



ARMY DOCTRINE PUBLICATION  
VOLUME 4

TRAINING

DECEMBER 1996

Prepared under the Direction of  
the Chief of the General Staff

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## AMENDMENTS

Amendment Number	Amended By	Date Amended

## DISTRIBUTION

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## **THE PRINCIPLES OF TRAINING**

**TRAINING IS A FUNCTION OF COMMAND**

**TRAINING IS A CONTINUOUS AND PROGRESSIVE  
PROCESS**

**TRAINING MUST BE RELEVANT**

**TRAINING MUST BE CHALLENGING AND INTERESTING**

**TRAINING MUST BE REALISTIC**

**TRAINING MUST HAVE AN AIM AND OBJECTIVES**

**TRAINING AND TRAINING METHODS MUST BE  
CONTINUOUSLY REVIEWED FOR THEIR  
EFFECTIVENESS**

**TRAINING MUST REFLECT OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE**

**TRAINING MUST BE PERMISSIVE OF ERROR**

**COLLECTIVE TRAINING SHOULD, WHEREVER  
POSSIBLE, INCLUDE OTHER CATEGORIES OF TRAINING**

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## FOREWORD

The British Army is known and admired throughout the world for the quality and effectiveness of its training. It is not by accident that other armies are keen to emulate the means by which we have consistently produced well-trained, confident officers and soldiers who are successful on operations. Time and again our training has proved instrumental in bringing our forces to operational readiness quickly and successfully. We should not be complacent however, and we must ensure that these standards are upheld in the future. It is only through a thorough understanding of training that we can hope to maintain and improve its quality.

This volume, the fourth in the series of Army Doctrine Publications, is essential reading for all those who have responsibility for training, whether in command, on the staff, or in the training organisation. It sets down the British approach to training and highlights the importance of being given the opportunity to learn from our mistakes while at the same time trying to achieve high standards.

Training is, and will remain, fundamental to the three inter-related components of Fighting Power. Properly conducted, it serves as a powerful reminder of the realities of soldiering, and develops the true potential of individuals, units and formations. It is the means whereby we practice the application of our doctrine. As we develop new, more capable force structures with multi-skilled units designed to operate in modular formations, our training needs are likely to increase and become more complex.

Finally, I would remind you that the first and most important principle of training is that it is a function of command. It is imperative that those responsible for training ensure that it is well organized, properly focused and skillfully managed. To do any less is to court disaster.



11 December 1996

Chief of the General Staff

## **AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

"1. Training is the preparation of the officer and the man for the duties which each will carry out in war.

2. War must be studied in order to ascertain the factors which make for success therein. An examination of the requirements of modern war show that not only are numbers, scientific organisation, armament and equipment necessary, but also mental, moral, and physical qualities developed as highly as possible in each individual according to his rank.

3. It is the function of training to develop these qualities, and to teach, by theory and practice, the methods of utilising numbers and scientific weapons to the best advantage. Without proper training, numbers, even when organised, tend to produce confusion and consequent disaster, and scientific weapons in untrained hands cannot develop their full power and may become a danger to the force which employs them.

4. Skill with arms and the power to move in formed bodies without confusion constitute the elementary stages of training. In this stage, physical efficiency is created and the foundations of discipline are laid, but there is little scope for the development of those qualities of mind and character which are such important factors of success in modern war, and which must for the following reasons form the principle object of advanced training.

5. To defeat the enemy in battle is the ultimate aim of all training. Modern battles are won by the successful co-operation of all arms on the battlefield. The combined action is far less easy to achieve than formerly, owing to the difficulties of obtaining information on which to base tactical plans, and also of control and communication. As a result, all ranks are thrown more on their own resources, and more frequently have to act without definite orders. To ensure that when this occurs, their action shall be in furtherance with the commander's design, and that they shall not hesitate to accept responsibility when occasion demands it, requires the careful training of the intelligence and character of each individual composing the Army."

**Training and Manoeuvre Regulations 1909**

# INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Army Doctrine Publication **TRAINING** is to interpret and expand upon the training elements of *The British Military Doctrine (BMD<sup>1</sup>)* in order to guide commanders and staff in the planning and conduct of training. It sets out the British Army's approach to training.

This publication provides the link between **BMD** and the **ARMY FIELD MANUAL** series which describes how the doctrine should be put into practice. It does so by interpreting and expanding upon the place of training in the components of Fighting Power.<sup>2</sup>

**Chapter One** defines military training and explains its **aim and purpose**. **Annex A** describes the **concept of training**, the environment in which training should take place if it is to be successful, the process of training, and the Systems Approach to Training which has been adopted by the Army. The five **categories of training** are described in **Annex B**.

**Chapter Two** addresses the **doctrinal interface** between training and warfighting, explains the contribution which training makes to Fighting Power, and highlights the importance of the Army's ethos to that contribution. It explains the contribution which training makes to the force development process.

**Chapter Three** addresses the **direction of training**, and explains how training should be programmed and controlled. It shows the allocation of responsibilities for training the Army, and in **Annex A** points the way **towards better training** in the future through the use of technology.

**Chapter Four** deals with the **operational focus** of training. It examines training in the context of the defence environment and the links between training, readiness and operations.

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1. *Design for Military Operations - The British Military Doctrine* (Army Code 71451).

2. The ability to fight: the combination of 3 inter-related components: Conceptual (the thought process); Physical (the means to fight); and Moral (the ability to get people to fight).

This doctrine is authoritative yet is essentially descriptive. It provides a framework of understanding, yet requires judgement in its application. Doctrine is not dogma, for as JFC Fuller once stated, "an absolute doctrine, whether theological, philosophical or military, is impossible; for there is nothing absolute in this world; neither do we require an absolute doctrine ...". What it does seek to do is provide a philosophical underpinning, a rationale, and a set of guidelines.

# CHAPTER ONE

## THE AIM AND PURPOSE OF TRAINING

"It cannot be too often repeated that in modern war ... the chief factor in achieving triumph is what has been done in the way of preparation and training before the beginning of the war.

Theodore Roosevelt, 1902

### MILITARY TRAINING

0101. There is sometimes confusion in people's minds about what training means and encompasses, and what its relationship is to education. Training is distinct from education, although the two overlap. Most training contains an element of education and vice versa. Both contribute to development. The Oxford English Dictionary defines these key elements as:

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MILITARY TRAINING  
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING  
THE AIM OF MILITARY TRAINING  
MILITARY TRAINING IN CONTEXT

**Training:** " ... discipline and instruction directed to the development of powers or formation of character ... systematic instruction and exercise in some art, profession or occupation, with a view to proficiency in it ... military drill."

**Education:** " ... culture or development of powers, formation of character, as contrasted with the imparting of mere knowledge or skills."

**Development** " ... the bringing out of latent capabilities ... gradual advancement through progressive stages, growth from within ... "

OED 1989 Ed

There is a greater merging of these concepts in the military sphere than elsewhere, and the term "training" is used here to cover military training, education in support of training, and development.

0102. Military training focuses on developing and enhancing performance within its particular environment. The performance may be of an individual

or a group. The environment may be general or specific i.e. the Army, or a particular arm or service, or appointment. The effect of the training should be assessed against pre-determined standards, and the outcome of training can usually be measured in terms of competence.

## **THE IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING**

0103. In some walks of life training can be a minor activity to which relatively little time is allocated. The main preoccupation is often with the core business, manufacturing goods or providing professional services. In the Army on the other hand, the core business - fighting wars or keeping the peace - occupies usually only a small fraction of total time. The main preoccupation is preparation for the possibility of real operations.

