.

6. ***Negotiation, Mediation and Conciliation.*** Given the context of peacekeeping thus far described, the precepts for settling disputes and preventing violence will be founded on the concepts of negotiation, mediation and conciliation. This means that the peacekeeping force will need to adjust its attitude and approach to the motivations and cultural backgrounds of the individuals and groups who represent the parties to the dispute. The person-to-person and group-to-group relationships between the peacekeeping force and the belligerent parties will comprise the basis for the resolution of conflict and the physical abatement of violence. Building a framework of confidence and trust will therefore be a key element of operational activity. That framework will be sustained by the peacekeeping force applying patience and restraint to

its dealings. Negotiation and mediation will be sustained by civil affairs programmes ('hearts and minds'), PSYOPS ('community information') and public information.

7. **Minimum Force.** Impartiality does not equate to the non-use of force. Force, when appropriate, may be used impartially in self-defence and within the scope afforded by the international mandate, which in peacekeeping will allow the defence of the mandate, not its enforcement. For example, force might be used to protect a humanitarian convoy - but would not be mandated for gratuitous use against a particular faction. A peacekeeping contingent should therefore be structured, equipped and trained to use combat power where appropriate. Whilst not precluding the use of force, impartiality will have important implications for the manner in which force is used and the purpose behind it. However, the use of force should generally be regarded as a last resort. Therefore operational level commanders must ensure that the serious ramifications of force are fully understood at all levels and that all alternatives to the use of force are thoroughly explored in every situation. There are also key principles that should be used to govern the use of force in peacekeeping. In essence, the degree of military force used in peacekeeping must be great enough to achieve its purpose but sufficiently controlled not to exacerbate the situation. The guiding principles might be summarized as 'minimum necessary force', defined as: **the measured application of violence or coercion, sufficient only to achieve a specific end, demonstrably reasonable, proportionate and appropriate; and confined in effect to the specific and legitimate target intended.** An inappropriate, unfocused use of force could seriously destabilize the overall course of a peacekeeping campaign, jeopardizing the desired operational end-state, prejudicing longer term post conflict activities and perhaps even causing an uncontrolled transition to peace enforcement.

DEFINING SUCCESS

8. **Definition of Success.** The concept of victory or defeat is inappropriate to peacekeeping. Military operations in peacekeeping will be designed principally to create or support the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed. Military action will therefore complement diplomatic, economic and humanitarian endeavours which together will pursue political objectives. Peacekeeping operations, therefore, will normally involve the commitment of military, police and civilian personnel undertaking a wide range of diplomatic, security, civil affairs and humanitarian activities. Success will thus be measured by the rate at which the sum total of those activities progresses towards the achievement of the UN mandate.

9. **Defining Objectives.** The subordination of military operations in peacekeeping to political and diplomatic activity may often tend to impart short-notice changes and incoherence to military objectives. The operational level commander must therefore balance this tendency by continually seeking to translate mandated activities into coherent, lasting and achievable objectives that support progress to a defined political end state. Peacekeeping operations represent a means of transition to post-conflict activities, including peacebuilding. The operational level commander's mission will reflect this perspective and his selection of operational objectives will be against this pragmatic background.

10. **Legitimacy.** The legitimacy of all peacekeeping operations must be rooted in international law and will usually be mandated by a United Nations Security Council resolution. It is essential that military forces act, and are seen to act, within domestic, national, international and military law. Failure to do so will strip a force of its legitimacy, authority and ultimately its operational effectiveness. It is particularly important that the Law of Armed Conflict is fully understood by commanders at all levels and its implications spelt out clearly for all ranks involved in these operations.

WIDER PEACEKEEPING

11. Wider Peacekeeping may be described as: **the wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile.** Wider peacekeeping therefore describes those broader aspects of UN peacekeeping operations which have attracted a greater emphasis post Cold War. Wider peacekeeping, like peacekeeping, concerns conflict resolution rather than conflict termination, and the preservation of impartiality remains the key determinant of operational conduct. **The peacekeeping principles described in the previous section will therefore apply to wider peacekeeping.**

CHARACTERISTICS

12. **Security Environment.** The security environment in which wider peacekeeping tasks are carried out may display some or all of the following characteristics:

Numerous parties to a conflict.

Indisciplined factions (not responsive to their own controlling authorities).

An ineffective ceasefire.

The absence of law and order.