0104. It is axiomatic that training should be the Army's most important activity when it is not committed to operations. Commanders should reflect the importance of training in the quality of the personnel and the resources which they allocate to it. When the time comes for operations, it may be too late to remedy deficiencies in training.

**“This was the great Allied lesson of Tunisia; equally important on the technical side was the value of training. Thorough technical, psychological, and physical training is one protection and one weapon that every nation can give its soldiers before committing them to battle, but since war always comes to a democracy as an unexpected emergency, this training must largely be accomplished in peace. Until world order is an accomplished fact and universal disarmament a logical result, it will always be a crime to excuse men from the types and kinds of training that will give them a decent chance of survival in battle. Many of the crosses standing in Tunisia today are witnesses to this truth.”**

**General Dwight D Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe.**

## **THE AIM OF MILITARY TRAINING**

The ultimate object of all training is to ensure military success. Training provides the means to practise, develop and validate, within constraints, the practical application of a common doctrine. Equally importantly, it provides the basis for schooling commanders and staffs in the exercise of command and control respectively. Training should be stimulating, rewarding, and inspire subordinates to achieve greater heights. A valuable by-product of good training is the fostering of teamwork and the generation of the force's confidence in

commanders, organizations, and in doctrine, a necessary pre-requisite of achieving high morale before troops are committed to operations.


0106. Military training develops individuals, groups and formations so that they can contribute to that success in the fullest possible way. The training should reflect the ethos and doctrine to which the Army subscribes, and which are addressed in Chapter 2. The product of military training should be highly skilled, confident and well-motivated individuals and units, and formations which are effectively commanded, cohesive, tactically and technically proficient, imbued with high morale, comradeship, and a will to win.

0107. The concept of training is discussed at Annex A, and the relationship between the various categories of training at Annex B.

## **MILITARY TRAINING IN CONTEXT**

0108. Training is fundamental to the three inter-related components of Fighting Power at Figure 1 (Page 1-4). It is an element of the conceptual component, in that training should be conducted in accordance with doctrine and develop an ability in officers and soldiers to cope with stress and uncertainty. It should provide a means, through the collation and dissemination of lessons learned, by which the Army can learn from experience. In addition, training and thus readiness contribute directly to the physical component of Fighting Power. Though training is not specifically represented as an element of the moral component, it has an important part to play in the development of confidence, motivation, and leadership throughout the Army. That aspect is dealt with in Chapter 2.

# MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS



**Figure 1: The Hierarchy of Military Effectiveness.**

## THE CONCEPT OF TRAINING

**"Hard on the training ground, easy on the battlefield."**

**Marshal Suvorov 1796**

### THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

1. Training should seek to increase the competence of an individual or group thereby building confidence. It is a positive activity which should be conducted in an encouraging atmosphere. As such it should be geared to building a trainee's confidence. It should never undermine it.

#### CONTENTS

THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

THE TRAINING PROCESS

THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO  
TRAINING

2. Within any training environment it is important to create an atmosphere which is conducive to learning and improvement, and which is permissive of acceptable error so that individuals or groups are not fearful of the consequences of mistakes in any particular activity. Error in a controlled training environment can be a powerful experience for learning. Importantly, learning points from error in training are usually more obvious and make greater impact than the experience of success. As a corollary to this, errors and mistakes in training should be corrected at an appropriate point in the training, and the training should be sufficiently flexible to allow for this. In correcting errors of judgment heavy-handedness should be avoided, as it tends to dampen future initiative.

**" ... a unit may do badly [on exercise]. That does not matter - it will all be experience which will save casualties when the operation has to be done in battle".**

**Lt Gen Montgomery, Lecture to Staff College 1941**

3. In a training environment all students should be treated equally. Individuals or groups should not be selected to perform the more important roles or tasks on the premise that they are less likely to fail. This is wrong in principle and usually stems from a concern not to jeopardise or adversely affect the training for others. This should not be a concern if the training is properly supervised. Moreover, individuals or groups do not generally perform well or show their real potential until they are faced with a challenging or demanding situation.

4. The aim should be to make training stimulating and challenging, but sensibly so, if confidence is not to be destroyed: the temptation to put those undergoing training in a ruthless and testing situation from the outset regardless of experience, the physical environment, and physical fitness must be resisted. Testing should be at an appropriate time when those undergoing the training have acquired or developed sufficient confidence and competence to meet the conditions of the test and to have a reasonable chance of success.
5. Training should not normally be used as a selection process, which is a separate and distinct activity requiring a different approach (although the outcome of training may of course be a factor to be considered in selection). Training staffs should be fully aware of this distinction and what their role as trainers involves.
6. The performance of those undergoing training should be assessed regularly and in each phase, using performance indicators against standards and outcomes determined by those responsible for the policy and planning of the training. The assessment should be related only to the particular training being carried out, and should not be extrapolated into an evaluation of overall individual or collective performance, which is a separate process taking into account numerous other factors. This assessment of performance will assist in the evaluation of a unit's readiness for operations by the chain of command. It is also one of the means by which future training requirements, and hence resource needs, can be determined.
7. An important element of assessment is feedback on performance to the individual or group being trained. The feedback should be constructive, as objective as possible, provided as soon as is practical after the event, and involve as many of the participants as will benefit from it. At lower levels it will normally be conducted informally. In collective training it is often described as an After Action Review (AAR).
8. The methods and media used to carry out training need to be monitored regularly for their effectiveness and efficiency.
9. Training should be a continuous and progressive process and not just part of a formal or organized activity. 'On the job' and continuation training are important, especially of the individual in the workplace, and the coaching of subordinates and teams by their commanders.
10. Units receiving individuals from initial training should recognise that a gap may exist between the level attained in that training and their own operational requirements. This so-called 'training-gap' is an accepted phenomenon in

individual training and is caused by resource constraints and the variation in the roles of units. It should be filled by well-planned continuation training in units.

## THE TRAINING PROCESS

11. The training process normally embraces four distinct and identifiable activities:

- a. The **acquisition** of skills, competence and knowledge.
- b. The **practising** of skills and competence and the exercising of knowledge.
- c. The **testing** of skills, competence and knowledge.
- d. The continuous **review** of training and training methods for their effectiveness, including, where appropriate, the assessment of training against set standards.

Training should be phased to allow these activities to take place sequentially, although there may be some overlap.

## THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO TRAINING

12. Training is driven by the twin needs of:

- a. The task, either generally or specifically.
- b. The individual or group, and the competence or expertise they need to acquire, develop or revise.

The content of the training should be determined by analysis of these two areas of need, a process that has been developed in the Armed Forces, and encapsulated in the Systems Approach to Training (SAT)<sup>1</sup>.

13. SAT represents a systematic and performance-based approach to the development of training which is in use throughout the Army, and which is to be implemented in the design and conduct of all training. It is illustrated in Figure 2 (Page 1-A-4) and explained in greater detail in AFM Vol VI - *Training for Operations*

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1. See: *The Systems Approach to Training - An Introduction* (Army Code 70670).




Figure 2 : The Systems Approach to Training

## CATEGORIES OF MILITARY TRAINING

### TRAINING CATEGORIES

1. In principle, military training can be placed in a number of categories:

- a. **Individual.**
- b. **Team.**
- c. **Collective.**
- d. **Operationally Specific.**
- e. **Command.**

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TRAINING CATEGORIES
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
TEAM TRAINING
COLLECTIVE TRAINING
OPERATIONALLY SPECIFIC TRAINING
COMMAND TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRESSION

2. In practice there is, or should be, considerable overlap, and in some cases integration between categories. Training should be regarded as a cohesive whole. There is, however, a temptation to focus only on one category at a time and to disregard the others. For example, individual and team training aspects are often neglected in collective training, yet they are interdependent. The emphasis may be on a particular category of training, but it should not be to the exclusion of others. Those who plan, supervise and assess training should be aware of this tendency. There is also a danger inherent in adopting too rigid a cyclic approach, and in separating responsibilities for the different categories of training.

### INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

3. The purpose of individual training (including recruit training) is to produce a self-confident and disciplined soldier who is physically fit, well motivated, and equipped with the basic skills and fighting qualities needed to survive on the battlefield and to operate as a member of a team or crew.

4. Individual training has two elements:

- a. Skills training.

- b. More general training that contributes to personal development. This may be more knowledge-based and include education.
5. Skills training may be equipment-related or aimed at personal or physical aptitude. Some skills are considered as core or mandatory, which all should possess. These, and the standards required, are governed by Army Training Directives (ATDs). The number of core skills, and the standards to be achieved in each, should be reviewed regularly.
6. Skills of all kinds deteriorate, especially if not used regularly, the extent of the deterioration depending on the individual and the particular skill. This can usually be overcome by incorporating these skills into other categories of training. The frequency of skills practice in order to sustain acceptable operational standards should be governed by balancing deterioration, operational efficiency, time and cost, rather than by any particular fixed time frame. The annual or bi-annual testing of skills in accordance with ATDs is separate from this process.
7. Individual training of a more general nature is aimed at developing the potential of the individual to fulfill his or her role as a commander or as a soldier in a team or unit. It is a long term investment. Such training may be carried out both on an individual and a group basis, on formal courses or informally, and be voluntary or prescribed. Achievement should be marked by appropriate recognition both within the Army and, where possible externally (through appropriate vocational qualifications).

## **TEAM TRAINING**

8. Team or crew training provides an immediate context for most individual skills training. It is when, for example, the specialist and complementary skills of the individual members of the gun detachment or tank crew are brought together. The output is team skills and proficiency which no individual alone can achieve. The team or crew is the basic unit in all low-level operations. Hence, training at this level should be revisited regularly, and particularly when there has been a change in team composition. It should also feature at the appropriate level on career courses.

## **COLLECTIVE TRAINING**

9. Collective training involves the training of two or more crews or detachments, sub-units, units and formations in the conduct of tactical operations. There is in theory no limit to the size of formation which may engage in collective training.

10. There are 3 types of collective training:

a. **Special to Arm Training.** Special to Arm training is collective training on a single Arm or functional basis. It provides the immediate context for team or crew training.

b. **Combined Arms Training.** Combined Arms training is the collective training of several arms together such as infantry, armour, artillery and aviation. Such training will normally be at sub-unit level and above and involve more than one Arm. It provides the immediate context for Special to Arm collective training.

c. **Joint and Multinational<sup>1</sup> Training.** Joint and multinational training will normally take place at unit level and above, and involve two or more Services or nations.

## **OPERATIONALLY SPECIFIC TRAINING**

11. Since the Army is a capability-based force trained in general war-fighting skills, and one which tends to be expeditionary in nature, there may be a requirement for some additional training for specific operations to reflect the particular circumstances of that deployment. Such training may take place before deployment or once the force has been deployed, or both. It should:

a. Ensure that those being committed to the operation are prepared fully, both mentally and physically, for the conditions which they might encounter.

b. Be completely relevant and reflect the most recent military experience.

12. Operationally specific training often has to encompass the whole range of training categories. Few units are likely to be permanently at an operationally ready state, and most will require reinforcement and training prior to operations. Operationally specific training and training whilst on operations are discussed further in Chapter 4.

## **COMMAND TRAINING**

13. The effective training of commanders and staff is the keystone of operational success and must therefore be given a high priority on a continuous

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1. The term "multinational", rather than "combined", is used in this publication, reflecting its wider nature, usage and application. "Multinational" is also used to avoid confusion with the term "combined arms". For the sake of completeness, the NATO definition of "combined" is retained in the glossary.

basis. The potential to command is innate, but it needs to be developed, and may require specific training if the individual is to perform effectively, especially within the context of the Army's doctrine. That doctrine requires a style of command which promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action, and initiative. Mission command<sup>2</sup> meets this requirement and is thus a central pillar of the Army's doctrine. It is designed to promote a robust system of command to achieve unity of effort at all levels. It requires development of mutual trust and understanding between commanders and subordinates throughout the chain of command, and effective and timely decision-making together with initiative at all levels. The successful employment of mission command rests on its principles being fully understood, fostered and frequently practised in training. The training of commanders at all levels must therefore be matched to the requirements of operations and the philosophy of command. That training should produce ruthless, cunning and innovative commanders who are creative thinkers, able to apply originality and imagination to problem-solving. They must be able to operate successfully within confusion and disorder, have the ability to recognise fleeting opportunities and the initiative and confidence to decide, act and communicate orders quickly in order to help generate and maintain tempo.

14. The attributes required of commanders, and by the command philosophy must be inculcated at the earliest stages of an officer's or a soldier's career. Arms Schools and colleges have an important role in developing these attributes in commanders from the most junior to the most senior during courses and training. The process should be continuous throughout an individual's career, and superiors too must play their part in developing their subordinates' qualities as commanders through training and coaching. Coaching is an informal process requiring particular skills which also have to be developed before most individuals can feel sufficiently confident to enable them to accept fully this further command responsibility.

15. An individual assuming a higher level of command will require development, and possibly refresher or additional training, to enable him to master the specific skills involved. He will also need to acquire an understanding of the nature and demands of command at the next higher level, otherwise he may continue to perform as a commander at the level with which he is familiar and probably most comfortable. It is fundamental to doctrine that officers and non-commissioned officers should be trained to understand the intent of the commander 2 levels higher and to command at least one level higher. Command training should accommodate the full range of requirements, including training for higher levels of command, and joint, theatre, and multinational commands.

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2. Mission Command is explained fully in Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 2 - *Command*.

**“The whole training of an officer seeks to accomplish one purpose - to instil in him the ability to take over a battle in time of crisis”.**

**General Matthew B Ridgway**

16. A key part of command is its moral component, which includes leadership. Every opportunity should be used to enable officers and non-commissioned officers to develop their leadership potential through study and practical activity both military and non-military, such as adventurous training, sport and battlefield tours.

17. Command is often viewed only in individual terms, whereas in reality and particularly in war, effective command is achieved by team effort. The effect of a sound and reliable staff will be to free the commander from detail and enable him to concentrate on decision-making and exercising leadership. Staff training must therefore be considered as inextricably linked with command training. The ability to build the command team and create the right climate are essential ingredients of command. The command team, which may change frequently, requires its own collective training and development if it is to realise its potential. This may be a separate exercise, or incorporated into other training. Technology offers a great deal in support of effective command team training.

18. The role of commanders in planning and directing training is more fully dealt with in Chapter 3.

## **TRAINING PROGRESSION**

19. Training should develop logically from **individual training** through **team training** to progressively more sophisticated and challenging **collective training**. This may be followed by **operationally specific training** prior to or after deployment to an operational theatre. Within each of these categories there will be initial training during which skills are learned, refresher training to maintain troops at a certain level of capability, and continuation training to develop further those skills in which a degree of competence has already been achieved. To achieve a progression in training standards, units and formations should be competent in special to arm skills before combined arms training is undertaken, and competent in single-Service operations before undertaking joint or multinational training.