Risk of local armed opposition to UN forces.

The presence and involvement of large numbers of civilians.

An undefined area of operations.

Wider Peacekeeping Operations are thus more likely to take place in environments that bear the characteristics of civil war or insurgency.

13. ***Escalation and Transition.*** Given the security environment, wider peacekeeping tasks are likely to prove demanding and dangerous and will often require the deployment in strength of professional soldiers equipped to respond to rapid escalations in the level of violence including a possible transition to peace enforcement. Heavy weapons, armoured vehicles, combat aircraft and warships may characterize UN deployments on such tasks. Whilst taking every precaution to avoid escalation and a transition to peace enforcement, operational level commanders must be fully prepared to cope with such developments if they occur.

WIDER PEACEKEEPING TASKS

14. The different categories of wider peacekeeping tasks are described below:

a. ***Conflict Prevention.*** The Security Council may authorise the preventive deployment of a force to an area to prevent or contain a conflict. Such a force will need to be structured, equipped and commanded in the same way as any intervention force, even though it may deploy without the immediate prospect of combat. It will require the availability of reinforcements and fire support assets from an offshore or regional strike force. A preventive deployment may be supplemented by the use of early warning resources, surveillance and stabilizing measures - the latter including pre-planned mutually balanced reductions in personnel and armaments, zonal restrictions, advanced notification of activities, inspections and liaison.

b. ***Demobilization Operations.*** Operations may be mandated to supervise the compliance by belligerent parties to the terms of a cease-fire resolution or a peace agreement including the withdrawal, demobilization and rehabilitation of conflicting factions. Such operations will be conducted with the purpose of restoring and maintaining a

satisfactory level of peace and personal security and may only be undertaken with the broad consent of the parties concerned. The successful execution of demobilization operations will rely on a formal agreement at the strategic and operational levels to resolve the conflict and the degree of support for the resultant peace plan at the tactical, or local, level. Initial activity will therefore almost certainly be directed at increasing this degree of support through an effective civil affairs programme. Operations are likely to be essentially low level but, given the possible involvement of many different parties, complex. Military activities are likely to demand cooperation with a multi-functional response force which might include humanitarian relief agencies, civil advisers and monitors as well as civil and military agencies concerned with peacebuilding.

c. ***Humanitarian Relief.*** The provision of humanitarian relief has been a common feature of many peacekeeping operations. In wider peacekeeping the delivery of supplies may be contested locally and the normal activities of relief agencies may prove inadequate. A principal military task therefore is likely to be the protection and transportation of relief supplies. Speed of delivery will be crucial to success. In-country relief will be mounted through a secure mounting base and the relief operation itself should be planned with the cooperation of regional neighbouring states. Where feasible, the host nation should be invited to take a leading role in the planning process. Whenever possible, operational level commanders should seek to ensure that humanitarian relief operations are accompanied by the establishment of a reasonably sound security framework to ensure that the recipients may survive to benefit from the relief being offered. Coordination of the relief agencies, both Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and the UN, will be critical and should be coordinated under the aegis of a single lead relief agency whose task will be to plan the relief operation, giving adequate notice and coordinating priorities with the military units.

d. ***Military Assistance.*** If a ceasefire has brought hostilities to a level which allows the resumption of civil order, the tempo of military activity will alter and the force's military capability may be subordinated to an interim civil authority. The likely tasks of the military force will be to supervise or police the provisions of a peace agreement and to ensure that the lead up to an election or transfer of power is conducted in a free and fair manner. Effective maintenance of law and order is essential to the success of a legitimate transfer of power and the force may also be required to restructure and train indigenous police and military forces and to restore

civil infrastructure facilities. The contingent will have to be organized in such a manner that it can transition across the range of tasks.

e. ***Guarantee or Denial of Movement.*** Operations may be authorised by the Security Council to guarantee or deny movement by ships, aircraft and vehicles in or through particular conflict areas, for example by the establishment of 'no fly' zones. Such operations are more likely to involve naval and air forces than ground forces, although the close relationship to humanitarian operations could require ground forces to employ combat power to protect convoys if so mandated. Operational level commanders should avoid conducting this category of wider peacekeeping operation in any way that might prejudice impartiality.

15. ***AFM Wider Peacekeeping.*** The tactical level practices of wider peacekeeping are covered in *AFM Wider Peacekeeping*.¹

1. Published in 1994.