**EXTRACT FROM**  
**THE TRAINING OF THE ARMY FOR WAR**  
**BY BRIGADIER AP WAVELL CMG MC**  
February 1933

**THE OBJECT OF TRAINING**

Some hold that training is greatly handicapped in that we have no definite war problem in prospect. I do not agree. Questions of organization and equipment are undoubtedly complicated by our having no definite military commitments, or rather so many indefinite commitments; but so far as training is concerned I hold that it is a positive advantage to have to train simply 'for war' and that to train 'for a war' is a danger because that particular war never happens; it certainly did not in 1914 - neither for the French nor for ourselves; and so much of our training since 1914 has been dulled and stultified by training for a war - the late War, which was almost entirely a siege war and the worst of training, for infantry at all events. Let us therefore shake the last of the Flanders mud out of our minds, and concentrate on the essentials of training 'for war', that is for 'any war'.

# CHAPTER TWO

## THE DOCTRINAL INTERFACE

**"In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military. "**

**General Douglas MacArthur**

### **BRITISH MILITARY DOCTRINE**

0201. BMD establishes a framework of understanding of the British Army's approach to warfare in order to provide the foundation for its practical application. Thus, it provides the philosophical framework within which training should be conducted. Military Doctrine is complemented by the Principles of War; broad precepts which influence the conduct of operations, and therefore training for it.

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0202. Training doctrine, along with the doctrine for operations, command and logistics, is subordinate to, and derives its authority from, BMD.

### **MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND TRAINING**

0203. The goal of British security policy is to maintain the freedom and territorial integrity of the United Kingdom and its Dependent Territories, and the ability to pursue its legitimate interests at home and abroad. Key to this is deterrence, which depends not only upon the perception of the nation's political will to respond to a threat, but on other factors, including forces which are perceived to be effective and capable of preventing a potential adversary from achieving his strategic objectives. To be perceived to have a highly trained, well-motivated, and operationally ready Army is an important part of that deterrence.

0204. Training is one of the elements of Fighting Power. It features twice in Figure 1 (Page 1-4), where the **Training Essentials** are shown as an element of the conceptual component of Fighting Power, and **Training and Readiness** within its physical component. Although not shown specifically in Figure 1, training also contributes to the moral component through its role in the development of confidence, motivation and leadership qualities throughout the Army. Training should be conducted in accordance with Military Doctrine and set in a general warfighting context related directly to the task of the formation or unit in order that the Army can practise the application of doctrine and learn from the experience thus gained.

## **DOCTRINE AND ETHOS**

0205. Training in the Army should be based on an underlying ethos<sup>1</sup> that both reflects doctrine and fosters what are sometimes described as the military virtues. These include:

- a. Professional competence.
- b. Initiative and responsiveness.
- c. Self-reliance, self discipline and personal responsibility.
- d. Mental robustness and physical toughness.
- e. The ability to withstand shock and resistance to the unknown, including casualties.
- f. Moral courage, integrity and ethical conduct.
- g. A positive approach to difficulty and a will to win, especially under adverse circumstances.
- h. Commitment; and loyalty to one's beliefs, comrades, the group, the Service and the Nation.
- i. Mutual trust and teamwork.
- j. Leadership by example and through personal and moral authority.

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1. "That spirit which enables soldiers to fight. It relies principally on motivation, which in turn calls for high degrees of commitment, self-sacrifice and mutual trust." ECAB/P(96)2 dated 4 Apr 96.

## MATCHING DOCTRINE

0206. In order to meet the needs of the command philosophy, the exercise of command and the manoeuvrist approach to operations, it is important to focus on the right attitude of mind in commanders, and the establishment of mutual trust and respect. The main tenets of this doctrine are:

- a. The potential nature of future operations and particularly warfighting demands an increasing need to be able to respond rapidly to changing tactical situations. This requires flexibility in both individuals and units and an emphasis on rapid decision making and well-honed procedures, including drills.
- b. An emphasis in training on:
  - (1) Delegated decision-making.
  - (2) Developing a high standard of leadership, and training commanders to think 2 levels above their present level so that they will be able to interpret the overall plan and understand the intentions of the superior commander.
  - (3) Preparing commanders and subordinates for a rapidly changing, often high, tempo of operations.
  - (4) The use of initiative, including calculated risk-taking and the acceptance of uncertainty rather than its avoidance.
  - (5) Adopting a constructive approach to genuine errors without condoning mistakes which could be avoided.
- c. An increasing emphasis on combined arms and joint operations, and with it a need to improve understanding and experience of the combined arms and joint battle, increasingly in a coalition or multi-national context.
- d. The nature of operations demanding that individuals and units are capable of operating over prolonged periods, and that commanders at all levels are thoroughly trained to meet these demands.
- e. Units being prepared to operate not only with other armies but also with non-governmental organisations.

## **GENERATING TEMPO**

0207. To achieve the conditions required for the successful application of the command philosophy, particularly the preparation of individuals and units for the tempo of operations, well-rehearsed battle drills are fundamental. The employment of drills will allow tasks to be performed quickly and with the minimum of communications, following their repeated practice in training. They will assist in building confidence and teamwork and will also help to overcome fear and uncertainty by providing an element of certainty in a procedure with which soldiers and officers are familiar and in which they have confidence. Training in the practice of drills and procedures should be appropriate to the weapon system, sub-unit or formation concerned. It should include those drills associated with the administration of the man and his equipment, both in barracks and in the field.

0208. To gain the benefits which accrue from proficiency in drills, time and resources must be set aside for tasks to be repeated often enough for that proficiency to be developed. The more practices that can be reduced to drills, the quicker those drills can be executed, and the quicker the force can switch from one drill to another. This contributes to the development and maintenance of tempo. However, drills and procedures must be adapted to meet the demands of the situation, and it will be for commanders at all levels to decide how best to apply those drills.

0209. Once proficiency in Special-to-Arm skills is reached, the emphasis on unit and formation level training must turn to the practice of combined arms tactical drills, and the subsequent application of those drills in advanced live-firing exercises or under other demanding conditions which create a friction through which units and commanders must work. To do so successfully will require competence, stamina, endurance and a degree of courage.

## **COPING WITH STRESS AND UNCERTAINTY**

0210. The effects of stress and uncertainty can, to some extent, be overcome by training. Commanders should understand the effects of uncertainty on morale, the planning and decision-making process, and the significance of quick reaction to the unexpected. Commanders should be educated and practised in the making of appropriate and timely decisions based on the best information available at the time (which may be incomplete and less than satisfactory) and, with their staffs, in the development of resulting plans. The greater the proficiency in timely planning, decision-making, and execution, the greater the agility of a force, and hence the tempo of its operations.

0211. Training should be specifically designed to prepare the Army properly for the uncertainty of war, and it is therefore important that unpredictability is a factor in exercises. Commanders must be placed under stress to test their flexibility, and new factors introduced so that plans have to be changed. Commanders must also be faced with a non-compliant enemy and the friction of war so that they have to fight the battle as well as deploy. This can only be fully achieved on a 2-sided exercise in the field, enhanced with simulation to create better training, under conditions which are as realistic as possible in peacetime.

## **LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE**

0212. In peacetime the Army's experience of fighting may be limited. To compensate for this, emphasis should be placed on learning from the experience of others. The study of military history will broaden and deepen understanding of doctrine, and assist the future commander in his study of his potential adversary. BMD recommends 3 general rules for the professional study of military history:

- a. In-depth study to get beneath the historians' necessarily imposed pattern of seeming orderliness and try to understand what war is really like - to get an idea of the confused nature of fighting.
- b. In breadth, so that the development of war over a long period can be understood.
- c. In context, to appreciate the political, social and economic factors that exercise important influences on the military part of the equation.

Military history will not, however, provide universal remedies. It can only offer accounts of problems, particular solutions, and the reasons for historical successes and failures.

0213. In addition to learning from history, experience can be gained from current operational experience, both British and foreign, and a wide variety of training. A Lessons Learned system should provide a means by which observations from After Action Reviews (AARs), Post Exercise Reports (PXR), operational reports and other sources can be collated to establish whether changes may be required in training and doctrine. Such lessons should be disseminated widely and in a timely fashion. On operations there may be an even greater need to learn from experience and implement changes without delay.

## **THE MORAL COMPONENT**

0214. Figure 1 shows that the third component of Fighting Power is the moral component (the ability to get people to fight), which is often described using the term *morale*. It is the most difficult of the components of fighting power to define, but historically it has always been accorded a high value by commanders in their assessments of the relative strengths of opposing forces. High morale will stem from sound training, confidence in equipment, good administration, as well as confidence in commanders, discipline, self-respect and a clear idea of what is happening and what is required. The moral component comprises motivation, leadership and management. All these elements are important in the exercise of the Army's command philosophy, and are discussed below.

0215. Motivation will follow from high morale, but will depend upon a sense of purpose. Well-motivated, well-led soldiers will work as a team, and from that teamwork will develop a spirit of comradeship which will sustain the group. It is the duty of the commanders to instil the sense of purpose and to develop and maintain the high morale which will give an important advantage in operations.

0216. The success of the commander as a leader will depend on his ability to project his personality and character in order to get his subordinates to do what is required of them, often under difficult and dangerous conditions. Skill in the techniques of leadership is the foremost quality in the art of command, and makes an enormous contribution to success on operations. Each commander will find his own way of motivating those under his command and of exercising his own style of leadership. A commander should use every training opportunity, even relatively simple TEWTs and MAPEXs which require little preparation, to familiarise his subordinates with his thought process and style.

0217. Management involves making best use of resources. It is a facet of command, but no substitute for leadership, though good management can have a considerable bearing on morale and military effectiveness. Management skills are essential in the efficient running of organisations and systems.

## **FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING**

0218. An essential part of Force Development is the regular and timely feedback of lessons learned from both training and operations. These should be for general guidance and distributed widely.

0219. Though the link between training and operations is one that is generally understood, the link between training and other activities that support operations is not. Training is often viewed in isolation from such activities as operational analysis, doctrine, equipment procurement, concept development, operational planning and readiness, and testing of plans. These various activities are closely inter-related, each having an interest in both the input and output of the others. They are all component parts, each meriting validation, of the Force Development process shown in Figure 3.

0220. The role of training in the Force Development process is twofold. First, it provides the means by which the Army, in peace, can implement and practise its operational doctrine, inculcating in all officers and soldiers the Army's philosophy of how it will fight. Secondly, it provides, in the absence of operational experience, one way by which the Army can learn lessons about the conduct of operations and the effectiveness of equipment and structures. In conjunction with operational experience, lessons learned from training can be used to influence the development of doctrine, improve training techniques and the design or procurement of equipment.




Figure 3: The Place of Training in the Force Development Process.

## EXTRACT FROM

### ARMY TRAINING MEMORANDUM No 38

February 1941

(Issued to every officer in the Army)

From time to time innumerable 'tasks' are laid at the door of the commanding officer; but at the present time he may take it that he has one paramount task - to foster in the officers and men under his command the development of the offensive spirit in every branch of training. All training must be dynamic, and all activities, administrative and otherwise, directed to this same end - the development of his unit into a formidable **fighting machine**. All other considerations must come within the category of peacetime luxuries. A feeling of personal aggressiveness must be engendered by every means available in all forms of work and training.

This country is at war; the British Army has already seen fighting on three fronts; and easy peace-time standards must be rigorously dismissed for the duration. Peacetime placidity must give way to wartime intensity; and no system of training deserves to be called intensive unless it makes exceptional demands on the mental and physical resilience of staff and troops. Waste of training time is as much a crime against the Army and the country as any other form of sabotage; whereas hard work will bring its own reward with a sense of work well done.

The offensive spirit in a body of troops represents an attitude of mind; its development is a mental rather than a physical process; its manifestation is both moral and physical. In its physical aspect it can make itself apparent as much in defence as in attack; in its moral aspect it can make itself apparent long before actual contact in battle, by establishing over an enemy an unbroken moral ascendancy. Thus a force that displays the offensive spirit is able to maintain over a more numerous enemy a moral if not a tactical initiative.

# CHAPTER THREE

## THE DIRECTION OF ARMY TRAINING

**"Divisional and field force or equivalent commanders will be responsible . . . specifically for the training of their troops for operations. "**

**"A Commanding Officer's most important responsibility is to ensure that the standard of individual and collective training within his unit is such that it is fit to fulfil its operational role efficiently. "**

**Queen's Regulations for the Army, 1975**

### TRAINING STRATEGIES

0301. Strategies are developed to provide longer-term direction for training. They set key objectives, define responsibilities, provide guidance, and allocate priorities.

0302. Training strategies are developed and promulgated by the appropriate staff in the Ministry of Defence. They govern both training generally and different aspects of training:

- a. An Army Training Strategy, providing a cohesive blueprint for training over a 5-15 year period.
- b. An Army Collective Training Strategy, providing a link between roles, readiness and the resources required to deliver an appropriate level of Collective Performance based on the demands of the Army Plan.
- c. An Army Individual Training Strategy, outlining the development of individual training in support of the requirements of the Field Army, and the relationship between individual training and the other elements of the Army Training Strategy.

### CONTENTS

TRAINING STRATEGIES  
TRAINING POLICIES  
TRAINING PLANS AND DIRECTIVES  
TRAINING PROGRAMMES  
CONTROL OF TRAINING  
THE ROLE OF COMMANDERS IN TRAINING  
SUMMARY OF RESPONSIBILITIES

- d. An Army Simulation Strategy, stating the Army's need for simulation and technology to support both individual and collective training and informing the equipment programme.

Strategies may also be produced for other specific subject areas such as Command Training.

## **TRAINING POLICIES**

0303. Policies give direction on how strategies are to be implemented as well as guidance on the meeting of key objectives.

0304. The Adjutant General (AG), as Commander Personnel and Training Command, has overall responsibility<sup>1</sup> for the policy governing the provision of initial individual and crew training for new entrants, and for career, command and Special to Arm or Service courses run by Central and Arm or Service establishments. He is advised where applicable by Arm and Service Directors, and responds to the requirements of Commands (except in the case of training associated with career structures). AG is also responsible for the policy on core skills as identified in ATDs, and individual aspects of joint training.

0305. The Director General of Individual Training (DGIT) is responsible to AG for the management of the Army Individual Training Organisation (AITO) and for meeting the individual training needs of Commands and the Army.

0306. The Commands are responsible for developing and promulgating the policy on collective training within their commands, and for that individual, crew and command training which is conducted in units (less that covered by ATDs). Commands are also responsible for Single Service operational training policy.

0307. Formation commanders may at times determine their own policy on specific training matters provided it is not in conflict with that promulgated at a higher level.

0308. Arms and Service Directors are responsible for setting training policy and determining the training standards for Special-to-Arm training.

## **TRAINING PLANS AND DIRECTIVES**

0309. The Departmental and Army Plans, allocating tasks and resources over a period of years, are produced by the Ministry of Defence for the guidance

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1. Less those elements conducted on a tri-Service basis, but including the TA.

of top level budget holders, and in turn by each major Command. They are normally related to management plans and updated annually.

0310. Training directives should be produced on a periodic basis from Command down to unit (and sometimes sub-unit) level. Training directives provide essential guidance to subordinate commands and are an important means for a commander himself to influence the manner in which training is conducted in his command. The directive should therefore be signed personally by the commander. Training is the direct responsibility of commanders<sup>2</sup>, one that cannot be delegated in principle (as opposed to detail). Formations, units and sub-units should receive one training directive only, from the next higher level of operational command.

0311. Directives must be credible and therefore documents to which (frequent) reference can be made. They should be realistic in terms of objectives, commitments, time and resources. They should be the outcome of discussion with those to whom they are addressed, and the result of detailed analysis by the commander and his staff. They should apply the principles of mission command and avoid prescription of how to train, but rather be confined to the results which are to be achieved. The objectives which they set should be relevant and measurable in order that subsequent reporting can contribute to the measurement of Fighting Power.

0312. Directives should be timely: produced in sufficient time to enable subordinate headquarters to produce theirs in turn. A situation should not arise in which a subordinate headquarters is forced to produce its own directives without proper guidance from above. Directives may and perhaps should be supplemented, but not replaced, by verbal briefings. Though they are written for the benefit and guidance of subordinates, superior commanders need to be kept informed.

## **TRAINING PROGRAMMES**

0313. Those with the direct responsibility for implementing training should produce programmes covering in detail the training that is to take place in a particular period. Training programmes should be properly structured with the various elements sensibly integrated. Unit commanders carry the major burden of organising training, and they should plan well ahead in order to secure resources, or to prepare for the effective use of limited or scarce resources.

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2. *Queens Regulations for the Army 1975*. Chapter 5, Paragraph 5.182.

0314. Training should generally follow a logical sequence, although benefit may be derived on occasion from participation in a particular training event that might be otherwise regarded as being out of phase. Training need not be cyclical, particularly in the Regular Army, except perhaps in terms of advanced collective training when there are only limited opportunities to train. It is often more a matter of sustaining proficiency.

0315. Detailed guidance on the planning and organising of training is contained in AFM Vol VI - *Training for Operations*.

## **CONTROL OF TRAINING**

0316. The control (and coordination) of training is best retained at the highest level commensurate with the detailed allocation of resources and the control of short-term or local commitments. This will be normally at formation level, either division or brigade according to circumstances.

0317. An active policy of coordination ensures that the best use is made of resources, and leads often to more interesting and integrated training as well as fostering inter-unit co-operation.

## **THE ROLE OF COMMANDERS IN TRAINING**

0318. The first principle of training is that it is a function of command. In peacetime, a commander directs, trains and prepares his command. In doing so he should also concern himself with the professional development of individuals, including future commanders, to fit them for positions of increased responsibility. The training of subordinates is a key responsibility of all commanders, and a core function which if neglected, under-resourced, or delegated without close supervision, will undermine the operational effectiveness and fighting power of the Army.

0319. The value of realistic and challenging training in developing and maintaining professional standards cannot be overstated. Commanders at all levels have a responsibility to train their forces and organizations in anticipation of operations. They should train their subordinates in planning and decision-making, and be able to validate that training. Where no clearly defined commitment exists in peacetime, the commander must place his emphasis on maintaining a broad capability of military proficiency applicable to his command, based on the Military Task(s) assigned in the Army Plan. On committal to operations, the commander must identify and prioritize his key training objectives, and be able to implement the appropriate training to ensure that his command is operationally fit for role.

## SUMMARY OF RESPONSIBILITIES

0320. The allocation of responsibilities for the direction of training is summarised in the figure below.

Level	Responsibility
MOD	Doctrine <sup>3</sup> Departmental and Army Plan Strategies <sup>4</sup> : Army Training Strategy Army Collective Training Strategy Army Individual Training Strategy Army Simulation Strategy Others strategies as required
AG	Individual Training Policy Career Training Policy
Arm and Service Directors	Special to Arm/Service Training Policy
Commands	Collective Training Policy Operational Training Policy Annual Training Directives
Formation Commanders	Training Directives
Unit Commanders	Training Directives

Figure 4. Responsibilities for the Direction of Army Training

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3. Including Joint Doctrine.

4. Including Joint Training Strategy.

## TOWARDS BETTER TRAINING

### TRAINING STAFF

1. The first of the principles of training is that it is a function of command, and an indication of the priority accorded to training is the quality of the training staff which a commander assembles. Training staff should be experienced and well qualified for the job, of a quality recognized by their peers, and importantly, proficient in training skills such as communication. To that end, officers particularly should be assessed as trainers in their annual reports.

#### CONTENTS

TRAINING STAFF
TRAINING SPECIALISTS
TRAINING EDUCATION
TRAINER DEVELOPMENT
TRAINING TECHNOLOGY
TRAINING RESOURCES
TRAINING AND NEW EQUIPMENT

### TRAINING SPECIALISTS

2. Training is not a specialist field, though officers and NCOs may become specialists, usually in a particular aspect of training within their own Arm or Service. In addition, Training Development Advisers (TDAs) are available to support mainstream training, and whose expertise in fields such as training-needs analysis, design and validation of training may enhance training considerably. To ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of training within each Arm and Service, Training Development Teams (TDTs) provide advice and consultancy on all aspects of training on behalf of the Director.

### TRAINING EDUCATION

3. Officers and non-commissioned officers need to appreciate fully the importance of training and to improve their performance as trainers through a proper understanding of the principles and process of training. Training should be included as a subject for study in its own right on career courses. It should also be studied from an educational perspective on courses dedicated to developing training staffs.

## **TRAINER DEVELOPMENT**

4. The aim should be to seek continuously to improve the standard of training preparation and delivery amongst all officers and non-commissioned officers. Maximum use should be made of courses dedicated to this end.
5. The importance of coaching of subordinates was stressed earlier. Coaching demands particular skills for which formal training is often required. This training should form a normal part of career and professional courses.

## **TRAINING TECHNOLOGY**

6. Training technology encompasses two main areas, those of simulation and computer-based training. Both rely heavily upon technology to replicate various elements of the training process. They should not, however, be seen as an end in themselves, but should be utilised to meet particular training needs.
7. Simulation has the potential to replace some existing training media, improve the value, quality and realism of training, and increase throughput. Additionally, activities may be undertaken within a simulation which could not otherwise occur because of safety or environmental considerations. Thus, its potential should be viewed positively, and new capabilities welcomed. However, simulation has inherent limitations, which mean that a proportion of training still requires to be carried out in the field and with live ammunition. A balance has to be struck between live training and simulation which takes advantage of the best that each has to offer.
8. In order that simulation can play its full part in the training cycle it should be integrated into the overall training regime so that it can be utilised at the appropriate time and level of training. Thus, the use of simulators at the individual and team level should flow seamlessly into collective training, and be used in conjunction with other training media.
9. Simulation offers a means of offsetting environmental and budgetary pressures as equipments become more complex and the Army more mobile. That trend is likely to continue, but the emphasis should be on incorporating simulation into new equipments at the design stage, and the use of simulation software within operational systems.
10. Computer based training (CBT), and computer based learning (CBL) systems both have the potential to deliver standardised training and testing throughout the Army. Those under training can, as a result, modify their learning to meet their individual needs, thereby making for more efficient training. CBT

multi-media systems can contribute greatly to the dissemination of material such as doctrine and field manuals. However, as with simulation, CBT and CBL must be properly integrated into the overall training process so that they enhance it.

11. Importantly, training technology should enable the ready transfer of skills, and not introduce any element of negative training. It should mirror as closely as possible the operational systems and environments.

## **TRAINING RESOURCES**

12. Despite the increasing use of simulation and the introduction of other cost-saving and efficiency measures, training will usually be subject to financial pressure. This has a number of implications which emphasise points made earlier:

- a. Training must be well planned and focused, and executed as efficiently as possible. The emphasis should be on measurement of output and assessment of performance.
- b. Training must be relevant to needs.
- c. Combined Arms training will be allocated increasingly on a basis of priorities, with opportunities for advanced collective training becoming less frequent.
- d. Training resources should be controlled at the highest practicable level.

## **TRAINING AND NEW EQUIPMENT**

13. Any major equipment introduced into service should be accompanied by a package of training for that equipment. Failure to address training issues early in the procurement cycle may result in inadequate training packages, a consequent reduction in operational effectiveness and potentially expensive rectification. The planning of that training should run parallel to, and be integrated with, the introduction into field service of that equipment.

# CHAPTER FOUR

## OPERATIONAL FOCUS

### THE DEFENCE ENVIRONMENT

0401. The circumstances for and in which the Army has to train have changed markedly in recent years:

- a. There is a greater range of deployment and operational possibilities, and these have become, increasingly, of an expeditionary nature. There are 7 mission types covering the possible employment options for British Forces, as identified in BMD and shown below.

#### CONTENTS

THE DEFENCE ENVIRONMENT

TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

READINESS

PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

TRAINING ON OPERATIONS

#### Seven Mission Types for British Forces

- Security of the UK, and Military Aid to the Civil Power in the United Kingdom.
- A challenge to the internal or external security of a Dependent Territory.
- A limited regional conflict involving a NATO Ally who calls for assistance under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
- A serious conflict (but not an attack on NATO or one of its members) which, if unchecked, could adversely affect European security, or pose a serious threat to British interests elsewhere, or to international security.
- A British contribution to the missions of NATO and the WEU.
- Other military assistance and limited operations, characteristically of lower intensity and longer duration, to support both British interests and international order and humanitarian principles, the latter most likely under United Nations auspices.
- General War - a large scale attack against NATO.

- b. There is an increased likelihood of deploying and operating as part of a joint and/or multinational force.
- c. Battlefield systems have become more complex and more dependent on extensive and sophisticated maintenance and logistic support.
- d. Operations, deployments, and increasingly training, are subject to political and media scrutiny for their efficiency, effectiveness and risk (not least in human terms).
- e. There is a likelihood of deployments at short notice. This has implications for the standards of training required of those forces at a high state of readiness.
- f. There may be a need to deploy composite units, with consequent training implications.
- g. Environmental pressures restrict live training.
- h. New technology, including simulation, enables some training to be carried out far more realistically and cost-effectively than in the past.
- i. Health and Safety legislation, and the duty of care which each commander has to his subordinates, have assumed greater prominence.

## **TRAINING AND OPERATIONS**

**"The best form of welfare for troops is first class training. "**

**Field Marshal Rommel**

0402. As illustrated in the preceding paragraph the Army is faced with a number of tasks, some of which overlap but most of which demand differing responses. Given that the Army is a capability-based force with a wide spectrum of potential commitments it is not possible, other than in general terms, to earmark forces for specific tasks. This places greater demands on training than hitherto, especially if the Army is to be able to deploy forces speedily in a given situation for both political and military reasons. In view of this:

- a. Training should be for war, not for a particular war, avoiding the tendency to focus training on the most recent experience or operations, or on a particular level of conflict.
- b. Training must be based on achieving a high standard of individual, team and collective skills. These are the building blocks on which operational success should be achieved.
- c. Individuals, units and formations should be trained for, and capable of adapting rapidly to, a variety of tasks.
- d. There may be a requirement for an operationally specific training package prior to and/or following deployment to a theatre of operations. Contingency planning for such situations should take account of this, and, where appropriate, such plans should contain a training element.

0403. The skills of warfighting can be adapted to operations other than war; the reverse is not true.

## **READINESS**

0404. Readiness is usually considered in terms of the time by which a unit or formation is expected to be **Ready to Deploy (RTD)** for operations. A unit is considered **Ready** for operations when it is prepared for its operational tasks, having the stipulated personnel, training, sustainment, equipment and support. A high readiness state might affect a unit or formation's ability to train if maintained for a prolonged period. Restrictions on equipment availability and the ability to deploy on training can result in collective and individual skill fade.

0405. The level of training which a unit or formation has achieved is a key factor to be considered when planning a deployment. For that reason a number of collective performance levels have been defined. Each level is determined in broad terms (not least because in a capability-based Army training has to be for war generally rather than for a particular war) and can be linked to readiness. Units which may have to deploy on operations at short notice, and which are required to maintain a high state of readiness and training, should be provided with the opportunities to train and the resources to do so.

0406. The collective performance that units and formations are to achieve should be defined by the chain of command and assessed during training to give an indication of their readiness for operations. The conduct of that assessment should be as objective and accurate as possible in order that it can make the

fullest contribution to the measurement by the chain of command of the unit's fighting power.

0407. In view of the fact that we train for war rather than for a particular war, it will not be possible to train to cover every eventuality. However, the Formation Training Plot (FTP)<sup>1</sup> will endeavour to prepare nominated formations and units to the highest generic level possible in order to ensure that force elements are close to their peak and in need of only limited operationally specific training prior to undertaking operations. This will minimise the risks associated with short-notice deployments. Some tasks may not demand the highest levels of training across the full spectrum of roles.

## **PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING**

0408. Specific operations or deployments may demand special training and theatre orientation if those involved are to carry out their tasks effectively. This may be the case even for those units at an advanced level of training. Moreover, even forces previously earmarked for operations cannot be maintained indefinitely at a peak of training and therefore operational readiness for long periods, and may require some 'top up' training before deployment.

0409. There may also be a need for commanders to prepare both individuals and units to make the transition mentally, as well as operationally, from the conditions which they have become used to in peacetime training to those likely to be encountered in combat.

### **THE GULF WAR (1991) - THE TRAINING NEED**

**Research has shown that few commanders deploying to the Gulf considered their units to be battle ready, including those at the peak of their training cycle, not least because reinforcements had to be absorbed and trained, equipment modified etc. All units underwent intensive battle training in theatre with the result that all went into battle at a high state of operational preparedness.**

**Study into Training and Preparation for Operation GRANBY**

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1. The FTP is a mechanism for separating operational and training commitments in order to ensure that units and formations are guaranteed training time to prepare for their commitments.

## **TRAINING ON OPERATIONS**

0410. Training does not cease once deployments or operations have begun. Individual, crew and collective skills are subject to deterioration, and operational practices have to be refined and rehearsed. Training on operations should always seek to remedy shortcomings and improve performance. On certain peace support operations, openly conducted training may well form part of the operational mission itself, as it can impress and deter potential belligerents.

### **THE 8th ARMY'S TRAINING**

**One of Montgomery's first actions on taking over command of the 8th Army in the late summer of 1942 was to issue a training memorandum to his corps commanders. He stressed that:**

**“ . . . . it is necessary for all commanders to clearly understand the requirements of the battle; then organize our training accordingly. ”**

**He then laid down his views of the requirements and who was responsible for the training - commanders. Even units in contact were expected to train.**

**“The important point is that every commander should realize the need for training. ”**

**8th Army Training Memorandum No 1, 1942**

## ENDPIECE

**“It is immensely important that no soldier, whatever his rank, should wait for war to expose himself to those aspects of active service that amaze and confuse him when he first comes across them. If he has met them even once before they will begin to be familiar to him. This is true even of physical effort. Exertions must be practised, and the mind must be made even more familiar with them than the body”.**

**Carl von Clausewitz**

**"On War"**

# GLOSSARY

## **After Action Review**

An interactive coaching session using objective evidence where possible to provide feedback to participants on their individual, team and collective performance. (Provisional)

## **Army Collective Training Objective (ACTO)**

An Army Collective Training Objective defines those components of land operations required to undertake a specified Military Task. Each objective comprises a number of related Collective Training Tasks. (Provisional)

## **Assessment**

A judgement based on a comparison of measured performance against a standard.

## **Battle Drills**

Standard methods of executing specific tactical operations. (SOHB 1996)

## **Collective Performance**

An element of Fighting Power: the ability of units or formations to function as cohesive entities and so perform collective tasks to specific standards.

## **Collective Training**

Collective training involves the training of two or more crews or detachments, sub-units, units and formations in the conduct of tactical operations.

## **Collective Training Standard**

A precise statement written in terms of Performance, Conditions and Standards which describes a collective performance carried out by any size of force element in the conduct of tactical operations.

## **Combat Power**

The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. (AAP- 6)

## **Combined**

Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all services or allies are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified; e.g. Combined Navies.). See also Joint. (AAP- 6). (See also Multinational Operation. Preferred term to avoid confusion with Combined Arms.)

## **Combined Arms**

The application of several arms such as infantry, armour, artillery and aviation. (ADP 2)

## **Command Evaluation**

The subjective judgement by a commander of the performance of a subordinate unit or formation. It may be based on objective information from training assessment. (Provisional)

## **Command Philosophy**

The Army's command philosophy provides the basis for the exercise of command: timely decision-making; the importance of understanding the superior commander's intent; and a clear responsibility to fulfil that intent (based upon a common doctrine, mutual trust between commanders, obedience to orders, and initiative to act within any freedom of action granted). (BMD 1996). Mission Command (q.v.) forms the foundation of this philosophy.

## **Command Training**

The training of commanders at all levels, to include, where appropriate, the staff and other elements of the command team.

## **Computer Based Training (CBT)**

Any application in which a computer is used as an interactive training medium. Also Computer Assisted Learning (CAL).

## **Deterrence**

The aim of deterrence is to preserve peace by facing a potential aggressor with a clear risk that the cost of aggression would outweigh any conceivable gain; and that the use of force is hence no longer a rational option. (BMD 1996)

## **Directive**

A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered.  
(AAP-6).

## **Doctrine**

Military doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success. (BMD 1996).

## **Education**

Education is concerned with providing knowledge, understanding and a structure within which the thought processes for problem solving are developed. Education is about the formation of attitude and the development of intellect.

## **Education in Support of Training**

Education which provides the enabling skills which are essential to effective training and enhance the trainee's ability to absorb information.

## **Ethos**

That spirit which enables soldiers to fight. It relies principally on motivation, which in turn calls for high degrees of commitment, self-sacrifice and mutual trust. (ECAB/P (96/2) dated 4 Apr 96)

## **Evaluation**

A value judgement in which statistical and/or factual data plays a part. (See also Command Evaluation).

## **Fighting Power**

An Army's ability to fight: a combination of 3 inter-related components: Conceptual (the thought process); Physical (the means to fight); and Moral (the ability to get people to fight). (BMD 1996)

## **Friction**

The force that resists all action and which makes the simple difficult and the difficult impossible (ADP 1).

## **Individual Training**

Training to enable an individual to perform his or her job.

## **Joint**

Connotes activities, operations, organisations etc., in which elements of more than one Service of the Armed Forces of the same nation participate. (When all Services are not involved, the participating Services shall be identified, e.g, Joint Army-Navy). See also Combined. (AAP - 6)

## **Manoeuvrist Approach**

An approach to operations in which shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. (BMD 1996)

## **Manoeuvre**

To manoeuvre is to seek to get into a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied. Such manoeuvre should be directed towards a decisive point or directly at the centre of gravity. (ADP 2)

## **Manoeuvre Warfare**

Manoeuvre Warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering his morale and physical cohesion - his ability to fight as an effective, co-ordinated whole - rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition. (ADP 2)

## **Military Effectiveness**

Military Effectiveness is the standard by which the Army is judged in peace and war. (BMD)

## **Mission Command**

Mission Command is designed to achieve unity of effort at all levels; it is dependant on centralisation. It requires the development of trust and mutual understanding between commanders and subordinates throughout the chain of command, and timely and effective decision-making together with initiative (a quality of a commander) at all levels, the keys to “getting inside” the enemy’s decision-making action cycle. (ADP 2)

## **Multinational Operation**

An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. (ADP 1).

## **Operation**

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence, and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (AAP - 6)

## **Operational Analysis (OA)**

The scientific and systematic analysis of operations for the purpose of studying force structures, equipment, tactics, operational concepts, training etc.

## **Operational Command**

The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to re-assign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander. (ATP - 35(A))

## **Operational Readiness**

The capability of a unit/formation, ship, weapon system or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organised or designed. May be used in a general sense or to express a level or degree of readiness. (AAP - 6)

## **Operational Training**

Training that develops, maintains or improves the operational readiness of individuals or units. (AAP- 6).

## **Operationally Specific Training**

Training provided to develop, maintain or improve the preparedness of individuals or units to conduct specific operations or deployments. (Provisional )

## **Operations Other Than War**

Operations Other Than War (OOTW) are those military operations which are conducted in situations of conflict other than war. Such operations, in which military activities are throughout likely to be firmly subordinated to the political, will be designed to prevent conflict, restore peace by resolving or terminating conflict before escalation into war, or assist with the rebuilding of peace after conflict or war. (ADP 2)

## **Readiness**

The time within which a unit can be made ready at the appropriate location - its normal peacetime base. (DMO)

## **Ready**

A formation or unit is 'Ready' when it is prepared for its operational tasks at war establishments of personnel and equipment, trained for those tasks and supported by appropriate stocks. (DMO)

## **Ready to Deploy (RTD)**

A formation or unit is RTD when it is able to deploy from its normal peacetime location,, prepared for its operational tasks, having the stipulated personnel, training, sustainment, equipment and support. (DMO)

## **Refresher Training**

That training required to maintain troops at a certain level of capability over a period of time.

## **Simulation**

A means of representing dynamically the operating conditions of a real system. Simulation used in training dynamically models real environments and/or equipments to enable trainees to acquire and practice skills, knowledge and attitudes.

## **Special to Arm Training**

Training conducted on a single Arm or functional basis.

## **Systems Approach to Training (SAT)**

A logical system for identifying and meeting the Army's training requirements in an efficient, effective and economical manner.

## **Team Training**

Training carried out by the crew of a vehicle, weapons system or other equipment in which each individual carries out different but complementary tasks, the result being proficiency in skills by the group. (Provisional)

## **Training**

Activity that aims to impart specific skills or knowledge and/or inculcate appropriate attitudes. (AAP - 6). See Paragraph 0105. This is expanded as follows: "The ultimate objective of all training is to ensure military success. Training provides the means to practise, develop and validate, within constraints, the practical application of a common doctrine."

## **Training Gap**

The difference in performance measured in conditions and standards between what can be achieved in training and what is required on the job.

## **Training Levels**

Standards of training used to define overall levels of collective performance. (Provisional)

## **Training-Needs Analysis**

A process of identifying training needs and the options to address those needs.

## **Training Simulator**

A dedicated training device which provides the trainee(s) with a representation of relevant aspects of the real situation and allows him/them to interact with, and control elements of that representation in the course of pursuing training objectives. (Provisional)

## **Validation**

The collection and processing of information regarding the effectiveness of training so that appropriate corrective action may be taken.